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LIBRARY 


TORONTO 


Shelf  No. 


Register  No.     \  t 


;    1907 


V 


THE 


ARGUMENT,  A   PRIORI, 


FOR    THE 


BEING   AND   THE   ATTRIBUTES. 


IcUprint  of  tijc  Sixti)  or  ^cists' 


piSTCi!  ds  A/og  Tasai  /AIV  ayuiat 
6'  dnQgui'-ruv  aycjgal,  /i£<rrj5 
Ka/  XVASKST  crccn-))  ^£  A/oj 
ToD  ya^>  xa/  yscoj  iffj&iv. 


Aratus. 


TRANSLATION. 

Him  we  men  never  pass  over 

Unmentioned.     All  streets  are  full  of  God, 

And  all  meeting-places  of  men  ;  the  sea  is  also  full, 

And  harljours  too  ;  and  in  all  places  we  all  yearn  for  God, 

For  His  offspring  also  are  we. 


THE    LATE   MR.  HONYMAN    GILLESPIE. 


THE 

NT.    A     PRI01 

KOR  THR 

Bl'INO   AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES 

OF 

THE  LORD  GOD, 

THE 

ABSOLUTE   ONE,  AND    FIRST   CAUSE. 


WIT. LI  AM    HOXYMAN    GILLESPIE, 

OF   TOIiMANKllIU,  ; 
K.R.O.S.   ;    K.7..S.  ',    K.G.S.I..  ;    ETC..  KTi\ 

AUTDi 
"THE    NECESSARY    EX1STKXCK    OF    O-iD," 

ETC.,   KTC. 


x      or 

With  a  Prrj'arc  j^.-j-imi  on  Behalf  uf  :• 

»./  Tort>antl<;n, 

liv  JAMKS    l.rf:QTTHA.RT,   F.S.A     > 


E  n  i  N  B  u  R  a  ii : 

REISSUED    KOR   THK   TIIUSTKKS   OF    .MKS     Ho.VVMAN    Oli. 

BY 

T.   k  T.   CLARK,    3s  HK..K..K  STHKKT. 
1900. 


THE 

ARGUMENT,  A   PRIORI, 

FOR   THE 

BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES 

OF 

THE  LORD  GOD, 

THE 

ABSOLUTE   ONE,  AND   FIRST   CAUSE. 


BY 

WILLIAM   HOXYMAN   GILLESPIE, 

OF   TORBAXEHILL ; 
F.R.G.S.  ;  F.Z.S.  ;  F.G.S.L.  ;  ETC.,  ETC. 

AUTHOR    OF 

"THE    NECESSARY    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD," 

ETC.,   ETC. 


<Sixth  or  Theists'  (BMtion, 

With  a  Preface  prepared  on  Mialf  of  the  Trustees  of  Mrs.  Hontiman  Gillespie 
of  Torbime/nll, 

l!v  JAMES   URQUHART,   F.S.A.  (Scox.). 


EDINBURGH: 

REISSUED   FOR   THE   TRUSTEES   OF   MRS.   HONVMAN  GILLESPIE 

BY 

T.   &  T.   CLARK,   38  GEORGE  STREET. 
1906. 


—  O    0F.O2!    n    TO/rVa;    rnv   xrJa/JMv    y.a!   Tai-ra    rd    sv    crjrw,    o-Jroj 
cisai-oS    xai   yr^    Kveio;    i/--de%(*jv,   o\tx   sv   ;/£/sMro/r7Vo;£    vao/j    xaroixii', 
oufe    I/TO   ynouv    dvdettiTUV   OzeaKiiizru.!    ffgofffaoftfvos    rivo:,  a'jroc 
vast    ^urtv    xai   TVOJJV    xai   ra    TacT-a'   g-To/Jjfff    n    ££   EI/OJ   a/'/iaro 
i'TbH,    xaroixsTv   SKI   KO.V    TO    T^&Vwcoi/    TTJJ    y^g,    oe/'tfaj 
;    xaiodit;    xai    rd;   (>?ot)saiac    rr^    xaro/x/'aj    avruv 
TON    0EON,   £/   a^ay=    -v]/7i>.af  qffnav  O.-JTOV    xai   tvgoitv,    xalroiys    OT 
MAKPAN     AIIO    EN02   EKA2TOT   HMHN    THAPXONTA.      EN 
ATTI1    PAP   XHMKN    KAI    KINOTME0A    KAI    E2MEN-    wg   xa/ 
T/I/EJ  rww  xa()'  0/xag  cro/^rwi'  j/gjjxaff/* 

ToD  yae  xa/  ysvof  ffffjbiv. 

Two;  o\/v  -j-TdgyMTSS  TOT  0EOT,  oix  Otpt 
7)  a«yu*w  »j  X/tfw,  ^agay/tar/  rs^v/jc  xa/ 
TO  0EION  f/rva<  o,ao/of.  —  ST.  PAUL. 


TRANSLATION. 

—  The  God  who  made  the  earth  and  all  things  that  are  in  it,  —  He,  being 
Lord  of  heaven  and  earth,  dwelleth  not  in  temples  made  with  hands, 
neither  is  He  served  \ty  the  hands  of  men,  [as  if]  needing  anything,  — 
Himself  giving  to  all,  life,  and  breath,  and  all  things  ;  and  He  made  of  one 
[blood]  every  nation  of  men,  to  dwell  upon  all  the  face  of  the  earth,  having 
determined  [their]  appointed  times,  and  the  bounds  of  their  habitation  ; 
that  they  should  seek  God,  if  haply  they  might  feel  after  Him,  and  find 
[Him],  though  He  is  not  far  from  each  one  of  us,  —  for  in  Him  we  live,  and 
move  and  have  our  being  —  as  even  some  of  your  own  poets  have  said, 
"  For  His  offspring  also  are  we." 

Being,  then,  the  offspring  of  God,  we  ought  not  to  think  that  the  God 
head  is  like  unto  gold,  or  silver,  or  stone,  in  graven  form  [the  outcome]  of 
art  and  device  of  man. 


CONTENTS. 


PREFACE  ON  BEHALF  OF  THE  TRUSTEES  OF  MRS.  HONYMAN 

GILLESPIE.     ......          Page  vii 

SYNOPSIS  OF  THE  ARGUMENT.    .....    xxv 

THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI.        .  1 

DIVISION    1. 

THE  BEING,  AND  THE  NATURAL  MODES.          .  .  .1 

DIVISION    II. 
THE  INTELLECTUAL  ATTRIBUTES.  .  4G 

DIVISION    III. 

THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES.           .  .  56 

SUB-DIVISION  I. — The  Transitional  Attributes.  .             .  f>6 

SUB-DIVISION  II. — The  Relative  Attributes.  .              .  63 

DIVISION    IV. 
THE  COMPLEX  OR  COMPOUND  ATTRIBUTES.       .  .173 

DIVISION    V. 
THE  TRANSCENDENT  EXCELLENCIES.      .  .  .     223 

THE  GENERAL  SCHOLIUM.  .     247 

APPENDIX. 
PREFACE  TO  SIXTH  EDITION.      ...  .     263 

PREFACE  TO  FIFTH  EDITION.  284 


PREFATORY    OBSERVATIONS 

WITH    A 

BRIEF  SKETCH  OF  THE  LIFE  AND  WORKS 
OF  THE  AUTHOR. 


MRS.  HONYMAN  GILLESPIE,  who  died  iii  1886, 
by  her  Trust-Disposition  and  Settlement  directed 
her  Trustees,  as  soon  as  conveniently  might  be 
after  fulfilling  certain  purposes  of  the  Trust  (which 
included  munificent  benefactions,  a  continuance 
of  like  generous  acts  in  her  lifetime),  to  apply  a 
specific  sum,  which  formed  a  considerable  part  of 
her  estate,  for  the  purpose  generally  of  extending 
the  circulation  of  the  Works  of  the  Author,  her 
late  husband,  "  so  as  to  keep  his  memory  and 
teaching  alive." 

The  Trustees,  at  a  meeting  in  December,  1905, 
decided  that  the  time  had  arrived  when  this  pro 
vision  could  be  proceeded  with,  and  resolved  to 
commence  carrying  it  into  execution  by  at  once 
reprinting  "  The  Argument,  a  priori,  for  the 
Being  and  the  Attributes "  (Theists'  Edition), 


Vll 


viii        PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 


Mr.  Gillespic's  latest  and  most  important 
work,  leaving  the  others  to  be  taken  up  at  such 
time  and  in  such  order  and  form  as  the  Trustees 
shall  deem  advisable. 

Besides  stating  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  fresh  issue  is  placed  before  a  thoughtful  public, 
the  Trustees  requested  one  of  their  number  to 
prepare  a  suitable  Preface. 

In  accepting  the  responsibility,  the  writer  has 
kept  before  him  the  fact  that  his  work  is  not  to 
enter  into  episodes  of  Mr.  Gillespie's  family  history, 
details  of  his  habits,  his  domestic  life  or  his  friend 
ships,  or  to  give  an  Appreciation  of  his  life  ;  but 
to  endeavour  to  convey,  as  accurately  as  may  be, 
an  impression  of  his  character  as  received,  partly 
through  reading  his  written  statements,  partly  by 
considering  his  known  actions,  and  partly  from 
opinions  expressed  by  those  still  alive  who  knew 
him  personally.  Neither  is  it  the  writer's  pro 
vince  to  enter  into  the  merits  of  Mr.  Gillespie's 
various  books,  but  to  make  such  references  to 
them  as  will  indicate  his  teaching.  An  effort 
has  been  made  to  obtain  from  likely  sources  all 
information  that  would  help  in  preparing  this 
Monograph. 

To  the  attentive  reader  of  any  important  book, 
the  motive  which  called  it  forth,  the  circumstances 
under  which  it  was  written,  and  the  character  and 
environment  of  the  author  are  always  of  interest. 


SKKTCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.       ix 

The  universal  testimony  to  the  great,  almost 
unique,  value  of  "The  Argument,  a  priori" 
justifies  the  belief  that  any  such  information 
regarding  Mr.  Gillespie's  Life  and  Works  will  be 
welcome. 

William  Gillespie  (afterwards  named  William 
Honymau  Gillespie)  was  born  at  Glasgow  in  1808. 
His  father  was  Richard  Gillespie,  of  South  Wood- 
side,  Renfrewshire,  a  descendant  of  the  Gillespies  of 
Ballemore  in  Cowal,  Argyllshire.  On  both  sides  of 
the  house  Mr.  Gillespie  traced  his  lineage  from  the 
Scottish  nobility,  and  on  one  with  a  temperament 
like  his,  this  fact  would  probably  have  influence, 
inspiring  him  with  lofty  aspirations,  and  strengthen 
ing  him  in  habits  of  self-respect  and  high  moral 
rectitude. 

Educated  at  the  High  School  and  University  of 
Glasgow,  he  afterwards  followed  the  profession  of 
the  law.  At  the  University,  where  he  matriculated 
in  1826,  his  mind  showed  a  bias  towards  Logic  and 
Natural  Philosophy,  and  in  the  former  subject  he 
became  a  prizeman.  The  then  Lord  Rector  was 
the  distinguished  Lord  Brougham,  and  in  after 
years  they  were  on  terms  of  scholarly  friendship.  In 
memory  of  her  husband  Mrs.  Gillespie  in  1876 
endowed  a  Lectureship  in  Geology  in  Glasgow 
University,  to  be  called  the  Honyman  Gillespie 
Lectureship. 

Great  results  often  spring  from  small  beginnings. 


x  PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

Naturally  reverential,  Mr.  Gillespie  accepted  theo 
logical  doctrines  without  much  inquiry,  until  one 
day,  in  his  twenty-first  year,  when  passing  along 
the  streets  of  Glasgow,  he  was  attracted  by  a  book 
seller's  shop- window  wherein  a  superior  edition  of 
Hume's  philosophical  works  was  exposed  for  sale. 
A  ready  purchaser,  he  soon  became  a  constant 
reader  of  the  Dialogues.  They  awakened  his  mind, 
but  only  to  a  perturbed  condition,  and  aroused  a 
spirit  of  inquiry.  Becoming  possessed  shortly 
afterwards  of  a  copy  of  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke's 
Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of 
God,  his  mind,  through  its  perusal,  soared  to 
lofty  conceptions.  The  study  of  these  two 
authors  was  the  turning-point  in  his  life.  He 
was  convinced  of  the  existence  of  God ;  but, 
not  satisfied  with  Clarke's  argument,  he  began  a 
scientific  process  of  independent  inquiry.  It 
seemed  to  him  that  the  argument  a  posteriori  was 
defective,  and  that  what  had  been  written  from  the 
a  priori  position  was  unsatisfactory.  He  gradually 
concentrated  his  attention  on  what  he  believed  to 
be  the  best  methods  of  proof.  Finally  adopting  a 
method  never  before  attempted,  he  started  from  the 
propositions,  acknowledged  by  Atheists  and  Theists 
alike,  that  there  is  Infinity  of  Extension  and  Infinity 
of  Duration. 

Generally,  his  investigation  proceeded  on  an  ex 
amination  of  the  a  posteriori  arguments,  an  inquiry 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.       xi 

into  the  a  priori  arguments  as  demonstrated  up 
to  that  time,  a  conviction  that  the  a  priori  method 
should  be  based  on  intuition  and  not  obtained 
through  the  senses,  and  a  series  of  propositions 
that  God  exists  and  is  knowable.  Encouraged  at 
college  by  the  success  of  a  Thesis  on  these  lines 
which  drew  from  his  Professor  much  praise,  he 
took  pride  in  his  effort,  and  cherished  it.  After 
his  demonstration  of  the  character  of  God,  he 
discovered  that  his  delineation  was  in  accordance 
with  the  Divine  Revelation  made  to  the  inspired 
Prophets  of  old. 

Joining  the  lending  debating  societies  of  the  day, 

O  *-3 

Mr.  Gillespie  devoted  himself  to  contributing  papers 
on  theological  discussions,  particularly  in  regard  to 
questions  of  infidelity.  He  soon  was  recognised 
as  an  enthusiastic  controversialist  of  the  first  rank, 
and  easily  took  his  place  in  public  as  an  accredited 
opponent  of  Atheism.  His  hands  became  full,  for 
he  had  many  opponents,  infidel  notions  being 
popular  and  rampant  at  the  time. 

At  an  early  date  he  began  to  recognise  that  the 
work  of  his  life  was  to  present  an  unassailable 
argument  that  God  is.  He  was  convinced  that  the 
weakness  of  the  position  of  the  Theists  was  that, 
up  to  that  time,  they  had  not  proved  their  case 
by  an  accurate  demonstration. 

In  later  years  he  frankly  gives  his  reasons  for  so 
dedicating  his  life,  when  he  refers  to  "  his  duty  in 


Xll 


PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 


reference  to  the  Master's  work  to  be  done  in  the 
world  at  this  present  time,"  adding  "  Let  no  man, 
therefore,  suppose  that  the  Editor  embarked  in  his 
undertaking  hoping  for  the  thanks  of  the  wise  in 
science  or  the  mighty  in  divinity.  He  works  with 
other  sort  of  reward  in  view  than  is  obtainable 
from  the  savants  of  either  kind.  And,  if  the 
Absolute  Disposer  of  all  events  shall  continue, 
through  the  medium  of  the  same  human  instru- 

o 

mentality,  to  awaken  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
better  light  from  Heaven,  now  one  here,  now  one 
there — each  one  of  whom,  with  his  big  brain,  is 
sure  to  become  a  centre  of  ideas  in  this  huge,  living 
panorama — the  worker  has  the  reward  he  coveted." 
His  great  book  assumed  its  present  shape  by  a 
process  of  evolution,  although  the  full  idea  was  long 
in  the  author's  mind.  As  each  division  appeared, 
he  awaited  its  criticism,  continued  to  test  the 
strength  of  his  efforts,  compared  its  value  with  that 
of  others  on  the  same  and  kindred  subjects,  recon 
sidered,  readjusted,  and  built  upon  it,  until,  in 
majestic  grandeur  and  solemnity,  there  developed, 
after  years  of  thought,  reason,  and  patient  applica 
tion,  his  ideal  of  the  finished  Argument,  a  priori, 
which  he  claimed  to  be  the  end  of  the  Theistic 
controversy.  The  first  part  appears  to  have  been 
presented  to  the  public  in  1833.  It  relates  to  (1) 
the  Being  and  the  Natural  Modes,  and  (2)  to  the 
Intellectual  Attributes,  and  forms  the  groundwork 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.      xiii 

on  which  the  rest  is  based.  A  learned  critic  de 
scribed  the  treatise  as  "  The  hardest,  closest,  most 
irrefragable  argument  we  have  seen  for  many  a  day, 
and,  so  far  as  we  have  discovered,  without  a  single 
weak  point."  After  its  trial  (during  which  a  Defence 
was  published  in  1840),  at  protracted  intervals, 
and  amid  much  anxiety,  further  parts  were  issued  : 
the  Propositions  relating  to  the  Happiness  and  the 
Goodness  or  the  transitional  Moral  Attributes  in 
1843;  the  relative  Moral  Attributes  in  1865, 
described  in  "Laws  of  Thought,"  1868,  as  "A 
course  of  severe  reasoning  as  strict,  indeed,  as 
that  of  Euclid  "  ;  and  the  Complex  or  Compound 
Moral  Attributes  in  1870.  These  were  all  published 
together  in  that  same  year  as  the  fifth  edition,  and 
have  been  described  as  the  book  suited  to  meet  the 
arguments  of  Atheists.  Thereafter  he  proceeded  to 
work  out  to  completion  his  great  plan,  by  writing 
the  Transcendent  Excellencies,  which,  added  to  the 
fifth  volume,  was  published  in  1872  as  the  Sixth 
Edition,  or  Theists'  Edition.  The  latter  division, 
which  exhibits  a  high  tone  of  moral  and  religious 
feeling,  is  suited  to  the  appreciation  of  the  Believer. 
It  contains,  further,  a  general  Scholium  applicable 
to  each  division  of  the  Demonstration. 

Mr.  Gillespie  more  than  once  gave  a  reason  for 
the  difference  of  style  in  the  latter  part  of  his  book, 
the  change  having  been  objected  to  by  several 
critics.  He  says,  "The  first  part  might  be  repre- 


xiv         PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

sen  ted  by  the  fixed  skeleton  generally ;  the  other 
portion  being  likened  unto  the  flesh  and  blood,  and 
all  the  outward  adornments  of  the  structure,  as  a 
living  organism,  in  all  the  glow  of  high  health  and 
beauty.  .  .  .  The  earlier  Scholia  concern  the  Being 
whose  existence  is  in  course  of  being  proved  ;  while 
the  later  Scholia  have  much  to  do  with  Man  and 
his  concerns.  .  .  .  The  truth  about  the  Being  of 
beings,  as  He  is  in  Himself,  is  simple,  and  capable 
of  being  clearly  stated  in  few  words.  But  with  Man's 
entrance  on  the  stage,  a  complicated  and  confused 
state  of  affairs  is  superinduced,  and,  by  comparison, 
a  deluge  of  words  becomes  necessary,  and  requires 
to  be  excused." 

Writing  in  regard  to  this  completed  work,  he 
says,  "If  this  our  demonstration  be,  as  it  is 
commonly  admitted  by  its  students  to  be,  an 
impregnable,  logical  construction :  if  it  be,  in 
truth,  a  demonstration  equal  to  a  mathematical 
certainty  (as  it  is  confidently  declared  to  be), 
mark  what  follows."  He  then  proceeds  to  deal 
with  those  who  desire  to  refute  the  existence 
of  a  Holy  Lord  God,  and  with  those  who  will 
not  concede  that  Nature  herself  had  an  actual 
commencement,  being  created  in  the  thoughts  of 
God.  Proceeding,  he  says,  "  The  course  of  the 
reasonings  is  duly  completed,  so  that  there  is  now 
existent  a  finished  performance,  wanting  nothing 
and  coming  to  its  proper  and  natural  ending.  .  .  . 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.       xv 

While  the  ages  roll  on  this  argument  will  exist, 
for  it  is  founded  upon  a  rock  which  cannot  be 
moved."  In  after  years,  he  writes,  "  A  whole 
generation  of  mortal  men  has  passed  away  since 
I  brought  out  the  original  edition  of  a  work 
professing  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  God. 
During  all  these  years  the  Atheists  of  this  Island 
have  been  endeavouring  to  find  an  actual  flaw 
in  my  demonstration,  but  in  vain.  Mr.  Bradlaugh 
and  those  who  simultaneously  attacked  the  demon 
stration  went  to  loggerheads  with  each  other 
about  the  really  weak  spot,  charging  each  other 
with  signal  failure  in  not  having  properly  selected 
fit  and  proper  places  to  be  assailed." 

Some  of  Mr.  Gillespie's  critics,  besides  making 
many  other  objections  to  his  book,  have  complained 
that  he  has  gone  outside  his  province  in  his 
Scholia  in  regard  to  the  finality  of  punishment 
in  Hell,  which  implies  that  the  .soul  of  unregenerate 
Man  is  not  immortal,  and  in  regard  to  the  sexual 
nature  of  God.  On  the  other  hand,  others  have 
complained  that  he  has  not  demonstrated  the  exist 
ence  of  evil,  the  value  of  prayer,  the  forgiveness  of 
sin,  the  Incarnation  and  the  Trinity  ! 

Mr.  Gillespie,  in  1834,  married  Miss  Elizabeth 
Honyman,  daughter  of  Sir  Richard  Honyman, 
Bart.,  and  heiress  of  entail  of  the  estate  of 
Torbanehill,  Linlithgowshire.  She  succeeded  to 


xvi        PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

the  estate  in  1842.  Despite  much  personal  atten 
tion  given,  for  many  years  afterwards,  to  matters 
connected  with  the  estate  and  with  litigation  in 
which  he  had  become  involved,  two  of  the  cases 
being  carried  to  the  House  of  Lords,  Mr.  Gillespie, 

O 

who  had  now  retired  from  his  professional  duties, 
devoted  all  the  time  at  his  command  to  his  life's 
work. 

In  1840  he  published  the  first  edition  of  "The 
Examination,"  which,  with  other  treatises,  ulti 
mately  appeared  in  one  volume  in  1843,  and  again 
in  1863,  and  in  18G5  under  the  title  of  "The 
Necessary  Existence  of  God."  The  author,  speak- 
ino-  of  the  last  edition,  mentions  that  the  corisecu- 

O  ' 

tive  treatises  given  there  may,  not  without  reason, 
be  held  to  constitute  an  entire,  compact  body 
of  information  respecting  the  a  priori  method. 
Really  the  predecessor  of  the  Fifth  Edition  of  the 
Argument,  it  consists  of  an  inquiry  into  the 
defects  of  the  a  posteriori  arguments,  reviews 
of  Demonstrations  by  Locke  and  others,  an 
Examination  of  "  The  Refutation  of  the  Argument, 
a  priori"  and  other  Papers. 

:<The  Truth  of  the  Evangelical  History  of  our 
Lord  Jesus  Christ  proved  in  opposition  to  Dr. 
Strauss,  the  chief  of  modern  disbelievers  in  Revela 
tion,"  was  issued  in  1856.  This  book  only  pro 
ceeded  to  a  certain  stage,  and,  after  Mr.  Gillespie's 
death,  was  reissued  by  his  widow  in  1875,  under 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK,      xvii 

the  appropriate  title  of  "  The  Distinctive  Designs 
of  the  Four  Evangelists."  These  titles  explain  its 
nature.  A  critic  writes,  "  Mr.  Gillespie  has  done 
here  against  anti-supernaturalism,  what,  in  a  pre 
ceding  and  masterly  work,  he  has  done  against 
anti-theism." 

Absolutely  confident  in  his  position,  he  three 
times  challenged  the  champions  of  infidelity  to  a 
public  discussion — once  in  Edinburgh  in  1837, 
when  he  was  met  by  an  abortive  attempt  from 
the  other  side,  and  again  in  Glasgow  in  1838 
where,  in  his  opinion,  he  was  faced  by  a  foeman 
worthy,  who  wrote  under  the -title  of  "  Antitheos," 
and  who  might  be  said  to  have  represented  the 
Atheists  of  Scotland.  A  summary  of  this  controversy 
appears  in  "The  Necessary  Existence."  Lastly,  in 
1867,  he  challenged  Mr.  Bnidlaugh,  as  the  accredited 
champion  of  Atheism  in  this  country.  The  results 
are  found  in  a  volume  published  in  1872,  entitled 
"  Atheism  or  Theism,"  where  Mr.  Gillespie  claimed 
victory  on  a  field  from  which  his  foe  had  withdrawn. 

Various  lesser  works  may  be  mentioned.  A 
volume  of  poetry,  entitled  "  The  Origin  of  Evil :  a 
Celestial  Drama,"  was  published  anonymously  in 
1873.  A  second  edition,  issued  by  his  widow, 
followed  in  1875.  The  leading  theme  is  meant  to 
be  a  warning  to  Atheists.  Mr.  Gillespie  joins  with 
others  in  upsetting  certain  Miltonic  theories.  His 

suggestions  are,  that  evil  sprang  in  the  mind  and 
6 


xviii      PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

was  therefore,  originally,  purely  intellectual,  not 
moral ;  and  that  the  Devil  and  his  Angels  were 
not  cast  into  Hell  at  first  but  to  palaeontological 
earth,  and  were  there  when  man  was  created. 
A  trace  of  playful  grimness  reveals  itself  here, 
as  in  some  of  his  other  less  important  writings, 
that  shows  he  possessed  a  fair  sense  of  humour. 
A  book  entitled,  "The  Theology  of  Geologists," 
a  pamphlet  entitled,  "  On  the  Proveableness  of  a 
God,"  another  on  "The  Absurdity  of  Materialism," 
and  a  few  Brochures,  complete  the  list. 

In  his  later  years  Mr.  Gillespie,  naturally 
unobtrusive  and  unostentatious,  lived  in-  com 
parative  seclusion,  principally  at  Stirling.  In 
1875  he  passed  away,  and  was  buried  on  the 
grassy  slope  of  a  little  knoll  in  the  picturesque 
cemetery  there,  a  suitable  resting-place,  his  mother 
having  been  born  at  Kippen,  a  village  in  the 
county  of  Stirling.  An  imposing  monument,  with 
a  suitable  inscription,  marks  the  grave.  A  beauti 
ful  stained-glass  memorial  window  was  placed  by 
his  widow  in  the  Kippen  Hall,  a  public  building 
which  was  one  of  her  many  benefactions.  Equipped 
with  a  valuable  library,  this  Hall  was  associated 
with  the  memory  of  Mr.  Gillespie's  mother,  whose 
death  shortly  preceded  his,  and  to  whom  he  was  a 
devoted  son.  Stirlingshire  can  claim  many  men 
of  eminence  since  the  days  of  George  Buchanan, 
the  prince  of  Scotland's  scholars. 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.        xix 

Although  not  written  by  Mr.  Gillespie,  there 
are  two  works  published,  the  first  on  his  behalf, 
and  the  second  on  behalf  of  his  widow,  which 
should  be  noted.  One  is  a  pamphlet  entitled,  "  A 
Vindication  of  the  Argument,  a  priori"  by  the 
Rev.  Dr.  Adamson,  Edinburgh,  issued  in  1872,  arid 
the  other,  "  The  Historic  Aspects  of  the  A  Priori 
Argument,"  by  Dr.  Cazenove,  Sub-Dean  and  Chan 
cellor  of  the  Cathedral  Church  of  St.  Mary,  Edin 
burgh.  The  latter,  consisting  of  four  public  lectures 
delivered  in  1884,  and  published  in  1886,  was 
arranged  through  the  generosity  of  Mrs.  Honyman 
Gillespie,  who  intended  them  to  form  the  first 
series  of  a  Lectureship. 

Like  all  men  of  strong  individuality  who 
have  risen  above  the  commonplaces  of  life  and 
dared  to  take  a  lead  in  public  questions  of  con 
troversy,  Mr.  Gillespie  had  many  detractors ;  and, 
like  such  others,  he  correspondingly  attached  to 
himself  many  warm  admirers.  In  1860,  shortly 
after  the  settlement  of  the  famous  Torbanehill 
Mineral  Case,  which  began  in  1852,  and  was 
described  as  an  arduous  and  unparalleled  contest,  he 
was  presented  with  an  address  by  many  who  knew 
him  intimately  as  well  as  by  other  friends.  So 
numerous  were  the  subscribers  that  the  signatories 
had  to  be  restricted  to  one  hundred  of  the  well- 
known  names.  In  reading  the  address  one  is 
impressed  by  the  unusual  number  of  excellent 


xx         PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

qualities  attributed  to  him.  The  subscribers 
express  their  admiration  of  the  ardour,  moral 
courage,  firmness,  fortitude,  and  perseverance,  in 
combination  with  prudence  and  wisdom,  with 
which  he  conducted  his  case.  They  declare  that 
he  has  displayed  unshaken  confidence  in  the 
Attributes  of  the  Great  Supreme  as  the  righteous 
moral  Governor  whose  Providence  extends  not 
only  to  the  world  as  a  whole,  but  particularly  to 
the  affairs  of  moral  agents  created  after  the  image 
of  the  Divine  Mind,  and  refer  to  his  firm,  unwaver 
ing  belief  and  personal  confidence  in  the  faithful 
ness  of  God.  Such  valuable  testimony  cannot  be 
lightly  considered.  Incidentally  to  this  litigation, 
which  arose  out  of  a  lease  of  coal  in  the  estate,  a 
large  body  of  scientific  and  practical  evidence  was 
presented  on  behalf  of  the  proprietors  on  the 
question  as  to  whether  the  Torbanehill  Mineral,  of 
extraordinary  richness  in  oil  which  had  been 
discovered  by  the  lessees,  was  a  coal  or  a  shale  or 
sui  generis.  Mr.  Gillespie's  intellect  predisposed 
him  towards  fundamental  problems  and  stimulated 
research  along  geological  lines  for  the  immediate 
purpose  of  the  case,  a  field  of  enquiry  on  which 
having  once  entered  he  felt  from  time  to  time 
recalled  in  after  life.  Among;  other  recognitions,  he 

O  O  7 

was  elected  a  Fellow  of  various  scientific  societies. 

Mr.  Gillespie,  who  was  a  man  of  simple  habits, 
was  highly  conscientious,  exact,  methodical,  and  of 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK.        xxi 

stern  impartiality,  unswayed  by  feelings  in  the 
endeavour  to  act  justly.  The  protracted  nature  of 
his  intense  studies  produced  long  periods  of  abstrac 
tion,  but  those  coming  in  contact  with  him  found  him 
urbane  and  considerate.  He  showed  confidence  in 
his  employes  and  gave  personal  attention  to  their 
needs.  He  took  an  active  interest  in  improving  the 
cottages  of  the  poor,  generously  assisted  the  inmates 
in  their  financial  and  other  difficulties,  and  visited 
the  sick.  He  retained  his  servants  from  father 
to  son.  Shy  to  strangers  and  clinging  to  old  and 
tried  friends,  those  who  understood  him  best  liked 
him  most.  Where  he  trusted  he  naturally  expected 
that  his  interests  would  be  attended  to  with  faith 
fulness,  intelligence  and  accuracy.  The  masculine 
qualities  of  his  mind  were  not  always  appreciated. 
Engrossed  with  many  schemes,  some  of  which  were 
never  completed,  his  regard  to  detail,  which  often 
caused  much  deliberation,  threw  him  open  to  the 
charge  of  being  finical  and  procrastinating  in  some 
of  his  methods. 

Mr.  Gillespie  had  many  difficulties  to  contend 
with  in  order  to  reach  the  daily  tenour  of  his  life, 
but  obstacles  only  stiffened  his  character.  His 
writings  reveal  him  to  be  a  man  of  faith,  of 
prayer,  of  meditation,  and  of  evangelical  truth. 
His  reasoning  faculties  were  more  highly  developed 
than  the  affections  of  his  heart.  He  was  an 
original  thinker,  of  an  ingenious,  calm,  reflective, 


xxii       PREFATORY  OBSERVATIONS,  WITH  A 

and  well-exercised  mind,  whose  intellect,  so  marvel 
lously  analytic  and  synthetic,  carried  him  into 
cold  altitudes  of  dispassionate  reasoning.  He 
never  wavered  in  his  teaching  that  the  exist 
ence  of  God  is  as  demonstrable  as  that  (to 
use  his  own  words)  the  three  inside  angles  of 
a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  rectangles.  He 
never  faltered  in  his  writings,  for  he  never 
doubted  his  mission.  Opposition  to  his  teaching 
braced  him  to  scrutinise  more  closely  every  link 
of  his  argument,  persevere  with  his  deliberate 
pen  in  a  merciless  combat  with  his  opponents,  and 
press  forward  the  claims  of  what  he  believed  to  be 
the  truth.  He  invariably  replied  to  all  completed 
works  which  sought  to  demolish  his  arguments. 
As  he  proceeded  with  his  life's  work  he  saw  more 
clearly  the  perfect  consummation  of  the  Archetypal 
plan,  for  any  mist  in  his  mind  gradually  dispelled ; 
indeed  he  seemed  to  attain  to  what  might  be  called  a 
naked  brain.  These  characteristics,  unconsciously 
and  gradually  made  him  a  man  apart  and  out 
of  personal  sympathy  with  social  life.  To  add 
to  his  loneliness,  Mr.  Gillespie  had  no  children  to 
enrich  his  nature  and  brighten  his  home. 

O 

We  are  often  too  apt  to  value  a  gift  by  con 
siderations  of  our  appreciation  of  the  messenger 
who  brought  it.  Curly le  (perhaps  prophetically 
describing  himself  us  portrayed  in  after  years 
by  Froude)  in  his  essay  on  Burns  writes  of 


SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR'S  LIFE  AND  WORK      xxiii 

the  poet  as  appointed  to  hold  a  great  light  guid 
ing  humanity.  One  gathers  that  Mr.  Gillespie 
valued  his  mission  more  than  himself  and  gladly 
would  stand  behind  his  great  argument  and  be 
overlooked,  holding  up  the  truth  he  taught  to  his 
fellow  beings,  if  only  he  thereby  convinced  them  of 
the  certainty  of  an  Eternal  Father. 

From  the  material  at  the  writer's  disposal  enough 
has  been  extracted  to  interest  and  satisfy  a  serious 
reader.  There  has  been  an  advantage  in  consider 
ing  Mr.  Gillespie's  life  and  writings  at  this  interval 
of  time.  Circumstances  which  once  assumed  pre 
ponderance  are  now  forgotten.  We  are  in  a  better 
position,  and  are  enabled  with  a  better  balance,  to 
consider  justly  the  merits. 

As  the  effect  of  a  picture  is  seen  by  standing  at 
a  proper  distance  from  it  and  in  a  good  light,  so 
now  one  can  view  the  lineaments  of  Mr.  Gillespie's 
character;  and,  as  the  effect  of  a  completed  structure 
of  noble  proportions  can  be  better  judged  after  the 
scaffolding  is  taken  down,  and  the  style  of  architec 
ture  defined  in  bold  relief  amid  the  clear  light  of 
day,  so  now  (amid  the  debris  of  much  that  was 
ephemeral)  one  can  estimate  the  value  of  Mr. 
Gillespie's  teaching. 

JAS.   URQUHART. 

13  DANUBE  STREET, 

EDINBURGH,  1906. 


SYNOPSIS    OF    THE    ARGUMENT. 


DIVISION    I. 
THE  BEING,   AND   THE  NATURAL   MODES. 

PART    I. 
PROPOSITION  I. 

Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  existing.  Page  1 

PROP.  II.  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  indivisible.  .       2 

Prolegomena.          .             .             .             .  .2 

Demonstration.       .             .             .             .  .3 

Scholium.  .  ...       4 

COROLLARY  from  Proposition  II.     Infinity  of  Ex 
tension  is  necessarily  immoveable.          .  .       4 

Prolegomena.          .  .  .4 

Demonstration.       .  .  .  .  .5 

Scholium.   .  .  .  .  .5 

III.  There  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension.        6 

IV.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  of 

unity  and  simplicity.  .  .  .  .7 

Corollary.   .  .  .  .  .  .9 

Scholium.   .  .  .  .  .  .10 

SUB-PROPOSITION.     The  Material  Universe  is  Jinitv 

in  extension.         .  .  .  .  .10 

Postulata.   .             .                          .  .  .10 

Demonstration.       .             .             .  .  .15 

Scholium.   .             .             .             .  .  .17 

General  Scholium  as  to  Extension.  .  .     20 

Sub-Scholium.        .  .  .  .     21 

xxv 


XXVI 


SYNOPSIS  OF 


DIVISION    I. 
PART  I. 


PROP.  V.  There   is   necessarily   but   one   Being  of   Infinity   of 

Expansion.         ....         Page  22 


PART  II. 

PROP.  I.  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  existing.     .  .     24 

II.  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  indivisible.  .     25 

Prolegomenon.          .  .  .  .  .25 

Demonstration.         .  .  .  .  .25 

COROLLARY  from  Proposition  II.     Infinity  of  Dura 
tion  is,  necessarily,  immoveable.   .  .  .25 

Prolegomenon.          .  .  .  .  .25 

Demonstration.         .  .  .  .  .26 

III.  There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration.  .     26 

IV.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of 

unity  and  simplicity.  .  .  .  •  .  .27 

Scholium  I.  .  .  .  .  .  .29 

Corollary.      .  .  .  .  .  .29 

Scholium  II.  .  .,  .  .  .29 

SOB-PROPOSITION.     The  Material  Universe  is  finite 

in  duration.  .  .  .  .  .30 

Prolegomenon.          .  .  .  .  .30 

Demonstration.         .  .  .  .  .31 

Scholium.      .  .  .  .  .  .33 

COROLLARY  from  Sub-Proposition.  Every  succes 
sion  of  finitely  extended  substances  is  finite  in 
duration.  .  .  .  .  .  .34 

V.  There   is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being   of   Infinity  of 

Duration.  36 


THE  ARGUMENT. 


DIVISION   I. 
PART  III. 

PROP.  I.  There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 

and  Infinity  of  Duration.         .  .  .        Page  38 

Scholium.      .  .  .  .  .  .41 

II.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  <>f 

Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity.        .     43 
III.  There    is,    necessarily,    but   one    Being   of   Infinity   of 

Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration.  .  .  .44 

Scholium.      .  .  .  .  .  .44 

Epilegomenon.         .  .  .  .  .45 


DIVISION   II. 

THE   INTELLECTUAL    ATTRIBUTES. 
PART  I. 

PROP.  The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 

Duration,  is,  necessarily,  Intelligent,  and  All-knowing..     46 
Prolegomena.    ....  .46 

Demonstration.  .  .  .  .  .47 

Scholium.  .  .     48 

PART  II. 

PROP.  The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  is,  necessarily,  All- 
powerful.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4!) 

PART  III. 

PROP.  The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  and  All-powerful,  is, 
necessarily,  entirely  Free.  .  .  .  .52 

Scholium.          ...  .     54 

Epilegomenon .  .  .  .  .55 


xxviii  SYNOPSIS  OF 


DIVISION   III. 
THE  MORAL   ATTRIBUTES. 


SUB-DIVISION    I. 
THE  TRANSITIONAL  ATTRIBUTES. 

PROP.    I.  The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and 
of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  and 
entirely  Free,  is,  necessarily,  completely  Happy.    Page  56 
SUB-PROPOSITION.     The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is 
All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely   Free,  and 
completely  Happy,  is,  necessarily,  perfectly  Good.     58 
Scholium.     .  .  .  .  .  .60 

Epilegomenon.          ...  .63 

SUB-DIVISION    II. 
THE  RELATIVE  ATTRIBUTES. 

SCHOLIA  PR^:POSITA.       .            .  .  .  .63 

Scholium  I.      ...  .  .     63 

Scholium  II.    .             .             .  .  .  .65 

PROP.  II.  God  is,  necessarily,  True.            .  .  .     67 

Prolegomenon.              .             .  .  .  .67 

Lemma.            .             .             .  .  .  .68 

Postulatum.      .             .             .  .  .  .72 

Demonstration.             .             .  .  .  .72 

COROLLARY  from  Proposition  II.  God,  who  is  True, 

is,  necessarily,  Faithful.       .  . .  •  .76 

Lemma.             .             .             .  .  .  .76 

Demonstration.  .  .     77 


THE  ARGUMENT. 


DIVISION    III. 

SUB-DIVISION    II. 
THE    RELATIVE   ATTRIBUTES. 

PROP.  III.  God,  who  is  True,  and   Faithful,  is,  necessarily, 

inflexibly  Just.  ....  Page  79 

Lemma.      .  .  .  .  .  .79 

Demonstration.       .  .  .  .  .82 

Scholium  I.  Man,  as  a  Moral  Being  inhabiting  the 
Earth.     ......       90 

Scholium  II.  The  indissoluble  connection  between 
Morality  and  Happiness, — and  Immorality  and 
Misery.    ...  96 

Scholium  sub  Scholio  II.  .  .  .  .     106 

Scholium  III.  The  Justice  of  the  Future.  .     108 

I.  Shall  there  be  a  Future  State  for  Man  ?      .     110 
II.  How  shall  Justice  be  administered  in  the 

Future  State  ?        .  .  .  .115 

ill.  Shall  Future  Punishment  be  Eternal  ?        .119 
(  'OROLLARY  from  Proposition  III.    God,  who  is  True, 
ami  Faithful,  and  inflexibly  Just,  is,  necessarily, 
altogether  Righteous.        ....      134 

PROP.  IV.  God,  who  is  True,  and  Faithful,  and  inflexibly  Just, 
and  altogether  Righteous,  is,  necessarily,  All-Loving, 
yea,  Love  Itself.          .  .  .  .138 

Prolegomenon.       .  .  .  .  .138 

Lemma  I.  .  .  .  .  .  .     139 

Lemma  II.  .  .  .  .  140 

Demonstration.  ....     140 


XXX 


SYNOPSIS  OF 


DIVISION    III. 

PROP.  IV.  Scholium  I.  An  important  difference  between  Pro 
positions  II.  &  III.,  on  one  side,  and  Proposition 
IV.,  on  the  other.  ....  Page  150 

Scholium  II.  Other  vital  differences  between 
Propositions  II.  &  III.,  and  Proposition  IV.  .  155 

Scholium  III.  Shall  the  Rewards  of  the  Good,  and 
the  Punishments  of  the  Evil,  be  to  all  Eternity  1  161 

Scholium  sub  Scholio  III.     ....     168 

Epilegomena.  .....     171 


DIVISION    IV. 
THE   COMPLEX    OR    COMPOUND    ATTRIBUTES. 

SCHOLIUM  PR^EPOSITUM.          ....     173 

PROP.  1.  As  God,  the  Lord,  is  the  Best,  so  He  is,  necessarily, 

the  Wisest  of  Beings.  .  .  .  .174 

Prolegomena.          .  .  .  •  .174 

First  Demonstration.          ....     176 

Scholium  after  First  Demonstration.        .  .     178 

Second  Demonstration.      .  .  .  .179 

Corollary  from  Second  Demonstration.     .  .180 

Scholium  after  Second  Demonstration.     .  .     181 

General  Scholium  as  to  Wisdom.  .  .  .     181 

Epilegomenon.        .  .  .  .  .188 

PROP.  II.  God,  the  Lord,  who  is  the  Wisest  of  Beings,  is,  neces 
sarily,  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity.      .  .  .     188 

Prolegomena.          .  .  .  .  .188 

Demonstration.       .....     190 

Scholium.    The  Moral  Purity,  what  it  fundamen 
tally  involves,  and  really  consists  in.    .  .193 

Sub-Scholium.  202 


THE  ARGUMENT.  xxxi 


DIVISION    IV. 

PROP.  III.  God.  the  Lord,  who  is  the  Wisest  of  Beings,  and  of 
ineffable  Moral  Purity,  is,  necessarily,  the  Holiest 
One.  .....  Page  204 

Prolegomena.      .....     204 

Demonstration.  .  .  .  .  .210 

Scholium  I.  The  Holiness  and  Sin  not  abso 
lutely  contradictory  correlatives.  .  .  216 

Scholium  II.  The  Holiness  and  never-ceasing 
Sin  incompatible.  ....  218 

Scholium  III.  The  negative  Moral  Purity, 
and  the  positive  Holiness,  in  fundamental 
agreement.  .....  219 

Epilegomena.      .....     221 


DIVISION    V. 
THE     TRANSCENDENT    EXCELLENCIES. 

PROF.  1.  The  Lord  God,  who  is  the  Holiest  One,  is,  neces 
sarily,  the  Self-Beaiitifid,  and  the  All-Perfect 
Being.  ...... 

Scholium.  ..... 

PROP.  II.  The  Lord  God,  who  is  the  Self-Beautiful,  and  the 
All-Perfect  Being,  is,  necessarily,  the  Ever-Blessed 
One.  .  .  .  .  .  .239 

Prolegomena.      .....  239 

Demonstration.  .....  242 

THE  GENERAL  SCHOLIUM.      ....  247 

Summary  of  positions  in  the  demonstration.     .  248 

Application  of  the  Summary  of  positions  in  the 
demonstration.  ....     251 

THE  PRAYER.  259 


THE 

ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI, 


FOR  THE 


BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES. 


DIVISION  I. 
THE  BEING,  AND  THE  NATURAL  MODES. 

PART  I. 

PROPOSITION  I. 

Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  existing. 

§  1.  Even  when  the  miiid  endeavours  to  remove 
from  it  the  idea  of  Infinity  of  Extension  as  really 
outwardly  existent,  it  cannot,  after  all  its  efforts, 
avoid  leaving  still  within  it  the  idea  of  such  infinity. 
Let  there  be  ever  so  much  endeavour  to  displace 
this  idea,  that  is,  conceive  the  external  Infinity  of 
Extension  non-existent;  every  one,  by  a  ivtlrx 
examination  of  his  own  thoughts,  will  find  it  is 
utterly  beyond  his  power  to  do  so. 

§  2.   Now,   since,   even   when   we  would  remove 


2  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      LDlv-  L 

the  notion  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  as  existing, 
out  of  our  minds,  we  cannot  but  leave  the  notion 
of  it  behind  ;  from  this,  it  is  manifest,  Infinity  of 
Extension  is  necessarily  existing  :  For,  Every  thing 
the  existence  of  which  we  cannot  but  believe,  is 
necessarily  existing. 

§  3.  To  deny,  therefore,  that  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion  necessarily  exists,  is  to  utter  a  downright 
contradiction. 

§  4.  Infinity  of  Extension  is,  then,  necessarily 
existing. 

PROPOSITION  II. 
Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  indivisible. 

PROLEGOMENA. 

§  1.  To  say,  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily 
indivisible,  is  as  much  as  to  say,  the  parts  of 
Infinity  of  Extension  are  necessarily  indivisible 
from  each  other. 

§  2.  Indivisible,  in  this  Proposition,  means 
indivisible  either  really  or  mentally:  For  there 
can  be  no  objection  to  a  real,  which  would  not 
apply  to  a  mental  divisibility ;  and  a  mental 
divisibility,  we  must  suppose,  would  imply  an 
actual  divisibility,  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 

§  3.  The  Proposition,  then,  is  to  the  effect,  that 
the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  are  necessarily 
indivisible  from  each  other  really  or  mentally. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.         3 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  That  which  is  divisible  really,  may  be 
divided  really :  and  a  thing  which  is  actually 
divided  from  another  must  have  superficies  of  its 
own,  every  way,  and  be  removed  or  separated  from 
that  other  thing,  be  it  by  ever  so  little  a  distance. 
If  any  one  should  say  that  things,  really  divided 
from  each  other  have  not  real  superficies  of  their 
own,  every  way  ;  to  be  able  to  believe  him,  \ve 
must  first  be  able  to  believe  this,  that  a  thing  can 
be,  and  not  be,  at  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same 
place  :  And  if  any  one  should  say  that  things 
which  are  really  divided  from  each  other,  which 
have  real  superficies  of  their  own  every  way,  can 
possibly  be  conceived  as  without  a  certain  distance, 
however  little,  being  between  them ;  as  this, 
it  could  as  soon  be  believed  that,  in  a  good 
syllogism  of  the  first  figure,  the  conclusion  does  not 
necessarily  follow  from  the  premises.  Being  really 
divided,  and  being  really  separated,  mean,  thus,  the 
same  thing. 

§  2.  Now,  divisibility  meaning  possibility  of 
separation  :  As  it  is  an  utter  contradiction  to  say. 
Infinity  of  Extension  can  be  separated ;  that  is,  a 
part  of  Infinity  of  Extension  separated,  by  a  certain 
distance,  from  Infinity  of  Extension  ;  there  remain 
ing  Infinity  of  Extension  after  part  of  it  is  taken 
away  : a  the  part  of  Infinity  of  Extension  so  removed, 

a  Prop.  I.  §  2. 


4  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

being  removed  from  the  remaining  parts  to  these 
very  same  parts  ;  the  part,  thus,  being  at  rest  while 
it  is  taken  away  ;a  the  part  so  moved  away,  being 
moved  away  from  itself;  it  still  remaining,  inas 
much  as  there  is  necessarily  Infinity  of  Extension  ;a 
that  is,  though  moved  away,  being  not  moved 
away  :  Which  could  not  be,  unless  it  be  false,  that 
whatever  is,  is,  where  it  is,  and  when  it  is.  As  it 
is,  thus,  an  utter  contradiction  to  say  Infinity  of 
Extension  can  be  separated,  so  it  is  an  utter 
contradiction  to  say  it  is  not  indivisible. 

$  3.  Infinity  of  Extension  is,  then,  necessarily 
indivisible. 

SCHOLIUM. 

The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being 
necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other ;  it  is  a 
necessary  consequence,  that  the  thing,  the  parts  of 
which  are  divisible  from  each  other,  is  not  Infinity 
of  Extension ;  nor  any  part  of  it :  part,  in  the 
sense  of  partial  consideration  only,  for  otherwise 
Infinity  of  Extension  can  have  no  parts.b 

COROLLARY  FROM  PROPOSITION  II. 
Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  immoveable. 

PROLEGOMENA. 
§  1.   Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily  immove- 

»  Prop.  I.  §2.  i>  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2. 


PART!.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.         5 

able  :  This  is  equal  to  saying,  the  parts  of  Infinity 
of  Extension  are  necessarily  immoveable  among 
themselves. 

§  2.  And  immoveable,  in  the  Corollary,  means 
immoveable  either  really  or  mentally. 

§  3.  The  Corollary,  therefore,  lays  down,  in 
effect,  that  the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  are 
necessarily  immoveable  among  themselves  really 

or  mentally. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  Motion  of  parts,  that  is,  the  motion  of  the 
parts  of  a  thing  as  among  themselves,  supposes, 
of  necessity,  separation  of  the  parts.  He  who  does 
not  see  that  motion  of  parts  among  themselves 
supposes,  or  presupposes,  of  necessity,  separation 
of  the  parts,  need  never  be  expected  to  see  the 
force  of  the  dialectical  inference,  that  because  every 
A  is  equal  to  B,  therefore  some  B  is  equal  to  A. 
And,  Infinity  of  Extension  being  necessarily 
incapable  of  separation, a  is,  therefore,  necessarily 
immoveable,  that  is,  its  parts  are  necessarily 
immoveable  among  themselves. 

§  2.  Infinity  of  Extension  is,  then,  necessarily 

immoveable. 

SCHOLIUM. 

The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being  neces 
sarily  immoveable  among  themselves ;  it  is  a 
necessary  consequence,  that  the  thing,  the  parts  of 

a  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2. 


6  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

which  ore  moveable  among  themselves,  is  not 
Infinity  of  Extension  ;  nor  any  part  of  it :  part, 
in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration  only,  for  other 
wise  Infinity  of  Extension  can  have  no  parts. a 

PROPOSITION  III. 

There  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Extension. 

§  1.  Either,  Infinity  of  Extension  subsists,  or 
(which  is  at  bottom  the  same  thing)  wre  conceive 
it  to  subsist,  without  a  support  or  substratum  :  or, 
it  subsists  not,  or  (which  is  the  same  thing)  we 
conceive  it  not  to  subsist,  without  a  Support  or 
Substratum. 

§  2.  First,  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist  with 
out  a  substratum,  then  it  is  a  substance.  And  if 
any  one  should  deny,  that  it  is  a  substance,  it  so 
subsisting ;  to  prove,  beyond  contradiction,  the 
utter  absurdity  of  such  denial,  we  have  but  to  defy 
him  to  show,  why  Infinity  of  Extension  is  not  a 
substance,  so  far  forth  as  it  can  subsist  by  itself,  or 
without  a  substratum. 

§  3.  As,  therefore,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  deny 
that  Infinity  of  Extension  exists,b  so  there  is,  on 
the  supposition  of  its  being  able  to  subsist  without 
a  substratum,  a  substance  or  being  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  necessarily  existing  :  Though  Infinity  of 

a  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2.  i>  Prop.  I.  §  3. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.         7 

Extension,  and  the  being  of  Infinity  of  Extension 
are  not  different,  as  standing  to  each  other  in  the 
relation  of  mode  and  subject  of  the  mode,  but  are 
identical. 

§  4.  Secondly,  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist 
not  without  a  Substratum,  then,  it  being  a  con 
tradiction  to  deny  there  is  Infinity  of  Extension  ,a  it 
is  a  contradiction  to  deny  there  is  a  Substratum  to  it. 

§  5.  Whether  or  not  men  will  consent  to  call 
this  Substratum  Substance  or  Being,  is  of  very 
little  consequence.  For,  'tis  certain  that  the  word 
Substance,  or  Being,  has  never  been  employed, 
and  can  never  be  employed,  to  stand  for  any  thing 
better  entitled  to  the  application  of  the  term  than 
the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension.  But  to 
refuse  to  give  such  Substratum  that  name,  being 
a  thing  obviously  most  unreasonable,  let  us  call  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  by  the  name 
Substance  or  Being. 

§  6.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Extension. 

PROPOSITION  IV. 

The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily 
of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  1.  Because  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily 
indivisible,1"  therefore  it  is  of  the  truest  unity.  For 

*  Prop.  I.  §  3.  b  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2. 


8  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

to  affirm  that  though  it  is  necessarily  indivisible, 
even  so  much  as  by  thought,  yet  it  is  not  of  the 
truest  unity,  is  to  affirm  what  is  no  more  intel 
ligible  than  would  be  the  assertion,  that  a  circle, 
this  being  a  figure  contained  by  one  line,  with 
every  part  of  that  line  or  circumference  equally 
distant  from  a  certain  point,  is  not  round. 

§  2.  And  as  Infinity  of  Extension  is  necessarily 
of  the  truest  unity,  so  it  is  necessarily  of  the  utmost 
simplicity.  For  what  more  can  be  included  in 
simplicity  than  is  implied  in  unity  caused  by  a 
thins;  beino1  necessarily  indivisible,  we  can  have  no 

o  O  J 

conception. 

§  3.  And  as,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity  of 
Extension  subsists  by  itself,  there  is  necessarily  a 
being  of  Infinity  of  Extension,*  so,  this  supposed, 
that  being  is  necessarily  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  4.  If  Infinity  of  Extension  subsist  not  without 
a  Substratum ;  that  we  cannot,  without  an  express 
contradiction,  deny,  that  the  Substratum  is  of  the 
truest  unity,  and  utmost  simplicity,  may  be  most 
easily  demonstrated. 

§  5.  For  it  is  intuitively  evident,  that  the  Sub 
stratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  can  be  no  more 
divisible  than  Infinity  of  Extension  itself.  And 
if  any  one  should  affirm  that  though  Infinity  of 
Extension  is  necessarily  indivisible,  yet  that  its 
Substratum  can  be  considered  as  divisible,  we  could 

a  Prop.  III.  §  3. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.         9 

in)  more  assent  to  the  proposition  than  we  could 
believe  that  a  subject  can  never  be  truly  pre 
dicated  of  itself.  And,  therefore,  as  Infinity  of 
Extension  is  necessarily  indivisible,*  so  is  its 
Substratum. 

§  6.  And  Infinity  of  Extension  being  necessarily 
of  unity  and  simplicity  because  necessarily 
indivisible,15  its  Substratum  is  so  likewise,  for  the 
same  reason. 

§  7.  And  as,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity 
of  Extension  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum, 
there  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion,0  so,  this  supposed,  that  Being  is  necessarily 
of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  8.  Then,  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension  is, 
necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

COROLLARY. 

The  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  being 
necessarily  indivisible,'1  that  is,  its  parts  being 
necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other :  it  is  a 
corollary,  that  its  parts  (parts,  in  the  sense  of 
partial  consideration  ouly,d)  are  necessarily  immove- 
able  among  themselves :  For  the  same  reason  that 
the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension  arc  necessarily 
immoveable  among  themselves,  because  necessarily 
indivisible  from  each  other. 

a  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2.  ':  Prop.  III.  $  4  &  Jj  5. 

b  Supra,  §  1  &  §  2.  ll  Prop.  IV.  §  5. 


10  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

SCHOLIUM. 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  thing,  the  parts  of 
which  are  divisible  from  each  other,  is  not  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  nor  any  part 
of  it  :  And,  the  thing,  the  parts  of  which  are 
moveable  among  themselves,  is  not  the  Substratum, 
nor  any  part  of  it :  Part,  in  the  sense  of  partial 
consideration  only.a 

SUB-PROPOSITION. 

The  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  extension. 
POSTULATA. 

§  1.  If,  now,  it  should  be  alleged,  that  the 
Material  Universe  is  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  the 
falsity  of  the  allegation  may  be  made  to  appeal- 
most  evidently.  That  is  to  say,  the  application  of 
positions  already  demonstrated,  directed  to  the  fact 
of  Matter,  (in  the  case  of  those  who  shall,  or  may, 
object  the  fact,)  enables  the  reasoner  to  make 
manifest,  by  incontestable  proof,  that  the  Material 
Universe  is  truly  not  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  but 
finite  in  extension. 

§  2.  For,  if  any  one  should  affirm,  that  the 
Material  Universe  is  truly  of  Infinity  of  Extension  ; 
his  affirmation  might  be  made  in  one  or  other  of 
two  ways.  To  wit,  either  by  way  of  an  assertion 

!l  Prop.  IV.  §  5 . 


PART  I.I     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.        11 


grounded  on  reasons :  or,  as  being  an  assertion 
made  without  the  support  of  any  reason  at  all. 
The  allegation,  in  this  latter  case,  being  made 
simply  because  the  alleger  pleases — and  for  no 
better  reason,  or  any  other  reason  whatsoever. 
Tis  first  affirmed,  that  the  Material  Universe  and 
Infinity  of  Extension  are  so  related  to  each  other, 
that  this  does  not  exist  without  that ;  and,  next, 
it  is  admitted,  that  the  affirm er  of  the  close 
relation  betwixt  those  two  can  assign  no  reason 
for  his  assertion  of  the  existence  of  the  relation 
save  his  own  good  pleasure. 

§  3.  Now,  as  to  the  second  of  those  alternatives, 
no  more  need  be  said  about  it.  What  is  arbitrarily 
affirmed  without  any  reason,  and  indeed  reasonable 
ness,  may,  much  more,  be  denied  with  sufficient 
reason. 

§  4.  As  to  the  other  member  of  the  alternative, 
the  position,  to  wit,  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
of  Infinity  of  Extension,  as  a  position  grounded  on 
reasons,  that  is,  necessary  reasons,  because,  to 
speak  of  reasons  other  than  necessary,  were  futile 
and  absurd.  De  facto,  or  a  posteriori,  or  mere 
empirical,  reasons  are  out  of  the  question  in  a  case 
beyond  the  limits  of  all  possible  human  experience, 
through  the  medium  of  sensation.  Only  reasons 
derived  from  the  necessary  relations  of  our  ideas 
can  avail.  As  to  the  position  in  question,  we 
repeat,  as  one  grounded  on  d  priori  reasons,  it  will 


12  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

be  found,  by  that  psychological  experience  which 
is  here  admissible,  that  no  reason  can  be  assigned, 
but  one  ;  because,  to  wit,  the  Material  Universe  is, 
i.e.,  must  be  considered  to  be,  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Extension.  No  other  reason  whatever, 
'tis  deliberately  repeated,  can  be  assigned  :  none 
can  be  imagined.  The  Material  Universe  is,  or 
rather  must  be,  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  by  reason 
of  its  being  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  : 
that,  or  some  position  or  other,  directly  resolvable 
into  that,  is  the  one  only  reason  which  can  possibly 
be  advanced,  or  thought  of.  Which  he  who 
pleases,  may  know,  or  verify  by  experience  :  One 
may  try  the  question  in  the  interior  of  his  own 
mind ;  and,  should  the  experimentalist  happily 
discover  some  additional  reason,  let  him  be  sure  to 
remember  other  folk,  not  by  any  means  so 
fortunately  situated,  by  making  his  discovery 
widely  known. 

§  5.  The  Material  Universe  is  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  :  and  the  reason  is.  because  the  Material 
Universe  is  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 
Therefore,  the  proposition  which  really  comes 
before  us  for  examination  is  this,  The  Material 
Universe  is  the  Substratum  in  question.  Yea,  the 
upholders  of  the  dictum,  that  the  Material  Universe 
is  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  will  be  among  the 
foremost  to  maintain  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
that  Substratum  :  since,  on  any  other  supposition, 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       13 

there  would  unquestionably  be  an  Extension 
besides  the  extension  of  Matter;  and  this  is  the 
very  thing  which  these  men  are  most  determinedly 
(not  to  say,  madly)  set  against  as  a  position  which 
they  can  by  no  means  endure.  In  truth,  the 
supposition  of  the  existence  of  Extension,  yea,  of 
Infinity  of  Extension,  apart  from  Matter,  or  distinct 
from  the  extension  of  Matter,  would  render  it  a 
piece  of  pure  idleness,  on  the  part  of  the  supposer, 
to  hold  that  Matter  is  of  Infinity  of  Extension.  It 
is  only  to  get  quit  of  an  extension  distinct  from 
that  of  Matter  that  the  assertion,  Matter  is 
infinitely  extended,  is  made.  Introduce  the  other 
and  separate  extension,  as  necessarily  existing,  and 
all  reason  for  holding  by  the  infinite  extension  of 
Matter  is  gone. 

§  6.  The  Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum 
of  Infinity  of  Extension  :  this,  then,  is  the  proposi 
tion  for  examination.  And,  after  due  reflection,  it 
will  become  evident,  as  it  is  in  itself  incontestable, 
that  to  contend  that  the  Material  Universe  is  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  is  tantamount 
to  another  contention,  the  other  being  this,  The 
Material  Universe  is  a  thorough  plenum  of  Infinity 

O  L  •/ 

of  Extension.  The  proof,  too,  which  will  serve  to 
evidence  the  unsoundness,  and  utter  falsity,  of  the 
one  proposition,  would  also  suffice  to  demolish 
every  vestige  of  the  other  position. 

7.   That  the  Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum 


H  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

of  Infinity  of  Extension,  will,  indeed,  be  maintained 
if  it  be  contended,  and  only  if  it  be  contended,  that 
the  Material  Universe  is  a  thorough  plenum  of 
Infinity  of  Extension.  This  is  very  evident,  as, 
bv  a  thorough  plenum  of  matter,  must  be  meant 
a  material  plenum  in  which  no  empty  interstice,  or 
hollow  vacuity,  (actual  or  possible, — by  compres 
sion,  or  otherwise,)  can  be :  the  two  factors,  the 
Substratum,  to  wit,  and  the  plenum,  being 
perfectly,  and  at  all  points  indissolubly,  coincident. 
For,  the  supposition  of  a  plenum  in  which  there 
are,  or  can  be,  true  vacuities,  would  be  the  supposi 
tion  of  no  true  plenum  at  all,  and  would  avail 
nothing.  A  plenum  (if  one  could  rightly  call 
it  so)  with  vacuities,  or  any  one  vacuum,  however 
small,  could  not  serve  as  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Extension,  in  which  no  vacuum,  nor 
division  of  any  kind  whatever,  is  conceivable. a 
The  plenum,  then,  must  be  held  to  be  with 
out  the  possibility  of  any  vacuum,  when  we 
speak  of  a  thorough  plenum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  as  being  the  Substratum  of  Infinity 
of  Extension.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
contend  that  the  Material  Universe  is  a  thorough 
plenum — which  is  the  equivalent  of  an  absolute, 
or  completely  incompressible,  solid — of  Infinity 
of  Extension,  would  be  (as  has  been  said)  equal 
to  the  affirmation  that  the  Material  Universe 

a  Prop.  IV.  Schol. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.        15 

is,   verily,   the    Substratum    of  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion. 

§  8.  Those  postulates  being  thus  laid  down,  the 
advance  to  the  demonstration  itself  may  be  most 
satisfactorily  accomplished. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  If,  then,  it  should  be  maintained,  that  the 
Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  :  (which  will  be  maintained,  as  is  most 
evident,  if  it  be  contended  that  the  Material 
Universe  is  truly  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  that  is, 
is  a  thorough  plenum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  ;) 
to  put  to  the  proof,  whether  or  not  the  Material 
Universe  can  be  such  Substratum,  we  have  but  to 
ask,  Are  the  parts  of  the  Material  Universe 
divisible  from  each  other  ?  and,  Are  they  moveable 
among  themselves  ?  For,  if  they  be  so  divisible,  if 
so  moveable,  then  the  Material  Universe  cannot 
be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension. a 

§  2.  Now7,  we  know,  of  a  certainty,  that  some 
parts  of  the  Material  Universe  are  divisible  from 
each  other;  and,  as  far  as  we  know,  every  part  of 
it  to  which  our  minds  could  be  directed  is  as 
divisible,  as  are  the  parts  which  we  certainly  know 
are  divisible  :  and  this  is  the  conclusion  to  which, 
by  the  rules  of  philosophy,  we  are  entitled  to 
come. 

a  Schol.  under  Prop.  IV. 


16  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

§  3.  Therefore,  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be 
the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension. 

§  4.  Again,  we  are  certain,  that  some  parts  of 
the  Material  Universe  are  moveable  among  them 
selves ;  and,  that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our 
minds  could  be  directed  is  as  moveable,  as  are  the 
parts  which  we  certainly  know  are  moveable,  is 
(here,  as  in  the  other  case)  what  we  are  entitled  to 
conclude. 

§  5.  Therefore,  again,  the  Material  Universe 
cannot  be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion. 

§  6.  And,  if,  because  the  parts  of  the  Material 
Universe  are  divisible  from  each  other,  it  is  proved 
that  it  is  not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion  ;  then,  because  the  parts  of  the  Material 
Universe  are  divisible  from  each  other,  and 
moveable  among  themselves,  it  is  proved,  much 
more,  (if  that  were  possible,)  that  the  Material 
Universe  is  not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension.  It  is  proved,  that  the  Material 
Universe  is  not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension ;  nor  any  part  thereof,  for  the  Sub 
stratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension  can  have  no  parts 
but  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration  : a  that  is, 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  extension. 
For,  were  it  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  it  would  be 
the  Substratum  thereof.  But  it  being  not  that 

a  Prop.  IV.  §  5. 


PART!.]       THE   BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     17 

Substratum :    Therefore,  it    is    not   of   Infinity    of 
Extension. 

§  7.  The  Material  Universe,  then,  is  Jinite  in 
extension. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  It  has  been  manifested,  that  an  infinitely 
extended  plenum  of  matter,  with  hollow  gaps, 
would  not  serve  as  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Extension. a  A  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension 
can  have  no  vacua,  nor  divisions,  nor  even  divisi 
bility,  of  any  sort.b  In  truth,  a  material  substratum 
of  Infinity  of  Extension,  with  empty  interstices  in 
it,  would  be  no  fit  substratum,  nor,  indeed,  sub 
stratum  at  all:  yea,  a  j^cnum,  with  vacua,  would 
be  no  plenum,  or,  at  most,  a,  plenum  only  in  words. 
But  even  were  one  to  suppose  such  a  plenum,  and 
such  a  substratum,  to  exist,  the  supposition  would 
be  made  to  little  purpose.  For,  while  such  a 
plenum,  and  substratum,  could  not  serve  as  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  the  Infinity 
of  Extension  itself  must  be  conceived  to  have  an 
adequate  (or  indivisible)  substratum  of  its  own,  if 
there  be  a  substratum  at  all.0  An  adequate  Sub 
stratum  would,  in  short,  necessitate  a  Substratum, 
as  without  external  limits,  so  without  internal 
interstices.  Ab  intra,  no  less  than  ab  extra,  there 
must  be  no  pure  vacuum.  The  supposition,  in 

a  Sub-Prop,  prececl.,  Postal.  §  7.  >'  Prop.  IV.  Sehol. 

c  Prop.  IV.  §  5. 


18  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

question,  would,  therefore,  be  made  in  vain ;  or, 
rather,  it  would  be  worse  than  in  vain,  and  fruitless, 
since  it  would  be  fruitful  of  very  undesired  con 
sequences. 

§  2.  As  it  is  here,  so  it  will  be  there.  Why, 
then,  should  any  one  suppose,  even  as  the  merest 
hypothesis,  that,  although  matter  have,  or  may 
have,  vacuous  spaces  interspersed  through  it,  or  in 
it,  (a  supposition  this  involved  in  the  position  of 
the  divisibility  and  moveability  of  matter,)  matter 
yet  has  no  general  boundaries  ?  Why  suppose 
divisible  and  moveable,  and,  therefore,  possibly 
vacuous,  matter  to  be  infinitely  extended  in  that 
imperfect  sense  ?  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that 
matter  is  finite  in  extension.^  What,  then,  would 
avail  such  a  blind  hypothesis  ?  What  could  avail 
the  hypothesis  of  a  plenum,  with  vacua,  but  without 
general  limits,  that  is,  without  vacuum  all  around 
the  limits  of  matter  as  a  whole,— seeing  that  the 
circumferential  spaces  of  every  internal  vacuum 
bound,  or  limit,  the  material  extension  all  round 
the  circumference — make,  in  fine,  the  matter  finite  ? 
The  necessity  of  the  concession  of  extension  finitely 
extended  in  such  respect,  makes  it  of  no  moment 
to  contend  that  the  extension  generally,  or  as  a 
whole,  is  infinite.  Extension  infinite  generally,  or 
without  general  boundaries,  but  with  interspersed 
hollownesses,  were — not  true  infinite  extension 

a  Sub- Prop,  preced.,  Dem.  §  6. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.        19 

(which  implies  fulness)  but,  at  most — infinity,  in 
number,  of  finite  extensions :  each  one  of  the 
empty  interstices  bounding,  or  limiting,  or  makiug 
finite,  the  extension  all  round  the  circumferential 
spaces.  A  single  vacuum,  indeed,  anywhere  in  the 
Material  Universe  would  destroy  plenitude  :  all  the 
lines  converging  on  the  vacuum, — great  or  little- 
would  be  stopped  by  its  circumference.  The  exten 
sion  of  the  matter  would  be  infallibly  arrested, 
whenever  the  rim,  or  superficies,  of  the  vacuum 
were  reached. 

§  3.  In  fine,  to  allege,  that  Matter,  or  (if  you 
will)  a  plenum  of  matter,  exists,  with  so  many,  or 
not  so  many,  i.e.,  infinitely  numerous,  vacua  con 
tained  in  it,  and  interspersed  throughout  it,  as  a 
whole  ;  were  simply  a  form  of  the  position,  Matter 
is  finite  in  extension.  If  matter  be  finite  in  this 
regard,  it  is  worth  no  one's  while  to  contend  for 
its  infinitude  in  the  sense  of  no  general  boundaries. 
In  fact,  accept,  or  admit,  (and  who,  after  the 
preceding  demonstration,  can  deny  ?)  the  fmiteness 
in  extent,  in  the  one  sense  ;  and  what  could  be  the 
purpose  to  be  served  in  asserting,  that  matter  is 
infinite  in  extension,  in  the  other  sense  ?  Gener 
ally,  and  to  all  practical  intents,  that  which  is 
divisible — much  more,  that  which  is  moveable,  is 
finite  in  extent. 


20  THS  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  I. 

GENERAL  SCHOLIUM  AS  TO  EXTENSION. 

§  1.  The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  or  of 
its  Substratum,  if  it  have  a  Substratum,  being 
necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other,a  and  im- 
moveable  among  themselves  : b  and  the  parts  of 
the  Material  Universe  being  divisible  from  each 
other,  and  moveable  among  themselves :  and  it 
therefore  following,  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
not  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  but 
is  finite  in  extension : c  Here  are  two  sorts  of 
extension.  The  one  sort,  that  which  the  Material 
Universe  has :  And  the  other,  the  extension  of 
Infinity  of  Extension.  And  as  Infinity  of  Exten 
sion  is  necessarily  existing,d  and  as  the  extension 
of  the  Material  Universe  must  exist,  if  it  exist,  in 
the  extension  of  Infinity  of  Extension  ;  a  part  of 
this,  or  of  its  Substratum,  if  it  have  a  Substratum, 
(part,  but  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration  ; a) 
must  penetrate  the  Material  Universe,  and  every 
atom,  even  the  minutest  atom,  of  it. 

§  2.  It  will  be  proper,  therefore,  to  distinguish 
between  these  two  kinds  of  extension.  And, 
accordingly,  let  us  confine  to  matter,  namely,  to 
the  distance  of  the  extremities  of  matter  from  each 
other,  the  name  extension;  and  apply  to  the 

a  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  2,  &  Prop.  IV.  §  5. 

b  Coroll.  from  Prop.  II.  Dem.,  &  Coroll.  under  Prop.  IV. 

c  Prop.  IV.  Sub-Prop.  Dem.  §  6.  d  Prop.  I.  §  2. 


PART  L]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       21 

extension  of  Infinity  of  Extension,  a  part  of  which 
(part,  in  the  sense  of  partial  consideration  only,a) 
penetrates  all  matter  to  the  minutest  atom,  or 
corpuscular  monad,  the  name  Expansion. 

§  3.  And,  therefore,  every  thing  which  hath 
been  proved  to  be  true  in  relation  to  that  exten 
sion  which  matter  has  not,  must  be  true  with 
regard  to  Expansion. 

SOB-SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  Penetration,  as  evidenced  in  the  foregoing 
General  Scholium,  being  postulated,  a  most  im 
portant  result  makes  its  appearance.  Infinity  of 
Extension — Expansion,  rather, — or  its  Substratum, 
(if  there  be  one,)  penetrates  matter  :  hence,  we  have 
the  fact,  and  the  doctrine,  of  Spirituality  coming 
to  the  surface.  That  which  intimately  penetrates 
matter — all  matter,  of  whatever  kind — is,  of  course, 
immaterial :  and  it  is  no  unwarrantable  step  farther 
to  take,  to  advance  that  the  Immaterial  Being  or 
Substance  (a  Substance,  on  any  supposition*3)  which 
penetrates  all  matter,  may  be  called  a  Spiritual 
Substance  :  in  one  word,  a  Spirit. 

§  2.  Therefore,  there  has  been  proved  to  be  a 
Spiritual  Substance  of  Infinity  of  Expansion.  And 
if  any  one  should  prefer  to  speak  of  such  as  being 

a  Prop.  II.  Dem.  $  -2. 

>'  Prop.  III.  §  3,  &  §  5,  with  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 


22  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  I. 

an  Infinite  Spirit,  no  fault  would,  or  righteously 
could,  be  found  with  such  a  mode  of  speaking. 

§  3.  Thus,  there  is  existing  necessarily  a  Spiritual 
Substance,  or  Spirit,  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  or, 
in  other  words,  an  Infinite  Spirit. 

§  4.  But  although  the  Spirituality  of  the 
Necessary  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  has  been 
manifested,  it  will  not  be  requisite  or  expedient  to 
introduce,  in  express  words,  the  element  of  the 
Spirituality  at  every  stage,  and  carry  it  expressly 
along  from  point  to  point.  It  shall  suffice  to 
know,  and  bear  in  mind,  that  the  principle,  in  con 
nection  with  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  is 
always  latently  present — ready,  when  necessary,  to 
be  evoked,  and  drawn  from  potentiality  into 
actuality.  The  principle  may  be  referred  to  once 
more  in  the  course  of  this  Division.  But,  at  all 
events,  the  element  shall  nowise  be  neglected 
when,  at  a  future  stage,  there  shall  be  a 
summarizing,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  the  various 
more  salient  elements  of  the  entire  demonstration.31 

PROPOSITION  V. 

There  is  necessarily  but  one  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion. 

§  1.  Infinity  of  Expansion  either  subsists  by 
itself,  or  it  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum.15  In 

a  See  the  concluding  General  Scholium,  §  4,  &c. 

b  Prop.  III.  §  1,  compared  with  Gen.  Schol.  as  to  Extens.  §  3. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       23 

both  cases  there  is  necessarily  a  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion.*  Now,  we  are  under  a  necessity  of 
inferring  from  the  existence  of  such  a  Being,  that 
there  is  but  one  such  Being. 

§  2.  For,  as  'tis  evident,  there  can  be  but  one 
Infinity  of  Expansion,  so,  on  the  supposition  that 
it  subsists  by  itself,  and  so  is  a  being,b  there  can  be 
but  one  being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion.  And,  as 
'tis  evident  there  can  no  more  be  more  than  one 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  (whatever 
that  Substratum  is)  than  there  can  be  more  than 
one  Infinity  of  Expansion  ;  and  as,  therefore,  'tis 
evident,  there  can  be  but  one  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  :  so,  on  the  supposition  that 
Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  not  without  a 
Substratum,  or  Being,0  there  can  be  but  one  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion. 

§  3.  And,  therefore,  any  one  who  asserts  he  can 
suppose  two  or  more  necessarily  existing  beings, 
each  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  is  no  more  to  be 
argued  with  than  one  who  denies,  Whatever  is,  is. 
The  denying  of  this  proposition  cannot,  indeed,  be 
regarded  as  more  curious  than  the  affirming  of  the 
other. 

§  4.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion. 

a  Prop.  III.  §  3,  &  §  4,  5,  &  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 
h  Prop.  III.  g  3,  &  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 
c  Prop.  III.  $>§  4,  5,  &  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 


24  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  I. 

DIVISION  I. 

PART  II. 
PROPOSITION  I. 

Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  existing. 

§  1.  The  truth  of  this  is  evident  from  the  same 
sort  of  consideration  as  shows  there  is  necessarily 
Infinity  of  Extension ;  to  wit,  that,  even  when  we 
endeavour  to  remove  from  our  minds  the  idea  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  that  is,  Infinity  of  Duration 
a  parte  ante  and  a  parte  post,  we  cannot,  after  all 
our  efforts,  avoid  leaving  this  idea  still  there. 

O 

Endeavour  as  much  as  we  may  to  displace  the  idea, 
that  is,  conceive  Infinity  of  Duration  a  parte  ante, 
or  a  parte  post,  non-existent,  we  shall  find,  after  a 
review  of  our  thoughts,  that  to  do  so  is  utterly 
beyond  our  power. 

§  2.  And  since,  even  when  we  would  remove 
the  conception  of  Infinity  of  Duration  from  the 
mind,  we  necessarily  leave  the  conception  of  it,  as 
existing,  behind ;  'tis  manifest,  that  Infinity  of 
Duration  necessarily  exists :  Because,  Every  thing 
the  existence  of  ivhich  we  cannot  but  believe,  is 
necessarily  existing. 

§  3.  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  then,  necessarily 
existing. 


PART  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     25 

PROPOSITION  II. 
Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  indivisible. 

PROLEGOMENON. 

This  Proposition  is  equivalent  to  another :  to 
wit,  The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Duration  are  necessarily 
indivisible  from  each  other ;  and  indivisible  really 

or  mentally. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  As  was  laid  down  before,  what  is  divisible 
may  be  divided  ;  and  that  which  is  divided  from 
something  else  must  have  superficies,  every  way, 
and  be  separated  from  the  other  thing,  be  the 
distance  ever  so  small.  There  is  no  difference 
between  being  divided  and  being  separated. 

§  2.  Then,  divisibility  meaning  possibility  of 
separation  :  Because  the  parts  of  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion  are  necessarily  inseparable,  they  are  necessarily 
indivisible. 

§  3.  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  then,  necessarily 
indivisible. 

COROLLARY  FROM  PROPOSITION  II. 
Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  immoveable. 

PROLEGOMENON. 

The  Corollary  is  tantamount  to  this  proposition, 
The  parts  of  Infinity  of  Duration  are  necessarily 
immoveable  among  themselves,  really  or  mentally. 


26  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  Motion  of  the  parts,  among  themselves,  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  would  necessarily  involve 
separation  of  its  parts.  And  its  parts  being 
necessarily  incapable  of  separation, a  are,  therefore, 
necessarily  immoveable  among  themselves. 

§  2.  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  then,  necessarily 
immoveable. 

PROPOSITION  III. 

There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration. 

§  1.  Either,  Infinity  of  Duration  exists,  or  is 
conceived  to  exist,  without  a  substratum ;  or,  it 
exists  not,  or  is  conceived  not  to  exist,  without 
a  Substratum. 

§  2.  First,  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  by  itself, 
it  is  a  substance.  For  should  any  one  deny  that  it 
is  a  substance,  if  it  so  exist ;  we  shall  prove,  past 
contradiction,  the  absurdity  of  the  denial,  by  just 
demanding  the  reason  -why  Infinity  of  Duration  is 
not  a  substance,  if  it  exist  without  a  substratum, 
or  by  itself. 

§  3.  And  therefore,  as  there  is  necessarily  In 
finity  of  Duration ,b  there  is,  supposing  it  to  exist 
by  itself,  a  substance  or  being  of  Infinity  of 

a  Part  II.  Prop.  ii.  Dem.  §  2.  b  Part  II.  Prop.  i.  §  2. 


PART  II.]     THE   BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     27 

Duration  necessarily  existing  :  Infinity  of  Duration 
and  the  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  being 
identical,  not  different. 

§  4.  Secondly,  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  not 
without  a  Substratum,  there  is  a  Substance  or 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration.  For  the  word 
Substance  or  Being  can  never,  it  is  certain,  stand 
for  anything  having  a  better  claim  to  the  applica 
tion  of  the  term  than  such  Substratum. 

§  5.  And  as  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily 
existing,*  so  there  is  necessarily  a  Substance  or 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  on  the  supposition 
that  it  exists  not  without  a  Substratum. 

§  6.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration. 

PROPOSITION  IV. 

The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily, 
of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  1.  As  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily 
indivisible,13  so  it  is  necessarily  of  the  truest  unity. 
For,  if  what  is  necessarily  indivisible,  even  by 
thought,  be  not  of  the  truest  unity,  what  unity 
consists  in  is  altogether  unintelligible. 

§  2.  And  since  Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily 

*  Part  II.  Prop.  i.  §  2.  b  Part  II.  Prop.  ii.  Dem.  §  2. 


THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

of  the  truest  unity,  it  is,  also,  of  the  utmost 
simplicity.  Because,  we  can  have  no  conception 
of  what  is  in  simplicity,  that  is  not  in  unity 
caused  by  a  thing  being  necessarily  indivisible. 

§  3.  And  as  there  necessarily  is  a  being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  on  the  supposition  that 
Infinity  of  Duration  exists  without  a  substratum,a 
so,  this  supposed,  the  being  is  necessarily  of  unity 
and  simplicity. 

§  4.  If  Infinity  of  Duration  exist  not  without  a 
Substratum  ;  that  the  Substratum  is  of  the  truest 
unity  and  utmost  simplicity,  is  a  thing  not  difficult 
to  be  demonstrated. 

§  5.  For,  that  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  is  no  more  divisible  than  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion,  is  a  self-evident  truth.  Therefore,  because 
Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  indivisible,b  so  is 
the  Substratum. 

§  6.  And  Infinity  of  Duration,  because  neces 
sarily  indivisible,  being  necessarily  of  unity  and 
simplicity,0  its  Substratum,  for  the  same  reason,  is 
so  likewise. 

§  7.  And   as    there    necessarily   is    a    Beino-    of 

T       /•>  ® 

Infinity  of  Duration,  on  the  supposition  that 
Infinity  of  Duration  exists  not  without  a  Sub 
stratum/1  so,  this  supposed,  the  Being  is  necessarily 
of  unity  and  simplicity. 

a  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  3.  c  Supra,  §§  1  &  2. 

b  Part  II.  Prop.  ii.  Dem.  §  2.  «i  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  5. 


PART  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     29 

§  8.   Then,  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is, 
necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity. 


SCHOLIUM  I. 

The  Substratum  of  Infinity  of   Duration    bein^ 

•/ 

necessarily  indivisible,*  that  is,  its  parts  being 
necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other ;  it  is  a 
necessary  consequence,  that  the  thing,  the  parts  of 
which  are  divisible  from  each  other,  is  not  such 
Substratum,  nor  any  part  thereof. 

COROLLARY. 

It  is  a  corollary  from  the  proposition,  The  parts 
of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration  are 
necessarily  indivisible  from  each  other,  that  they  are 
necessarily  immoveable  among  themselves  :  Just  as 
Infinity  of  Duration  is  necessarily  immoveable, 
because  necessarily  indivisible. 

SCHOLIUM  II. 

And  the  parts  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  being  necessarily  immoveable  among 
themselves  ;b  it  is  a  necessary  consequence,  that 
the  thing,  the  parts  of  which  are  moveable  "///«//// 
themselves,  is  not  such  Substratum,  nor  any  part 
thereof. 

a  Part  II.  Prop.  iv.  §  5.  b  Coroll.  preced. 


30  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

SUB-PKOPOSITIOX. 

The  Material  Universe  is  finite  in  duration. 
PROLEGOMENON. 

Just  as  it  will  be  maintained,  that  the  Material 
Universe  is  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Extension, 
if  it  be  contended  that  the  Material  Universe  is 
truly  of  Infinity  of  Extension  ;  so,  it  will  be  held, 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  if  it  be  alleged  that  the 
Material  Universe  is,  of  itself,  of  Infinity  of 
Duration,  d  parte  ante.  To  contend  that  the 
Material  Universe  is,  of  itself,  of  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion,  a  parte  ante,  is  tantamount  to  holding  that 
there  is  an  indissoluble  bond  which  we  are  under 
a  necessity  of  conceiving  ;  so  that  the  Infinity  of 
Duration  cannot  be  conceived  to  have  existed 
without  the  Material  Universe,  the  correlate.  Now, 
such  a  position,  regarding  an  indissoluble  bond  in 
our  conceptions  between  Matter  and  Duration, 
would  be  held  in  the  face  of  the  notorious  and 
decisive  fact,  that  no  such  bond  has  any  existence 
whatsoever  in  our  conceptions.  But  not  to  rest  on 
the  undoubted  and  readily  evincible  fact  in 
psychological  experience,  that  the  human  mind  can 
most  easily  conceive  the  non-existence,  from 
Infinity  of  Duration,  past  or  to  come,  of  Matter ; 
—no  bond,  which  can  anywise  represent  a  necessary 


PART  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      31 

bond  or  relation,  can  be  imagined,  other  than  the 
relation  between  the  two  of  Mode  and  Substratum, 
whereby  the  Infinity  of  Duration  stands  for  Mode, 
(Quality,  Property,  Attribute,  anything,  in  fact, 
you  like,)  and  the  Matter  bears  to  the  other  the 
relation  of  Substratum  or  Substance.  Tis  posited, 
in  fine,  by  the  maintairiers  of  the  fact  of  the 
indissoluble  bond  in  our  conceptions  between  the 
Infinity  of  Duration  and  the  Matter,  that  the 
Infinity  of  Duration  cannot  be — id  cst,  cannot  be 
conceived  to  be — without  the  Matter,  because  this 
is  the  Substratum  of  that,  the  Mode. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  If,  then,  it  should  be  held,  that  the  finitely  a 
extended  Material  Universe  is  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  or  a  part  thereof;  (which 
will  noticeably  be  held,  if  it  be  alleged  that  the 
Material  Universe  is,  of  itself,  of  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion,  ct,  parte  ante;)  to  put  to  the  proof  whether  or 
not  the  Material  Universe  can  be  such  Substratum, 
or  a  part  thereof,  we  have  but  to  ask,  Arc  the  parts 
cf  the  Material  Universe  divisible  from  each  other  ? 
and,  Are  they  moveable  among  themselves  ?  For 
if  they  be  so  divisible  and  moveable,  the  Material 
Universe  cannot  be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration,  nor  any  part  thereof, lj  the  Substratum 

a  Part  I.  Prop.  iv.  Sub-Prop. 

b  Part  II.  Schol.  I.  &  n.  under  Prop.  iv. 


32  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  I. 

having  110  parts  in  the  sense  of  capability  of 
separation.* 

§  2.  Now,  we  know,  certainly,  that  some  parts 
of  the  Material  Universe  are  divisible  from  each 
other;  and  that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our 
minds  could  be  directed  is  as  divisible,  as  are  the 
parts  which  we  certainly  know  are  divisible,  is  the 
conclusion  to  which  the  rules  of  philosophy  entitle 
us  to  come. 

§  3.  Then,  the  Material  Universe  cannot  be  the 
Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any  part 
thereof. 

§  4.  Again,  we  know,  certainly,  that  some  parts 
of  the  Material  Universe  are  moveable  among 
themselves;  and  that  every  part  of  it  to  which  our 
minds  could  be  directed  is  as  moveable.  as  are  the 
parts  which  we  certainly  know  are  moveable,  is 
(in  this,  as  well  as  in  the  other  case)  the  conclusion 
to  which  we  are  entitled  to  come. 

§  5.  Then,  again,  the  Material  Universe  cannot 
be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  nor  any 
part  thereof. 

§  6.  That  is,  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in 
duration.  For,  were  it  of  Infinity  of  Duration, 
it  would  be  the  Substratum  thereof,  or,  at  least, 
a  part  of  the  Substratum.  But  it  being  not 
that  Substratum,  nor  any  part  of  it :  Therefore, 
it,  of  itself,  is  not  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  but 

;i  Part  II.  Prop.  iv.  §  5. 


PART  II.     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      33 

is  finite  in  duration.      So   it   began   sometime   to 
be. 

§  7.  Thus,  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in 
duration. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  To  state,  in  few  words,  the  result  of  the 
whole  reasoning  on  the  topic  introduced  by  the 
Sub-Proposition,  set  down  above :  The  truth  is, 
that,  while  Matter,  or  (if  you  prefer  it)  the 
Material  Universe,  is  emphatically  the  divisible, 
and  the  moveable ;  Duration,  or  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion,  is  the  subject  to  which  the  predicates,  divisible, 
moveable,  are  totally  inapplicable.  The  ideas  of 
the  two  things,  Duration,  and  divisibility  by 
separability  of  parts,  are  absolutely  incompatible. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  Matter  is  simply  another 
word  for  that  which  is  divisible  in  every  sense,  or 
in  every  possible  way.  How,  then,  can  the  one — 
that  which  is  so  divisible — be  so  bound  up  with 
the  other — that  to  which  the  idea  of  division,  or 
divisibility,  of  any  sort,  is  so  utterly  repugnant— 
as  that  the  two  tilings  must  be  always  associated 
together  ?  The  plain  truth  is,  that  the  notion  of 
such  junction  is  purely  preposterous. 

§  2.  When,  therefore,  one  shall  be  met  with 
maintaining, — or  consequentially  implying,  by  any 
position  he  may  maintain, — that  the  Material 
Universe,  as  a  substance,  or  existence  of  any  sort, 


34  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR       [Div.  I. 

the  parts  of  which  are  divisible  from  each  other, 
and  moveable  among  themselves,  in  every  variety 
of  way ;  can  be,  and  is,  the  substratum  of  that 
other  thing,  Duration,  even  Infinity  of  Duration, 
to  which  it  is  ridiculous  to  think  of  applying  the 
notion  of  divisibility  at  all,  (far  less,  moveability  of 
parts  from  parts  : — )  what  are  we  to  make  of  the 
allegation  ?  Examine  well,  and,  if  it  be  clear  that 
the  propounder  of  the  dictum  is  seriously  in 
earnest,  then  there  is  plainly  a  case,  not  for  any 
doctor  of  philosophy,  but  for  a  doctor  of  medicine, 
exclusively  and  imperatively.  And  as  a  philosopher 
labouring  under  a  manifest  intellectual  delusion 
has  never  been  found,  in  any  age  or  country,  to 
be  the  most  eligible  company ;  the  sooner  so 
unprofitable — perhaps,  so  dangerous — companion 
ship  is  dissolved,  the  better  for  the  party  whose 
headpiece  is  yet  unshattered  and  entire. 

COROLLARY  FROM  SUB-PROPOSITION. 

Every  succession  of  finitely  extended  substances 
is  finite  in  duration. 

§  1.  Should  it,  now,  be  asserted  that  any  suc 
cession,  or  successions,  of  substances  finite  in 
extension  ;  finite  in  extension,  for  —  not  to  say, 
that  there  can  be  but  one  Substance,  or  Being,  of 

o' 

Infinity  of  Extension, a — a  succession  of  substances 

a  Part  I.  Prop,  v.,  &  §  3,  Gen.  Schol.  under  Prop.  iv. 


PART  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     35 

of  Infinity  of  Extension  were  we  know  not  what : 
Should  it  be  asserted,  that  any  successions,  or  any 
one  succession,  of  substances — say,  of  animals,  or 
vegetables,  or  minerals,  or  all  together,  or  of 
worlds,  or  of  systems  of  worlds,  or  systems  of 
germs  of  worlds — is  of  Infinity  of  Duration  ;  the 
falsity  of  the  assertion  is,  immediately  and  abund 
antly,  apparent.  For,  seeing  that  the  whole  finitely 
extended  Material  Universe,  itself,  is  finite  in 
duration, a  every  succession  of  substances  which 
are  in  the  Material  Universe  (and,  of  course,  there 
can  be  no  substances  finite  in  extension  which  are 
out  of  it)  must,  therefore,  be  finite  in  duration, 
too. 

§  2.  Should  it  be  pertinaciously  alleged  yet 
farther,  that — not  substances  in  the  Material 
Universe,  but — such  a  world,  as  one  actually 
existing  whole,  is  but  an  item  in  a  succession  of 
worlds,  or  germs  of  worlds,  having  no  beginning, 
or  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  a  parte  ante  :  then, 
the  ready  answer  would  be,  that  a  succession  (of 
whatever  kind)  does,  most  obviously,  involve 
motion,  or  things  moved  ;  since  successions,  or  but 
a  single  course  of  succession,  implies,  by  the  very 
nature  thereof,  motion, — things  succeeding  each 
other,  being  things  moved  in  relation  to  each  other. 
Now,  things  (successions,  as  you  will,  of  motes,  or 
molehills,  or  mountains,  or  worlds,  or  systems  of 

a  Sub-Prop,  preced. 


36  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

worlds,  or  systems  of  germs  of  worlds)  which  are 
moved,  cannot  be  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration,  nor  any  part  of  it : a  and,  therefore,  can 
not  be  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  but  are  tied  down 
to  finiteness  in  duration.1*  But  an  answer,  over 
whelmingly  potent,  is  at  hand,  as  a  preliminary  bar 
to  any  such  supposition  as  is  set  down.  The  over 
whelming  preliminary  is  this :  After  all,  such  a 
succession  of  Universes  as  that  ex  hypothesi 
advanced,  would  be  but  our  own  old  Material 
Universe,  itself,  in  disguise.  The  supposed  succes 
sion  of  worlds  emerging,  one  by  one,  from  the  depths 
of  eternity,  would  be  nothing  more  than  the 
Material  Universe  under  one  of  its  conceivable  (if 
it  be  conceivable)  or  possible  phases,  or  as  a  system 
of  primordia  rerum  renewing  itself,  phoenix-like, 
over  and  over  again.  And  we  have  seen,  that  the 
Material  Universe  itself  is  finite  in  duration.13 

§  3.  Every  succession  of  material  substances,  is, 
then,  finite  in  duration. 

PROPOSITION  V. 

Iliere  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Duration. 

§  1.  Infinity  of  Duration  either  exists  without  a 
substratum,  or,  it  exists  not  without  a  Substratum  : c 

a  Part  II.  Prop.  iv.  Schol.  n.          b  Supra,  Sub-Prop.  Dem.  §  6. 
cPart  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  1. 


PART  1 1.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       37 

And  in  either  case,  there  necessarily  is  a  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration.*  And  we  are  under  the 
necessity  of  inferring  from  the  existence  of  such  a 
Being,  that  there  can  be  no  more  than  one  such 
Being. 

§  2.  Because  'tis  manifest  there  can  be  but  one 
Injinity  of  Duration,  therefore,  on  the  supposition 
that  it  exists  without  a  substratum,  and,  so,  is  a 
being,b  there  can  be  but  one  being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration.  And  because  'tis  as  manifest  there  can 
be  but  one  Substratum  of  Injinity  of  Duration 
(whatever  the  Substratum  is),  as  that  there  can  be 
but  one  Infinity  of  Duration ;  and  because,  there 
fore,  'tis  manifest  there  can  be  but  one  such  Sub 
stratum  :  therefore,  on  the  supposition  that  Infinity 
of  Duration  exists  not  without  a  Substratum,  or 
Beinor0  there  can  be  but  one  Beino;  of  Infinity 

o '  o  «y 

of  Duration. 

§  3.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Duration. 

••>•  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  i$  3  &  §  5.  ''Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  3. 

0  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  4. 


38  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

DIVISION    I. 

PART  III. 
PROPOSITION  I. 

There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  1.  This  will  be  demonstrated,  if  it  be  proved, 
that  the  necessarily  existing  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion,  and  the  necessarily  existing  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  are  not  different  Beings,  but 
are  identical. 

§  2.  Now,  either,  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists 
by  itself,  and,  then,  it  is  a  Being  :  a  and,  Infinity 
of  Duration  exists  by  itself,  and,  then,  it  is  a 
Being.1' 

§  3.  Or,  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  not 
without  a  Substratum,  or  Being : c  and,  Infinity  of 
Duration  exists  not  without  a  Substratum,  or 
Being.d 

§  4.  To  take  the  former  alternative.  Every 
part  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  being  in  every  part 
of  Infinity  of  Duration,  every  part  of  the  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is  in  every  part  of  the 

a  Part  I.  Prop.  iii.  §  1  &  §  3,  compared  with  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 

b  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  1  &§  3. 

c  Part  I.  Prop.  iii.  §  1  &  §  5,  and  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 

d  Part  II.  Prop.  iii.  §  1  &  §  4. 


PART  III.J     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     39 

Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration.  And  every  part 
of  Infinity  of  Duration  being  in  every  part  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion,  every  part  of  the  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration  is  in  every  part  of  the  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion.  Part,  in  all  the  cases,  in 
the  sense  of  partial  consideration  only. 

§  5.  To-wit,  The  whole  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
being  in  the  whole  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  the 
whole  of  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is  in 
the  whole  of  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 
And,  The  whole  of  Infinity  of  Duration  being  in 
the  whole  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  the  whole  of 
the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is  in  the  whole  of 
the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion.  Whole,  in 
every  instance,  but  as  a  figure. 

§  6.  And  this  being,  most  manifestly,  impossible, 
if  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  the 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  be  different ;  it 
necessarily  follows,  that  they  are  identical. 

§  7.  That  is,  Infinity  of  Expansion  is  Infinity 
of  Duration,  and  Infinity  of  Duration  is  Infinity 
of  Expansion.  Which  conclusion  being  plainly 
absurd ;  and  it  necessarily  following  irom  the 
supposition,  that  Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  by 
itself,  and  that  Infinity  of  Duration  subsists  by 
itself,  it  is  proved,  that  the  supposition  itself  is 
absurd.  Therefore,  Infinity  of  Expansion  cannot 
exist  by  itself,  and  Infinity  of  Duration  cannot 
exist  by  itself. 


40  THE  ARGUMENT,   A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

§  8.  Then,  to  turn  to  the  other  alternative, 
Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  not  without  a  Sub 
stratum,  or  Being :  and  Infinity  of  Duration 
subsists  not  without  a  Substratum,  or  Being. 

§  9.  And,  as  every  part  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
is  in  every  part  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  therefore, 
every  part  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion  is  in  every  part  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity 
of  Duration.  And,  as  every  part  of  Infinity  of 
Duration  is  in  every  part  of  Infinity  of  Expansion, 
therefore,  every  part  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity 
of  Duration  is  in  every  part  of  the  Substratum  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion.  Part,  but  in  the  sense  of 
partial  consideration. 

§10.  That  is,  The  whole  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
being  in  the  whole  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  the 
whole  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
is  in  the  whole  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Duration.  And,  The  whole  of  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion  being  in  the  whole  of  Infinity  of  Expansion, 
the  whole  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of  Duration 
is  in  the  whole  of  the  Substratum  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion.  Whole,  in  all  the  cases,  used  figura 
tively. 

§11.  And  this  being,  most  manifestly,  impossible, 
if  the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion,  and  the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of 
Duration,  be  different,  it  follows  necessarily,  that 
they  are  identical  :  To- wit,  the  Substratum,  or 


PART  III.]      THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     41 

Being,  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is,  also,  the  Sub 
stratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  12.  And  this  being  proved,  it  is  demonstrated, 
there  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion,  and  Infinity  of  Duration.* 

§  13.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  Combinations  of  the  alternatives  might  have 
been  made  other  than  those  presented  in  Sections 
2  &  3,  in  the  preceding  Proposition.  Two  sets  of 
combinations  are  there  given  ;  but  a  third  set  might 
have  been  added.  It  is  not  thought  necessary, 
however,  to  state  the  additional  combinations  of 
alternatives,  in  a  formal  manner,  and  as  positions 
demanding  consideration — far  less,  rigid  discussion. 
Those  other  combinations  of  alternative  proposi 
tions,  going  to  constitute  the  third  set,  would  be. 
at  best,  only  stupid  and  inept  methods  of  saying 
virtually  the  things  over  ao-ain  which  were  said 

J  O  O 

already. 

§  2.  Exempli  gratia,  if  one  should  contend  that 
Infinity  of  Expansion  subsists  by  itself,  and  that 
such  is  to  be  combined  with  Infinity  of  Duration, 
which  exists  not  without  a  Substratum,  and  which 
has  for  its  Substratum  the  self-subsisting  Infinity 

a  Supra,  §  1. 


42  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

of  Expansion  :  what  were  this,  at  bottom,  but  a 
way  of  imperfectly  and  clumsily  stating  what 
comes,  and  amounts,  to  the  same  thing  as  the 
conclusion  actually  arrived  at,  by  a  more  unobjec 
tionable  method,a — The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion  is,  also,  the  Substratum,  or  Being,  of  Infinity 
of  Duration  ? 

§  3.  Again,  were  one  to  simply  reverse  matters, 
and  urge  that  the  Infinity  of  Duration  it  is  which 
exists  by  itself,  and  that  the  Infinity  of  Expansion 
it  is  which  subsists  not  without  a  Substratum,  the 
Substratum  being  the  Infinity  of  Duration :  what, 
in  the  way  of  conclusion,  would  be  really  advanced 
(so  far  as  there  is  truly  any  comprehensible  sense 
in  the  statement)  more  than  what  is  alleged  already 
when  it  was  said,  as  the  demonstrated  conclusion, b 
There  is,  necessarily,  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion,  and  Infinity  of  Duration  ? 

§  4.  Besides,  and  as  the  preliminary  fatal  objec 
tion  to  such  supposita  (which  have  undoubtedly 
their  own  inherent  and  ineradicable  impossibilities  :) 
No  good  reason  can  be  given  why  either  of  these 
arbitrary,  and  ungainly,  combinations  should  be 
preferred  to  the  other.  Why  should  one  be  allowed 
to  hold,  that  Expansion  can  subsist,  or  exist,  by 
itself,  more  than  Duration  can  be  self-subsistent,  or 
self-existent :  or,  that  Duration  can  exist,  or  subsist, 
by  itself,  more  than  Expansion  can  do  so  ?  It  is 

a  Vide  preced.  Prop.,  §  11.  b  Vide,  ibid.,  §  12. 


PART  III.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     43 

absolutely  indispensable  that  a  rational  pretext 
should  be  set  up,  or  laid  down,  for  the  preference, — 
since,  Whatever  (a  thought  in  your  mind,  as  much 
as  one  in  mine,  or  his)  Whatever  begins  to  be  must 
have  a  cause.  And  no  rational  pretext  whatever 
can  be  given  in  this  case,  i.e.,  for  a  preference  of 
the  one  unseemly  combination  to  the  other.  Try 
all  you  can  to  hit  upon  a  sufficient  reason,  and, 
in  the  end,  confess  the  truth  that  'tis  really  so  :  no 
reason  for  a  preference  is  discoverable. 


PROPOSITION  II. 

The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity 
of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and 
simplicity. 

§  1.  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is, 
necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity.8  And,  the 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of 
unity  and  simplicity.13  And  these  two  being  not 
different,  but  identical,0  it  follows,  that  the  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration 
is,  necessarily,  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

§  2.  Then,  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Infinity  of  Duration  is,  necessarily,  of  unity 
and  simplicity. 

a  Part  I.  Prop.  iv.  §  8,  compared  with  Gen.  Schol.  §  3. 
b  Part  II.  Prop.  iv.  §  8.  c  Part  III.  Prop.  i.  §  11. 


44  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  I. 

PROPOSITION  III. 

TJiere  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 

§  1.  There  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion.*  And  the  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  being  also  the  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Duration,13  it  follows,  that  there  is,  necessarily,  but 
one  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity 
of  Duration. 

§  2.  Then,  there  is,  necessarily,  but  one  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Infinity  of  Duration. 


SCHOLIUM. 

We  may,  for  an  instant,  evoke  here  the  always 
latent  principle  or  element  of  Spirituality.0  It  has 
been  shewn,  that  there  is  an  Immaterial  or  Spiritual 
Substance,  or  Being,  of  Infinity  of  Expansion ;  ° 
and  there  is  but  one  such  Substance  or  Beiug.d 
It  has  been  demonstrated,  too,  that  the  Being 
of  Infinity  of  Expansion  is,  also,  of  Infinity 
of  Duration,6  and  that  there  is  but  one  such.f 
Consequently,  as  there  is  one,  so  there  is 
but  one,  Immaterial  or  Spiritual  Substance,  or 

a  Part  I.  Prop.  v.  §  4.  J  Part  I.  Prop,  v.,  and  Gen.  Schol. 

b  Part  III.  Prop.  i.  §  11.  e  Part  III.  Prop.  i. 

c  Part  I.  Sub-Prop.,  Sub-Schol.       *  Part  III.  Prop.  iii. 


PART  III.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     45 

Being,  of   Infinity   of  Expansion   and   Infinity   of 
Duration. 

EPILEGOMENON. 

Here  endeth  the  consideration,  as  of  the  BEING, 
so  of  the  Natural,  or  Physical  Modes  or  Attributes. 
Those  Attributes  are  also  Absolute  and  Simple. 


46  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  II. 


DIVISION    II. 
THE  INTELLECTUAL   ATTRIBUTES. 

PART   I. 
PROPOSITION. 

The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  is,  necessarily,  Intelligent, 
and  All-knowing. 

PROLEGOMENA. 

§  1.  To  try  to  define  Intelligence,  would  be  a 
vain  effort.  That  which  Consciousness,  directly 
and  always,  testifies,  while  thought  goes  on,  is  best 
evidenced  by  Consciousness  itself.  Thought  is 
best  explained  by  being  left  without  endeavour 
at  explanation. 

§  2.  The  same  holds  with  regard  to  knowing. 
What  to  know  is,  or  essentially  involves,  is  best 
come  at  by  keeping  silence  to  the  outward  ear, 
and  letting  the  voices  within  be  alone  heard. 

§  3.  If  you  understand  wherein  Intelligence, 
Thought,  Consciousness,  Knowledge,  as  subjective, 
or  without  reference  to  aught  beyond  the  mind 
itself,  consists, — farther  than  Consciousness  itself 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       47 

doth  immediately  testify ;  thrice  happy  and 
fortunate,  as  well  as  most  peculiar,  are  you,  who 
ever  you  be.  If,  however,  none  of  us  can  ascend 
higher  up,  or  go  farther  in,  than  the  testimony 
itself  of  Consciousness ;  'tis  because  the  secret  in 
the  Cogito  is  the  ultimate  to  us  all. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  Now,  that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  In 
finity  of  Expansion,  and  of  Duration,  is  Intelligent, 
will  not  be  a  thing  very  difficult  to  demonstrate. 
For  Intelligence  either  began  to  be,  or  it  never 
began  to  be. 

§  2.  That  it,  absolutely  speaking,  never  began 
to  be,  is  evident  in  this,  that  if  it  began  to  be, 
in  the  sense  of  there  never  having  been  any 
Intelligence  whatever  before,  it  must  have  had 
a  cause ;  for,  Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have 
a  cause.  And  the  cause  of  Intelligence  must  be 
of  Intelligence  ;  for,  there  having  been  no  Intelli 
gence  whatever  before,  What  is  not  of  Intelligence 
cannot  make  Intelligence  begin  to  be.  Therefore, 
if  Intelligence  began  to  be,  there  was  Intelligence 
before  there  was  Intelligence.  Now,  Intelligence 

O  O 

being,  before  Intelligence  began  to  be,  is  a  contra 
diction.  And  this  absurdity  following  from  the 
supposition,  that  Intelligence  began  to  be,  it  is 
proved,  that  Intelligence  never  began  to  be  :  to- 
wit,  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration. 


-iS  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     Div.  II. 

§  3.  And  as  Intelligence  is  of  Infinity  of  Dura 
tion,  and  supposes  a  Being:  And  no  succession  of 
substances,  or  beings,  is  of  Infinity  of  Duration : a 
It  necessarily  follows,  that  there  is  one  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Duration  which  is  of  Intelligence.  And 
as  there  is  but  One  Being  of  Infinity  of  Duration  :  b 
and  this  Being  is  of  Simplicity  : c  and  is  also  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion : d  It  follows,  that  the 
Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and 
of  Duration  is  necessarily  of  Intelligence. 

§  4.  And  that  this  Being  is  All-knowing,  is  no 
inference  from  the  proposition,  that  the  Simple, 
Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration  is  necessarily  of  Intelligence,  for  it  is, 
indeed,  implied  by  such  proposition :  A  Being  of 
Intelligence  who  is  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration,  is  convertible  with  an  All-knowing 
Being. 

§  5.  Then,  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  is,  necessarily, 
Intelligent,  and  All-knowing. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  being  Intelligent,6  is  a 
Mind,  a  Mind  conscious  of  Itself.  An  intelligent 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Coroll.  from  Sub- Prop. 

b  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Prop.  v.  §  3.         c  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Prop.  iv.  §  8. 

d  Div.  I.  Part  iii.  Prop.  I.  §  11.      e  Dem,,  prceced. 


PART  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      49 

being  that  is  not  a  mind,  being  all  the  same  as  an 
intelligent  being  that  is  not,  in  any  proper  sense 
of  the  term,  intelligent :  And  a  mind  which  is  not 
conscious  of  itself,  being  just  a  mind  which  is  not 
deserving  of  the  name  of  mind  at  all. 

§  2.  Perception  without  the  power  of  apperception 
—Consciousness  of  thoughts,  without  there  being- 
thought  objective  to  the  subjective  thought  which  is 
conscious ;  would  be  110  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  a  mind,  in  any  thorough  sense  of  the  term 
standing  for  the  true  idea  of  a  Mind.*  To  be  con 
scious  of  consciousness,  is  to  have  the  mind,  as 
conscious  subject,  and  the  objective  thought  of 
which  the  mind  is  conscious  :  this  much,  at  the 
least,  is  implied  in  the  very  being  of  thinking  with 
consciousness. 

DIVISION  II. 

PART  II. 
PROPOSITION. 

The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  is, 
'i i ecessa rily ,  A ll-powe rful. 

§  1.  This  must  be  granted,  if  it  be  shown,  that 
the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  made  matter 
begirt  to  be. 

a  Vide,  infra,  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv.  Dem.  §  14,  aliosq;  loc. 
4 


50  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  II. 

§  2.  Then,  as  the  Material  Universe  is  finite  in 
duration, a  or  began  to  be,  it  must  have  had  a  cause  ; 
for,  Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause. 
And  that  cause  must  be,  in  one  respect  or  other, 
the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing ; b  inas 
much  as,  what  being,  or  cause,  other  than,  or 
independent  of,  that  Being,  could  there  be  ? 
And  therefore,  that  Beinsj  made  matter  begin 

7  O  O 

to  be. 

§  3.  The  momenta  expressed,  or  implied,  in  the 
proof  are  these : — The  Material  Universe  is  finite 
in  duration,a  or  it  began  to  be.  Whatever  begins 
to  be  must  have  a  cause :  Therefore,  the  Material 
Universe  had  a  cause.  Besides  the  Simple,  Sole, 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration, 
there  was — ere  the  Material  Universe  began  to  be 
— no  substance  or  being :  at  any  rate,  none 
admissible  on  this  platform.  Whereon  no  sub 
stance  or  being  is  introducible  without  sufficient 
warrant  in  the  premises, — to  wit,  the  previously 
established  posita,  or  supi^osita  having  independent 
necessary  supports.  Therefore  there  existed  no 
Substance  or  Being  to  be  the  cause  of  the  Material 
Universe,  other  than  the  necessarily  existing 
Intelligent  Substance  or  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  Duration.  Therefore,  again,  this 
Substance  or  Being  was,  and  must  have  been,  the 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Sub-Prop.  *  Supra,  Part  i. 


PART  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      51 

very  Cause,  or  Creator,  of  the  Material  Universe, 
or  all  matter. 

§  4.  By  the  common  consent  of  philosophers 
who  have  flourished  since  men  have  been  familiar 
ized  with  the  idea  of  Creation,  in  the  strict  and 
proper  sense,  (in  the  sense,  that  is,  of  a  creating 
being  simply  the  making  begin  to  be  ofivhat  before 
ivas  not  /)  it  has  been  agreed,  that  to  make  matter 
begin  to  be, — in  other  words,  to  create  matter,— 
would  evince  the  possession  of  unlimited  power,  or 
all  power,  not  involving  any  contradiction,  or 
impossibility,  or  absurdity  of  any  kind.  For  good 
reason,  did  the  philosophers,  nemine  contradicente, 
so  agree.  If  true  creation  do  not  prove  all-power- 
fulness, — this  can  by  no  means  be  proved  at  all. 
But  Creation  is  the  highest  conceivable  exercise  of 
power.  Creation  is,  in  truth,  the  test,  and  the 
sign,  of  Omnipotence.  In  fine,  .the  Being  who 
created  all  Matter,  namely,  all  the  visible,  or  (as  it 
is  called)  gross  matter,  and  all  the  particles,  atoms, 
sperms,  elements,  however  subtile,  visible  or  in- 

O  *  * 

visible,  solid  or  imponderable,  of  matter  as  men 
see  it ; — that  Being  can  do  all  possible  things.  No 
truth  can  be  plainer. 

§  5.  And  it  being  shown,  that  the  Being  in 
question  did  make  matter  begin  to  be,  it  must  be 
granted,  that  that  Being  is,  necessarily,  All- 
powerful.8' 

a  Supra,  §§  1,  2,  &c. 


52  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  II. 

§  6.  Then,  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Extension  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  is, 
necessarily,  All-powerful. 


DIVISION   II. 

PART  III. 
PROPOSITION. 

The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  ivho  is  All-knowing,  and 
All-powerful,  is,  necessarily,  entirely  Free. 

§  1.  This  will  be  evinced,  if  it  be  manifested, 
that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  and  All- 
powerful,  made  motion  begin  to  be. 

§  2.  Now,  of  all  the  corporeal  substances  in 
motion,  none  of  them  belongs  to  a  succession  of 
Infinity  of  Duration,  every  succession  of  corporeal 
substances  being  finite  in  duration.81  And  the 
moving  substances  being  all  finite  in  duration,  or 
having  begun  sometime  to  be,  they  must  have  had 
a  cause  ;  for,  Whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a 
cause.  And  no  first  cause  can  be  assigned,  or  even 
thought  of,  other  than  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All- 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Coroll.  from  Sub-Prop. 


PART  III.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      53 

knowing,*  and  All-powerful. b  Therefore,  this  Being 
made  moving  substances,  or  motion,  begin  to  be. 

§  3.  No  philosopher,  of  any  age,  was  ever  known 
to  call  in  question  the  position,  that  the  Being 
causing,  or  making  begin  to  be,  all  motion,  or 
motion  absolutely,  is  Free,  or  must  be  supposed  to 
be  Free, — Free  of  all  outward  or  extraneous 
influence,  i.e.,  in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word.  To 
be  the  cause  of  all  motion — to  originate  absolute 
motion, — is,  and  has  universally  been,  allowed  to 
be  the  best  possible  test,  and  sign,  of  the  posses 
sion  of  true  Freeness.  There  is  the  common  con 
sent  of  philosophers  :  and  there  is  the  sufficient 
reason  for  the  universality  of  doctrine. 

§  4.  Motion  involves  the  existence  of  bodies, 
and,  so,  of  matter.  If  there  were  no  bodies,  there 
could  lie  no  motion  : — at  any  rate,  no  motion  of 
the  sole  kind  which  could  appear  on  a  platform 
as  between  Theist  and  Atheist,  or  Materialist. 
Motion  other  than  the  motion  of  corporeal  things, 
were  altogether  beside  the  purpose  of  this  demon 
stration, — at  least,  as  at  this  precise  point  in  its 
progress.  Motion,  then,  implies  bodies,  or  cor 
poreal  substances  ;  bodies,  again,  imply  matter. 

§  5.  The  momenta  expressed,  or  involved,  in  this 
demonstration,  are  these  : — Every  individual  cor 
poreal  substance,  or  body,  and  every  set,  and  every 
succession,  of  bodies,  in  motion,  being  finite  in 

a  Supra,  Part  i.  b  Supra,  Part  ii. 


54  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  II. 

duration,31  began  to  be.  Whatever  begins  to  be 
must  have  a  cause :  Therefore,  every  moving  body, 
or  substance,  and  every  set,  or  succession,  of 
moving  bodies,  had  a  cause,  or  creator.  Besides 
the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  there  was — ere  motion,  all  motion, 
be<mn  to  be — no  Substance  or  Beino-  whatever  in 

O  <-> 

existence,  except  Matter,  which,  ex  hypothesi,  was 
at  absolute  rest.  Therefore,  there  was  no  sub 
stance,  or  being,  to  be  the  cause,  or  creator,  of 
motion,  other  than  the  necessarily  existing  Intelli 
gent  and  All-powerful  Substance  or  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration.  Therefore, 
again,  this  Substance  or  Being  was,  and  must  be 
supposed  to  have  been,  the  very  Cause,  or  Creator, 
of  all  the  motion  which  began  to  be, — that  is,  of 
all  motion  whatsoever. 

§  6.  And  this  being  manifested,  it  is  evinced, 
that  that  Being  is,  necessarily,  entirely  Free.b 

§  7.  Then,  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
and  All-powerful,  is,  necessarily,  entirely  Free. 

SCHOLIUM. 

As  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being,  Mind,  or  Spirit,  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration,  who  is  All- 
knowing,  All-powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  was  the 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Coroll.  from  Sub-Prop. 
b  Supra,  §§  1,  2,  &c. 


PART  III.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     55 

cause  of  all  substances  that  move,*  or,  in  other 
words,  all  successions  of  substances,  or  beings,  (for 
'tis  plain,  that  successions  of  beings,  as  successions, 
are  moved ;)  therefore,  that  Being  was  the  Cause  of 
the  particular  successions,  or  succession,  of  men. 
To  express  the  same  thing  otherwise, — The  Being 
in  question  made  the  succession,  or  successions, 
of  those  intellectual  and  moral  beings  denominated 
men,  begin  to  be.  That  is,  that  Being  is  the 
Creator  of  men. 

EPILEGOMENON. 

With  this  Division,  the  consideration  of  the 
Attributes  called,  by  a  certain  licence,  the  Intellect 
ual  Attributes,  ends.  Those  Intellectual  Attri 
butes  may,  moreover,  be  said  to  fall  under  the 
head  of  the  Absolute  Attributes.  They  are,  like 
wise,  to  be  classed  with  the  Simple  Attributes,  or 
those  which  are  not  Complex  or  Compound. 
Lastly, — the  Attributes  being  divided  according 
to  another  classification,  those  Intellectual  Attri 
butes  fall  to  be  ranged  among  the  Psychical,  and, 
among  the  Psychical,  their  place  is  the  first. 

a  Prop,  preced.  §§  2,  3,  &c. 


56  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 


DIVISION  III. 
THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES. 


SUB-DIVISION  I. 
TEE    TRANSITIONAL    ATTRIBUTES. 


PROPOSITION  I. 

The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  All- 
powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  is,  necessarily, 
completely  Happy. 

§  1.  Every  position  which  we  cannot  but  believe, 
is  a  necessary  truth.*  But  we  cannot  but  believe, 
that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expan 
sion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  All- 
powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  is  completely  Happy. 
Therefore,  that  this  Being  is  completely  Happy,  is 
a  necessary  truth.  The  minor  proposition  of  the 
syllogism  is  the  only  proposition  standing  in  any 
need  of  expatiation.  The  major  is  an  undeniable 
axiom : a  and  the  conclusion  is  the  unavoidable 
sequence. 

a  Vide,  infra,  Div.  V.  Prop.  i.  §  2. 


SuB-Div.  I.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    57 

$  -.  Before  we  could  righteously  predicate 
unhappiness  of  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All -knowing, 
All-powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  wre  would  require 
to  know  of  some  sufficient  reason  for  the  predication. 
But  we  can  know  of  none.  For  every  kind,  and 
degree,  of  unhappiness  must  proceed,  or  be 
resolvable  into  what  proceeds,  from  some  natural 
defect,  or  imperfection  :  And  what  imperfection 
can  that  Simple  Being  be  subject  to,  who,  Only, 
is  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is 
All-knowing,  All-powerful,  and  entirely  Free? 

§  3.  And  as  we  can  have  no  sufficient  reason  for 
ascribing  unhappiness  to  that  Being ;  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  there  is  a  sufficient  reason  why  we 
cannot  help  ascribing  to  It  Happiness  the  most 
complete.  For,  the  Being  is  a  Mind,a  conscious  of 
Itself:  that  is,  It  perceives  Its  own  attributes,  or 
perfections,  and  is  conscious  of  the  thoughts 
whereby  It  perceives  them.b  How  could  a  Mind 
conscious  of  perceiving,  as  appertaining  to  Itself, 
such  attributes  as  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration,  All-powerfulness,  entire  Freeness.  be 
supposed  otherwise  than  as  most  consummately 
Happy  ? 

§  4.  Truly,    therefore,    we    cannot    but    believe, 

a  Div.  II.  Parti.  Schol.  §  1. 

b  Vide,  supra,  §  2,  Schol.  apud   Part  i.  Div.  II.    Ac  vide,  infra, 
Prop.  iv.  Dem.  §14. 


58  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  is  completely 
Happy. 

§  5.  Then,  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  and  entirely  Free,  is,  necessarily, 
completely  Happy. 

SUB-PROPOSITIOX. 

The  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  of  Duration,  ivho  is  All-knowing,  All- 
powerful,  entirely  Free,  and  completely 
Happy,  is,  necessarily,  perfectly  Good. 

§  1.  On  the  supposition,  that  the  Simple,  Sole, 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration, 
who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely  Free, 
and  completely  Happy,  created  intellectual  and 
moral  beings — indeed,  any  animal  natures  what 
ever  ;  the  only  motive,  or,  if  you  think  there  were 
more  motives  than  one,  one  of  the  motives,  to  create, 
must  be  believed  to  have  been,  a  desire  to  make 
happiness  besides  Its  own  consummate  Happiness 
begin  to  be.  And  should  there  be  assigned  any 
additional  motive,  it  cannot  be  believed  to  have 
been  incompatible  with  such  desire.  The  reason 
being  very  plain  :  A  Mind  labouring  with  incon 
gruous  motives  cannot  be  happy. 


SUB-DIV.  L]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    59 

§  -2.  But  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  'tis  the 
case,  that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  and  completely  Happy, 
created  intellectual  and  moral,  or,  to  employ  a 
most  comprehensive  term,  sentient,  substances  or 

beings.a 

§  ^3.  Therefore,  the  only  motive,  or,  at  least,  one 
of  the  motives,  to  create,  must  have  been,  a  desire 
to  produce  creaturely  happiness.  The  will  to  create 
moral  intelligences, — in  one  word,  men, — involves, 
on  the  part  of  the  essentially  Happy  Creating  Mind, 
a  desire  to  communicate  of— or,  according  to— Its 
own.  Had  there  been  no  such  will,  the  will  pre 
supposing  the  desire,  in  the  Divine  Nature,  the 
Divine  would  have  remained  sole,  alone,  without 
the  creatures.  But  creation  having  become  an 
accomplished  fact,a  we  can  legitimately  argue  back 
to  the  indispensably  requisite  sine  qud  non  conchtio, 
without  which  the  creature-minds  must  have  been 
as  impossible  as  an  effect  without  any  cause. 

§  4.  The  consequentially  necessary  connection 
between  the  consummate  Happiness  of  the  Simple, 
Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Dura 
tion,  who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  and  entirely 
Free  ;  and  Its  desire  to  communicate  happiness,  all 
possible  happiness  (for  there  is  no  sufficient  reason 
why  we  should  suppose  the  amount  of  happiness  to 

"Div.  II.  Part  iii.  SehoL,  &  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  §  4. 


60  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

be  bestowed  on  the  creatures,  as  creatures,  to  be 
less  than  it  might  be  :)  the  necessary  connection, 
we  say,  is  intuitively  evident.  By  no  stretch  of 
imagination  can  we  conceive,  that  the  Simple,  Sole, 
Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration, 
who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  and  completely 
Happy,  could  be  the  Free  Cause  of  misery,  or  aught 
but  happiness,  to  Its  creatures :  Unless  we  can 
conceive,  that  happiness,  as  happiness,  can  give 
birth  to  its  opposite ;  the  cause  being  wholly 
disproportionate  to  the  effect. 

§  5.  Now,  to  produce,  in  consequence  of  desire 
to  produce,  all  possible  creaturely  happiness,  is  to 
be  perfectly  Good. 

§  6.  From  all  which,  it  is  most  obvious,  that  the 
Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration,  who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely 
Free,  and  completely  Happy,  is,  necessarily, 
perfectly  Good. 

§  7.  Then,  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  and  completely  Happy, 
is,  necessarily,  perfectly  Good. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  This  Proposition  as  to  Goodness,  is  the 
great  transition  Proposition.  It  passes  from  the 
absolute  positions  to  those  which  are  purely 


SUB-DIV.  L]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     61 

relative :  itself  constituting  the  link  between  the 
two  sorts.  The  truly  absolute  Propositions  dis 
course  of  an  unconditioned  Being,  which,  a 
Supreme  Mind,  yet  exists  in,  and  by,  and  for, 
Itself:  while  Goodness  takes  (so  to  speak)  that 
Mind  beyond  (as  it  were)  Itself,  and  supplies 
the  creaturely  objects  for  the  exercise  and  dis 
play  of  the  relative  Moral  Attributes  or  Per 
fections. 

§  2.  The  penultimate  Proposition,  with  its 
positions  relating  to  Happiness,  is — it  is  to  be 
noted — of  a  different  complexion,  in  that  the 
Happiness,  strictly  considered,  is  quite  an  absolute 
thing.  That  is,  the  Being  treated  of  in  the  Pro 
position  now  in  question  is  consummately  Happy 
in  Itself.  By  Itself,  it  is  in  possession  of  complete 
Happiness  ;  needing,  or  indeed  admitting  of,  access, 
or  the  possibility  of  increase,  in  essential  Happi 
ness,  from  no  quarter  whatever ;  least  of  all, 
from  the  creature,  the  product  of  Its  own  Will, 
and  mere  good  pleasure.  But,  the  Happiness 
overflowing,  Goodness,  as  a  distinct  thing,  is  to 
be  seen  in  being,  and  the  creature,  in  its  train, 
is  the  result.  The  creature  once  in  conscious 
existence,  objects  for  the  manifestation  of  the 
relative  Qualities  or  Properties  of  Mind  stand  out 
as  realities. 

§  3.  There  may  be  much  propriety  in  noticing, 
on  this  occasion,  a  nice,  perhaps,  but,  withal,  very 


G2  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

important  distinction.  Remark  we,  then,  that 
Goodness,  as  appertaining  to  the  Supreme  Mind,  is 
no  such  single  and  simple  thing  as  one  might  too 
hastily  conclude  it  to  be.  Goodness  has,  indeed, 
two  sides  ;  or  it  may  be  said  to  look  with  two  faces. 
On  the  one  side,  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  still 
complacency  of  the  Supreme  Spirit,  disposing  It 
contemplatively  and  abstractly  to  doings  of  Benevol 
ence.  The  other  face  of  Goodness  presents  us  with 
the  actual  active  kindnesses  exercised  in  regard  to 
the  already  existing  creature-minds,  the  images,  to 
some  extent,  of  that  Supreme  Mind.  In  the  first 
way,  there  is  perfect  Happiness  ready  to  overflow, 
and,  creating,  to  flood  the  other  with  gladness  :  In 
the  second  way,  the  Happiness,  so  consummate, 
has  run  over  into,  being  mingled  with,  acts  of 
actual  Goodness,  by  the  continuous  production  of  a 
creation  with  Intellectual  and  Moral  agents  capable, 
according  to  their  measure,  of  happiness  them 
selves.  The  creatures,  once  in  being,  are  objects 
fitted  to  be  continuously  and  lastingly  receptive  of 
the  Most  Happy  Creator's  successive  communica 
tions. 

§  4.  But  Goodness,  as  the  principle  and  fount  of 
sustained  series  of  actings,  belongs  rather  to 
another  head,  and  the  student  may  be  prepared  for 
finding  Goodness,  seen  in  such  light,  handled  under 
a  subsequent  Proposition. a 

a  Vide,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  in  this  same  Division. 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    63 

EPILEGOMENON. 

With  Proposition  I.  in  this  Division,  terminate 
the  purely  Absolute  Attributes.  As  a  whole,  these 
two  Propositions  of  this  Sub-Division  constitute 
and  exhaust  the  Transitional,  and  prepare  the  way 
for  the  directly  Relative,  Moral  Attributes.  Of 
course,  those  Propositions  carry  on  the  series  of 
the  Propositions  relating  to  the  Attributes  which 
are  the  Simple  and  the  Psychical. 


DIVISION   III. 
THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES. 


SUB-DIVISION   II. 
THE  RELATIVE  ATTRIBUTES. 


SCHOLIA  PR^EPOSITA. 
SCHOLIUM  I. 

§  1.  In  place  of  the  words,  "The  Simple,  Sole, 
"  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration, 
"  who  is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely  Free, 
"and  completely  Happy,"  as  well  as  "perfectly 
"  Good,"  as  occurring  in  the  last  section  of  the  last 
Sub-Proposition  ;  a  or  in  place  of  any  such  collection 

a  Viz.  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  Sub-Prop.  §  7. 


64  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

of  words  ;  for  the  future,  we  shall  employ  the  one 
term  GOD.  That  is,  so  often  as  is  desirable  we 
shall  do  so. 

§  2.  This  substitution  will  be  highly  advan 
tageous,  inasmuch  as  it  will  save  repetitions  of 
words,  in  clauses  consisting  of  many  words. 
'Twill  be  certainly  a  great  object  gained,  to  prevent 
the  necessity,  ever  recurring,  of  using  so  many 
words,  in  cases  where  each  word,  or  phrase,  is 
simply  syncategorematic,  or  a  part  only  of  the 
complex  term  which  forms  the  subject  of  the 
proposition.  In  the  generality  of  cases,  such 
circumlocutions  might  be  apt  to  become  trouble 
some. 

§  3.  There  is,  too,  another  consideration.  This 
is  not  a  case  of  mere  arbitrary  substitution  of  one 
term  for  another.  For  the  great  majority  of 
persons,  including  many  of  our  best  etymologists, 
are  firmly  of  opinion,  that  the  term,  "  God,"  is 
tantamount,  linguistically  speaking,  to  "  The  Good." 
If,  however,  the  fact,  regarding  the  etymology,  be 
not  as  is  supposed,  let  the  term  chosen  be — if  not 
by  etymology,  by  hypothesis,  and  express  adoption 
—equivalent  to  the  whole  complex  term  constitut 
ing  the  subject  in  such  propositions  as  we  have  in 
view.  Then,  having  argumentatively  compassed  the 
existence  of  The  Good  One ;  we  shall  henceforth 
employ  the  word  in  question  as  being  simply 
equivalent  to  that  Good  Being  whose  existence  the 


SUB-DIV.  IT]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    G5 

demonstration  has  attained  to  ;  namely,  The 
necessarily  existing  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Expansion  and  of  Duration  ;  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  completely  Happy,  and, 
also,  perfectly  Good. 

§  4.  The  term  chosen  as  substitute  has,  therefore, 
the  great  virtue  of  suitableness.  Other  etymons 
for  the  word  good  have  been  assigned  by  the 
learned  :  not  one  of  them,  however,  could  have 
been  selected  as  an  eligible  substitute.  But 
the  term  chosen  by  us  is,  from  its  established 
associations  in  men's  minds,  admirably  adapted,  in 
every  respect,  for  the  situation  it  has  been  fixed  on 
to  fill. 

§  5.  In  fine,  in  substituting  "  God,"  we  are  in 
possession  of  a  word  expressive  of  an  idea  tanta 
mount  to  the  last  predicate.  The  term  conveys 
the  great  attribute,  the  latest  element,  as  yet,  in 
the  demonstration.  A  Being,  perfectly  Good, 
necessarily  exists  :  that  is,  there  is  necessarily  a 
God. 

$  G.  It  will  be  understood,  therefore,  that,  so 
often  as  the  term  (rod  shall  henceforth  be  employed, 
reference  is  always,  though  tacitly,  nuide  to  this 
present  Scholium. 

SCHOLIUM   II. 

§  1.  Again,  for  the  terms  themselves,  The  Simple, 
Sole,  Bcirnj  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and  of 


GG  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

Duration,  who  is  All -knowing,  All-powerful,  en 
tirely  Free,  completely  Happy,  and  perfectly 
Good  ;  or,  for  the  neuter  pronoun  "  it,"  as  standing 
for  these  terms,  or  so  many  of  them  ; a  or,  finally, 
for  the  substitute  noun  on  which  we  have  fixed  ;  b 
the  word  "He"  shall,  on  every  suitable  occasion, 
be  employed  to  denote  the  same  thing.  Not  that 
there  can  be  an  intention  to  attach  any  idea  of 
specific  sex c  to  the  Being  denoted  by  the  more 
noble  pronoun  :  but  the  one  word  will  be  more 
suitable  than  the  other.  To  us,  the  inhabitants  of 
Great  Britain,  and,  in  general,  the  peoples  who 
speak  our  English  tongue,  it  is  more  decorous  and 
reverential,  and  in  every  way  becoming,  to  apply 
the  word  He  to  the  great  d  and  good  e  Being  in 
question  than  any  such  word  as  it.  Such  the 
genius  and  contexture  of  our  language. 

§  2.  It  need  hardly  be  observed,  that,  in  sub 
stituting  the  more  noble  personal  pronoun,  in  the 
place  of  the  impersonal  pronoun  "  it,"  and  its 
cognates,  we  shall,  of  course,  embrace,  with  "  He," 
the  cognates  "His"  and  "Himself,"  in  the  sub 
stitution.  And  for  the  justification  of  the 
employment  of  "He,"  "His,"  or  "Himself,"  in 
every  future  instance  of  the  use,  we  shall  be 

a  As  used,  ex.  gr.,  in  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  §  3,  &  Sub-Prop.  §  4. 

''   Vide  tfcliol.  pneccd. 

c  Confer  Div.  IV.  Prop.  ii.  Schol.  §  13. 

d  Div.  I.  II.  e  Div.  III.  Sub-Div.  i. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    G7 

understood  to  make  (it  may  be,  silent)  reference  to 
the  sanction  accorded  by  this  Second  Scholium  of 
these  Scholia  Prceposita. 

PROPOSITION  II. 

God  is  necessarily  True. 

PROLEGOMENON. 

§  1.  Viewed  as  an  affair  of  language,  the  pro 
position,  God  is  True,  may  be  taken  in  one  or 
other  of  two  distinct  senses.  First  sense :  God  is 
True,  may  be  held  to  mean,  that  He  truly,  or  in 
truth,  or  according  to  truthfulness,  is  God.  So, 
we  say,  or  may  say,  "This  is  the  True  GOD." 
Again  :  "  Ye  turned  to  GOD  from  idols,  to  serve 
the  Living  and  True  GOD." 

§  2.  Second  sense.  God  is  True,  may  mean  that 
He  acts  truly,  or  with  trueness,  or  truth,  or  truth 
fulness.  In  this  way,  we  may  say,  "  Let  GOD  be 
True,  but  every  man  a  liar."  Or,  "  He  that  hath 
received  His  testimony,  hath  set  to  his  seal  that 
GOD  is  True." 

§  3.  These  two  meanings  are  not  only  dis 
tinguishable,  but  they  are  quite  different,  from 
each  other.  Nevertheless,  they  may  be  (for  they 
have  been)  injudiciously  blended,  or  more  or  less 
confounded  together. 

§  4.   Our    English     word,    True,    with     its    two 


68  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

meanings,  is  alleged  to  be  of  Anglo-Saxon,  and  even 
Gothic  descent.  And  there  is  significance  in  the 
fact,  that  the  same  sort  of  distinction  is  preserved 
in  the  Latin  adjectives,  Verus  and  Verax.  Of 
course,  it  is  only  in  the  latter  of  those  senses,  that 
our  Proposition,  God  is  True,  is  to  be  taken.  The 
Proposition  in  the  other  sense  has  been  well,  if 
only  virtually,  elaborated,  and,  'tis  trusted,  most 
successfully  established,  in  the  previous  portions  of 
this  demonstration. 

LEMMA. 

§  1.  Now,  there  is  one  thing  involved  in,  or 
rather  implied  by,  this  proposition,  which  must  be 
considered  at  the  very  outset.  For  we  can 
righteously  advance  not  so  much  as  a  single  step 
without  the  aid  of  the  supposition  in  view. 

§  2.  The  supposition  in  question  —  whether 
expressed,  or  only  tacitly  understood ;  for  it  is  by 
no  means  always  necessary  that  a  necessary 
supposition  should  be  formally  expressed — is,  that 
there  are  objects  of  God's  Truth,  objects  in  relation 
to  which  God's  Truth  must  be.  This  becomes  very 
evident  on  reflection  :  'tis  a  position  containing  its 
own  evidence  within  itself.  The  notion  of  God's 
Truth  clearly  implies  that  God  has  objects  for  the 
manifestation  of  that  truth.  Without  these,  there 
is  palpably  no  place  for  the  truth.  No  possibility 
of  its  existence.  God  cannot  act  with  truthfulness 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    G9 

in  relation  to nothing.     Tis,  then,  quite  plain, 

that    the  supposition    in  question    is    actually   in 
volved  in  our  Proposition. 

§  3.  And  this  being  so,  the  distinction  of 
absolute  Attributes,  and  relative  Attributes,  has 
been  therefore  brought,  fairly  and  thoroughly,  into 
the  field.  Now,  the  distinction  between  an 
absolute  attribute,  and  a  relative  one,  lies  in  this, 
that  the  former  expresses  what  God  is  in  Himself, 
or  without  relation  to  anything  beyond  Himself,  or 
His  own  Essence  :  while  the  latter,  or  a  relative 
attribute,  expresses  what  God  is  in  relation  to 
something  which  exists  besides  Himself,  and  be 
yond  Himself,  as  a  creature,  or,  at  least,  as  in  some 
way  objective.  If  one  wishes  to  study  instances 
of  the  purely  absolute  Attributes,  choice  may  be 
made  among  the  predicates  of  former  Propositions 
in  Divisions  I.  and  II.  of  this  demonstration. 

§  4.  'Tis,  therefore,  quite  plain,  that  in  the  Pro 
position  God  is  True,  it  is  involved  that  there  are 
objects.  But  it  is  a  totally  different  consideration 
of  what  character  the  objects  are.  These  may  be 
(observe,  it  is  not  said  that  they  must  be)  creatures, 
that  is,  Intelligent  and  Moral  creatures  ;  for  no  one 
with  whom  we  will  have  to  do  will  insult  mankind 
by  contending  that  God  can  be  considered  Truth 
ful  in  relation  simply  to  mere  Animal  Natures, 
destitute  of  intellectual  and  moral  qualities.  And 
to  speak  of  Truth  in  relation  to  the  Vegetable 


70  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

World,  were  lamentably  out  of  the  question  :  while 
to  talk  of  Truth  as  manifested  to  any  portion  of 
the  Mineral  Kingdom,  would  be  to  suggest  a  sheer 
impossibility,  and  to  mock  our  understanding  by  a 
shameless  pantheistical  absurdity. 

§  5.  The  objects  of  the  Truth  in  question  may 
possibly  not  be  creatures  like  men.  Nevertheless, 
some  persons  would,  doubtless,  contend,  that  the 
objects  present  to  the  mind,  when  we  treat  of  God's 
Truth,  must  needs  be  creatures  like  us.  These 
persons  would  assever,  None  but  men,  None  but 
men  can  be.  We  shall  (they  say)  admit  the 
existence  of  no  Intellectual  and  Moral  inhabitants, 
whether  man-like,  or  angelic,  i.e.,  having  faculties 
analogous  to  those  of  men,  only  higher  in  degree, 
—no  inhabitants,  we  repeat,  of  any  other  planet  in 
our  system — or  of  our  own  Central  Luminary — or 
of  any  other  self-luminous  Sun  or  Star — or,  finally, 
of  any  other  sidereal  system  among  the  countless 
constellations,  or  larger  systems,  of  the  wide 
Heavens.  So  decide  these  self-confident,  most 
rigid  humanitarians.  Narrow  is  their  horizon  : 
within  it,  themselves  the  only  visibles.  But  'tis 
enough  to  advance,  in  opposition  to  the  tenet,  that 
only  creatures  that  are  men  upon  this  earth  can  be 
objects  of  God's  Truth,  that  this  tenet  has  not  yet 
been  proved  to  be  true  ;  neither  has  it  been 
rendered  at  all  probable. a 

a  Vide,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  Schol.  ii.  §  14. 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    71 

§  6.  But  further :  There  are  objects,  indeed,  of 
God's  Truth  ;  but  whether  the  object  be  necessarily 
conceived  to  be  a  creature  at  all, — even  this  must 
be  reckoned  to  be  an  open  question.  A  question, 
however,  on  which  we  mean  not  at  all  to  enter. 
For,  to  do  so,  would  involve  the  entering  upon  the 
subject  of  the  constitution,  the  internal  constitu 
tion,  as  it  were,  of  the  Godhead  ;  and  it  is,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  far  removed  from  our  present 
purpose  to  investigate  such  a  subject, — especially, 
if  the  investigation  should  naturally  tend  to  bear 
us  to  the  deepest  foundations,  in  our  minds,  of  that 
most  profound  of  metaphysical  topics.* 

§  7.  There  is,  then,  to  be  supposed  the  other 
than  GOD,  in  proceeding  to  our  demonstration. 
And  in  treating  of  the  other  than  God,  we  shall, 
for  reasons  which  may  be  gathered  from  the  pre 
ceding  sections,  cast  out  of  the  account  all  but  the 
intellectual  and  moral  creatures.  And,  in  the  next 
place,  our  view  shall  be, — for  the  most  part,  if  not 
always, — limited  to  man.  For,  should  we,  in  any 
place,  speak  of  other  creatures,  or,  in  plainer 
language,  spirits  with  intellectual  and  moral 
natures  superior  to  man's  nature  ;  we  shall  do  so 
as  a  matter  of  grace,  or  of  mere  hypothesis.  \\  e 
shall  do  so  only  for  the  sake  of  some  illustration, 
or  for  the  mere  purpose  of  widening  the  range  of 
our  horizon.  A  statement,  indeed,  which  may  be 

a  Vide,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  Dem.  §  14,  &c. 


72  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

found  to  be  more  applicable  to  subsequent  places, 
in  our  demonstration,  than  to  this  place. 

POSTULATUM. 

§  1.  Let  it  be  granted,  not  only  that  the  other 
than  God  exists  as  objective  to  Him,  but  that  God 
does,  in  actual  deed,  act,  or  make  communications, 
towards  the  other,  the  objects  being  men. 

§  2.  The  Postulate  now  laid  down  for  use  in 
this  Proposition,  shall — expressly,  or  tacitly — be 
made  to  hold  with  regard  to  the  immediately 
ensuing  Corollary,  and  the  Proposition  succeeding 
it.  But  such  postulation  shall  cease  whenever  we 
shall  have  arrived  at  Proposition  IV.,  under  which 
the  postulated  position  shall  change  its  character,  by 
becoming  a  proved  point.  The  proof,  too,  will  hold 
with  regard  to  each  one  of  the  three  specified  Pro 
positions  alike.  For  the  evidence  of  all  which,  weigh 
Scholium  I.  §  1 — 9,  of  the  Proposition  referred  to. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  We  come  now  to  the  demonstration  itself 
of  the  truth  of  our  Proposition,  God  is  necessarily 
True.  And  to  demonstrate  this,  in  the  exactest 
manner,  not  a  great  deal  will  be  required  to  be 
advanced. 

§  2.  For  a  mind  to  be  true,  is,  to  consciously 
act  as  things  are,  and  not  as  they  are  not.  'Tis, 
in  a  word,  to  consciously  energize  in  accordance 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    73 

with  the  reality.  Now,  to  act  as  a  thing  is, 
requires  no  foreign  element :  but  it  does  obviously 
require  the  introduction  of  a  foreign  element,  to 
act  as  a  thing  is  not.  God,  a  Conscious  Mind,a 
in  acting  h  as  He  is,  to  men  as  men,0  goes  not 
beyond  the  reality  of  things.  But  suppose  it 
otherwise  :  Suppose,  to  wit,  God  consciously 
acting  as  if  He  were  not  what  He  really  is,  or  as 
if  He  were  what  He  really  is  not  ;  and  to  men  as 
not  being  what  they  are,  or  as  being  what  they 
are  not ; — you  thereby  necessitate  the  introduction 
of  a  supposition  to  account  for  this  acting  falsely. 
Obviously,  you  require  something  out  of  God,  and 
beyond  God,  to  account  for  His  (presumed)  con 
scious  falseness.  His  acting  truly  requires  no 
reason — no  reason  certainly  beyond  the  fact,  that 
God  is  God,  and  men  are  men.c  Can  an  extraneous 
reason  be  needed  to  account  for  God  manifesting 
Himself  as  God,  or  for  God  communicating  with 
men  as  being  what  they  are  ?  Impossible.  But  once 
say,  that  God  acts  as  if  He  were  not  God,  that  is,  as 
if  He  were  ceasing  to  be,  or  made  to  cease  to  be, 
God  ;  and  as  if  men  were  no  longer  men,  but  non- 
human ; — once  say,  in  any  form,  that  God  acts 
towards  the  other  than  Himself  as  if  He  were  what 
He  is  not,  or  as  if  the  other  be  what  it  is  not :  and 
you  have,  in  the  most  decided  manner,  introduced 

a  Schol.  under  Part  i.  Div.  II.  '•  Postul. 

c  Lemma,  §  7. 


74  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

the  necessity  of  the  supposition  of  a  foreign  element. 
And  what  foreign  element  can  there  be  ?  Most 
evidently,  there  can  be  none.  Out  of,  or  beyond, 
the  necessarily  existing  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of 
Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is 
All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  com 
pletely  Happy,  and  perfectly  Good,  what  can  there 
be  to  necessitate  His  acting  falsely  ?  No  such 
foreign  element  can  be  assigned,  or  so  much  as 
thought  of,  by  the  most  unbridled  imagination  in 
its  very  wildest  flight.  Tis  plain,  there  can  be  no 
being  independent  of  that  Being  :  None,  therefore, 
to  cause  Him  to  energize  falsely. 

§  3.  But  an  additional  absurdity  would  be  in 
volved  by  the  introduction  of  the  supposition  of 
such  foreign  element.  There  is  no  place  for  such 
element— But  on  supposition  of  it,  a  fresh  absurdity 
would  come  into  the  field.  At  all  events,  the 
absurdity  which  there  unquestionably  is,  will  be 
presented  in  a  somewhat  new,  and  greatly  stronger 
light. 

§  4.  At  this  stage,  we  consider  Falsity  on  its  mere 
intellectual  side  or  simply  as  opposed  to  the  True. 
But  under  the  future a  Proposition  concerning 
Justice,  the  False  will  appear  in  its  true  colours,  or 
as  the  Immoral.  Yet,  although  precluded  from 
occupying  higher  ground,  by  taking  in  the  element 
of  morality,  still  Falsity,  Falseness,  Falsehood,  of 

a  Viz.  Infra,  Prop.  III. 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    75 

any  kind,  and  of  every  degree,  involves  imperfec 
tion  in  the  being  who  is  false.  Falseness  can  only 
have  a  place  in  a  nature  defective  in  some  respect. 
Now,  defect  or  imperfection  cannot  be  supposed  in 
God.  What  defect  or  imperfection  can  there  be  in 
that  One  Necessary  Being,  of  utmost  Simplicity, 
who,  being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  Duration, 
is  All-knowing,  All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  com 
pletely  Happy,  and  perfectly  Good  ? 

§  5.  In  fine,  to  suppose  God  otherwise  than 
True,  that  is,  as  acting  falsely,  were  equal  to  the 
absurdity  of  alleging,  that  the  necessarily  Un 
limited  One  is,  in  point  of  fact,  limited :  most 
limited  too.  For,  no  limitation  can  be  greater  than 
that  defect  which  would  bring  about  the  adoption 
of  falsehood. 

§  G.  Thus,  even  as  it  is  involved  in  the  proposi 
tion,  that  God  is  necessarily  True, — involved  in  the 
proposition  as  what  it  essentially  means  ; — so,  it 
has  been  rigorously  demonstrated, 

That  God,  as  a  Conscious  Mind,  acts  towards  the 
other  than  Himself, 

As  if  He  is  what  He  is,  not  what  He  is  not. 

And 
As  if  the  other  is  what  it  is,  not  what  it  is 

not. 
To  state  the  same  thing  otherwise  : 

God  must  manifest  Himself  as  God.      And 
He  must  manifest  Himself  to  Man  as  Man. 


7G  THK  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FUR      [Div.  Ill 

Both  relations  being,  at  same  time,  preserved; 
or,  in  other  words, 

God,  as  God,  must  communicate  with  Man, 

as  being  what  he  is — Man. 

§  7.  So,  there  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  our 
position,  that  God,  in  acting,  must  act  as  things 
are ;  and,  therefore,  we  conclude,  that  God  is 
necessarily  True. 

§  8.  God,  then,  is,  necessarily,  the  True. 

COROLLARY  FROM  PROPOSITION  II. 

God,  wlio  is  True,  is  necessarily  Faithful. 

LEMMA. 

§  1.  A  presupposition  is  implied  by  this  proposi 
tion,  God  is  Faithful,  in  addition  to  the  pre 
supposition  implied  in  the  preceding  proposition. 

§  2.  Faithfulness  demands  the  positing  of  true 
objects,  as  well  as  Truth  does.a  But  Faithfulness 
not  only  demands  objects  (specific  and  peculiar 
objects,  indeed),  but  itself,  as  subject,  necessitates 
the  supposition  of  a  thing,  not,  like  a  pure  object, 
beyond  itself.  For  Faithfulness  plainly  can  only 
come  to  be  exercised  with  reference  to  Promises, 
Covenants,  or  Engagements  of  some  kind.  And  it 
is  not  difficult  to  see  that  all  these  are  at  bottom 
one.  A  covenant,  an  engagement,  an  obligation  of 

a  Preced.  Prop.,  Lemma. 


SUR-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    77 

any  description  whatsoever,  come  under,  or  entered 
into,  by  God,  is  just  a  promise  in  another  form. 
All  the  rest  are  resolvable  into  the  first :  Logically 
speaking,  the  whole  genus  contains  but  one  species, 
Divine  Promise. 

§  3.  As,  therefore,  there  are  relative  attributes ; 
among  the  relative  attributes,  this  attribute  of 
Faithfulness  is  by  no  means  the  least  relative. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  In  the  proof  of  the  Proposition,  no  great 
measure  of  force  will  need  to  be  expended.  The 
attribute  of  Truth  being  once  established,  the 
foundations  of  the  Faithfulness  have  been  laid. 

§  2.  Indeed,  Faithfulness,  as  an  attribute, 
implies  not  a  great  deal  more  than  Truencss. 
Truth  is  not  Faithfulness,  but  the  latter  involves 
the  former,  arid  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  an 
application,  a  particular  application,  of  Truthful 
ness.  To  be  faithful,  is  to  be  something  more  than 
being  true,  for  it  is  to  be  true  as  to  engagements 
contracted.  Faithfulness  is  simply  Truth  as  to 
Engagements. 

§  3.  As,  therefore,  'tis  so  that  Faithfulness  holds 
so  directly  of  Truth,  a  separate  and  lengthily  drawn 
out  demonstration  is  by  no  means  necessary  :  such 
might  not  even  be  expedient,  since  it  would,  or 
might,  have  a  tendency  to  obscure  rather  than  to 
enlighten  farther.  If  a  separate  demonstration  be 


78  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

not  absolutely  necessary,  such  might  serve  the 
same  sort  of  purpose  which  works  of  superer 
ogation  do  ofttimes  accomplish  :  it  might  give 
birth  to  the  thought,  that  a  mountainous  diffi 
culty  ought  to  be  removed,  where,  behold,  all 
is  a  plain  already. 

§  4.  A  Divine  Promise,  however,  is  a  serious 
thing.  The  Faithfulness  of  God  is  an  attribute 
which,  more  than  many  of  the  attributes,  depends 
on,  i.e.,  implies  as  objective,  the  other  than  God  :a 
Nevertheless,  the  faithfulness  in  question  is  the 
true  heavenly  archetype,  or  (should  you  object  to 
such  form  of  words)  the  real  archetypal  ground  of 
every  law  which  altereth  not.  God's  Faithfulness 
to  a  promise,  is  the  God  of  Truth b  Himself  with 
reference  to  a  promise.  A  divine  promise,  once 
made,  is  sure,  yea  unchangeable.  A  promise  by 
God,  is  God  Himself  promising.  A  divine  promise 
broken,  would  be  God  no  longer  God,  and  the 
pledge  of  intellectual  and  moral  chaos  and 
universal  ruin.  In  fine,  it  is  impossible  for  God, 
having  covenanted,  to  lie,  because  it  is  impossible 
that  God  sliould  cease  to  be. 

§  5.  We  cannot  hesitate,  therefore,  to  maintain, 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  necessary  Faithfulness  of 
God  is  necessarily  sound  doctrine. 

§  6.  So  God,  who  is  the  True,  is,  necessarily, 
the  Faithful. 

"•  Lemma.  }>  Proposition  II. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    79 

PROPOSITION  III. 

God,  who  is  True,  and  Faithful,  is 
necessarily  Inflexibly  Just. 

LEMMA. 

§  1.  If  the  preceding  Proposition  demanded 
a  great  presupposition  to  be  previously  grounded, a 
the  present  one  equally,  or  much  more,  makes  the 
same  requirement.  If  to  manifest  Truth,  or  to  do 
the  Truth  (as  one  saith),  objects  are  required  ; 
to  manifest  Justice  requires,  no  less,  object*  on 
which  the  Justice  is  to  be  exercised. 

§  2.  And  not  to  repeat  at  length  considerations 
advanced  under  that  previous  Proposition,  the 
objects  presented  to  the  Justice  must  be,  or,  at  any 
rate,  shall  be,  considered  to  be  men.  They  must 
be  so  considered,  taking  the  nature  of  the  lower 
animals,  and  all  beneath  the  lower  animals,  into 
account.  And  the  objects  of  the  Justice  shall,  or, 
perhaps,  must  be  considered  to  the  exclusion  of 
angel-spirits,  or  any  possibly  existing  higher 
natures.* 

§  3.  But  it  falls  to  be  now  noticed,  that  another 
element,  with  special  regard  to  one  at  least  of  the 
factors,  must  be  introduced.  While  the  proposi 
tion,  God  is  True,  regards,  or  may  regard  men, 
simply  as  men  ;  the  proposition,  God  is  Just, 

:i  Prop.  II.  Lemma. 


SO  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  TIL 

regards,  always  regards,  men  in  the  farther  light 
of  beino; 

O 

Men,  Men, 

Virtuous,  or  Un-virtuous,  or 

Vicious : 
In  other  words, 

Good,  or  Bad,  or  Evil ; 

Righteous,  Un-righteous.  or 

Wicked: 
In  fine, 
Moral,  or  Im-moral. 

With 
All  the  subdivisions 

of 
Truthful,  &c.  False,  <tc. 

A  moral  designation,  therefore,  is  added  to  the 
objects.  The  men  are  always  considered  to  be 
Virtuous,  or  Moral,  or.  on  the  other  hand,  Un- 
virtuous,  or  Immoral. 

§  4.  The  propriety  of  the  introduction  of  that 
new  element  will  not  be  seriously  gairisayed.  To 
be  True,  nothing  more  is  required  than  to  do  as 
things  are,  and  not  as  they  are  not;  and  the 
notion  is  complete  without  considering  whether 
the  creatures,  who  are  the  objects  to  whom  the 
Truth  is  manifested,  be  good  or  be  bad.  But  it  is 
different  in  the  case  of  Justice.  God  cannot  be 
the  Just  God  to  men  unless  their  moral  condition 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    81 

be  taken  into  account.  Justice,  in  fact,  is  a  quality 
having  necessary  reference  to  the  deserts  or  merits, 
and  the  demerits,  that  is,  the  goodness  or  the 
badness,  of  its  objects.  Take  away  moral  states, 
and  you  obliterate  the  possibility  of  the  exercise 
of  Justice. 

§  5.  There  needs  no  elaborate  proof  of  the 
propriety  of  what  is  now  advanced.  'Tis  involved 
in  the  propositions  themselves,  as  the  use  of 
language  shows.  No  necessity  can  lie  upon  one  to 
prove  that  common  language  means  what  it  means. 
The  use  of  language  must  proceed,  no  doubt,  from 
the  source  of  the  firm  realities  in  the  region  of 
absolute  ideas,  (the  certain  regulators  they  of 
affairs  in  the  sphere  or  plane  underneath,)  as  an 
effect  involves  the  existence  somewhere  of  its 
cause  ; a  and  the  good  use  of  language  has  fixed, 
that  to  be  True  is  different  from  being  Just,  and 
that  to  be  Just  requires  that  there  be  some  merit, 
or  some  demerit,  in  each  one  of  the  objects. 
Unless  men  be  considered  to  be  good,  and  bad, 
they  are  not  fit  objects  for  the  display  of  Justice. 
Justice,  in  fine,  has  a  distinct  additional  element 
in  it  over  and  above  that  which  Triteness  of 
necessity  involves.  Truth  has  to  do  with  exist 
ences  simply  :  Justice,  with  moral  existences  only 
as  such. 

§  G.  The  present  Proposition,  therefore,  not  only 

a  Confer,  infra,  Schol.  III.  §  35. 
6 


82  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR    [Div.  111. 

relates  to  a  relative  Attribute ;  but,  if  there  be 
degrees  in  relati\7eness,  this  Proposition  were  more 
relative  than  even  the  penultimate  one. 

$  7.  Our  Proposition  is  tantamount,  then,  to 
this,  that  God  must  be  Just  to  men,  as  Moral 
Beings.  God  is  Just :  that  is,  He  acts  towards 
the  good  man,  as  being  a  good  man  :  and  towards 
the  evil  or  bad,  as  being  so. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  Now  come  we  to  the  demonstration  of  the 
proposition,  that  God  is  inflexibly  Just,  and  that 
necessarily.  This  is  a  proposition  second  to  none 
in  importance,  and  the  greatest  care  must  be  taken 
that,  to  the  keenest  eye,  no  lack  of  cogency,  or  the 
exactest  accuracy,  shall  be  discernible  in  our 
demonstration. 

§  2.  We  have  already  a  adverted  to  the  peculiarity 
connected  with  the  objects  of  this  attribute  of 
Justice.  Man  is — specially,  if  not  exclusively- 
regarded  by  it  as  a  moral  being.31  A  characteristic, 
in  truth,  of  the  human  race  is  Conscience.  Every 
genuine  member  of  the  family  of  man  isdistinguished, 
and  honoured,  and  blessed,  by  the  possession  of  this 
admirable  mental  power.  This  it  is  which,  even 
more  than  his  Intellectual  pre-eminence,  gives  man 
(the  undisputed  sovereign  lord  of  all  this  kosmos] 

a  Lemma. 


Sue-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    83 

his  vast  superiority  over  even  the  very  highest  of 
the  lower  animals  :  this  it  is  which  most  assimilates 
man  to  every  higher  order  of  minds, — more 
especially  to  The  Mind  over  all  minds. a  By  this 
Conscience,  or  Moral  Sense,  man  approves  or  dis 
approves  of  the  actions  of  moral  agents, — praises, 
or  blames,  the  doers  of  the  actions,  good  and  ill,— 
recognises  the  one  kind  to  be  worthy  of  reward, 
and  the  opposite  kind  to  be  deserving  of  punish 
ment.  The  faculty,  susceptibility,  or  power  of 
mind  in  question,  has  been  called,  by  some  philos 
ophers,  Conscientiousness :  a  good  word  enough, 
perhaps,  to  express,  distinctively,  the  thing  meant. 
§  3.  The  next  point  is  :  Is  there  convincing 
reason  for  attributing  to  God  such  a  quality  or 
property  of  mind  as  that  denoted?  In  answering 
which  question,  it  may  at  once  be  fearlessly 
advanced,  that,  as  far  as  regards  man,  this  faculty 
of  Conscientiousness  is  a  most  undoubted  perfection. 
Not  only  so  :  for  Conscience  asserts,  and  vindicates 
in  asserting,  its  rightful  supremacy  over  the  whole 
man,  as  a  Moral  Being.  It  claims  to  be  above  all 
the  emotions,  as  well  as  all  the  passions, — above 
all  the  feelings,  indeed,  let  them  be  called  by  any 
name  one  likes  ;  and,  above  them  all,  Conscience 
reigns  as  rightful  absolute  monarch.  In  fine,  if 
Conscience  be  no  perfection,  there  is  no  perfec 
tion  in,  or  connected  with,  man.  That  man  has 
aSchol.  Part  iii.  Div.  II. 


84  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

Intellectual  excellencies  or  perfections,  few  will 
dispute,  and  none  can  establish,  since  a  complete 
proof  would  itself  denote  a  most  unexceptionable 
excellency  of  reasoning.  But  man's  power  to  take 
in  intellectual  truths  in  the  pure  mathematics 
themselves, — to  discern,  say,  the  relation  of  equality 
between  twice  two  (2  +  2,  or  2x2)  and  four  (4)— 
the  comprehension  of  the  simplest  equation  being 
accepted  as  evidence  of  aptitude  for  the  abstrusest 
geometrical,  or  algebraical,  calculations ;  could  yet 
be  reckoned  as  appertaining  to  no  perfection  of 
man's  nature,  if  the  power  to  distinguish  between 
right  and  wrong — virtuous  action  and  unvirtuous, 
— to  perceive  merit  and  demerit,  to  award  praise 
and  blame,  and  to  distribute  reward  and  punish 
ment,  accordingly, — if  such,  we  say,  be  no  perfec 
tion.  But  the  power  of  mind  under  notice  is  not 
only  a  perfection,  but  it  is  manifestly  an  original 
and  distinct  perfection  of  mind.  Indeed,  this  is 
implied  by  the  very  nature  of  the  case  :  For,  how 
could  such  a  perfection  grow  from  nothing,  or 
result  from  any  congeries  of  powers  destitute  of 
Conscientiousness  themselves  ?  Twere  ridiculous 
to  contend,  that  Conscience,  rudiments  and  all, 
could  have  been  (not  cultivated  and  improved,  but 
acquired)  absolutely  acquired  by  education  ;  for  'tis 
but  too  obvious,  that  a  conscience  cannot  be  the 
product  of  factors  themselves  wanting  all  conscience. 
In  fact,  every  genuine  representative  of  our  race 


SuB-Div.  TI.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    85 

will  admit — yea,  he  will  glory  in — the  uniqueness, 
and  the  lawful  supremacy,  of  Conscience.  Those 
persons  only  who,  malformed,  or  ill-constituted,  as 
individuals,  are  deficient,  as  to  degree,  in  this  grand 
faculty,  will  seek  to  lower  its  claims,  and  represent 
them  as  baseless  pretensions.  These  individuals, 
in  speaking,  may  draw  from  their  own  experience 

-in  which  they  are  most  unhappy.  But  their 
mishap  must  l>e  corrected  by  the  general  verdict. 
Taking  in  all  the  landscape,  exceptional  infelicities 
are  lost  sight  of  by  the  large-minded  spectator. 
And  'tis  well  that  it  be  so.  In  fine,  Conscience  in 
the  greatest  of  perfections  in  man's  whole  Intellectual 
System. 

S  4.    In  the  next  place  :    It  beins*  to  be  taken  for 

o  L  O 

granted,  as  a  most  certain  truth,  that  Conscience 
is  a  perfection  ;  wo  proceed  to  consider  the  identi 
fication  of  God  as  the  ( )ri<nnator  of  man's  conscience1, 

O 

Himself  the  Conscience  of  consciences.  Now,  'tis 
to  be  noted,  that  there  is  an  Axiom  as  sure  as  any 
axiom,  or  any  truth  whatever,  in  any  Science 
whatsoever,  even  inclusive  of  the  exact  sciences. 
The  Axiom,  so  much  to  our  purpose,  is  :  An  ejj'cct, 
qua  effect,  cannot  possess  any  original,  distinct, 
perfection,  which  is  not  in  the  cause,  cither  actually, 
or  at  least  in  a  higher  degree.  It  has  been  proved, 
that  man  is  a  creature,11  which  is  another  way  of 
saying  that  he  is  an  effect ;  and  to  affirm,  that  man 

:l  Schol.  under  Part  iii.  Div.  II. 


86  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

is  a  creature,  or  an  effect,  is  equivalent  to  the 
affirmation  that  man  has  a  Creator,  or  that  (regard 
being  had  to  the  nature  of  the  proof)  there  is  a 
First  Cause.  Therefore,  in  the  Creator,  or  Mind  of 
minds,  qua  First  Cause,  there  must  be  an  attribute 
corresponding  to  this  perfection,  the  Conscience  to 
wit,  in  man  the  creature,  qua  effect.  For,  no  Effect 
can  possibly  have  a  perfection  which  is  not,  in 
some  respect,  in  the  Cause  :  Otherwise,  the  perfec 
tion  might  be  effected  by — nothing. 

§  5.  If  any   one  should,  by   way   of  objecting, 
urs;e  that  such  arguing  from  man's  moral  sense  to 

O  o  o 

the  mind  of  God,  is  a  posteriori;  the  reply  is: 
Granted,  that  an  a  posteriori  element  has  been 
allowed  to  enter  here.  But  the  continent  of  the 
element — the  larger  ground,  in  virtue  of  which  the 
entrance  of  the  element  became  a  possibility — was 
by  no  means  a  posteriori  ground.  The  larger 
point,  that  man  is  a  creature,  or  an  effect,  and, 
correlatively,  that  there  is  a  Creator,  or  First 
Cause  ; — the  proof  of  this  was  sufficiently  a  priori. 
Let  it  be  remembered,  therefore,  of  what  nature  is 
the  demonstration  as  a  whole.  The  method  which 
has  been  followed,  in  the  present  instance,  is  of  a 
mixed  character, — but  what  of  that  ?  The  perfec 
tion  of  this  demonstration  consists  not  in  this,  that, 
from  beginning  to  end,  there  are  no  a  posteriori, 
or  purely  empirical,  elements  to  be  found,  however 
diligent  may  be  the  search.  Because,  where  man 


Sue-Div.  IT.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    87 

is  concerned,  and  is,  indeed,  a  main  factor,  it  is 
impossible  to  be  altogether  without  momenta 
drawn  from  (what  is  called)  probable  evidence. 
And  any  expectation  that  all  such  momenta  would 
be  altogether  absent,  would  be  the  height  of 

o  o 

extravagance.*  The  very  introduction  into  the 
subject  of  Matter,  as  a  thing  to  be  reasoned  about 
—Matter,  which  is  the  only  and  very  God  of  the 
Atheists,  who  must  be  presumed  to  lie  ever  in  the 
posture  of  hostile  critics; — Matter,  we  say,  brings 
with  it  a  posteriori  elements,  if,  indeed,  Matter 
itself  be  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  entirely  empirical 
existence.  Certainly,  Expansion  and  Duration,  on 
the  one  side,  and  Matter,  on  the  other,  do  not  fall 
under  the  same  category  :  Matter  being  admittedly 
contingent  in  this,  that  we  are  not  obliged,  by  the 
constitution  of  our  minds,  to  conceive  of  it  as 
always  existing ;  while,  again,  Expansion  and 
Duration  exist  to  us  as  things  the  non-existence  of 

O 

which  is  not  possible.  Besides,  too :  When  we 
shall  have  arrived  at  a  succeeding  Proposition,1'  it 
will  be  seen  that  there  is  a  special  reason,  of 
a  peculiar  description,  for  the  exceptional  treat 
ment  of  the  Attribute  under  notice,  the  Justice,  to 
wit,  of  God.  But  the  perfection  of  our  demonstra 
tion  lies  in  this,  that,  in  all  the  main  features,  and 
specially  as  touching  the  Being,  and  the  Absolute 
Attributes  of  the  Chief  Factor,  the  method  is 

»  Confer,  infra,  Schol.  I.  §  9.  ''  \"r:.  Coroll.  from  Prop.  III. 


88  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

purely  a  priori,  synthetical,  deductive,  abstract. 
The  perfection,  too,  of  the  demonstration,  when  its 
final  cause  is  in  view,  will  (in  fine)  be  found  to  be 
in  its  being  convincing,  and  irrefragable  by  any 
objector.  In  these  regards  will  consist  the  real 
perfection  of  the  demonstration  :  not  in  its  having 
received  no  aids,  anywhere,  from  human  observa 
tion,  or  general  experience,  in  matters  relating  to 
man,  and  his  to  him  most  weighty  concernments.51 

§  6.  Upon  the  whole  :  Tis,  therefore,  clear  that 
in  the  Supreme  Mind  there  is  the  Quality  or 
Property  of  Conscience.  Reason  shows,  that  God 
is  the  Just  God  :  Consciously  Just.  Justice  is 
most  assuredly  one  of  the  Divine  Attributes. 

§  7.  Tt  being,  then,  established,  that  God  is 
Just,  and  it  having  been  laid  down  (what  is 
sufficiently  incontrovertible)  that  the  just  and  the 
unjust  among  men  are  the  proper  objects  of  God's 
Justice ; b  we  are  prepared  to  approach  another 
point  in  our  extensive  horizon,  and  edge  off  our 
workmanship  by  an  a  priori  finishing.  God's 
Truth  and  His  Justice  impinge  upon  each  other ; 
but  they  do  not,  for  all  that,  coalesce.  The  Truth 
and  the  Justice  coincide,  to  a  certain  extent  :  so 
far  they  go  on  the  same  road  ;  but,  while  Truth  has 
been  proceeding  in  a  wider  highway,  Justice  goes 
farther  along  the  route.  The  fact  is,  that  the  Just 
God  acts  towards  moral  agents  according  to  their 

O  O 

a  Confer -,  infra,  Div.  V.  Prop.  i.  §  1C.  b  Lemma. 


Sue-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    89 

true  states, — that  is,  towards  the  good  as  being 
good,  and  towards  the  evil  as  being  so.  This  is, 

~  O  7 

however,  in  virtue,  not  of  God's  Trueness,  but  of 
His  Justness.  This  latter  it  is  which  specializes  in 
the  common  objects,  men,  fixing,  exclusively,  on 
the  moral  principles  of  the  nature.  But,  never 
theless,  God's  Justice  involves  the  Trueness.  A 
matter  of  moment,  since  a  highly  important  con 
sequence  follows. 

§  8.  Inasmuch  as  God's  Justice  is,  indeed,  little 
more  than  His  Trueness  applied  to  the  good,  and 
to  the  bad,  as  being,  respectively,  good  and  bad, 
morally  :  The  supposition  that  God  is  un-just, 
involving  that  He  is  false  ;  as  the  absurdity  of 
God's  being  false  has  been  demonstrated/1  the 
absurdity  of  the  supposition  which  would  involve 
that  absurdity  is  also,  at  same  time,  made  manifest. 
For  God  to  be  false,  were  impossible  :a  Therefore, 
the  supposition  of  God  being  un-just,  as  implying 
the  same  impossibility,  were  impossible  also. 

§  9.  Again  :  For  the  Just  God  to  act  as  if  He 
were  not  Just, — or  for  God  to  act  to  the  good  as 
if  they  were  bad,  and  to  the  bad  as  if  they  were 
good  ;  were  to  be  (not  only  not  True,  i.e.,  False— 
but,  moreover)  un-just  and  im-moral.  But  the 
simple  supposition  of  God's  injustice  is  so  absurd 
in  itself,  that  no  position  can  by  any  possibility  be 
more  absurd.  For,  to  suppose  God  to  be  unjust, 

a  Fupra,  Prop.  II. 


90  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

were  to  suppose  that  God  has  need  to  be  unjust ; 
and  to  suppose  this,  would  be  to  suppose  a  cause 
without,  or  apart  from,  God,  compelling  Him  : 
and  'tis  absurd,  in  the  case  of  God,  as  we  have 
demonstrated  His  Existence,  and  so  many  of  His 
Attributes,8  to  suppose  a  cause,  cib  extra,  or  outside 
Him,  determining  Him.  In  short,  nothing  more 
absurd  than,  without  reference  to  any  other 
absurdity,  to  suppose  God  to  be  necessitated,  from 
without,  to  act  as  He  is  not — to  be  obliged  to  act 
as  He  is  not,  to  men  good,  and  men  bad,  as  being 
otherwise  than  they  really  are. 

§  10.  Thus,  there  can  be  no  reason  why  we 
should  suppose  the  possibility  of  God  being  unjust : 
but  there  is  sufficient  reason  why  we  pronounce  the 
impossibility  of  there  being  injustice  in  God. 

§  11.  We  can  have  no  difficulty,  therefore,  in 
arriving  at  the  conclusion,  that  God  and  Justice 
stand  to  each  other  as  necessary  inseparables  ;  and 
so  we  maintain,  that  God  is  necessarily  of  inflexible 
Justice. 

§  12.  Then,  God,  who  is  the  True,  and  the 
Faithful,  is,  necessarily,  the  inflexibly  Just. 

SCHOLIUM  T. 

MAN,   AS  A  MORAL  BEING  INHABITING  THE  EARTH. 
§  1.   Tis  incumbent  upon  us  now  to  enter  upon 
another  part  of  our  subject.      We  have  noticed  a 

a  See  the  Propositions  in  Divisions  I.  &  II. 


Sue-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    91 

special  clement  which  falls  to  be  introduced  when 
treating  of  Justice,8-  and  we  are  arrived  at  the 
place  where  we  must  take  notice  of  an  additional 
element,  one,  too,  of  the  gravest  importance.  The 
former  element  was  weighty  in  one  respect :  this 
one  will  be  seen  to  be  so  in  another.  The  former 
went  to  make  up  the  idea  of  what  Justice  implies, 
or  what  is  Justice  :  and  therefore  it  behoved  to 
appear  before  the  demonstration.  But  it  may 
perhaps  be,  that  the  present  element  looks  more 
towards  the  consequences  of  Justice,  than  the  con 
stitution  itself  of  the  idea  thereof:  and,  so,  its 
natural  position  is  after  the  demonstration.  Its 
fit  place  is  in  our  posterior  analytics. 

§  2.  We  have  seen,  that  the  Justice  of  God 
implies  that  lie  act  to  the  good  as  good  ;  to  the 
bad,  as  being  really  bad.1'  But  we  now  allege, 
that  the  good  man  is,  as  such,  naturally  happy  : 
he  is  happy  so  far  as  he  is  good,  or  as  the  good 
which  is  in  him  is  uninterruptedly  operative. 
Analogously,  the  bad  man,  as  such,  is  infallibly 
unhappy,  or,  to  adopt  as  plain  a  word,  miserable. 
Goodness  or  virtue,  in  short,  implies  happiness, 
and  vice  implies  misery,  of  a  greater  or  a  less 
degree.  God,  therefore,  must  act  towards  the 
good  man  as  being  a  happy  man,  and  to  the 
evil  man  as  being  a  miserable  man.  And  we 
shall  have  an  opportunity  of  observing  how  much, 

a  Supra,  Lemma.  *'  Supra,  Demonstration. 


92  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

of  even  tremendous  significance,  is  involved  in 
these  things.51 

§  3.  It  is,  then,  to  be  shown,  that  goodness  in 
men  involves  happiness  ;  and  badness,  unhappiness. 
Afterwards,  we  shall  attend  emphatically  to  what 
is  implied  in  God  acting  to  the  good  or  happy  man, 
as  being  truly  a  happy  man,  and  to  the  evil  or  un 
happy  man — to  be  plain  with  you,  the  sinner — as 
being  indeed  an  unhappy,  yea  a  miserable  man.b 
Not  omitting  neither  the  consequences  of  such 
action  in  the  one  way  and  in  the  other.  At  the 
point  indicated,  the  grand  doctrine  of  Rewards  and 
Punishments  will  break  in  upon  us  ;  and,  in  self- 
luminous  flashes  of  light  derived  from  the  source 
of  that  doctrine,  we  shall  have,  at  a  certain  point 
in  our  progress,  glimpses  of  the  unutterable  blessed 
ness  of  heaven  ;  as  well  as  be  obliged  to  admit 
within  the  scope  of  our  gaze  (although  blasting 
will  be  the  vision)  the  lurid  darkness  of  the  horrific 
damnation  of  hell.  Such  the  dire  necessity  of  the 
case. 

§  4.  Thus,  we  are  to  address  ourselves,  in  the 
first  place,  to  the  doctrine,  that  virtue  involves 
happiness  ;  and  vice,  misery. 

§  5.  Now,  when  we  say,  that  the  virtuous,  or 
good  man  is,  as  such,  happy  ;  we  mean,  that  this  is 
so  according  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 

:i  Vide,  infra,  Schol.  TT.  Sect.  13,  14  ; — aliasq; 
b  Vide,  infra,  Schol.  II.  Atque,  Schol.  III. 


SuB-Div.  11. j    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    93 

the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  as  experi 
enced  by  us.  But  goodness  is  not  the  only  thing 
or  cause  in  operation,  in  any  case.  As  Conscious 
ness  testifies,  and  as  Observation  of  others,  and 
Experience  generally  make  plain,  there  is  no  man 
thoroughly  good,  and  that  continually  :  and  there 
are  other  disturbing  forces  at  work  besides  those 
flowing  from  the  man  himself,  directly,  or  in 
directly  ;  voluntarily,  or  hereditarily.  There  are 
other  lines,  some  of  them  of  course  traversing 
lines,  besides  the  main  line  of  life.  All  those 
disturbing  forces,  from  whatever  quarter,  being 
resolvable  into  the  evil  that  is  in  the  world.  And 
the  consequence  of  all  this,  the  experienced,  and 
the  admitted  consequence  is,  that  goodness  is  not 
so  much  productive  of,  and  attended  by,  happiness 
simply,  as  it  tends,  always  tends,  to  be  so.  Virtue, 
so  far  forth  as  it  is  virtue,  involves  happiness,  so 
far  as  the  virtue  is  singly  operative.  This  length 
we  must  indeed  go.  But  the  confusion  which 
there  is  in  the  actual  world  prevents  us  from  being 
able  to  go  farther.  Still,  let  it  be  believed,  that 
length  is  quite  far  enough  from  being  a  short  way. 

§  6.  And,  similarly,  the  same  sort  of  thing  holds 
with  regard  to  the  opposite,  unvirtuousness.  As, 
according  to  the  constitution  of  nature,  the  good 
man  is  happy,  so,  after  the  same  fashion,  the 
vicious  man  is  miserable,  more  or  less  miserable, 
and  he  always  tends  to  become  so,  and  more  and 


94  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

more.  But  no  wicked  man  alive  is  as  evil  as  it  is 
possible  he  might  have  been,  or  may  hereafter 
come  to  be  ;  by  reason — if  for  no  other  reason — of 
the  good,  the  great  good,  which  there  is  in  this 
world  of  sense,  with  all  its  deficiencies  :  The  good 
will  not  allow  the  evil  to  be  so  evil,  as,  without  the 
good,  the  evil  would  assuredly  be.  The  good  is 
always  striving  (such  is  its  nature)  to  keep  the  evil 
within  bounds,  and  to  lessen  the  effects,  at  least, 
of  its  malignity.  And  the  experienced  consequence 
is,  that  evil,  or  vice,  is  not  attended  by  so  much 
misery  as  it  invariably  tends  to  produce.  For  the 
same  reason — that  is,  this  is  the  reason — Sin,  most 
prolific  mother,  does  not  sooner  bring  about  Death, 
true,  absolute  Death.  There  are  counteracting 
agencies  at  work,  which  keep  the  whole  of  the 
dreadful  sin-brood  in  a  sort  of  half-life,  or  lingering 
death.  It  is  only  when  Sin  hath  conceived,  in  a 
completed  way,  that  the  dread  monster-mother 
effects  the  legitimate  end,  and  bringeth  forth 
unsightly  Death. 

§  7.  If  there  be  any  qualifications  of  the  doctrine, 
above-delivered,  of  Virtue  leading  to  Happiness, 
and  Vice  leading  to  Misery, — any  qualifications 
other  than  have  been  already  advanced  ;  these  of 
course  should  have  a  hearing.  But  it  does  not 
appear  that  there  are  any  other  qualifications. 
The  subject  might,  indeed,  be  much  drawn  out : 
many  particulars  might  be  brought  in,  in  the  way 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    95 

of  details.  But  besides  the  great  fact  of  the 
incessant  conflict,  the  ever-waged  battle,  of  Good 
against  Evil,  and  Evil  against  Good,  and  the  con 
sequent  limits  and  constraints  set  by  the  one  to  the 
actual  progress  of  the  other ;  there  cannot  be 
adduced  any  distinct  consideration.  In  fine,  how 
can  there  be  any  qualifications  but  those  denoted, 
however  dimly  ?  Apart  from  the  limitations  set 
by  The  Good,  and  its  kingdom,  to  the  Evil,  with 
its  shadowy  likeness  of  a  kingdom,  and  by  the  Evil 
to  The  Good  :  what  should  hinder  each  working, 

O' 

without  let  or  hindrance,  on  and  on?  Good  tend 
ing  always  to  happiness,  more  good  and  more 
happiness  ;  evil  tending  always  to  evil,  and  misery, 
more  and  more,  without  assignable  end. 

O 

§  8.  Those  effects,  namely,  happiness  and  the 
reverse,  are,  then,  the  natural  consequences, 
certainly  the  natural  attendants,  of  Virtue  and 
Viciousness.  And  if  any  one  will,  the  effects  in 
question  might  be  designated  Rewards  and  Pmtix/i- 
ments.  Happiness  may,  indeed,  be  said  to  be 
the  natural  Reward  of  the  good  man  ;  as  Misery 
maybe  said  to  be  tin-  natural  Punishment. of  the 
evil  man. 

§  9.  All  this  which  has  been  advanced  is  nothing 
but  an  appeal  to  those  facts  with  which  knowledge 
of  ourselves,  and  external  observation  supply  us. 
A  demonstrative  proof,  therefore,  as  it  were  out  of 
the  question,  so  it  is  quite  unnecessary.  In  truth, 


96  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

we  can  demonstrate  no  fact  regarding  men  :  that  is, 
we  cannot  demonstrate,  in  the  strictest  sense ;  we 
can  only  prove  in  virtue  of  postulates.*  There  is 
no  more  than  one  fact,  in  cell  the  universe,  which 
is  truly  strictly  demonstrative,  the  fact,  namely,  of 
the  Existence  of  God.  Nor  can  those  statements 
regarding  human  nature  be  supported  by  authority  ; 
because  the  facts  are  so,  or  they  are  so  and  so, 
whatever  any  one  may  urge.  Authority,  as  such, 
would  go  for  nothing.  Yet,  in  a  question,  as  to 
any  matter  of  fact,  whether  a  thing  be  so  and  so, 
or  not,  it  is  quite  competent  and  pertinent  to 
adduce  the  testimony  of  those  who  are  the  best 
judges  of  what  is  really  the  fact.  It  is  quite 
competent  to  produce  witnesses,  who  could  testify 
as  to  what  they  have  observed,  in  regard  to  the 
matter  in  hand ;  and  it  would  be  quite  pertinent, 
were  the  facts  of  the  case  doubtful.  But  they  are 
not  so. 

SCHOLIUM  II. 

THE  INDISSOLUBLE  CONNECTION  BETWEEN  MORALITY  AND 
HAPPINESS, — AND  IMMORALITY  AND  MISERY. 

§  1.  Tis  the  case,  then,  that,  by  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature,  the  moral  are  actually  happy  ; 
the  immoral,  the  reverse.13  This  is  true,  but  true, 
however,  with  the  conditions  and  qualifications 
stated  in  the  preceding  Scholium.  The  imperfect 

a  Vide,  supra,  Dem.  §  5.  b  Schol.  proceed. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     97 

virtue  which  obtains  among  men  tends  to  produce 
happiness, — while  the  actually  existing  vice,  with 
all  its  checks,  has  a  tendency  to  produce  unhappi- 
ness  and  positive  misery.  So  far  as  virtue  operates 
unimpeded,  it  has  such  a  tendency  :  so  far  as 
untrammelled  vice  extends,  it  has  a  tendency 
drawing  in  the  opposite  direction,  or  to  wretched 
ness  within  and  without  the  man.  Such  is  indeed 
the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  as  made 
known  to  us  by  our  own  consciousness,  and  as 
observed  regarding  others,  in  the  way  of  daily 
experience.  The  moral  are,  comparatively,  the 
happy  :  the  immoral,  the  unhappy.  Now,  an 
important  immanent  question  awaits  us  here  :  Is 
such  constitution  founded  in  the  eternal  fitnesses  of 
things,  or  not?  is  it  intrinsically  necessary,  or  is  it, 
on  the  contrary,  purely  contingent  and  arbitrary  ? 
Let  us  put  it  otherwise.  Is  it  an  inherent  power 
of  virtue  that  it  produce  happiness  ?  and,  Is  it 
inherent  in  vice  to  produce  misery  ?  Or,  Is  the 
reverse  true  ?  And,  Are  the  happiness  and  the 
unhappiness  merely  arbitrarily  superadded  qualities 
— superadded,  that  is,  by  the  arbitrary  fiat,  the 
mere  will  or  good  pleasure,  of  the  Creator  ? a 

§  2.  But  whereas  the  question,  as  put,  does, 
though  secretly,  yet  really,  distinguish  between 
the  nature  of  the  Creator,  and  His  good  pleasure, 
or  fiat,  insinuating,  too,  that  the  nature  and  the 

:i  Scholium  under  Part  iii.  Division  II. 


98  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

particular  will  could  possibly  be  disjoined  and 
disconnected  :  it  is  to  be  preliminarily  observed 
that  the  disconnection  is  impossible.  This  follows 
from  Proposition  II.,  where  it  was  proved  that 
God,  the  Creator,  is  necessarily  True.  Being  most 
Truthful,  He  must  manifest  Himself  as  He  is  ;  He 
cannot,  therefore,  reveal  Himself  by  a  fiat,  declara 
tive  of  a  general  law,  inconsistent  with  the  reality 
of  His  character.  God's  fiat,  in  fine,  must  be  but 
the  pure  expression  of  Himself,  as  willing  from,  or 
in  accordance  with,  His  nature. 

§  3.  This  may  be  said  to  be  an  answer  to  the 
question  by  objecting  to  it,  by  objecting  to  an 
assumption  radically  contained  in  it,  and  by 
raising  a  previous  question.  Nevertheless,  it 
appears  to  involve,  in  any  view,  an  answer  to  the 
interrogatory.  It  answers  by  a  decided  negative 
as  to  the  possible  arbitrariness  of  any  such  fiat. 

§  4.  Thus,  the  course  of  nature  determining  that 
virtue  should  produce  happiness,  and  vice  misery  ; 
it  seems  to  follow,  that  the  connection  between  the 
virtue  and  the  happiness,  the  vice  and  the  misery, 
is  not  arbitrary  but  necessary.  That  is,  taking  the 
constitution  of  things  as  an  expression  of  the  will — 
fiat,  if  you  prefer  the  word — of  God;  it  seems  to 
be  evident  that  the  constitution  of  things,  which 
fixes  the  connection  in  question,  is  unalterable. 
The  expression  of  will  being  grounded  in  the 
nature  of  that  God  whose  attributes  have  been 


Suu-Div.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTMBUTES.     99 

demonstrated,  is  therefore  unchangeable.  The 
essential  attributes  of  God  are  immutable,  if 
immutability  be. 

§  5.  But  as  the  relation  of  virtue  to  happiness, 
and  of  vice  to  misery,  is  an  important  subject ; 
and  it  may  be  attended  with  good  results  to  dwell 
upon  the  character  of  the  connection  in  question  ; 
let  us  consider  the  matter  yet  a  little  further,  by 
letting  in  new  lights,  and  looking  at  the  objects  in 
other  attitudes.  Let  us,  starting  afresh,  put  the 
question  over  again,  while  the  ground  of  the 
objection  which  was  sustained  is  dropped  out. 

§  6.  Is  it  inherent  in  virtue  to  be  accompanied 
by  happiness  ?  and  in  vice  to  be  accompanied  by 
the  reverse  ?  Or,  on  the  contrary,  could  virtue  be 
followed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  by  misery  ?  and 
could  vice  be  followed,  by  reason  of  the  same  law, 
by  true  happiness  ? 

§  7.  Virtue  leads,  at  present,  to  happiness  ;  and 
vice,  to  misery. a  IS'ow,  this  human  virtue — of 
whatever  it  may  consist,  i.e.,  of  whatever  par 
ticulars  it  may  be  composed,  or  into  whatever 
elemental  bases  it  may  be  resolved — must  be  held 
to  be,  generally,  expressive  of  conformity  to  the 
moral  nature  with  which  man  is  endowed  ;  while 
vice,  shortly,  denotes  departure  from  such  con 
formity.  Next,  the  virtue,  which  is  simply  con- 
a  Schol. 


100  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

formity  to  the  true  moral  nature  of  man,  must  be 
also  allowed  to  be  in  conformity,  so  far,  at  the 
very  least,  with  the  moral  nature  with  which  man 
was  originally  endowed  by  his  Creator;  while  the 
contrary  holds  as  to  vice.  This  is  just  what  is 
meant  by  Virtue,  or  Morality;  what,  by  the 
opposite,  Vice.  This  is  just  the  virtue  and  the 
vice  about  which  the  question  asks  :  Otherwise,  no 
question  can  be  legitimately  before  us,  as  at  this 
stage  in  our  argument.  We  cannot  logically 
ignore  now  the  supposition  of  God,  the  Creator  of 
men. 

§  8.  This  being  so,  the  question  before  us 
almost  answers  itself.  In  viewing  human  virtue 
as  a  conformity,  partial  conformity  it  may  be,  to 
the  moral  nature  with  which  man  was  at  first 
endowed,  it  must  view  virtue  as  being,  to  a  certain 
extent  at  least,  in  conformity  also  with  the  nature 
of  the  Creator  Himself.  How,  then,  were  it 
possible  that  virtue  should  not  be  followed  by 
happiness,  since  the  Creator  Himself  is  happy  ? a 
Could  conformity,  in  a  variety  of  ways,  to  the 
Creator's  own  nature,  lead  to  anything  but  some 
thing  else  equally  in  conformity  with  the  nature  of 
the  Creator  ?  Could  living  as  God  would  have  us 
live  ;  being,  so,  like  Himself ;  conduct  but  to  some 
thing  like  Himself?  Could  it  possibly  conduct  to 
anything  unlike  Himself? — So,  too,  regarding  vice. 

il  Div.  III.  Prop.  i. 


Suu-Div.  II.]    THK  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    101 

This  is  disconformity  to  the  true  nature  of  man, 
and,  so,  to  the  nature  of  God.  How,  then,  could 
it  lead  to  happiness,  or  aught  but  the  reverse  of 
happiness  ?  How  could  disconformity,  in  im 
portant  regards,  to  the  God-like,  lead  but  to  some 
other  un-God-like  disconformity  ?  Could  the  vice, 
the  unlike  God,  lead  to  happiness,  the  like  God  ? 


§  9.  Thus  the  question  which  was  raised  a  is  to 
be  met  with  a  decided  negative,  approaching  it  by 
the  track  pursued.  But  while  throughout  the 
preceding,  the  elements  of  Virtue  and  Vice  pre 
dominated  ;  in  what  is  to  follow,  certain  other 
elements  will  be  the  predominating  ones. 

§  10.  The  question,  then,  being  looked  at  with 
the  element  of  Happiness,  and  that  of  Misery,  its 
reverse,  prominently  in  the  foreground ;  it  is 
fortunate  that  we  can,  at  once,  answer,  that  any 
alternative,  such  as  the  question  presents,  cannot 
be  entertained  for  one  moment.  The  connection 
between  virtue  and  happiness,  and  vice  and 
misery,  is  indissoluble,  being  grounded  in  the  very 
nature  of  things  which  are  themselves  immutable. 

§  11.  The  reason  why  the  connection  in  question 
is  unalterable,  is,  because  the  supposition  of  aught 
else  were  quite  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  that 
Supreme  already  demonstrated.  He  is,  for  example, 

§  6,  sub  Jin. 


102  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR    [Div.  III. 

necessarily  consummately  Happy/1  And,  so  far  as 
He  produces  anything  like  Himself,  He  must  effect 
creaturely  Happiness,  only  creaturely  Happiness. b 
That  is,  by  the  constitution  of  things  established 
by  God,  the  creature  man,  following  the  laws  of  its 
highest  or  inmost  being,  must  be  happy.  Un- 
happiness  is  the  un-like  God ;  unhappiness,  there 
fore,  can  only  be  the  attribute  of  creatures  unlike 
God.  There  will  be  no  dispute  as  to  whether  the 
moral  part  of  the  nature  of  moral  beings  be  the 
main  seat  of  happiness,  worthy  of  the  name,  and 
of  unhappiness.  True  happiness,  if  not  itself  a 
moral  quality,  is  necessarily  associated  with  moral 
qualities.  Perhaps  it  is  an  index  to  their  state  and 
condition :  the  greater  the  true  happiness,  the 
more  the  genuine  moral  qualities  are  in  exercise. 
Happiness,  in  fine,  if  not  a  moral  faculty,  is  at 
least  a  quasi  moral  faculty  ;  and  it  is  certainly  a 
very  important  quality,  whatever  else  it  be.  It 
follows,  that  moral  creatures,  unlike  God  as  to 
happiness,  presuppose  a  change  to  have  taken  place 
with  regard  to  them  since  the  time  of  their  being 
created.  Thus :  Certain  creatures  are  unhappy, 
that  is,  habitually  so.  Being  unhappy,  they  are 
unlike  God.  A  race  of  moral  creatures,  unlike 
God,  must  in  time  have  become  so ;  that  is,  they 
must,  in  some  way  or  other,  have  degenerated,  or 
become  sinners.  God  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 

a  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  'J  Sub-Prop,  under  Prop.  i.  Div.  III. 


SUB-DIV.  1 1.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     103 

for  creatures,  the  direct  work  of  his  hands,  or 
(should  you  object  to  the  anthropomorphize 
language)  his  own  workmanship,  beings  unlike 
Himself,  opposed  to  Himself,  in  their  moral 
qualifications ;  as  this  would  involve  an  effect 
without  a  cause  ;  or,  rather,  it  would  involve  an 
effect  proceeding  from  an  inadequate  and  impossible 
cause,  a  thing,  if  possible,  even  more  absurd  than 
the  other.  The  creatures,  therefore,  as  they  came 
from  God,  at  their  creation,  must  have  resembled 
God ;  in  other  words,  they  must  have  been  in  His 
image  and  likeness.  They  must  have  been,  there 
fore,  happy.  That  is,  as  moral  beings,  with  their 
moral  natures  entire,  and  in  legitimate  exercise ; 
which  in  other  words  is  just  saying,  truly  and 
thoroughly  virtuous  beings  ;  they  must  have  been 
happy.  .Being  like  God,  being  virtuous  or  innocent, 
man  (very  properly  we,  under  our  present  circum 
stances,  shall  by  no  means  be  allowed  to  call  him 
the  Adamic  man]  was  necessarily  very  happy. 

§12.  All  this  is,  unless  a  huge  mistake  has 
entered  into  the  reasoning,  a  demonstration, 
founded  upon  the  nature,  or  the  attributes,  of  God, 
of  the  real  connection  which  exists  between  virtue 
and  happiness,  and,  consequentially,  between  vice 
and  misery ;  when  one  ascends  to  the  source  of 
things,  where,  only,  things  at  their  perfection  can 
be  seen.  In  the  foregoing  Scholium,  the  connec 
tion  between  imperfect  virtue,  and  imperfect 


104  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

happiness,  in  man.  as  lie  at  present  is,  is  stated  as 
a  fact  of  experience :  and  herein  we  have  been 
greatly  busied  with  an  enquiry  as  to  human 
virtue  and  happiness  as  man  must  have  existed 
when  he  came  fresh  from  his  Creator's  hands.  To 
this  enquiry,  the  application  of  strict  a  priori 
reasoning  is  quite  practicable  and  legitimate.  And 
should  any  one  deem  it  to  be  otherwise,  in  general, 
or  in  particular,  he  has  no  more  to  do  than  put  his 
finger  on  the  place  where  is  the  wrongness  in 
what  is  advanced.  An  objector  has  only  to  shew, 
that  a  priori  reasoning  is  totally  inapplicable,  or 
point  out  wherein  it  has  been  positively  misapplied 
in  the  detail. 

§  13.  And  now  to  enforce  that  for  which  much 
of  the  foregoing  is  an  excellent  preparation.  But 
before  proceeding  in  our  course,  we  may  take  the 
opportunity  to  make,  or  to  repeat,  an  observation. 
When  certain  expressions  (such  as,  "  a  good  man  ;  " 
"  a  happy  man  :  "  "a  bad  man  ;  "  an  "  unhappy," 
or  a  "miserable"  man)  and  others  coined  after  the 
same  fashions,  are  employed ;  they  are,  of  course, 
to  be  taken  in  connection  with  their  proper  qualifi 
cations.  It  cannot  be  deemed  to  be  necessary  to 
qualify,  on  every  occasion,  propositions,  or  expres 
sions,  which  have  been  qualified  once  for  all.a 
To  return  now  to  that  which  we  were  about  to 

a  Scholium  I.  §§  5,  6  ;  also,  above,  §  1. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     105 

enforce  :  Goodness  and  happiness  are  intimately, 
yea,  inseparably,  associated  ;  as  well  as  are  the 
opposites,  badness  and  unhappiness.a  When, 
therefore,  God  acts  in  relation  to  a  good  man,  as 
such,  He  is  in  contact  with  a  happy  man.  And 
when  God  manifests  Himself  towards  a  happy  man, 
the  man  is,  of  course,  made  to  be  more  happy. 
The  good  man  is  naturally  happy  :  moreover,  he 
necessarily  becomes  more  so,  in  the  case  where 
God,  The  Blessed  One  ('O  Ma/capo?),1'  in  acting,  just 
reveals  or  communicates  Himself. 

§  14.  In  like  manner,  when  the  consummately 
Happy  Being  specially  reveals  Himself  to  a  bad 
man,  the  man,  naturally  unhappy,  is  necessarily 
made  to  become  more  miserable.  Just  because,  in 
the  case  supposed,  a  Nature  diametrically  opposite, 
and  contrary,  is  in  contact  with  the  evil  of  the  bad 
man.  It  is,  indeed,  an  awful  thought — but  one  of 
the  most  pregnant  with  high  consequences  of  any 
which  deal  in  the  great  concernments  of  moral 
matters — that  the  mere  contact  of  goodness  and 
evil,  where  the  goodness  is  over-powcringly 
influential,  should  result  in  misery,  or,  rather,  an 
increase  in  misery,  to  the  bad.  But  it  is  inevitably 
so.  Such  is  the  constitution  of  things :  and  it 
could  not  be  otherwise.  It  could  not  be  otherwise, 
simply  because  God  is  God,  and  cannot  cease  to  be 
God. 

a  Schol.  I.  £  preceding  portion  of  this  Schol.     h  Div.  III.  Prop.  i. 


106 


THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 


SCHOLIUM  SUB  SCHOLIO  II. 

§  1.  One  thing  is  now  clear  :  Sinners  have 
a  reason  for  hating  God.  Men  who  are  conscious 
of  sinning  against  Him  who  is  the  True, — the 
Faithful  executor  of  the  laws  of  Nature,  as  being, 
so  far,  but  the  outside  expressions  of  His  inner 
Character,  and  to  which,  by  once  establishing  them, 
He  has  engaged  to  adhere,— the  inflexibly  Just 
One,  rendering  to  every  man  according  to  his 
deeds  ;  men,  we  repeat,  who  are  conscious  of  being 
sinners,  may  well  hate  God,  because  He  increases 
their  misery  when  He  draws  nigh  unto  them. 
Sinners,  however,  and  Sin,  are  not  the  same,  and 
not  everything  which  is  true  of  the  one,  is  true  of 
the  other  also.  Inasmuch,  then,  as  the  domain  of 
Sin  is  intensified,  and  so  increased,  by  the  contact 
of  God  with  the  nature  in  which  Sin  reigns,  she 
(if  it  be  lawful  to  personify  Sin)  may  yet  be 
imagined  to  rejoice  herein.  Sin,  in  becoming 
more  conscious  to  herself  of  her  exceeding  sinful- 
ness,  becoming  enlarged,  or  intensified,  by  contact 
with  God,  may  be  imagined  to  rejoice  at  this  the 
extension  of  her  borders.  Still,  Sin,  the  monster- 
mother  of  all  human  anguish,  should  she,  in 
portentous  audacity,  court  for  such  reason  the 
thought  of  God,  should  also  remember,  that  she 
courts  the  contact  of  her  bane  :  not  wise,  after  the 
pattern  of  the  wisdom  of  the  serpent,  but  foolish, 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    107 

after  the  fashion  of  fatuous  self-murderers,  to  allow 
herself  to  be  drawn  within  the  vortex  of  that 
mighty  influence  which  shall  at  last  be  her  inevit 
able  destruction.  When  Sin  hath  fully  conceived, 
by  reason  of  her  visions  of  God,  her  offspring  will 
assuredly  be  Death.  And  Death,  once  brought 
fairly  forth,  will  have  an  insatiable  maw,  maw 
never  to  be  satisfied  until  Sin  herself,  own  mother 
of  Death,  shall  be  consumed.  And  then  his 
occupation  being  entirely  gone,  and  his  subsistence 
no  longer  possible,  but  thoroughly  impossible, 
Death  himself  shall  die. 

§  2.  Therefore,  it  is  pre-eminently  sinners,  miser 
able  sinners,  who  yet  madly  cry,  in  their  hearts,  to 
God,  'Depart  from  us,  for  we  desire  not  the 
knowledge  of  Thy  ways,'  who,  as  actuated  by  self- 
interested  motives,  should  desire  the  contact  of  the 
Good  One,  even  though  He  approach  as  the  Just 
God ;  for  in  the  increase,  and  the  ever  increase,  of 
their  misery,  lies  the  direction  of  the  only  door  of 
hope.  For  to  have  hope,  the  sinner  must  forsake 
his  way,  and,  as  unrighteous,  his  thoughts,  the 
very  thoughts  however  which  constitute,  as  it  were, 
his  radical  nature,  as  his  nature  has  come  to  be. 
Then,  indeed,  repenting,  or  changing  his  mind; 
ceasing  to  do  evil,  and  learning  to  do  well ; 
becoming,  in  fine,  a  new  man ;  God  can  be  the 

O7  7 

Just  God  to  him,  and  yet  a  source  of  blessedness. 
§  3.  But  although  the  preceding  be  nothing  but 


108  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

what  is  legitimately  consistent  with  doctrine  deal 
ing  only  in  a  priori  principles ;  alas  !  neither  a 
priori  principle,  nor  application  of  any  a  priori 
principle ;  no  a  priori  reasoning,  and,  in  fact,  no 
reasoning  whatever;  can  tell  how  a  man,  being 
evil,  is,  in  consistency  with  the  strict  rules  of  the 
attribute  of  Inflexible  Justice,  to  be  changed  into 
a  good  being :  For  this  would  involve  a  new 
creation,  and,  so,  it  would  utterly  transcend  the 
region  of  purely  Moral  Law.  Reasoning,  not 
ascending  above  the  plane  of  this  attribute  of 
Justice,  can  do  no  more  than  tell  how  the  Just 
God  acts  towards  the  good  and  the  bad,  the  happy 
and  the  unhappy,  as  such,  and  the  results,  in 
accordance  with  the  established  course  of  nature, 
in  the  first  place,  and,  in  the  next,  with  the 
constitution  of  things,  as  related  to  each  other  by 
eternal  fitnesses. 

SCHOLIUM   III. 
THE  JUSTICE  OF  THE  FUTURE. 

§  1.  It  has  been  stated, a  that  Happiness  may  be 
said  to  be  the  natural  Reward  of  the  good  man, 
and  Misery  the  natural  Punishment  of  the  evil  man. 
This  brings  us,  in  a  general  way,  to  the  great 
topic  of  Rewards  and  Punishments.  May  it  not 
be  said  with  truth,  that,  for  us,  men,  and  sinners, 

a  Schol.  I.  §  8,—aliisq_; 


SUB-DIV.  IT.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    109 

(as  we  unquestionably  are,  on  the  supposition  of  a 
God  of  Truth, a  and  of  Justice,b  who  created  us  in 
His  own  image  and  likeness,  morally,)  not  the 
least  important  subject  falling  to  be  discussed, 
under  this  Proposition  relating  to  God's  Justice,  is 
this  same  subject  of  Rewards  and  Punishments  ? 
Or,  might  it  not  be  said,  with  propriety,  that  the 
doctrine  of  PUNISHMENTS,  solely,  is,  for  mankind  as 
they  commonly  are,  the  important  matter  in  this 
whole  inquiry "?  A  form  of  the  question  which 
would  surely  fit  the  topic  more  accurately  to  the 
occasion,  than  one  which  introduced  the  subject 
of  REWARDS  as  an  equally  prominent  element. 

§  2.  Connected,  then,  with  the  great  subject  of 
Good  and  Evil,  of  Happiness  and  Unhappincss,  of 
Reward  and  Punishment,  there  is  still  a  question 
remaining  for  consideration  ;  a  question  yielding, 
in  importance  and  interest,  to  none  whatever. 
The  particular  subject  is  that  of  future  Rewards 
and  Punishments,  or,  to  express  it  more  accurately, 
Rewards  and  Punishments  in  a  future  state,  if  a 
future  state  there  be.  And  how  are  these  Rewards 
and  Punishments  of  the  future — assumed  to  be 
certain — to  be  affected  by  that  Inflexible  Justice 
of  God? 

§  3.  There  are,  therefore,  two  great  questions 
before  us  for  consideration  in  this  place.  Do  the 
premises  to  which  we  have  acquired  right,  entitle 

a  Prop.  II.  '•  Dem.  preced. 


110  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PKIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

us  to  infer  that  there  shall  be  a  future  state  of 
existence  for  man  ?  Such  is  the  first  question,  and 
the  second  is,  What  saith  the  Justice  of  God  as  to 
the  moral  arrangements  of  the  future  state, 
ascertained,  and  held  to  be  certain  ? 

I.  SHALL  THERE  HE  A  FUTURE  STATE  FOR  MAN  ? 

§  4.  Looking,  then,  in  the  direction  of  these 
topics,  we  ask,  Does  the  doctrine  of  the  reality  of 
a  future  life,  with  its  Rewards  and  Punishments, 
belong  in  truth  to  the  subject  of  Natural  Religion  ? 
and,  in  particular,  does  the  doctrine  fall  under  our 
a  priori  argument,  appertaining,  with  perfect 
propriety,  to  its  procedure  ?  These  queries  deserve 
to  be  answered  in  the  most  decided  affirmatives  ; 
and  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  affirmation 
of  the  latter  implies  the  affirmation  of  the  former. 
The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of 
Rewards  and  Punishments,  does  evidently  belong 
to  the  subject  of  Natural  Religion,  and,  most 
incontestably,  the  consideration  does,  specifically, 
belong  to  the  domain  of  the  a  priori  Theology. 
For,  everything  which  undeniably  follows  from,  or 
is  a  strict  application  of,  the  Jlrst  principles  of  our 
Science, — which  themselves  must  be  unimpugn- 
able ; — every  such  thing,  'tis  repeated,  is  legiti 
mately  introducible,  and,  in  a  question  of  title, 
must  be  allowed  to  remain,  as  lawful  adjuncts, 


SUB-DIV.  1 1.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     Ill 

among  the  fitting  accessory  pertinents  of  the 
principal  theme.  But  'tis  not  less  than  a  duty  to 
make  this  whole  matter  level  to  the  commonest 
understanding.  Of  the  most  weighty  concern 
ments  of  every  man  we  are  directly  treating  at 
this  present ;  and  here,  therefore,  if  any  where, 
the  deliverance  should  be  clear,  and  devoid  of  all 
uncertainty  or  ambiguity.  'Tis  a  most  serious 
thing  to  consider  the  judgment  of  imperative 
Justice  itself.  It  behoves  us,  in  sooth,  to  make  the 
matter  quite  plain  to  the  dullest  of  intellects. 

§  5.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that  there  is  a 
God  of  Truth,  and  of  Faithfulness,  and  of  Inflexible 
Justice,  and  we  have  seen  what  demonstrations  of 
such  a  character  do,  of  necessity,  involve.  To  the 
Justice  of  God,  as  the  acme  of  the  series,a  there 
must  be  now  adjoined  the  facts  made  clear  regard 
ing  man  :  to  wit,  that,  to  him,  happiness  comes  in 
proportion  to  his  advances  in  virtuousness — in 
proportion,  too,  to  the  absence  of  traversing 
influences,  those,  more  especially,  running  quite 
counter  to  the  line  of  virtue  ;  while,  in  a  reverse 
way,  unhappiness,  or  misery,  is  the  unfailing 
concomitant,  and  dread  follower,  of  immorality  and 
active  viciousness  :  that  this  is,  because  there 
exists  an  indefeasible  connection  between  these 
things  themselves,  between,  that  is,  the  virtue  and 
the  happiness,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  vice  and 

a  Supra,  Prop.  III.  Dem, 


112  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

the  misery,  on  the  other.  So  that  God,  by  simply 
communicating  with  man,  increases, — by  the 
necessity  of  the  case,  increases, — the  happiness 
of  the  good,  and  the  unhappiness  of  the  bad.a  All 
this  has  been  made  very  clear ;  and  a  considerable 
portion  has  been  matter  of  the  strictest  demonstra 
tion,  direct,  or  consequential. 

§  G.  It  results,  then,  that,  although  the  good 
have  their  reward,  they  are  by  no  means  fully 
rewarded,  in  this  world.  Nor  are  the  wicked 
adequately  punished  here.  Often,  indeed,  they 
seem  to  be  hardly  punished  at  all, — certainly,  far 
from  punished  according  to  the  measure  of  their 
deserts,  which,  at  times,  are  very  great,  the 
iniquities  (which  are  also  sins)  being  appallingly 
flagrant  and  rampant.  What  is  deducible  ?  What 
is  the  conclusion  to  which  our  consciences  are 
infallibly  led  ?  Must  not  it  follow,  that  Inflexible 
Justice  requires  a  future  state  in  which  all  those 
inequalities  shall  be  rectified  ?  the  rectification 
doing  away  with  all  the  confusion  in  which  moral 
existencies  are  enveloped  and  enclosed  in  this 
present  scene  ?  In  fine,  is  it  not  necessary  that 
the  Moral  Governor  of  men  (for  a  Just  God  at  the 
head  of  affairs  in  the  universe,  is,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  a  Moral  Governor)  should  accomplish 
that  which  the  heaven-bestowed  Consciences  of  His 
creatures  cry  out  is  necessary  to  be  accomplished, 

a  Supra,  Schol.  II. ,  §§  13,  14. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     113 

in  order  that  the  behests  of  irrepressible  Justice 
may  be  obeyed  ? 

§  7.  In  this  world,  and  before  our  eyes,  a 
scheme  of  Moral  Government  is  evidently 
established,  and,  the  operations  being  visibly  and 
palpably  in  progress,  the  plan  may  be  said  to  be,  as 
a  whole,  in  course  of  fulfilment,  having  attained 
a  certain  amount  of  actual  development.  There  is 
a  Moral  Government,  the  principles  and  begin 
nings  of  which  are  evident  on  all  sides  :  will  there 
be  no  completion  of  the  system  ?  Beyond  all 
dispute,  there  are  discernible,  in  the  present  con 
stitution  and  course  of  nature,  the  first  principles, 
and  the  commencement,  of  a  scheme  of  government 
carried  on  by  moral  means  working  to  an  end 
consonant  thereunto :  Is  it  now  a  possible 
supposition,  that  the  undeviatingly  Just  One 
should  stay  the  initial  operations  by  a  fiat  of,  No 
farther?  that  the  Supreme,  denying  Himself, 
should  go  contrary  to  His  own  plan,  or  that  He 
would  allow  His  purpose  to  fall,  through  desuetude, 
into  complete  and  final  inefficacy  and  abortion  ? 

§  8.  Would  not  such  inetficacy  and  abortion 
amount  to  a  direct  breach  in  the  integrity  and 
continuity  of  things  ?  Would  not  it  amount  to  an 
actual  positive  violation  of  the  Veracity,  and  Faith 
fulness,  and  Justice  of  the  Universal  Ruler  ?  There 
are  laws  of  Nature  established  by  Him,  and  they 
encompass  us  before  and  behind,  and  011  all  sides : 


114  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

but  none  is  more  weighty  and  abiding  than  the 
moral  laws  written  by  His  finger  on  and  in  the 
hearts  of  His  intelligent  creatures,  whereby  they 
are  obliged  to  infer,  that — in  consonance  with 
the  present  experience,  and  with  the  past,  since 
the  earliest  records  of  man  upon  the  earth,  in  con 
sonance  also  with  the  unmistakable  aspirations, 
and  not-to-be-suppressed  yearnings,  of  our  natures 
projecting  themselves,  as  'twere,  into  the  antici- 
patingly  realized  future ; — to  infer  (we  repeat) 
that  there  shall  be  a  time  of  complete  reckoning 
for  the  just,  and  for  the  unjust.  For  the  just 
among  men,  in  order  that  they  may  receive  the 
due  reward  of  all  their  difficult  and  painful 
strugglings,  through  so  many  toilsome  days,  after 
perfect  conformity  to  the  Will  and  Character  of 
God,  their  Maker,  and  for  the  unjust,  that  they, 
arraigned  before  the  universe,  may  receive  the 
recompense  of  their  unrighteous  deeds — too  often 
cruel  deeds,  committed  at  the  expense  of  the 
suffering  of  their  more  righteous  neighbours. 

§  9.  As  a  legitimate  conclusion  from  our  premises 
(sure  as  these  are)  it  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  moral 
certainty  that  there  shall  be  a  future  state  for  man  : 
and  a  future  life  is  the  foundation  of  all  human 
hopes  and  fears  of  any  considerable  weight.  No 
wise  person  ever  thinks  of  laying  down  grand 
plans  with  reference  to  a  casual  residence  in  a  road 
side  inn,  to  be  left  behind  whenever  the  journey 


SUB  Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     115 

towards  home  sliall  be  resumed.  A  wise  man 
reserves  his  fine  architectonic  devices,  and  measures 
of  general  amenity,  for  that  permanent  abode 
where  all  that  he  most  loves  is  to  be  found  abiding. 

II.   How  SHALL  JUSTICE  BE  ADMINISTERED  IN  THE 
FUTUUE  STATE? 

§  10.  Taking  for  granted,  therefore,  that  there 
shall  be  a  future  state  of  Rewards  and  Punish 
ments,  Rewards  for  the  righteous,  and  Punishments 
for  the  unrighteous  or  wicked  ;  we  proceed  to  the 
remaining  portion  of  our  undertaking,  and  ask, 
How  does  the  inflexible  Justice  of  God  stand  in 
relation  to  the  future  life  ?  How  are  we  to  apply, 
in  a  particular  way,  to  the  denizens  of  the 
kingdoms  beyond  the  grave,  the  doctrine  that  God 
is  inflexibly  Just  ?  The  point  has,  indeed,  been, 
to  a  certain  extent,  anticipated  by  the  foregoing 
observations.  We  found,  that  God's  Justice,  and 
man's  earthly  condition,  being  conjoined,  a  valid 
practical  proof  emerges,  shewing  that  a  future 
state  must  be  inferred.  At  present,  our  business 
lies  with  the  future  world  as  our  postulate,  and  we 
are  concerned  with  the  moral  administration  which 
shall  prevail  in  that  world.  That  is  our  datum  : 
this,  the  qucBSitum. 

§  11.  In  grappling  with  our  subject,  the  solution 
of  whatever  difficulty  there  is,  or  may  be  imagined 
to  be,  is  to  be  found  in  the  circumstance  that  there 


116  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

is  no  radically  and  essentially  new  element  intro 
duced  into  the  case  put,  except  the  (assumed)  fact 
of  the  existence  being  after  the  death  of  the  body 
on  earth.  Now,  the  introduction  of  this  element 
of  mere  continuance  of  the  life  of  men  cannot 
disturb,  in  any  way,  or  to  any  extent,  the  applica 
tion  of  the  rule  valid  for  the  Inflexible  Justice ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  application,  to  the  same  objects 
as  before,  substantially  the  same,  of  the  same  rule. 

§  12.  It  must  be  plain  to  every  mind,  that  the 
strict  Justice  of  God  is  the  same  this  year  as  it  was 
the  last  year,  and  as  it  will  be  the  next  year,  and 
for  ever.  The  Justice  is  the  same  now  that  ever  it 
was ;  and  it  will  be  for  ever  the  same  as  it  is  now. 
Mere  continuance,  any  amount  of  perpetuity  one 
likes  to  imagine,  of  existence  of  the  objects,  can,  of 
itself,  make  no  difference  in  the  application  of  the 
regulating  principle.  And,  by  hypothesis,  the 
continued  existence  is  the  sole  new  element  in  the 
matter. a 

§  13.  The  law,  or  rule,  is  : 
The  inflexibly  Just  God  acts  towards 

Good,    who   are  also  happy,   men,   as   being,  in 
reality,  good,  and  happy,  men  ;  and  towards 

Evil  men,  who  are  likewise  unhappy  or  miserable 

men,  as  being,  in  truth,  such.b 

Now,  no  difference  can  arise  when    the  scene  for 
the  display  of  the  Justice  is  in  one  state  of  being 

a  Sect,  preced.  b  Supra,  Dem.,  &  Schol.  II. 


Sun-Div.  IT.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     117 

rather  than  in  another  ;  is  in — word  it  this  way, 
if  you  please — the  spiritual  world  rather  than  on 
this  earth ; — the  future  world,  as  contradistin 
guished  from  this  world,  at  any  rate.  The 
Inflexible  Justice  of  the  Supreme,  which  renders 
to  every  man  according  to  his  works,  proceeding 
from  the  state  of  his  mind,  cannot  alter  itself,  nor 
submit  to  alteration  brought  about  from  without, 

O 

even  if  causes  for  alteration  could  exist,  as  they 
cannot  ;a  and  the  objects  presented  to  the  Justice 
being  the  same,  to  wit,  good  and  blessed  men  here, 
and  bad  and  miserable  men  there,  the  result  is  the 
same. 

§14.  The  result  is  the  same.  The  good  are,  in 
consequence  of  the  manifestation  of  God,  in  His 
Justice,  to  them,  made  to  be  more  happy  ;  and  the 
more  manifestation,  the  more  blessedness  :  While 
the  evil  are,  by  the  same  means,  ma.de  to  become 
more  miserable,  ever  more  miserable.  And  so  on 
with  regard  to  both  classes  of  men,  without 
determinate  end.'1 

§  1  5.  But  'tis  time  that  an  objection,  which  may 
not  unnaturally  occur,  should  be  favoured  with  a 
hearing.  An  objector,  then,  might  urge  the 
following.  Has  not  one  important  point  been 
omitted  ?  Is  there  not  an  additional  element,  of 
great  weight,  to  which,  as  yet,  no  allusion  has 
been  made  ?  Is  it  not  true,  that  this  life  is  a 

a  Supra,  Dem.,  Sect.  9.  b  Schol.  II.,  §§  13,  14. 


118  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

state  of  probation,  of  trial,  and  of  discipline, — the 
future  life  being  one,  not  of  probation  at  all,  but 
of  retribution,  full  and  final  retribution :  and  is 
not  this  vital  difference  between  the  two  states 
a  matter  of  the  very  highest  moment,  the  considera 
tion  of  it  being  quite  indispensable  in  the  rendering 
of  an  answer  to  the  question  which  has  been 
raised  ? 

§  16.  No  doubt  can  be  entertained  about  the 
importance  of  the  point,  but  a  doubt  may  be 
entertained  about  the  entire  novelty  of  the  same. 
If  you  take  the  additional  element,  as  suck,  to  the 
problem,  it  will,  doubtless,  be  contained  in  it,  and 
must  go  along;  with  it.  But  what  if  the  element 

O  O 

pre-existed  in  the  problem  before  this  handling  of 
it  as  a  distinct  thing  ?  With  great  propriety  is 
the  mooted  point  to  be  weighed  :  the  only  doubt 
concerns  its  existence  beforehand,  in  the  matter 
which  has  been  before  the  reader. 

§  17.  The  essential  of  a  state  of  future  retribu 
tion,  as  distinguished  from  the  present  scene,  where 
men  are  upon  their  trial,  is,  that,  in  that  future,  all 
the  checks,  impediments,  and  limiting  conditions 
of  all  kinds,  will  be  removed  out  of  the  way.  So 
that  virtue,  or  goodness,  will  reap  its  full  reward 
in  unalloyed  and  perfect  happiness  :  while  vicious- 
ness,  as  a  permanent  disposition,  no  longer  counter 
acted  by  direct  or  immediate  influences  from  the 
kingdom  of  The  Good,  will  be  allowed  to  meet 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    119 

witli  the  extremest  punishment  in  the  dire  misery 
which  is  the  necessary  consequent,  no  less  than  the 
appropriate  accompaniment,  of  vice  let  loose  with 
out  restraint.  This  representation  appears  to  be, 
in  all  its  parts,  correct.  But  it  only  shews,  that 
the  administration  of  the  Divine  Justice  will  go  on 
without  the  limiting  conditions  which  restrained 
its  exercise,  and  were  hindrances  to  its  complete 
manifestation,  on  earth.  In  fact,  the  representa 
tion  quite  harmonizes  with  the  whole  course  of  the 
argumentation  pursued  throughout  these  Scholiums. 
The  element,  which  has  been  made  prominent  by 
being  singled  out,  was — latently  it  may  be,  but 
yet — really  and  truly,  in  the  premises,  and  the 
conclusion,  which  had  been  previously  submitted 
to  the  critical  reader. 

III.  SHAM,  FUTURE  PUNISHMENT  BE  ETERNAL? 

§  18.  Answer  has  been  returned  to  the  query, 
How,  there  being  a  future  state,  how  shall  Justice 
be  administered  therein  1  But,  after  all,  there  is 
no  denying  that  the  real  gist  of  the  inquiry  relates 
more  to  the  hidden  import,  than  to  the  precise 
form,  of  the  words  in  which  the  inquiry  is  embodied. 
In  all  probability,  the  questioner  does  not  ask,  or 
care,  so  much  about  the  nature  of  the  future 
Rewards  and  Punishments,  as  he  would  ask,  and 
is  naturally  curious,  about  the  continuance  of  the 
Rewards  and  Punishments '?  Shall  they  last  for 


120  THE  ARGUMENT,  A   PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

ever  and  ever  ?  It  is  of  some  importance  that  no 
miscarriage  should  take  place  in  conveying  these 
things.  A  rash  inconsiderate  critic  might  be 
ready  to  come  to  an  erroneous  judgment,  simply 
because  he  had  laid  hold  of  the  wrong  premises. 
Let  this,  therefore,  be  impressed  on  the  reader's 
mind,  that  our  precise  question,  at  the  present 
moment,  is,  Are  the  natural,  and  consequentially 
necessary,  Rewards  of  the  righteous,  and  the 
natural,  and  consequentially  necessary,  Punish 
ments  of  the  evil  or  wicked, — in  short,  are  the 
complete  retributions,  whatever  these  may  be, — to 
continue  in  the  future  state  ?  are  they,  indeed, 
to  endure  coeval  with  Duration,  and  coexist  with 
Eternity  itself? 

§  19.  But  at  this  stage,  and  for  a  sufficient 
reason,  (the  goodness  of  the  reason  will  be  apparent 
by  and  by,a)  we  may  drop  out  of  view  one  of  the 
two  constituent  data  of  the  subject-matter,  which 
we  have  hitherto  carried  along,  imbedded  in  our 
interrogation.  As  we  have  been  asking  about  the 
Rewards  of  the  Righteous,  as  well  as  the  Punish 
ments  of  the  Unrighteous,  about  the  former  as 
much  as  about  the  latter ;  so,  we  may  advantage 
ously  let  go  our  hold  now  of  the  former  of  these 
topics, — the  Rewards  of  the  righteous  or  good, — 
and  confine  our  attention  to  the  latter,  the  Punish 
ments  of  the  unrighteous  or  bad.  It  shall  suffice, 

a  Vide,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  Schol.  iii. 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    121 

that,  in  what  remains  of  this  Scholium,  we  adhere 
to  that  latter  topic  alone,  and  exclusively.  Treat 
ing,  then,  of  the  Punishments  of  the  wicked,  we 
ask,  Shall  these  be  continued  without  end  ? 

§  20.  Without  end  ?  Without  end,  in  truth, 
should  you  lay  down  that  the  men,  the  bad  men, 
have  no  end.  But  if  your  position  were,  that  the 
men  had  an  end  ;  then,  the  natural,  and  consequen 
tially  necessary,  punishment  would,  of  course,  have 
an  end  too.  How  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  But 
what  ?  shall  the  men,  then,  themselves  have  an 
end,  or  shall  they  continue  in  existence  forever? 
Of  course,  their  punishment  cannot  go  on  without 
the  men  as  subjects  of  inhesion  :  but  as  to  the 
continuance  perpetually  of  the  men,  themselves, 
the  bad  men,  how  is  it? 

$  21.  Justice     cannot     tell.      She     can    mve    no 

»*  o 

dogmatic,  apodeictically  certain,  reply.  This 
attribute  must  admit,  tbat  the  ground  for  a 
confident  answer  is  not  in  her.  Justice  can,  in 
fact,  throw  no  light,  not  the  faintest  ray,  upon 
this  topic.  If  we  want  more  light  let  in,  we  must 
be  humbly  and  gladly  ready  to  receive,  and  admit, 
rays  coming  from  above,  coming  through  a  sky- 
lightened  window,  exposed  to  another  region  of 
the  heavens  above  us  all. 


§  22.   An  ample  light  shines  around  us  at  the 
point    where    we    stand,    illumining     things     to    a 


122  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  I  IT. 

certain  distance ;  hut  beyond  the  limit  within 
which  the  full  light  is  confined,  all  is  obscure,  a 
faint  light  only  being  discernible  in  rare  directions, 
at  a  few  favoured  spots.  Endeavouring,  to  the 
best  of  our  power,  to  cast  our  eyes  in  the  direction 
of  the  more  luminous  portions  of  the  region  which 
is  beyond  the  space  of  the  clear  light,  and  fixing 
our  gaze  intently  on  the  partially  enlightened 
places ;  let  us  note,  and  set  down  carefully,  the 
result  of  the  experiences. 

§  23.  Shall  those  dread  Punishments  be  without 
end  ?  Justice,  by  herself,  cannot  tell.  Justice 
alone,  in  answering  such  a  query,  and  speaking 
with  a  voice  of  authority,  can  do  no  more  than 
pronounce  what  the  rule  must  be  :  the  punishment 
shall  be  adequate, or  proportionate  to  the  wickedness. 
But  if  it  be  assumed,  or  subsumed,  by  the  questioner, 
that  there  shall  be  no  such  proportionateness, 
—namely,  no  proportion,  to  the  wickedness,  in  the 
measure  of  suffering,  and,  so,  punishment,  borne  : 
this  would  involve,  or  plainly  be,  an  outrage  on 
all  the  requirements  of  Justice.  The  intenseness 
of  the  misery,  or  the  punishment,  shall  be  propor 
tioned  to  the  greatness  of  the  wickedness  :  other 
wise,  things  are  made  to  run  counter  to  the 
elementary  principles  themselves  of  all  which  this 
unbending  attribute  demands. 

§  24.  In  this  connection,  it  may  be  noted,  that, 
while  every  act  of  wickedness  (a  life  of  wickedness 


Sun-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    123 

being  merely  the  sum  of  so  many  wicked  acts) 
should  be  punished  by  an  adequate,  or  propor 
tionate,  i.e.,  measurable  amount  of  suffering;  end 
less  suffering  would  appear  to  be,  very  plainly  too, 
measureless,  or  incommensurable  suffering. 

§  25.  Two  things,  indeed,  go  to  make  up  the  full 
idea  of  adequateness  in  suffering  and  punishment, 
so  that  nothing  can  be  added  to  the  notion  of 
adequacy  to  make  it  more  complete.  The  first 
element,  is,  intensity  in  degree  in  the  suffering ; 
and  the  second,  is,  the  length  of  time  during 
which  that  degree  of  suffering  is  to  be  endured  : 
and  the  two  elements  are  to  be  added,  or  multi 
plied,  together,  in  order  to  the  production  of  the 
completed  compound  of  misery,  and  punishment. 
But  if,  for  one  of  the  constituents,  or  any  assigned, 
or  assignable,  period  of  time,  you  put  in,  as  an 
ex  £>o.s'£  facto  coefficient,  endless  duration,  you 
thereby  render  the  process  of  calculation,  as  to 
adequacy,  impossible. 

§  26.  One  thing,  however,  by  way  of  a  qualify 
ing  observation,  deserves  to  be  attended  to,  while 
we  are  discoursing,  perhaps  glibly  enough,  con 
cerning  the  endless  life  of  contingent  beings, 
who,  besides,  are  sinners.  Let  it  be  borne  in 
mind,  then,  that  the  intensity,  that  is,  of  suffering, 
is,  to  Justice,  the  chief  ingredient,  among  the 
elements,  or  in  the  product;  length  of  time,  or 
continuance  of  the  suffering,  being  merelv  the 


124  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

adscititious  accessary.  And  you  cannot,  with 
deference  to  Justice,  suppose  that,  by  prolongation 
of  the  time  of  suffering,  the  due  measure  of 
intenseness  may  be  withdrawn, — the  adequate 
degree  of  intensity  in  the  suffering  being  justly 
compensated  for  by  that  prolongation. 

§  27.  But,  at  this  point,  an  objection  may 
possibly  be  started.  The  natural,  or  conse 
quentially  necessary,  Punishments  of  wickedness 
consist  in  sufferings,  or  miseries,  proportionate  to 
the  wickedness  itself, — the  effect  being  according 
to  the  measure  of  the  potency  residing  in  the  cause. 
Justice,  however,  can  award  suitable  punishment, 
for  the  wickedness,  to  the  doer  of  the  wickedness, 
only  while  he  lives.  Is  it  not,  therefore,  within  the 
province  of  Justice  to  take  all  possible,  or  requisite, 
care  to  prolong  life,  in  order  to  render  the  criminal 
capable  of  enduring  the  due  amount — or  for  the 
specified  number  of  days,  or  months,  or  years — of 
so  much  minimum  in  suffering  ?  True  :  yet  only 
so  far.  In  the  case  of  human  Justice,  the  principle 
of  the  representation  may  be  allowed  to  be  un 
objectionable. 

§  28.  In  the  case,  however,  of  the  Divine 
Justice, — which  possibly  may  be  concerned  with 
myriads,  or  millenniums,  of  years  of  suffering,  or 
punishment, — the  representation  is  defective,  and 
the  principle  animating  it  is  even  untrue.  The 
Supreme  Judge  who  appoints  the  retribution,  runs 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    125 

no  risk  of  losing  the  object  of  Divine  Justice 
untimeously  ;  because  the  life  of  the  object,  and 
the  retribution,  do  both  depend  on  Him  who  has 
decreed  the  one  not  without  equal  reference  to  the 
other.  In  fact,  such  a  difficulty  as  the  preceding 
is  only  applicable  to  a  human  legislator  and  judge, 
who  has  no  power  of  making  his  sentence,  and  the 
existence  of  the  criminal,  be  bound  up  together,  in 
one  indissoluble  connection.  The  Divine  Law 
giver,  and  Judge,  however,  punishes  by  natural 
laws,  self-acting,  and  self-enforcing,  or  by  infliction 
of  connected  sufferings,  intense  in  proportion  to 
the  degree,  or  measure,  of  evil  done  :  and  all 
eventualities  are  alike  provided  for,  and  made  to 
be  mutually  inter-dependent,  by  the  original 
decree.  No  danger  that  any  criminal  will  escape, 
by  putting  himself  out  of  the  way,  in  the  case  of 
this  Judge,  and  Executor  of  this  law. — In  fine,  the 

O     *  7 

objection,  drawn  from,  and  misapplying,  one  of  the 
ingredients  in  the  compound  giving  the  full  notion 
of  complete  adequacy  of  suffering  ;  forgets,  at  least 
the  maker  of  the  objection  forgets,  that  the  one 
element  (that,  the  non-essential  element)  cannot 
be — can,  to  no  extent,  be — substituted  for  the 
other.  Indefinitely  prolonged  time  cannot  be 
substituted  for  a  certain  amount  of  intensity  in 
suffering.  A  certain  high  degree  of  intensity  in 
suffering  is,  as  the  sign  and  representative  of  a 
certain  measure  or  amount  of  criminality,  a  definite 


126  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

and  fixed   quantity  which  can  never  be  superseded 
by  substituted  time,  be  the  time  ever  so  long. 


§  '29.  But  here  we  are  reminded,  once  more, 
that,  though  a  full  light  illuminates  certain  places, 
that  light  finally  borders  on  the  most  profound 
darkness,  with  only  regions  of  more  or  less  un 
certain  vaporous  gloom,  interspersed  with  partial 
and  fitful  irradiations.  We  were  speaking  of  the 
adequacy  of  punishment,  in  the  guise  of  Buffering, 
and  specially  of  the  main  ingredient — intenseness ; 
and  we  had  been  remarking,  that  the  intensity 
could  not  be  abolished,  and  the  vacuity  filled  up 
by  a  substituted  prolongation  of  the  time  of  suffer 
ing.  Nay,  it  seems  to  be  a  law  of  suffering, 
applicable,  therefore,  to  all  suffering,  that,  the  more 
intense  suffering  becomes,  so  much  the  nearer  the 
sufferer  is  to  extinction.  We  are  familiar  with  the 
workings  of  this  wide  law  in  our  little,  and  low7, 
sphere.  Some  of  us  are  only  too  familiar  with  the 
workings  of  the  law.  But  for  the  benign  anaesthetics, 
exemplifications  of  the  law  might  be  seen,  any 
hour,  in  domestic  hospital  practice.  Pain,  carried 
up  to  a  certain  point,  causes  fainting,  and  utter 
insensibility,  to  ensue.  And,  in  like  manner,  with 
regard  to  more  purely  mental  suffering,  namely, 
sufferings  from  moral  causes  :  Inflict  measure  upon 
measure  of  calamities,  growing  worse  and  worse, 
upon  a  man,  and  (unless  a  miracle  shall  prevent) 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     127 

the  necessary  consequence  is,  madness,  or  delirium 
in  some  form, — or  stupor,  and  accompanying  in 
sensibility.  No  kind  of  suffering  can  be  continu 
ally  laid  on  and  increased,  without  incapacity  for 
farther  suffering  being  induced  at  length.  This  is 
one  of  the  ways  by  which  kind  Nature,  the  outside, 
or  ultimate,  of  God,  shews  her  pity  and  active  com 
passion  for  her  children,  when  the  cup  of  human 
distress  has  been  filled  to  the  brim,  and  runs  over. 
The  blessed  anaesthetic,  producing  insensibility  to 
pain,  if  not  utter  unconsciousness,  is  a  resemblance 
to  the  operations  of  Nature  herself,  in  that  the 
copy  effects  that  very  insensibility  to  over  great 
a.fonv  which  the  original,  and  greater  cause,  had 

O          «,  O  O 

before  pointed  out  (only  men  were  blind)  as 
the  fit  amelioration  in  the  case  of  extremest 
suffering. 

§  30.  The  reason  of  that  merciful  law  is  pro 
found,  and  yet  the  evidence  of  its  existence  will  be 
convincing.  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that 
we  must  keep  in  mind,  beforehand,  the  original 
and  most  intimate  connection  between  sin  and 
suffering,  whereby  so  much  suffering  indicates  the 
existence — somewhere,  and  in  some  form — of  so 
much  previously  contracted  sin  and  guilt, — the 
unfailing  precursors,  they,  of  the  co-relative  :  A 
truth  which,  in  the  present  connection,  must  by  no 
means  be  lost  sight  of.  A  good  man,  then,  has  his 
face  turned  to  God,  who,  as  the  highest  or  inmost 


128  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

Sun,  and  the  Sun  of  suns,a — the  great  focus-centre 
of  all  attractive  power, — is  the  life-giver  ;  and,  so, 
the  good  man  is  in  the  way  of  receiving  life-in 
fluences.  But  a  bad  man  is  he  who  has  his  face 
turned  away  from  God,  and  the  bad  man,  his  back 
to  God.  is  always  withdrawing  farther,  and  farther 
from  Him  who  is  Life,  and  the  life  of  the  world ; 
and,  so,  from  the  source  of  all  life-influences  goeth 
the  man,  his  atmosphere  becoming  more  and  more 
darkened,  and  chilly,  and  inimical  to  all  health  and 
life.  Consequently,  the  evil  man  is  ever  drawing 
nearer  to  death.  He  is  a  living  thing,  in  the 
course  of  evanescing;.  Now  the  law  in  view  seems 

O 

to  be  a  necessary  law  of  dependent  moral  being : 
which  nothing;  can  counteract  but  a  miraculous 

O 

intervention  to  sustain,  by  supplying,  life  contrary 
to  that  moral  law. 

§  31.  When,  therefore,  the  incorrigibly  bad 
man's  positive  wickedness,  as  the  cause  of  a 
diminishing  series,  and  his  proportionate  sufferings, 
at  the  head  of  another  series  of  diminutions,  shall 
be  added  together,  or  multiplied  together ;  what 
an  abundance  of  the  causes  and  circumstances, 
tending  to  extinction  of  being,  will  be  at  work  to 
increase  the  fearful  stock  ! 


§  32.  But   it    may    be    urged,    in    the    way    of 

a  Confer,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  Schol.  i.  §  10. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    129 

objection,  that  the  law  referred  toa  is  a  law  but  for 
man's  body,  or,  at  most,  for  man  as  existing  in  this 
temporal  scene.  When  the  blood  recedes  suddenly, 
and  in  undue  quantity,  from  the  brain,  the  person 
who  has  received  the  accession  of  agonizing  pain, 
or  the  agitating  mental  shocks,  becomes  pale, 
feeling-less,  and  faints  right  away.  But  this  is 
merely  by  virtue  of  a  law  applicable  to  the 
corporeal  system — applicable  to  the  corporeal 
system,  and  limited  to  it.  And  so  of  all  the  other 
particular  phenomena,  whether  the  exciting  and 
proximate  causes  be  strictly  corporeal,  or  more 
purely  mental.  All  the  causes  are  inert,  until  they 
reach  to,  and  operate  on,  the  nervous  system,  or, 
rather,  centre,  and  the  terminus  of  the  cranio- 
spinal  axis,  the  white  and  grey  medullary  and 
cerebral  matter.  Such  is  the  medical,  and,  so, 
fittingly  technical,  objection,  and,  as  materialistic, 
it  is  one  of  a  class  common  enough,  and  very  old. 
If,  therefore,  the  reply  to  the  objection  should  be 
of  an  ancient,  and  characteristic  nature  likewise,  it 
need  not  surprise  any. 

§  33.  'Tis  admitted,  that  there  is  such  a  law  for 
the  body, — admitted,  happily,  on  both  sides  ;  for 
the  existence  of  the  law,  as  applicable  to  man's 
material  frame,  was  exactly  that  which  the  objec 
tionable,  or  (by  your  leave)  objected-to  section1* 
had  been  trying  to  enforce.  But  'tis  verily  another 

a  Supra,  §  29.  b  Ibid. 


130          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

point,  whether  the  law  be  applicable  to  the  human 
body,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  no  wider  applications, 
and  that  it  is  not  founded  on  profounder  and  more 
enduring  realities,  appertaining  to  the  region  of 
a  higher,  and  more  potent  causation.  This,  indeed, 
raises  another  question,  to  which,  therefore,  'tis 
riofht  that  we  now  address  ourselves. 

o 

§  34.  The  law  applies  to  the  human  body.  But 
does  not  the  law,  as  it  is,  adumbrate  a  more  interior 
law  ?  or,  rather,  does  not  that  outside  working,  on  the 
plane  of  ultimates,  shadow  forth,  that,  archetypally, 
there  is  a  more  Universal  Law,  of  which  the  time- 
manifestation  is  only  the  external  exponent  and 
index  ? 

§  35.  Now,  in  answer,  let  us  consider  the  follow 
ing.  Things  on  the  earth,  if  made,  and  regulated, 
by  a  Contriving  Mind,  (and  that  this  is  so,  is,  at 
this  point,  our  postulate,  and  no  matter  of 
question,) — earthly  things,  we  say,  must  have  been 
made  according  to  a  plan,  or  after  a  pattern  :  there 
must,  therefore,  be,  in  the  higher  sphere  of  causes, 
the  models,  of  which  the  earthly  objects  and  effects 
are  the  resemblances  ;  and  according  to  the  laws  of 
these  causes,  the  earthly  operations  are  conducted 
and  go  on.  The  earthly  images  may  be  affirmed, 
or  may  be  denied,  to  be  the  representatives  of  the 
most  real  and  ever-enduring  archetypal  ideas: 
but  certain  it  is,  that,  whatever  be  the  names  by 
which  these  likenesses  are  designated,  the  causes 


SuB-Div.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    131 

of  them  must  have  pre-existed  in,  or  been  present 
to,  in  some  special  manner,  the  Divine  Mind,  which 
was  the  depository  of  the  model-thoughts,  until 
they  \vere  actualized  in  this  lower  theatre.  Tis 
from  the  very  nature  and  intrinsic  necessity  of  the 
case  that  this  should  be  so.  Postulate  a  Divine 
Mind,  the  creative  cause  of  men,  and  of  all  earthly 
things :  the  men,  and  all  their  surroundings  (and 
the  mental  constitution,  and  the  corporeal  system 
of  man,  cannot  be  permitted  to  be  overlooked  in 
such  a  circumstantiating)  become  matters  of  the 
utmost  moment,  not,  for  an  instant,  to  be  forgotten. 
But  all  these  are  ultimates,  in  the  world  of  effects  ; 
and  not  one  of  the  general  laws  which  rule 
substances,  and  all  operations  here,  can  be  without 
its  representative  in  that  higher  world  of  causes, 
where  the  real  and  abiding  exemplars  exist :  where 
they  must  exist,  else  there  could  have  been  no 
manifestation,  in  time,  of  things  on  that  plane  of 
ultimates,  which  is,  now  and  here,  their  continent. a 

§  36.  What  is  the  nature,  or  what  are  the 
characteristics,  of  that  higher  law,  to  which  those 
phenomena  of  Man,  and  of  Nature  correspond  ;  is 
a  question  which,  in  many  regards,  would  be  a 
most  difficult  one  to  solve. 

§  37.  It  may  be,  that  to  pile  agony  on  agony, 
ceaselessly,  upon  a  man's  body,  or  upon  a  man's 
soul, — upon  a  man,  at  any  rate  ;  is  impossible, 

a  Confer,  supra,  Lemma,  §  5. 


132          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

regard  being  bad  to  that  finite  nature,  by  which, 
and  within  which,  man  is  necessarily  environed 
and  confined.  A  finite  spirit  cannot  bear  the 
weight  of  agony,  infinite  in  any  respect :  this 
appears  to  be  clear  and  certain.  The  two  things, 
a  creature,  to  wit,  and  infinite  agony,  seem  to  be 
incapable  of  approximation, — far  less,  of  junction. 
The  two  factors  would  obstinately  refuse  to  be 
blended,  and  wrought  together.  Possibly,  this  is 
the  nearest  approach  which  it  is  permitted  us  to 
make  to  the  solution  of  that  awful  mystery.  How 
much  torture,  keeping  within  the  bounds  of  finity, 
can  a  human  being, — a  pure  spirit,  or  a  spirit 
clothed  with  a  body,  it  matters  not, — endure,  and 
be  yet  consciously  alive  ?  this  is  that  Secret — 
profounder  than  the  Sphinx's  riddle,  and  more 
terrible  than  aught  save  lowest  Hell — which  may 
Heaven's  pity  and  compassion  never  allow  to  be 
solved  in  the  person  of  any  mere  son  of  man  ! 


§  38.  Finally, — Our  immediate  topic  has  through 
out  been  a  definite  one.  It  was  this  :  So  far  as 
the  single  attribute  of  Justice  is  involved,  (for 
with  that  sole  attribute  we  were  concerned,)  How 
about  the  Rewards  of  the  Good,  and  the  Punishments 
of  the  Wicked,  in  the  future  state  of  existence  ? 
How  shall  the  Divine  Justice  be  exercised  there  ? 
Is  the  natural,  and  consequentially  necessary, 
Punishment  of  the  Evil,  as  well  as  the  natural,  and 


Sus-Div.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    133 

consequentially  necessary,  Reward  of  the  Righteous, 
to  continue  in  the  future  state  for  ever  and  ever  ? 

§  39.  There  is,  however,  another,  a  far  wider, 
and,  probably,  more  deeply  interesting,  question, 
awaiting  decision ;  although  it  might,  with  some 
truth,  be  said,  that  the  question  which  has  been 
before  us  concerned  us  all  the  more  that  we  were 
obliged,  in  strict  logical  procedure,  to  pass  over, 
here  and  now,  the  wider,  and  more  interesting 
topic.  The  new  question  is  this  :  So  far  as  God, 
with  all  His  attributes,  including,  of  course,  yea 
pre-eminently,  His  perfect  Goodness,  harmonizing 
with  His  consummate  Happiness,  (these  two 
animating  mutually,  and  animated  by  each  other,) 
the  very  Attributes  from  the  activity  and  action  of 
which  the  creation  itself  of  men  arose  : — we  say, 
taking  into  account  all  the  Attributes  of  God- 
specially,  those  concerned  with  calling  the  men 
themselves  into  being, — What  about  the  Reward 
of  the  Good,  not  forgetting  the  Punishment  of  the 
Bad,  in  the  future  state  ?  How  will  God  act 
towards  them  in  the  eternal  world  ?  Will  the 
natural,  and  the  necessary,  Rewards,  and  Punish 
ments  be  for  ever,  or  to  all  eternity  ?  This, 
indeed,  is  a  question  very  different  from  the  other 
interrogatory, — different  as  to  stand-point,  and  in 
all  the  circumstantials.  It  will  fall  to  be  answered 
in  another,  and  a  more  fitting  place. a  And  as  the 

a  Vide,  infra,  Prop.  IV.  Schol.  iii. 


134          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

questions  are  so  very  different,  it  is  possible  that 
the  replies  thereunto  may  turn  out  to  be  as 
different  as  are  the  questions  themselves.  Possibly, 
too,  as  the  latter  of  the  two  may  deserve  to  receive 
a  different  answer  from  that  due  to  the  other,  so 
the  answer  itself  appertaining  to  the  wider  and 
profounder  question,  may  be  found  to  be  more 
worthy  of  all  acceptation,  acceptable,  in  sooth,  as 
cold  water  to  a  thirsty  soul  in  a  parched  and 
thirsty  wilderness. 

COROLLARY  FROM  PROPOSITION  III. 

God,  who  is  True,  and  faithful,  and  inflexibly 
Just,  is  necessarily  altogether  Righteous. 

§  1.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that,  making 
certain  pre-suppositions,  God  is  the  Inflexibly  Just 
One.a  Now,  to  be  just,  is  unquestionably  to  stand 
in  a  certain  relation  to  the  other.  But  justice,  in 
act,  must  proceed  from  a  capacity  of  being  just :  in 
other  words,  justice  points  back  to  a  principle, 
or  a  something  in  the  mind  distinguishable  from 
the  justice  itself.  The  act  must  be  regarded  as  the 
consequence  of  the  capacity,  or  (if  you  object  not 
to  the  term)  the  faculty.  Most  decidedly,  and 
most  specially,  is  this  the  case  with  respect  to 
God,  as  the  Supreme  Mind,  absolute  in  Himself. 
If  He  be  just  to  His  moral  creatures,  there  must 

a  Preced.  Prop. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    135 

be  considered  to  be  in  Him  a  mental  principle,  as 
a  something  other  than  the  justice  itself,  considered 
as  act ;  the  act  proceeding  from  the  faculty  giving 
birth  to  it. 

§  2.  Now,  what  is  the  absolute  principle  in  the 
Divine  Mind  which  gives  birth  to  the  justice,  on 
supposition  of  the  existence  of  the  suitable  objects, 
and  of  communications  therewith  ?  Absolute 
Justice  it  cannot  be,  because,  Justice  denoting 
necessarily  relation,*  the  terms,  "absolute  justice," 
are  expressive  of  an  impossibility,  or  rather 
absurdity.  In  reality,  there  can  be  no  Justice 
but  one  sort.  All  Justice  is  necessarily  relative 
—to  its  objects,  its  own  objects.  Unrelative 
Justice  would  be  a  chimera.  In  fact,  not  a  little 
nonsense  has  been  vented,  both  in  this  region. 

o  * 

and  in  the  approaches  to  it,  or  byways  from  it. 
Alas !  it  is  quite  possible  to  utter  nonsense  on 
almost  any  topic. 

§  3.  No  error,  however,  will  be  fallen  into, 
should  we  denominate  the  absolute  principle  in 
question  by  the  name  of  Righteousness.  With 
all  correctness  we  may  say,  that  there  is  in  God, 
as  absolute  in  Himself,  the  principle  of  right, 
rectitude,  or  righteousness;  from  which  absolute 
principle  proceeds,  on  occasion,  justice  as  act, 
whereby  God  exercises  the  strictest  justice  to  His 
Intelligent,  Moral  creatures. 

a  Prop,  preced.  Lemma. 


136          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

§  4.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  there  is  in 
God  an  absolute  principle  of  Kectitude,  or 
Righteousness,  by  reason  of  which  He  is,  ever  and 
necessarily,  determined  towards  that  which  in 
thought  is,  in  itself,  right :  No  matter,  whether 
the  thing  thought  of  be  a  purely  abstract  concep 
tion,  or  be  a  thing  leading  to  positive  acts  in 
relation  to  the  other. 

§  5.  The  unalterable  Rightness  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  which  we  have  arrived  at  by  the  course 
actually  taken,  which  we  may  admit  has  been 
forced  on  us  by  the  progress  of  our  ratiocination  ; — 
that  unalterable  Rightness,  or  Rectitude,  we  say, 
might  have  been  demonstrated  otherwise.  The 
truth  in  question  might  have  been  proved,  in  the 
most  strictly  logical  manner,  by  considerations 
withdrawn  from  any  notions  of  Justice  as  a 
positive  series  of  relative  acts :  and  the  student 
who  shall  diligently  weigh  the  elements  of  a 
demonstration  to  be  found  in  our  Fourth  Di vision ,a 
will  not  be  far  from  a  perception  of  a  mode  of 
proof  by  which  the  Absolute  Rectitude,  here — as 
well  as  the  Ineffable  Moral  Purity,  there — might 
be  most  satisfactorily  established. 

§  6.  In  fine,  absolutely  speaking,  the  Divine 
Being  must  be  Righteous.  But,  as  logicians,  we 
dare  not,  at  this  point,  make  a  stronger  affirmation 
respecting  the  relative  act  than  that  God  must  be 

a  Vide,  infra,  Div.  IV.  Prop.  ii.  Dem. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    137 

Just  conditionally.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Justice  depends  on  there  being  suitable  objects, 
and  on  communications  being  established  with 
them.  Thus,  God  is  necessarily  undeviatingly 
Righteous  in  Himself :  and  He  is,  by  consequential 
necessity,  of  inflexible  Justice  in  His  relations  to 
the  other.  Justice  began  (it  might  be  affirmed) 
with  the  creation.  Yea,  'tis  not  without  its  own 
significance  that,  in  the  progress  of  our  proof,  the 
Justice  of  God  was  (first)  reached  by  an  a 
posteriori  step.  The  proposition  as  to  Justice 
supplies,  in  fact,  the  only  instance  where  a  simple 
argument  from  effect  to  cause  is  introduced  into  a 
demonstration ;  and  this  circumstance  may  be 
held  to  tell  its  own  tale.  Rectitude,  however,  was 
ere  the  universe  of  finites  was :  it  was  from 
eternity ;  and  from  eternity  it  was  a  necessary 
constituent  of  the  Divine  Mind.  A  condition  of  the 
Divine  Mind  is  to  be  always  thinking  :  and  the 
thoughts  of  the  Divine  Mind  were,  of  necessity, 
always  Riirht. 

*/ 

§  7.  It  is,  therefore,  undeniable,  being  a  most 
evidently  true  position,  that  God,  the  True,  the 
Faithful,  the  inflexibly  Just,  is,  of  necessity, 
altogether  Righteous  ;  and  we  formulate  the  certain 
and  most  weighty  truth  accordingly. 

§  8.  So,  God,  who  is  the  True,  and  the  Faithful, 
and  the  inflexibly  Just,  is,  necessarily,  the 
altogether  Righteous. 


138          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

PROPOSITION  IV. 

God,  ivho  is  True,  and  Faithful,  and  inflexibly 
Just,  and  altogether  Righteous,  is,  necessarily, 
All-Loving,  yea,  Love  Itself. 

PROLEGOMENON. 

§  1.  Having  the  Proposition,  God  is  Loving, 
given  as  one  to  be  evinced  by  strict  demonstration, 
is  exactly  equipollent  to  the  obligation  to  prove,  by 
reasoning  the  severest,  and  impervious  to  the  shafts 
of  the  keenest  logic  which  may  be  opposed,  that 
God  is  Love.  Let,  then,  what  has  been  already 
advanced  be  carefully  remembered  and  pondered : 
namely,  That  every  position  which  undeniably 
follows  from  our  first  principles,  themselves 
altogether  unimpugnable,  is  introducible,  and,  in 
fact,  has  a  real  title  to  remain  among  the  truths  of 
our  science.31  Let  this  be  weighed,  likewise,  That 
any  objector,  who  may  present  himself,  has  some 
thing  not  so  very  inconsiderable  to  do.  An 
objector  is  under  the  necessity  of  shelving  that  a 
priori  reasoning  is  totally  inapplicable,  or  he  must 
point  out  wherein  it  has  been  positively  misapplied 
in  the  detail.b 

§  2.  But  to  facilitate  our  progress  in  demon 
strating  the  proposition  before  us,  and  in  deducing 

a  Sect.  4  of  Schol.  ill.  xinder  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III. 
b  Sect.  12  of  Schol.  n.  under  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III. 


Sus-Div.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    139 

correctly  the  suitable  inferences,  and  making  the 
proper  applications  of  the  demonstration  ;  let  us, 
first  of  all,  lay  down  two  pre-suppositions,  in  a 
distinct  form.  They  might  indeed  have  been 
subsumed  as  we  went  along,  without  any  such 
explicit  enunciation,  and  verily  in  a  noiseless  and 
unpretentious  way.  Unpretentiousness  is  generally 
commendable :  yet  'tis  laudable  only  where  no 
illicit  assumption  is  concealed  under  the  affected 
reticence  ;  and  every  assumption  (metaphysical,  as 
well  as  ethical)  is  improper  which  is  not  meant  for 
the  eye,  or  honest  inspection  of  some  sort.  An 
assumption  not  meant  for  inspection,  but  kept 
sedulously  out  of  sight,  is  dishonest ;  and,  so,  it 
discreetly  courts  the  shade.  In  fine,  'twas  deemed 
best  to  proceed  in  the  most  undisguised  and  open 
manner.  Besides,  what  ill  consequences  need  be 
feared  from  the  formal  exposure  of  the  postulates 
in  question  ?  The  more  they  are  considered,  the 
more  their  truth  will  be  conceded,  and  appreci 
ated. 

LEMMA  I. 

§  1.  On  the  supposition  of  a  creation  of  the 
world,  the  continuance  of  the  same  in  being  is 
equal  to  (not,  observe,  identical  with)  the  continu 
ally  repeated  creation  of  the  particulars  and  their 
continent. 


140          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

§  2.  Tis  clear,  that  created  existence  implies  the 
relative  Creator.  Existence,  by  reason  of  a  Being 
having  made  the  things  begin  to  be,  is  dependent, 
of  course,  on  the  Being.  In  fine,  conservation,  or 
preservation  of  existence,  is  plainly  tantamount  to 
continued  creation,  on  supposition  of  a  creation. 

LEMMA  II. 

On  the  supposition  of  the  conservation  of  things, 
consequent  on  a  creation ;  the  supposition  of  the 
possibility  of  an  annihilation  of  any,  or  of  all,  of 
the  things  actually  existing,  involves  no  contradic 
tion,  nor  even  difficulty.  The  supposition,  that 
things  began  to  be,  involves  that  they  may,  as  a 
possibility,  cease  to  be.  Creation  involves  the 
possibility  of  annihilation.  A  Creator,  therefore, 
may  annihilate. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that  the  Supreme 
is  consummately  Happy,a  and  that  the  motive  to 
create  was  the  overflowing  Happiness,  in  alliance 
with  a  desire  coincident  with  the  perfect  Goodness, 
of  the  Creator. b  Now,  a  great  deal  is  contained  in 
these  positions ;  and  it  will  be  necessary  that  we 
weigh  well  their  fulness  of  meaning. 

§  2.  In  the  next  place,  we  must  consider  the 
force  of  the  indisputably  true  proposition,  that 

a  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.         b  Div.  III.  Sub-Prop,  after  Prop.  i. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    141 

preservation  or  conservation  is  tantamount  to 
continued  creation  ;a  not  overlooking  what  is 
implied  thereby. 

§  3.  For  the  consequence  is  truly  important. 
Creation  involves  Happiness  and  Goodness :  the 
conservation,  therefore,  must  also  involve  the 
Goodness.  Conservation  (we  say)  being  equivalent 
to  continued  creation ;  while  creation  itself 
proceeded  from  the  Goodness  of  God :  the  con 
servation  must  be  regarded  as  the  product  of  the 
same  Goodness. 

§  4.  But  to  come  a  little  closer  still  to  our  point. 
The  attribute  of  Goodness  it  was  which  brought 
the  race  of  man  into  being. b  Preservation  is  just 
creation  indefinitely  prolonged  : a  The  preservation 
of  man  upon  the  face  of  the  earth,  is,  therefore,  due 
to  that  attribute  of  Goodness. 

§  5.  Now,  Goodness,  culling  men  into  existence, 
and  preserving  them  in  being,  after  their  creation  ; 
this  is  Lore  to  men.  If,  in  fact,  Goodness  be 
viewed  as  a  permanent  condition  or  state  of  mind  ; 
Love  may  be  viewed  as  the  same  Goodness  in 
exercise,  or  in  its  acts.  In  truth  :  Given  Goodness, 
preserving  the  men  whom  the  Goodness  created, 
and  have  you  not  Love  \  What  else  could  be 
meant  by  Love  ?  Verily,  such  Goodness  preserv 
ing  men,  is  but  another  name  for  Love  to  men. 

:t  Lemma  I. 
h  Schol.  under  Part  iii.  Div.  II.  ;  and  Sub-Prop.  Prop.  i.  Div.  III. 


142          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

§  6.  We  must  bear  in  mind  whereabouts  we  are. 
Our  exact  stand-point  will  be  seen  in  the  following 
recapitulatory  positions.  The  world,  with  all  it 
contains,  began  to  be.a  In  particular,  our  race  was 
created ; b  and  the  Goodness  of  the  consummately 
Happy  Supreme  was  the  cause  or  reason  of  the 
creation.0  In  fine,  Man  became,  is  to  us  equal,  in 
logical  force,  or  apodeictically,  to  saying,  Goodness, 
creating,  was  in  lively  exercise.  The  living  Good 
ness,  as  a  potency,  was  put  forth  in  acts.  And 
now  'tis  added  :  Conservation  involving  continued 
Goodness ; d  the  Goodness,  in  such  continuous 
living  act,  is  Love. 

§  7.  On  the  supposition,  that  it  has  been  demon 
strated  that  God  is  All-loving,  a  question  arises, 
naturally  arises  from  the  subject  itself,  but  arises 
also  from  reflection  on  the  case  of  the  attribute  of 
Justice.6  In  the  case  referred  to,  we  have  seen 
that  Justice  is  a  purely  relative  affection ;  while, 
to  express  what  is,  in  God,  the  absolute  principle 
from  which  the  Justice — on  presentation  of  the  fit 
and  suitable  objects — derives  its  birth,  we  are 
obliged  to  use  another  term,  standing  for  another 
idea,  namely,  Righteousness,  Rightness,  Rectitude.1 
Analogously,  must  we  adopt  now  another  term 

a  Sub- Prop.  &  Coroll.  from  same,  after  Prop.  iv.  Part  ii.  Div.  I. 
b  Schol.  after  Part  iii.  Div.  II.  <l  Supra,  §  3. 

0  Prop.  i.  and  Sub-Prop.  Div.  III.  e  Supra,  Prop.  III. 

t  Supra,  Coroll.  from  Prop.  III. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    143 

when  we  would  denote  that  which,  in  God  as 
absolute,  corresponds  to  Love  to  mankind  ?  Or, 
does  it  suffice,  to  denote  the  original  absolute 
principle  from  which  that  Love  proceeded,  that  we 
abide  by  the  same  word  itself,  saying,  That,  as 
God  loves  men,  so,  from  eternity,  there  was,  in  Him, 
the  principle  of  Love,  or  (to  express  it  so)  He  is 
Love  itself:  Love  from  eternity,  or  absolutely,  as 
a  source,  in  posse,  of  the  Love  which,  in  esse,  a 
creation,  or  real  becoming,  of  Intelligent  and  Moral 
creatures — capable  (because  of  their  nature)  of 
loving  God  in  return — would  develope,  or  bring- 
forth  as  a  time-manifestation  ? 

§  8.  To  the  query  thus  started,  the  correct 
answer  must  indubitably  be,  that  here, — unlike 
what  holds  in  the  case  of  Justice  and  Righteous 
ness, — the  very  same  word  which  expresses  the 
relative  affection  towards  the  creature-objects,  will 
properly  serve  to  express  the  absolute  principle  in 
which  the  time-manifestation  has  its  origin.  Love 
to  men  could  not  have  come  to  be,  unless  there 
had  been  in  God  the  source,  and  immediate  cause, 
of  such  a  becoming  :  and  the  absolute  principle,  or 
the  principle  in  God  as  absolute,  could  be 
righteously  denoted  by  no  term  better  than  by 
the  term  itself  which  stands  for  the  relative 
affection. 

§  9.  Thus,  God,  as  He  is  Loving  to  His  creature, 
so  is  He,  as  in  Himself,  Love  itself,  or  essentially. 


144         THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  III. 

§10.  But  this  solution  of  the  inquiry  only  gives 
rise  to  another  question — or  the  same  question  in 
another  form — or  the  same  question,  but  raised  (to 
speak  the  language  of  science)  to  a  higher  power, 
or  (in  language  less  scientific)  advanced  to  a 
profounder  phasis.  God  is  loving  to  men  :  and 
God  is  Love  itself:  But  does  not  Love,  whether 
as  a  relative  affection,  or  as  an  absolute  principle 
in  (or  of)  Deity,  equally  demand  an  object  ?  It 
may  be  said,  and  truly,  that  God  is  Righteous  in 
Himself,  or  without  the  supposal  of  any  object. 
But  can  we  suppose  Love  in  God, — any  sort  of 
Love, — without  supposing,  at  the  same  time,  an 
object — some  object  or  other,  to  which  the  Love 
must  be  directed,  and  on  which  the  Love  must  be 
exerted  and  expended  ?  In  short,  are  not  Love, 
and  objectivity,  so  related  that  the  former  cannot 
be,  or  be  conceived  to  be,  without  the  latter  ? 

§  11.  The  answer  to  this  query,  must  be  in  the 
most  decided  affirmative.  It  is  formerly  and 
absolutely  impossible — an  impossibility  in  the 
inmost  nature  of  things — that  Love  can  exist 
without  there  being  Love  exerted  towards,  or  in 
connection  with,  some  object  or  other. 

§  12.  But  if  this  be  so,  (and  very  plainly  it 
must  be  so,)  does  not  the  supposition  farther 
demand,  that  there  should  be  the  eternal,  i.e., 
beginning-less,  object  of  the  eternal  Love  ?  Of 
course,  that  supposition  does  demand  the  farther 


SUB-DIV.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    145 

concession  ;  and,  of  a  truth,  there  is  no  denying, 
nor  evading  either,  the  consequence. 

§  13.  Well,  then:  that  being  so,  is  there  not 
necessitated  thereby  the  supposition  of  the  exist 
ence  of  the  creation,  or  actual  beginning  to  be  of 
creatures,  as  the  objective  ?  Is  not  the  creation 
the  necessary  eternal  effect  of  an  eternal  efficient 
cause  ?  Is  not  there  such  a  necessity  ?  By  no 
means.  Nothing  of  the  kind  must,  or  need,  be 
supposed.  For,  as  we  have  already  had  a 
demonstration  of  the  impossibility  of  the  con 
ception  of  the  eternity  of  the  material  universe,a 
so  there  is  now  no  reason  why  we  should  feel 
the  need  of  a  created  object  to  meet  the  re 
quirements  of  absolute  Love,  or  Love  in  God  as 
absolute. 

§  14.  Of  necessity,  Love  demands  the  objective 
to  it.  True ;  but  the  object  may  be  existing  in 
the  Supreme  Mind  Itself,  and  discoverable  on  an 
analysis  of — the  outer  part  at  least  of — the  internal 
constitution  of  the  Godhead.  The  Divine  Being,  in 
being  conscious  of  His  own  thoughts,13  must  be 
capable  of  reflection  upon  Himself,  also.  Without 
such  capability  of  self-reflection,  or  apperception, 
there  were  no  mind  :  True  mind  demands,  necessarily 
demands,  this  power  of  apperception,  or  self- analysis.1* 
Well :  the  mind  reflecting  has,  as  objective  to  it, 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Prop.  iv.  Sub-Prop,  and  Coroll.  from  same. 
b  Div.  II.  Part  i.,  Schol.     Vide,  etiam,  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  §  3. 
10 


146          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

the  niind  reflected  on.  All  the  consequences 
resulting  necessarily  from  the  circumstance  thus 
referred  to,  it  can  form  no  part  of  our  present 
business  to  follow  out.  A  single  suggestive  hint, 
however,  in  addition  to  the  cardinal  fact  alluded 
to,  may  be  dropped  ere  we  retire  from  this  ground 
—a  region  admitting  to,  and  abounding  in,  the 
most  fascinating  speculation  on  the  sublimest  of  all 
subjects. 

§  15.  The  Supreme  Mind,  in  reflecting,  and  in 
being,  simul  et  semel,  reflected  on,  supplies,  in  the 
active,  and  the  passive,  attitudes  involved,  the 
strikingly  pronounced  duality  necessarily  inherent 
in  the  very  conception  of  such  a  mind.  Now,  the 
reflection  must  be  accompanied  by  perfect  com 
placence,  entertained  by  the  agent  reflecting,  to 
wit,  the  mind  existing  as  agent,  towards  and  upon 
the  reflected  on,  or  the  mind  existing  as  patient. 
That  is,  the  Divine  Mind  reflecting,  is  delighted 
with  =  loves  the  Mind  reflected  on.  Necessarily 
so,  because  the  reflecting  on  perfections  (whether 
attributes  or  thoughts)  must  causally  necessitate 
perfect  complacence,  delight,  love — pure  felicity, 
in  short — in  the  very  reflection.  Thus,  the  reflected 
on  is  loved  :  the  Eternal  Mind,  therefore,  eternally 
delights  in,  or  loves,  that  image,  or  likeness, 
begotten  of  itself,  which  is  reflected  on.  It  is 
evident,  too,  that  the  reflecting  Mind,  as  the  cause 
of  the  loved  reflection,  is  truly  and  really  the 


Sus-DiT.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    147 

Father  of  the  other,  which,  therefore,  becomes,  is 
eternally  becoming,  the  Son  of  that  Love.  All  this 
is  evident,  because  it  follows  from  the  postulation 
of  premises  which  themselves  have  been  thoroughly 
established. 

§  16.  But  is  not  the  relation  which  has  just 
been  exhibited  productive,  by  the  necessary 
sequence  of  thought,  of  yet  another  relation  in 
the  Godhead  ?  Doubtlessly  it  would  appear  so : 
but  it  behoves  us  to  stop  short,  else,  and  ere 
we  are  aware,  we  shall  be  certainly  landed  in 
the  study  of  the  verity  of  the  Divine  Trinity. 
Indeed,  it  seems  hardly  possible  to  encounter 
the  doctrine  of  the  true  Love  of  God,  even  in 
the  abstractest  way,  without  touching  on  some 
points  where  the  doctrine  branches  oft'  into,  if  not 
Trinitarian  ground,  ground  surely  adjoining  the 
sphere  within  which  the  doctrine  of  the  primal 
Triad  is  contained.  In  fact,  the  two  may  be 
compared  to  two  circles,  or  other  geometrical 
figures,  whereof  the  one  is  contained  within,  and 
forms  part  of,  the  other.  While,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  dogma  of  one  God,  shut  up  in  but 
one  person,  is  an  unprolific  datum,  and  leads  to 
very  little  of  any  great  importance  or  interest  to 
man.  The  Love  to  a  creature  of  a  Being,  loveless 
before  the  creation,  furnishes  but  a  cold  sort  of 
warmth.  That  dogma  is  besides  a  horrific  doQ-ma, 

O  O  ' 

holding  within  it  the  idea  of  an  utterly  solitary 


148  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  III. 

Mind,  existing,  for  the  eternity  before  the  creation 
was,  in  drear,  dread  solitude,  alone,  and  un-loving : 
for,  the  moment  Love  enters  on  the  scene,  agent 
and  patient,  the  lover  and  the  loved,  enter  too,  and, 
in  fine,  the  first  step  leading  to  hypostases  in  the 
Godhead  is  taken. 

§  17.  As  a  matter  of  course,  this  is  another 
relative  Attribute  :  relative  it  is,  at  all  events,  in 
the  same  way  as  that  in  which  Truth  is  relative." 
Both  Attributes  require  the  objective,  an  object  of 
some  kind.  Truth  imperatively  demands  an  object, 
and  Love  imperatively  needs  an  object.  The  nature 
of  Love  is  such  that  it  incessantly  craves  after  an 
object.  Without  any  object,  Love  would  inevit 
ably  cease  to  be  Love,  becoming  an  unsatisfied 
longing  for — it  would  not  know  what :  there  could 
remain  no  more  than  an  everlasting  pining.  Love, 
then,  must  have  its  object  :  Without  it,  Love  Itself 
were  unhappy.  Completely  Happy  Love  ;  in  other 
words,  the  Love  of  The  Consummately  Happy  One  ; 
must  have  its  object :  ay,  and  an  adequate  object 
too.  An  insufficient  object  could  not  meet  such 
Love,  or  (but  language,  with  its  limited  power, 
threatens  to  fail  us  here)  be  equal  to  the  require 
ments  of  the  yearnings  of  the  Love  of  the  Eternal 
Infinite  One.  Anything  contained  within  Time 
and  Space  were  all  too  little.  Love  ('tis  repeated) 
imperatively  needs  an  object.  The  objective,  of 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  IT.  Lemma. 


Sue-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.   149 

some  sort :  whether  a  Hypostasis  in  the  Godhead,* 
or  some  phase  of  the  creaturely  nature ;  this  latter, 
again,  being  divisible  into  the  angelic  nature, b  and 
the  human  nature.  Of  course,  we  eschew  the 
particular  consideration  of  every  object  rising  above 
the  plane  of  mankind  ;  in  the  same  way  as  was  done 
in  the  case  of  the  proposition  about  Truth. c 

§  18.  This  is  a  most  relative  Proposition,  if  you 
like,  or  when  held  to  be  restricted  to  a  creature, 
and  to  man.  For,  should  it  be  argued,  that, 
strictly,  as  Goodness  is  to  all  things,  or  may  be 
conceived  to  regard  all  things,  in  creation  ;  so  Love 
is  certainly  not  applicable  to  even  animality 
generally,  but,  in  propriety,  can  be  considered 
applicable  to  only  humanity,  the  Intelligent  and 
Moral,  the  Rational  and  Loving,  part  of  the  world ; 
no  one  should  be  greatly  inclined  to  dispute  it. 

§  19.  On  the  whole,  as  it  has  been  demonstrated, 
that  the  Simple,  Sole,  Being  of  Infinity  of 
Expansion  and  of  Duration,  who  is  All-knowing, 
All-powerful,  entirely  Free,  and  completely  Happy, 
is  necessarily  perfectly  Good  ; (1  the  implied  Goodness 
being  entirely  equivalent  to  Love  ;e  the  conclusion 
is,  therefore,  inevitable,  that  that  Great  and  Good 
Being  is  necessarily  Loving,  or,  to  vary  the 
phraseology,  the  All-Loving  One.  And  the  Love 

a  Weigh  §  6  of  Lemma,  Prop.  ii.  Division  III. 

11  Weigh  §  5,  ibid.  d  Sub-Prop,  to  Prop.  i.  Div.  III. 

c  Ibid.,  §  7.  °  Xupra,  Sect.  5,  6. 


150          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

to  the  creature  being  regarded  as  to  its  source,  that 
Being  is  rightly  said  to  be  Love  Itself.  Love, 
unlike  Justice,  has  its  foundation  in  se.  Love  is 
act,  or  state,  as  to  time,  and  aboriginal  principle, 
all  in  one. 

§  20.  Then,  God,  who  is  the  True,  and  the 
Faithful,  and  the  inflexibly  Just,  and  the  altogether 
Righteous,  is,  necessarily,  the  All-Loving  One,  yea, 
Love  Itself. 

SCHOLIUM  I. 

AN    IMPORTANT  DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN    PROPOSITIONS  II.  &  III., 
ON    ONE    SIDE,    AND    PROPOSITION    IV.,  ON     THE    OTHER. 

§  1.  A  great  difference  exists,  and  is  to  be 
noticed  between  the  cases  of  Truth  and  Justice, 
and  the  case  of  Love  ;  and  it  shall  be  our  business, 
here,  to  distinguish  between  the  cases,  as  the 
nature  of  things  demands. 

§  2.  Whereas,  the  demonstrations,  in  the  cases 
of  Truth  and  Justice,  are  to  this  effect :  postulating 
objects,  and  that  there  be  action  ;  God  is,  necessarily, 
Truthful  and  Just.  But  the  action  itself  is  not 
proved. 

§  3.  To  particularize.  To  be  True,  requires 
objects. a  God  is  necessarily  Truthful  to  man, 
when  He  communicates  with  man.b  But  the 
communication  itself  is  not  demonstrated  :  it  was 

a  Supra,  Prop.  II.  Lemma.  b  Prop.  II.  Dem. 


Si-B-Div.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.   151 

but  postulated.  Consequently,  Truthfulness,  as  a 
fact,  is  never  proved  under  the  demonstration  in 
view.a 

§  4.  So  with  regard  to  Justice.  To  be  Just 
requires  objects,b  and  objects  of  a  special 
description.0  God  necessarily  administers  Justice, 
in  communicating  with  the  good  and  with  the  bad.d 
But  the  actual  administration  itself  of  the  Justice, 
in  reference  to  those  objects,  is  never  demonstrated  : 
Consequently,  no  one  exercise  of  the  attribute  in 
question  is  ever  demonstratively  established. 

§  5.  But,  with  regard  to  Love,  'tis  quite  other 
wise.  For,  when  there  is  postulated  now,  what  has 
been  beforehand  demonstrated,  that  Love  does 
conserve  the  men  whom  Goodness  created,6  the 
existence  itself  of  the  men,  the  objects  of  the  Love, 
is  irreversibly  bestowed.  Love  does,  therefore, 
evidence  the  existence  of  its  own  objects,  by  its 
intimate  living  relation  to  them. 

§  6.  In  truth,  nobody — except,  perhaps,  a  stray 
metaphysician  (maddened  by  all-unadulterated 
egoistic  emanations,  inhaled  imdilutedly,  and,  by  a 
great  deal,  too  incautiously)  dreaming  in  a  panthe- 
istically  idealistic  region  hopelessly  beyond  the 
sphere  common  to  Theists  and  Atheists,  and  very 
far  indeed  away  in  the  clouds  ;  he  (a  man  himself, 

a  Prop.  II.  Postal.  d  Prop.  III.  Dem. 

b  Supra,  Prop.  III.  Lemma,  §  1.          e  Supra,  Dem.  Sect.  5,  6. 

c  Prop.  III.  Lemma,  §  3,  &c. 


152          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  III. 

it  is  to  be  presumed)  having  been  expressly 
transported  thither  by  no  other  machinery  than 
his  o\vn  pure  and  simple,  but  rapt,  imagination, 
helped,  mayhap,  by  a  push  from  some  other  unsober 
philosopher,  at  starting :  nobody  (we  say)  but  a 
stricken  metaphysician,  denies  the  existence  of 
men.  Nobody  denies,  therefore,  the  existence  of 
the  objects  of  this  attribute  of  Love. 

§  7.  And  this  is  now  to  be  considered  :  Whether 
it  is  credible,  that,  Goodness  having  created  men, 
and  Love  being  concerned  in  preserving  them, 
God,  as  possessor  of  the  attributes  of  Trueness  and 
Justness,  should  never,  on  any  occasion,  reveal 
Himself  to  men,  or  come,  in  any  way,  into  living 
contact  with  them  ?  Love  has  men  for  its  cosmical 
objects  :  God  loves  the  world  of  men  :  Were  it  not 
incredible,  therefore,  that  the  God  of  Truth,  and 
Justice,  should  never  draw  nigh  unto  men ;  draw 
nigh,  for  example,  unto  the  virtuous  and  good,  who 
resemble  Himself,  to  bless  them  yet  more  and 
more.a  Yea,  Love  makes  it  plain,  that  God's 
presence  with  men  is  credible,  and  more  than 
credible  :  the  utter  absence  of  God  were  incredible. 
Incredible,  indeed,  and  impossible,  too,  that  Love 
should  never  communicate  with  its  objects,  whom, 
yet,  it  conserves  from  day  to  day.  Love  and  God 
are  the  same : b  God  does,  therefore,  communicate 
with  Love's  objects,  that  is,  men.  But  God  is 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  III.  Schol.  ii.  §  13,  &c.     b  Supra,  Dem.  §  19. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    153 

Truthful,  and  Just,  as  well  as  Loving.  In  fine, 
Love  must  be  supposed  to  have  Truth  and  Justice 
in  its  train.  The  three  Attributes  meet  in  the 
same  God,  the  common  Substrate  of  all  the 
Attributes :  Therefore,  the  three  do  necessarily  go 
together. 

§  8.  Thus,  it  is  proved,  that  the  condition  of 
Truth,  as  actual  fact,  and  the  condition  of  Justice, 
as  actual  fact,  have  been  implemented.  And  so, 
what  was  before  demonstrated  as  in  posse,  is  now 
demonstrated  as  in  esse ;  the  only  postulate 
subsumed,  by  the  demonstration,  being  one  as 
inoffensive  as  it  is  verily  unobjectionable,  the 
position,  to  wit,  There  are  men.  A  position  very 
secure  from  assailment  on  the  side  of  Atheism ; 
as  Atheists  are  agreed  in  ignoring,  not  men  indeed, 
but  all  intelligences,  or  orders  of  intelligences,  but 
men.  So  far  from  denying  the  existence  of  men, 
Atheists  go  to  the  opposite  extreme,  and  deny  all 
mental  existence  which  is  not  a  man's. 

§  9.  The  present  demonstration  is,  thus,  the 
complement,  not  only  of  the  Proposition  as  to 
Goodness, a — as  it  unquestionably  is, — but  also  it 
is  (though  in  another  way)  the  complement  of  the 
Proposition  regarding  Truth,b  as  well  as  of  that 
regarding  Justice.0  For  which  reason,  the  import 
ance  of  this  Proposition  cannot  be  rated  too  highly. d 

a  Sub-Prop,  under  Prop.  i.  Div.  III.         bProp.  ii.  Div.  III. 
cProp.  iii.  Div.  III.         (1  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  ii.  Postul. 


154          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

The  referential  importance  of  this  Proposition, 
therefore,  cannot  be  rated  too  highly,  even  if  we 
were  to  urge  nought  about  its  importance  on  its 
own  account.  But  such  importance,  in  its  turn, 
cannot  be  overrated. 

§  10.  For,  Love  is,  without  doubt,  a  tree  of 
Life  :  in  a  certain  good  sense,  it  is  the  tree  of  Life. 
It  is,  in  fact,  the  true  mundane  Yggdrasil.  To 
vary  our  view,  and  enlarge,  to  the  utmost,  the 
illustrating  medium  :  Love  is  the  central  attractive 
power  of  the  universe.  It  is  the  centre,  whence 
all  influential  radiations  must  depart,  and  to  which 
they  must  return  as  their  proper  home.  There  is, 
of  necessity,  an  inmost  Spiritual  Sun  to  the 
Universe ;  a  central  influence  appertaining  to  the 
sum  total  of  all  the  forces  of  every  world,  and 
every  system  of  worlds.a  There  must  be  supposed 
a  centre ;  in  other  words,  a  Sun  of  all  Suns, 
material  and  spiritual :  otherwise,  related  things 
would  be  out  of  proportion  to  each  other,  and 
apparent  effects  would  be  unlawfully  divorced 
from  their  only  possible  causes. 

§  11.  GOD  is  Love;  and,  when  we  say  so,  we 
evoke  the  omnipotent  word,  representative  of  the 
all-radiant  idea,  which  throws  warmth  upon  the 
field  of  our  world.  Possessed  of  this  secret,  we  feel 
we  are  in  possession  of  the  talisman  yielding  the 
primal  causation.  When  we  have  reached  as  high 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  III.  Schol.  iii.  §  30. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]   THEBEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    155 

as  Love,  we  have  reached  (to  use  the  humanly 
most  significant  expression)  the  very  heart  of  GOD. 

§  12.  And  if  Love  is  omnipotent  at  one  pole, 
equally  so  is  it  at  the  opposite  pole.  Strong  as  an 
aggressive  force,  it  is  equally  strong  as  a  resisting 
force.  Equally  positive  :  equally  negative. 

§  13.  What,  now,  can  resist  the  Love  of  God? 
What  can  be  stronger  than  the  great  motive  power 
of  the  absolute  universe  ? 

SCHOLIUM  II. 

OTHER  VITAL  DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  PROPOSITIONS  II.  <t  III., 
AND  PROPOSITION  IV. 

§  1.  In  the  preceding  Scholium  there  is  pointed 
out  one  great  difference  between  Propositions  II. 
and  III.  and  the  present  Proposition."  There  are 
other  differences ;  and  it  may  be  wise  to  take  this 
opportunity,  so  fit  and  suitable  in  every  way,  to 
draw  attention  to  some  of  those  other  differences. 

§  2.  Why,  or  from  what  cause,  Creation  ?  And 
how  do  the  several  attributes  of  Truthfulness, 
Justice,  and  Goodness  =  Love,  stand  affected  to 
Creation,  and  to  each  other  with  reference  to  that 
relation  ?  These  are  the  questions  to  which 
attention  shall  be  now  directed  :  and  throughout 
this  Scholium  our  distinctive  object  must  be 
sedulously  kept  in  sight. 

a  Schol.  preced.  §§  1-6. 


156          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

§  3.  Supposing  the  fact  of  a  creation — Supposing, 
in  other  words,  that  the  world  which  is  around  us, 
and  the  worlds  upon  worlds,  or  systems  upon 
systems  of  worlds,  which  are  around  our  little  ball, 
or  our  small  sidereal  system,  as  a  centre,  with  all 
things  in  those  continents,  began  sometime  to  be 
(a  point  demonstrated*) ;  when  'tis  asked,  Why 
was  that  world  of  ours,  or  the  universe  at  large, 
created  ?  the  answer  (as  we  have  seenb)  is : 
Because  of  the  existence  of  a  principle  co-incident 
with  the  over-flowing,  as  'twere,  of  the  Happiness 
of  the  Being  who  is  the  essential  Substratum  of 
Expansion  and  Duration,  Immensity  and  Eternity. 
To  repeat  it :  The  Happiness  of  the  Infinite  One, 
uniting  with  His  Goodness,  does,  as  it  were,  flow 
over  :  Over-flowing,  the  confluence  freely  out-births 
itself  in  Creation.  And  this  is  Goodness  :  at  any 
rate,  one  great  part  of  Goodness. 

§  4.  But  were  one  to  ask  abstractly,  that  is, 
abstracting  in  mind  creation  as  fact,  with  its  only 
possible  cause  ;  wrere  one  (we  say)  to  ask  abstractly, 
Why,  or,  Whence  Creation  ?  a  totally  different 
state  of  things  would  be  presented.  Our  stand 
point  would  be  different :  the  objects  seen  would 
be  different :  The  vision,  therefore,  would  be 
reported  (because  presented)  quite  differently.  In 
the  case  now  supposed,  we  would  not  be  in 

a  Div.  I.  Part  ii.  Sub-Prop,  and  Coroll.  therefrom. 
b  Div.  III.  Sub-Prop. 


SUB-DIV.  IL]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    157 

possession  of  the  indispensable  condition  of  the 
unspeakable  Happiness,  in  union  and  unison  with 
the  aboriginal  Goodness,  of  the  One  self-existent 
Substance.  But  this  whole  matter  shall  be  made 
still  plainer. 

§  5.  And  to  begin  at  the  beginning.  Were  the 
question  put,  Will  the  Great  Being  create  ?  the 
question  being  taken  in  and  by  itself,  it  could  not 
be  answered.  The  reasons,  or  causes,  would  be 
awanting.  In  the  case  at  present  imagined,  the 
fact  of  creation  would  be  out  of  sight :  creation 
would  be  only  possible.  And  whether  the  Great 
Being  would,  or  would  not,  create,  could  not  be 
declared.  The  question  could  be  answered  only  by 
the  help  of  certain  assumed  positions. a  Creation 
being  viewed  as  no  more  than  a  mere  possibility ; 
and  the  theorem  of  complete  Happiness b  being 
entirely  omitted;  no  creaturely  mind,  however 
exalted,  could  by  any  means  decide  even  this,— 
Whether  it  were  likely  that  there  would  be  a 
creation  at  all,  or  nut.  The  premises  warranting 
any  decision  would  be  absent.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Happiness  b  being  taken  into  account ;  creation 
would  be  likely  :  Not  necessary,  by  reason  of  the 
entire  Freeness,0  but  very  likely.  In  fine,  when 
we  view  creation  as  a  possibility,  and  not  yet 
actually  being,  the  absolute  attribute  of  Happi- 

a  Confer  §  3  of  Lemma,  Prop.  ii.  Div.  III. 
b  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  c  Div.  II.  Part.  iii. 


158          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

ness    is   the    attribute    to   which  we  must  mainly 
look. 

§  6.  But  another  datum  shall  next  be  postulated. 
On  the  supposition  of  a  creation  of  men, — a  point 
itself  demonstrated  elsewhere, a — we  have  demon 
strated  Goodness  to  be  an  Attribute  :  b  the  transi 
tional  Attribute  ;  intermediate  between  the  absolute 
attributes  of  Divisions  I.  &  II.,  and  the  really 
relative  attributes  of  this  Division.0  We  have 
demonstrated,  we  repeat,  Goodness  to  be  an 
attribute.  That  is  ;  accepting  the  creation  of  man 
as  a  fact;  then,  applying  to  the  attribute  of 
Happiness/1  we  prove  that  the  one  must  be  assigned 
as  the  cause  of  the  other  : e  Happiness  resulting  in 
Goodness,  and  Creation,  are  in  relation  to  each 
other  as  cause  and  effect.6  Thus,  the  question  of 
creation  is  one  about  Goodness.  This  is  the 
attribute  to  which  creation  must  be  attached. 

§  7.  Of  course,  we  may  affirm  nearly  the  same 
thing  of  Conservation,  so  far  forth  as  conservation 
is  tantamount  to  continued  creation.*  Conserva 
tion,  as  well  as  Creation,  is  the  result  of  Goodness. 

§  8.  Thus  :  If  the  question,  Taking  for  granted 
creation,  why  creation  ?  be  put ;  the  attributes  of 

a  Coroll.  from  Sub-Prop.  Part  ii.  Div.  I.  ;  &  Schol.  Part  iii.  Div.  II. 

b  Div.  III.  Sub-Prop. 

c  Vide  Div.  III.  Prop.  ii.  Lemma,  §   3. — Coroll.  from  Prop.  ii. 

Lemma,  §  3. — Prop.  iii.  Lemma,  §  6.     Vide,  etiam,  Prop,  iv., 

Dem.  Sect.  17,  18. 
d  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.      e  Div.  III.  Sub-Prop.      *  Supra,  Lemma  I. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    159 

Happiness  and  Goodness  give  us  the  answer.  And 
they  only  are  capable  of  entering  into  the  solution. 

§  9.  But  when  we  are  abreast  of  Justice,  'tis 
quite  another  case.  Another  attribute  has  been 
introduced,  and  a  quite  different  field  is  before  us. 

§10.  These  topics,  though  they  may  be  com 
paratively  uninteresting,  are  yet  highly  important 
in  themselves ;  and  therefore,  and  to  attain 
exceeding  plainness  in  so  grave  a  matter,  we  shall 
go  over  the  ground  again.  When  we  regard 
creation  as  only  possible,  man  is  viewed,  of  course, 
as  not  yet  actually  existent :  he  is  only  to  be. 
He  exists  in  the  ideas  of  the  Supreme  Mind,  and 
there  only.  And  when,  postulating  man,  we  speak 
of  the  cause  of  man's  existence,  we  must  look  to 
Happiness,  and  the  accompanying  and  resulting 
Goodness.  But  when  we  have  in  aspect  man  as 
really  existing ;  and  God's  dealing  with  man,  the 
reality  :  there  is  taken  in  another  attribute,  that, 
to  wit,  of  Justice.  AVe  say,  we  take  in  the  Justice 
of  God ;  not  merely  His  Truth.  Yet,  doubtless, 
the  Justice  of  God  involves  the  Truth  of  God.a 

§  11.  And,  in  the  same  way,  when  we  regard 
God  as  the  Just  God,  man  is  held  as  created ;  not, 
to  be  created.  God  created  man  : b  and  He  acts 
towards  man,  the  real  existence,  not  only  as  the 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  III.  Dem.  §  7,  et  seq. 

b  Schol.  after  Sub-Prop,  under  Prop.  i.  Div.  III.  ;  in  conjunction 
with  Schol.  after  Part  iii.  Div.  II. 


160          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

Good  One,  who  conserves  the  creatures  He  brought 
into  being/1  but  as  the  Just  God,  who  must  act 
towards  each  man  as  he  truly  is,  and  who,  there 
fore,  must  render  to  every  man  according  to  his 
state  of  mind,  and  resulting  works ;  the  good  man 
being  treated  as  being  so,  and  the  bad  man  being 
treated  as  such.b 

§  12.  To  glance  once  more  at  the  ground  we 
have  gone  over.  The  question  concerning  creation 
can  have  110  reference  to  the  attribute  of  Justice. 
But  it  refers  to  Goodness.  The  fields  of  the  two 
attributes  are,  so  far,  entirely  distinct. 

§  13.  Truth  and  Justice,  as  in  God,  have,  thus, 
nought  to  do  with  creation,  old  or  new. — id  est, 
the  creation  of  man  in  the  beginning,  or  his 
re-creation  now  by  the  impartation  to  him,  as  a 
deteriorated  being,  of  a  better  nature  than  the  old 
one,  defaced  and  all-degraded  as  it  has  become.0 
Yea,  these  attributes  require,  not  a  possible 
creation,  but  the  creature  as  an  accomplished  fact,'1 
as  the  field  for  their  exercise.  GOD  is  Just  =  GOD 
is  Just  to  creatures,  or  at  least  to  men*  It  is 
never  to  be  forgotten,  that  the  Good  One,  who 
creates,  conserves  man ;  and,  as  Conserver  or 

a  Dem.  preced.  Sect.  3,  4. 

b  Supra,  Prop.  III.  Dem.  §  9,  &  Coroll.  §  6,  multisque  aliis  locis. 

c  Confer,  ut  supra,  Prop.  III.  Schol.  ii.  §  11, —  &  Schol.  sub  Schol. 

ii.  §  3. 

d  Conftr  Sect.  10,  11,  ut  supra. 
e  Div.  III.  Prop.  iii.  Lemma,  §  2, — etc. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     161 

Preserver,  has,  therefore,    to    do    with    man    as  a 
real  existence.* 

§  14.  There  is  one  thing  which  must  be  admitted, 
— and  which  (if  our  conceptions  were  capacious  and 
clear)  should  and  would  be  borne  in  mind, — that, 
in  one  great  special  respect,  'tis  somewhat  different 
with  regard  to  Truth,  from  what  strictly  holds  with 
regard  to  Justice.  Truth  may  be  conceived  to  be 
occupied,  not  only  concerning  creaturely  intelli 
gences  other  than  men,  for  instance,  angelic  spirits  ; 
but  also  concerning  uncreated  hypostases,  if  there 
be  such, — if  there  be  (let  us  say)  a  Second  Hypos- 
tasis,  and  a  Third,  in  the  GODHEAD.*'  Justice, 
however, — Justice  in,  at  any  rate,  its  essential 
aspects, — can  be  exercised  only  in  the  case  of 
creaturely  objects  ;  that  is,  as  far  as  our  demon 
stration  is  concerned,  only  with  regard  to  human 
beings.0 

O 

SCHOLIUM  III. 

SHALL  THE  REWARDS  OF  THE  GOOD,  AND  THE  PUNISHMENTS  OF 
THE  EVIL,  BE  TO  ALL  ETERNITY  ? 

§  1.  A  question  was  reserved  d  for  this  place  ;  the 
question,  to  wit,  Will  the  Rewards  of  the  Righteous, 
and  the  Punishment  of  the  Wicked,  continue  for 
ever  ?  And,  on  a  first  view,  it  appears  as  if,  in 
this  quarter  of  our  a  priori  horizon,  the  question 

a  Dem.  preced.  Sect.  3,  4. 

b  Confer  Div.  III.  Prop.  ii.  Lemma,  Sect.  4,  5,  6. 
0  Div.  III.  Prop.  iii.  Lemma,  §  2, — etc. 
d  Vide  §  39,  Schol.  in.  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III. 
11 


162  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR    [Div.  III. 

might  be  decided  very  easily.  For  the  Love  of 
God,  founded  on  His  Goodness,  being  in  the  field 
of  argument,  as  now  to  be  postulated,  what  great 
difficulty  can  there  be  ? 

§  2.  We  have  seen  a  what  is  the  decision,  upon 
the  matter  in  hand,  of  the  attribute  of  Justice,  the 
origin,  this,  of  so  many  prominent  and  differential 
masculine  characteristics.  Justice  cannot  decide, 
dogmatically  and  unconditionally,  whether  the 
rewards  of  the  righteous,  and  the  punishments  of 
the  wicked,  shall  last  for  ever,  or  not.  Justice  can, 
in  truth,  say  nothing  apodeictically  on  these  points.b 
This  attribute  informs  us,  that  impartial  retribu 
tions  shall  be  inflexibly  and  accurately  administered 
to  every  man,  according  to  his  works  ;  whether  the 
administration  takes  place  in  this  world,  or  shall 
take  place  in  the  next  world.0  But,  taking  for 
granted  that  the  rewards  and  the  punishments,  or, 
at  any  rate,  the  punishments,  shall  be  finite  in 
duration,  Justice,  at  the  utmost,  can  do  no  more 
than  decide  precisely  how  long  the  punishments 
shall  last,  by  declaring  that  they  shall,  or  at  least 
may,  last  long  enough  to  allow  of  the  infliction  of 
misery  adequate  to  the  enormity  of  the  wickedness 
calling  for  punishment.  Yet  Justice  hath  no  power 
to  decide  even  this  by  abstract  information  as  to 

a  Supra,  Prop.  III.  Schol.  iii. 

b  Supra,  Prop.  III.  Schol.  iii.,  §  21,  &c. 

c  Prop.  III.  Schol.  iii.  Sect.  11-14,  &c. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.  163 
how  loner  the  men  themselves  will  live  ;  whether 

O  * 

for  a  long  time,  or  for  a  very  long  time.  Justice 
did  not  make  the  men  begin  to  be  :  Justice  does 
not  conserve  them  :  This  attribute  has  nought  to 
do  with  such  matters.8 

§  3.  But  is  the  same  decision  to  be  come  to  by 
the  attribute  of  Love  ?  Love,  on  one,  at  least,  of 
its  sides,  the  seat,  as  it  were,  of  the  femininism  of 
Deity, — namely,  Love,  as  long-suffering  patience, 
and  pitiful  compassionateness,  to  the  low  and  sunk, 
and  mercifulness  to  the  miserable  and  lost, — Love, 
the  source,  consequently,  of  the  feminine  excel 
lencies  of  our  race.  Does  Love  answer  the  question 
with  the  same,  /  know  not:  it  is  not  in  me? 
Surely,  one  need  not  be  reckoned  over- hasty  who 
would  at  once  say,  Xo  :  Love  must  reply  with  a 
difference. 

§  4.  As  far  as  the  Rewards  of  the  Righteous  are 
concerned,  there  will  be  no  difficulty  at  all,  from 
any  quarter.  The  ground  of  the  decision  he're  is 
clear ;  the  decision  itself  easy.  Goodness  called 
the  men  into  being  :  b  Love  preserves  them  : c  In 
the  spiritual  world,  or  in  heaven,  good  men  will  be 
only  more  like  GOD  than  they  were  when  they 
lived  on  earth : d  On  the  whole,  therefore,  the 

a  Schc.l.  prececl.  Sect.  9-13,  &c. 

b  Sub-Prop.  Div.  III.         c  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv.  Dem.  Sect.  f>  &  9. 
a  Vide,  supra,  §!!,&§  13,  Schol.  ii.  ;  and  §  11  to  §  14,  Schol.  iii., 
both  in  Prop.  III.  ; — aliosqj  loc. 


164  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

answer  must  be,  It  is  certain,  that  the  men  will 
exist  for  ever.  All  the  causes  of  their  existence, 
and  conservation,  are  at  work.  And  no  inexor 
able  attribute  demands,  or  even  seems  to  demand, 
aught  else  to  be  accomplished.  The  Righteous, 
then,  will  continue  for  ever  and  ever.  They  are 
attached  (if  the  strong  anthropomorphitism  may  be 
pardoned  a)  by  strong  connecting  links,  to  the  throne 
of  God.  As  God  liveth,  they  shall  live  also.  Star- 
suns,  they  shall  shine  ceaselessly  in  the  Eternal 
Empyrean. 

§  5.  Such  is  the  answer  to  the  question,  so  far 
as  the  one  class  of  men  is  concerned. 

§  6.  But  what  is  the  answer  which  is  to  be 
returned  as  to  the  other  class  ?  A  very  different 
sort  of  men  are  the  Righteous  from  the  Wicked, 
and  a  very  different  solution  must  be  accorded  as 
to  the  case  of  these  latter.  The  true  gist  of  the 
whole  question,  as  one  of  difficulty,  is  undoubtedly 
in  this  direction. 

§  7.  Will  the  Punishment  of  the  Wicked  be  for 
ever?  Or,  as  we  might  now  put  the  question, 
without  just  offence  to  the  unalterable  laws  of  logic, 
Will  God  punish  sinners,  or,  suffer  sinners  to  be 
punished  (  =  to  punish  themselves)  eternally  ?  In 
any  case,  Will  sinners  be  punished  eternally  ? 
This,  then,  is  the  question ;  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  that  this  is  a  fearfully  momentous  question 

a  Vide,  supra,  §  11,  Schol.  ii.  Prop.  III.,  etc. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     165 

for  sinners  to  ask,  and  to  have  answered  for  them. 
The  great  reason  is,  of  course,  because  of  the 
tremendous  weight  attached  to  one  of  the  terms  in 
the  query  :  "for  ever,"  or  "eternally,"  or  whatso 
ever  the  word,  or  rather  words,  mayhap  the  phrase, 
may  be.  Whatever  was  the  case  at  first,  with 
regard  to  the  equivalent  terms,  or  rather  expres 
sions,  in  the  original  Greek  and  Hebrew  languages 
—from  which  source  the  current  English  meaning 
was  doubtless  taken  ;  the  term  has  come  to  have  a 
most  particularly  emphatic  meaning  with  us.  By 
"eternal"  existence,  as  employed  in  this  question, 
the  ordinary  superficial  theologian  of  the  day  means 
(though  perhaps  he  knows  it  not)  an  existence 
enduring  alongside  of,  and  coincident  with,  the 
duration  of  the  existence  of  God  Himself:  true 
co-existence.  'Tis  but  proper  to  avoid  enlarging, 
on  the  present  occasion,  on  this  portentous  topic  ; 
but,  nevertheless,  'tis  not  easy  to  omit  the 
suggestion  of  a  single  reflection  :  Only  think,  then, 
of  the  full  significance  of  that  affirmation  which 
attaches  the  miserable  damnation  of  the  wicked  in 
hell — and,  consequently,  infernal  blasphemies,  the 
absolute  acme  of  all  evil — to  the  o-lorious  high 

O  O 

throne  of  the  Eternal :  which  binds  up  the  existence 
of  evil,  and  the  existence  of  GOD,  in  one  indissoluble 
attachment.  Speak  we  not  of  the  accumulation  of 
horrors,  to  every  individual  member  of  the  universe, 
implied  in  the  dreadful  position :  But  in  what 


166  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

sense  can  God  be  the  One  Living  One,  if  an 
antagonistic  element,  centred  in  a  monstrous 
Monarch,  be  bound  up  with  the  eternity  to  come  as 
much  as  God  Himself  ?  For,  no  condition  of  things, 
even  hellish,  can  exist  without  the  shadow  at 
least  of  a  government.  No  kingdom  without  a 
king.  Even  an  abhorred  kingdom  of  darkness 
could  not  maintain  itself  through  one  of  the  days, 
nights  rather,  of  hell,  without  its  appallingly 
hateful  and  hating  Ahriman. 

§  8.  But  in  touching  on  the  immense  significa 
tion  covered  by  one  of  the  terms  of  that  query, 
have  not  we  been  betrayed  into  something  like  a 
proleptical  objection  to  the  doctrine  itself  of 
Eternal  Torments  ?  The  excuse  must  be,  that  the 
drifting  into  objection,  proceeding  from  exposition, 
is  only  too  natural.  Yet  it  must  be  remembered 
that,  whatever  be  implied  in  the  position,  The 
torments  of  the  damned  shall  be  to  all  eternity ; 
our  inquiry  at  present  is  really  this,  Is  the  doctrine 
true  ?  Whatever  be  involved  in  the  fundamental 
idea  of  the  junction  of  such  a  predicate  to  such 
a  subject,  Is  the  proposition  itself  true,  or  false ; 
to  be  accepted,  or  rejected  ? 

§  9.  What  great  difficulty  can  there  be,  after  all, 
in  deciding  the  question  ? 

§  10.  Namely,  what  difficulty  can  there  be  in 
deciding,  that  those  attributes  of  Goodness  and 
Love  will  be  always  exigent  in  demanding  that, 


SUB-DIV.  IT.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    167 

if  possible,  the  torments  of  the  miserable  damned 
should  be  made  to  cease  to  be  :  While  not  one  of 
the  other  Attributes,  as  demonstrated,  necessitates, 
or  even  seems  to  necessitate,  the  everlasting 
continuance  of  the  misery  of  those  unhappy 
damned  ones, — most  miserable  they  in  their  minds, 
and  most  grievously  tormented  perhaps  in  their 
responsive  bodies ; — those  most  pitiable  sufferers, 
most  to  be  pitied  as  suffering  tortures  by  reason 
of  their  own  evil  passions,  strong  and  victorious 
over  all  their  lawful  feelings  and  thoughts,  strong 
and  victorious  even  in  hell,  the  place  of  not-to-be- 
comforted  lost  souls.  Certainly,  not  one  of  the 
other  Attributes  does,  in  the  merest  seeming, 
necessitate  the  everlasting  continuance  of  misery, 
if  Inflexible  Justice  do  not  so.  And  this  Attribute 
does  not,  even  in  seeming,  demand  the  everlasting 
misery — nor  any  such  appallingly,  unutterably, 
horrific  consequence.11 

§11.  If,  then,  the  misery  be  to  come  to  an  end, 
How  (say  you)  shall  the  misery  come  to  its  end  ? 
Who  can  tell  ?  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  any 
one  should  know.  Enough,  if  we  know  that 
Inflexible  Justice  is  silent,  while  Divine  Love — in 
the  shape  of  gentle  pity  and  compassion,  or  (better 
yet)  soft-hearted  Mercy — Mercy,  which  is  simply 
Love  =  Goodness  to  the  abject  and  miserable,— 
Divine  Love  (we  say)  unceasingly  pleads  and  prays 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  III. 


168  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

for  the  cessation,  as  soon  as  possible,  of  all  the 
unutterable  wretchedness  in  the  wide  domains  of 
God.  Love  to  men  is  very  fain  to  become  Mercy, 
on  the  presentation  of  the  truly  miserable  among 

men :    and    Divine    Mercy what,   in  this  wide 

universe,  can  refuse  to  yield  itself  thereunto? 
Enough  is  it  for  the  good  to  know  so  much  :  and 
humbly  must  they  wait,  in  hope,  for  that  consumma 
tion,  the  greatest,  and  the  last,  of  all  the  creaturely 
consummations.  For,  by  that  consummation, 
the  whole  creation,  which,  so  visibly  and  pitifully, 
groaneth  and  travaileth  in  pain  together  until  now, 
shall,  finally,  be  delivered  from  the  bondage  of 
corruption.  In  fine, — Then  the  end ;  and  God 
shall  be  all  in  all. 


SCHOLIUM  SUB  SCHOLIO  III. 

§  1.  But  though  no  one  can  tell,  in  a  positive 
way,  or  dogmatically,  how  the  misery  is  to  come 
to  its  end  ;  one  may  surmise  how  the  misery  will 
be  terminated.  The  misery  will  assuredly  end : 
But  very  likely  not  by  the  ceasing  to  be  of  the 
evil,  or  (to  give  the  most  proper  term)  the  wicked 
ness,  abstractly  taken— the  cause  of  all  the  misery. 
For,  no  way  of  ending  evil  is  patent,  or  even 
comprehensible,  so  long  as  the  wicked  persons 
themselves  remain.  The  evil  tree  must  first  be 
made  good,  before  the  poison-fruit  will  become 


SuB-Div.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     169 

good,  and  safe  for  food,  and  wholesome  in  every 
way.  It  seems,  indeed,  a  moral  proposition  as 
certain  as  any  in  metaphysical  science,  or  mathe 
matical,  that  the  intensely  wicked  will  not  cease 
from  troubling  even  in  hell :  (whatever  they  may 
l>e  compelled  to  be,  or  not  to  do,  in  the  grave.) 
But,  at  all  events,  the  wickedness,  and  its  effect, 
the  misery,  might  be  made  to  cease  to  be,  by  an 
Almighty  fiat,  commanding  the  wickedness,  with  its 
subject,  to  cease  to  be.a  That  Power  which  called 
all  men  into  being,  can  cause  men  to  be  no  more : 
yea,  it  could  cause  all  the  things  of  Time  itself  to 
be  no  longer,  and  that  in  the  very  fullest  of 
senses. a  No  contradiction,  no  impossibility,  no 
absurdity, — yea,  no  difficulty,  of  any  kind, — would 
be  implied  in  an  act  of  Omnipotence,  directed  to 
such  a  purpose,  and  bringing  about  such  an  end  as 
contemplated.  About  the  existence  of  the  power, 
there  can  be  no  doubt :  The  question  is  solely 
about  the  exercise  of  the  ability.  The  annihilation 
of  the  wicked  in  hell  is  quite  possible  to  the 
Creator. a  Some  of  the  Moral  Attributes  demand 
it :  Not  one  Attribute  says,  Nay ;  the  wickedness, 
and  the  misery, — multiplied  into  each  other,  and 
increasing  in  more  than  any  geometrical  ratio.— 
must  last  for  ever.  The  final  annihilation,  there 
fore,  is  possible  :  And,  being  possible,  it  is 
absolutely  certain.  The  Creator,  and  Conserver, 

•l  Lemma  II 


170  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

as  the  All-Loving  One,  must  be  the  All-Merciful 
One  too,  since,  in  Him,  Mercy  is  but  Love  regard 
ing  the  disconsolately  afflicted. a  Hence,  the 
certainty  follows  from  the  possibility  of  final 
annihilation,  as  the  ceasing  to  be  of  all  misery  in 
the  universe. 

§  2.  Thus,  the  doctrine  of  the  final  annihilation 
of  the  hopelessly  abandoned  and  reprobate  wicked, 
arid  therefore  the  unutterably  tormented  and  com 
fortless,  is  a  doctrine  from  which  there  is  no 
escaping.  It  is  a  tenet  of  reason,  and  it  is,  there 
fore,  in  perfect  accord  with  the  reasonings  of  the 
argument  a  priori. 

§  3.  Not  the  philosophically-sounding  annihila 
tion,  however,  but  the  morally-characteristic 
"destruction,"  is  the  ethically  correct  (not  to  say, 
the  Scriptural)  expression,  to  denote  the  awful 
utter  close  of  the  career  of  incorrigible,  and  finally 
impenitent,  wicked  men.  ;Twere  not  lawful  to 
seek  to  found  any  statement,  in  a  demonstrative 
work,  upon  the  testimony  of  a  Bible-writer,  or 
upon  any  authority  whatever  :  but  as  there  is  here 
but  surmising,  and  not  laying  down  the  law 
apodeictically,b  each  of  the  writers  in  the  Bible  is 
entitled  to  be  heard,  as  well  as,  and  as  much  as, 
any  author,  whosoever  he  be  ;  even  taking  that 
low  ground  wherefrom  the  authors  of  the  books  in 
The  Book  are  viewed  as  purely  human  authorities. 

a  Supra,  Schol.  III.  §  11.  b  Supra,  §  1. 


SUB-DIV.  II.]    THE  BEIXG  AXD  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     171 

"  Destruction,"  'tis  repeated,  is  the  ordinary 
Scriptural  expression,  though,  occasionally,  we 
meet  with  the  idea  in  even  stronger  words  or 
phrases;  such  as,  "everlasting  destruction  from 
the  presence  of  the  Lord,  and  from  the  glory  of 
His  power."  Everlasting  destruction,  indeed,  just 
because  from  the  presence  of  the  Lord,  the 
Demiurge,  the  "  express  image "  of  the  person 
(vTToo-Tc'ia-eux;)  of  Him  "  who  only "  "hath  Life  in 
Himself,"  the  sole  source  of  life  to  all  the  creatures. 

EPILEGOMEXA. 

§  1.  One  circumstance  there  is,  on  which  an 
observation,  not  to  be  forgotten,  must  be  made. 
It  is  only  by  a  licence,  that  Truth,  or  Truthfulness, 
rigorously  construed,  is  included  among  the  Moral 
Attributes.  Considered  apart  from  other  modes  of 
Mind,  Trueness  belongs  rather  to  the  Intellectual 
class  of  faculties. a  But,  being  (in  its  turn)  a  main 
constituent  in  Justice,  or  the  Moral  faculty ,b  Truth 
fulness  is  drawn  over  to  the  great  Moral  group  of 
mental  susceptibilities. 

§  2.  The  proposition  as  to  Trueness  constitutes, 
indeed,  the  link  between  the  Intellectual  Attributes 
and  the  strictly  Moral  powers  of  Mind.  Just  as, 
in  a  similar  manner,  the  principle  of  Freeness 
might  be  said  to  be  a  link  between  the  same  two 

a  Vide,  supra,  Prop.  II.  Dem.  §  4. 

b  Vide,  supra,  §  3  of  Lemma,  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III. 


172  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  III. 

sets  of  powers  :  Freeness  being  capable  of  being 
viewed  as  connected  with  the  large  Will  branch, 
and,  so,  as  being  a  Moral  faculty ;  as  well  as  it  is 
capable  of  being  viewed  as  connected  with  the  more 
purely  Intellectual  Attributes,  or  those  appertain 
ing  to  the  domain  of  the  Understanding, — Freeness 
standing  in  relation  to  the  power  of  beginning 
motion,  being  itself  beyond  the  reach  of,  and 
unconstrained  by,  all  ab  extra  influences. 


§  3.  Here  terminates  the  consideration  of  the,  at 
once,  directly  Relative,  and  purely  Moral,  Attri 
butes.  The  propositions  of  this  group  carry  on,  of 
course,  the  series  of  the  Psychical  Attributes ; 
and  they  close  the  series  of  those  Attributes  which 
have  been  denominated  the  Simple,  in  opposition  to 
the  Complex  or  Compound,  which  are  yet  before 
us,  remaining  for  consideration  in  the  Fourth 
Division  of  this  demonstration. 


Div.  IV.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      173 


DIVISION  IV. 

THE   COMPLEX  OR   COMPOUND   ATTRIBUTES. 


SCHOLIUM  PR.EPOSITUM. 

§  1.  In  place  of  such  words  as,  God,  u'ho  is  the 
True,  and  the  Faithful,  and  the  inflexibly  Just, 
and  the  altogether  Righteous  One, — ivho  is  also  the 
All-Loving  One,  yea,  Love  Itself, — as  occurring  in 
the  last  section  of  the  preceding  Proposition  a  ;  in 
future,  there  shall  be  employed,  for  the  most  part, 
these  terms, — GOD,  THE  LORD,  or,  THE  LORD  GOD. 

§  2.  The  substitution  will  conduce  to  an  effective 
brevity.  It  will  enable  us  to  avoid  circumlocutions 
and  repetitions,  which  might  be  not  only  tedious, 
but  undesirable  perhaps  on  accounts  other  than 
those  proceeding  from  mere  tediousness,  provocative 
of  wearisomeness. 

§  3.  The  predicates  in  the  various  propositions 
demonstrated  in  the  foregoing  Sub-Division,  express 
relative  qualities.  These  are  the  attributes  expres 
sive  of  peculiar  relations  in  which  the  Supreme 
Being  stands  to  the  human  race  ;  and  the  term 

a  Viz.  §  20,  Dem.  Prop.  iv.  Div.  III. 


174  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV 

LORD  shall  henceforth  be  used — frequently,  at  all 
events,  shall  be  used — to  signify  the  relations 
denoted  by  those  words  respectively.  The  term  in 
question  shall  stand  for  all  those  predicates  of  moral 
relation. 

PROPOSITION  I. 

As  God,  the  Lord,  is  the  Best,  so  He  is,  necessarily, 
the  Wisest  of  Beings. 

PROLEGOMENA. 
8  1.  Wisdom    is    not    the    same   as  Knowledge. 

*J  O 

But  Wisdom  implies  Knowledge,  as  Knowledge 
implies  Intelligence,  and  Intelligence,  again, 
implies  a  Mind.a  Knowledge  is  implied  by 
Wisdom  as  the  less  is  implied  by  the  greater. 

§  2.  In  itself,  Wisdom  may  be  said  to  be  the 
capacity  of  designing  to  employ  means  to  ends,  so 
as  to  bring  the  ends  or  purposes  about.  Wisdom, 
therefore,  involves  the  knowledge  of  the  use  of 
the  most  proper  means,  in  aiming  after  purposes 
or  objects.  Wisdom  may  even  be  said  to  involve 
the  capability  of  handling  things,  so  as  to  turn 
them  into  causes  adequate  to  produce  effects. 

§  3.  Thus,  Wisdom  is  Knowledge  of  a  certain 
kind,  applied  in  a  certain  way.  Wisdom  is  the 
knowledge  of  the  relations  of  things — specially, 
of  the  relations  of  some  things,  as  means,  to  other 

a  Division  II.  Part  i.  Scholium. 


PROP.  I.]      THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      175 

things,  as  ends.  Wisdom  is  also  the  knowledge  of 
the  fitnesses  of  causes  to  produce  effects,  in  combina 
tion  with  the  power  to  employ  the  means,  and  to 
bring  the  ends  or  effects  to  pass,  in  combination, 
moreover,  with  the  actual  realisations  of  the  mere 
potentialities.  For  Wisdom  implies  somewhere  a 
power  of  execution.  And  power  must  be  measured 
by  the  actual  execution  or  effect. 

§  4.  The  elements,  therefore,  going  to  constitute 
Wisdom  are,  Knowledge  of  relations, — will  and 
power  to  use  means,  and  thereby  to  realise  ends, 
or  put  in  execution  affairs. 

§  5.  Wisdom,  as  it  has  hitherto  been  explained, 
is, — for  the  most  part,  at  least, — an  Intellectual 
function  of  Mind.  AVhatever  be  the  constituents 
of  which,  exclusively,  Wisdom  consists  (a  point  on 
which  we  are  by  no  means  obliged  to  pronounce 
an  absolute  verdict ;)  'tis  certain,  that  Wisdom 
appertains  to  Intellect  in  this,  that  every  act  of 
Wisdom  involves  a  mental  act  or  process  into  which 
the  Intellect  enters.  Whether  or  no  Wisdom  is 
purely  Intellectual,  Wisdom  implies  always  the 
operation  of  the  Intellectual  powers.  That  which 
containeth  not  any  appeal  to.  or  use  of,  the  faculties 
of  the  Intellect,  is,  in  no  propriety  of  speech, 
Wisdom  of  any  sort. 

§  6.  So  much  with  regard  to  Wisdom  abstractly, 
or  considered  apart  from  all  but  the  essential 
momenta.  In  fine,  Wisdom,  so  far  forth  as  it  is  an 


176  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  IV. 

Intellectual  function  of  Mind,  is  what  we  have 
been  considering.  There  is,  however,  another  sort 
of  Wisdom ;  a  Wisdom  with  positive  moral 
elements,  superadded  thereunto.  Of  which  addi 
tional  species  anon. 

§  7.  The  ground  being  thus  opened  up,  by  the 
appropriate  definition,  or  description,  we  are  ready 
to  advance  to  the  demonstration  itself  of  the 
Proposition,  that  God  the  Lord  is  necessarily  the 
Wisest  of  Beings. 

FIRST  DEMONSTRATION. 

PROPOSITION. 
God  the  Lord  is,  necessarily,  the  Wisest  of  Beings. 

§  1.  Now,  that  God  the  Lord  must  needs  be  the 
Wisest  of  Beings,  requires  no  very  laboured 
demonstration.  The  media  concludendi  are  at 
hand,  and  irresistible. 

§  2.  God  the  Lord  has  been  demonstrated  to  be 
the  Intelligent  and  All-knowing  Creator  of  all 
things  whatsoever  ; a  and  He  has  also  been  proved 
to  be  the  Upholder  or  Sustainer  in  being  of  all 
things  : b  it  consequently  follows,  that  He  knoweth 
all  the  relations,  actual  and  possible,  of  things  to 
each  other.  The  Mind  which  brought  the  things, 

O  O     3 

with  all  their  powers  and  qualities,  into  existence, 

a  Div.  II.  Part  i.  §  4,  and  Part  ii.  §  2. 
b  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv.  Dem.  §  5,  &c. 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     177 

and    which    continues    the    existence,    cannot    but 

know  all  the  relations  to  each  other  of  the  things 

o 

made  and  upheld  by  it. 

§  3.  To  know  all  the  possible  relations  of  things 
to  each  other,  involves  the  knowledge  of  the 
adaptability  of  the  powers  of  things,  as  means  to 
ends.  God  the  Lord,  therefore,  must  be  supposed 
to  know  the  fitness  of  this  or  that,  to  effect  this 
or  the  other  thing.  His  knowledge  of  possible 
fitnesses  must  be  as  profound  as  the  knowledge 
of  all  actual  fitnesses  throughout  the  wide  uni 
verse. 

§  4.  But  the  knowledge  is  not  all  that  is 
possessed.  For  as  God  the  Lord  is  All-powerful, a 
as  well  as  All-knowing,1*  He  must  have  ability 
to  accomplish  the  realisation  of  all  the  adaptations 
of  things  arising  from  so  many  fitnesses.  Even  as 
He  knows  the  various  fitnesses  of  things  to  each 
other,  so  He  can  bring  about  the  adaptations,  and 
the  ends  had  in  view,  whatever  they  be. 

§  5.  In  fine,  it  is  a  necessary  consequence  from 
what  has  preceded  in  this  demonstration,  that  God 
the  Lord  can  bring  about  all  the  purposes  which 
his  All-knowing  Intelligence  presents,  and  which 
are  desired  as  effects. 

§  6.  From  all  which  it  follows,  most  evidently, 
that  God,  the  Lord,  is  necessarily  the  Wisest 
of  Beings. 

o 

*  Div.  II.  Part  ii.  b  Div.  II.  Part  i. 

12 


178          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

§  7.  Then,  God,  the  Lord,  is,  necessarily,  the 
Wisest  of  Beings. 

SCHOLIUM  AFTER  FIRST  DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  The  demonstration  just  set  forth  may  be 
said  to  be  that  of  the  truth  of  the  predicate.  But 
a  second  demonstration  is  available,  in  which  the 
subject,  qua  subject,  shall  become  more  prominent. 
The  proof  shall  extend  to  the  subject  as  much  as 
to  the  predicate,  and  to  both  in  conjunction 
equally. 

§  2.  As,  therefore,  the  proof,  in  the  foregoing 
demonstration,  was  greatly  confined  to  the 
predicate,  so,  joining  subject  to  predicate  after 
another  fashion,  we  must  note  the  result.  Con 
joining,  then,  those  two,  we  have  the  Perfect 
Goodness  and  Love  of  God  the  Lord,  adjoined  to 
His  Measureless  Wisdom.  The  practical  result 
of  the  conjunction  will  be,  that  all  the  ends 
accomplished  by  the  Being  of  beings  must  be  the 
most  Benevolent,  as  well  as  the  most  Wise, — or, 
the  Best,  at  once,  and  the  Wisest. 

§  3.  But  the  important  truth  shall  be  best 
brought  out  in  a  separate  demonstration. 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      179 

SECOND  DEMONSTRATION. 
PROPOSITION. 

As  God,  the  Lord,  is  the  Best :  so  He  is,  necessarily, 
the  Wisest  of  Beings. 

§  1.  God,  the  Lord,  not  only  is  the  All-knowing 
and  the  All-powerful  Cause  of  all  things  in  the 
material  universe : a  He  is,  also,  the  Loving  One 
conserving  all.b  He  created  all  the  things  of  the 

D  O 

world  in  Goodness,  and  He  sustains  them  in  Love.c 
What,  now,  is  the  necessary  result  of  the  addition 
of  the  precise  Moral  element  in  view  to  the 
Wisdom,  the  possession  of  which  by  God,  the  Lord, 
has  been  already  demonstrated  ? (1 

§  2.  Of  course,  it  follows  from  the  special 
additional  elements  of  the  Goodness,  and  the  Love, 
beino-  combined  with  the  Wisdom, — most  mani- 

o 

festly,  it  immediately  follows, — that  God,  the  Lord, 
will  be  always  exercising  His  Wisdom  so  as  to 
bring  Beneficent  ends  about.  Only  Benevolent 
effects  will  be  aimed  at  by  One  who  is  endowed 
with  an  assemblage  of  such  Perfections,  acting  ever 
harmoniously  with  a  view  to  a  common  end. 

§  3.  The  Wisdom,  then,  with  which  we  are  now 
concerned,  is  that  which  is  engaged  in  seeking  to 

a  Div.  II.  Parts  i.  &  ii.  ''  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv.  Dem. 

c  Div.  III.  Sub-Prop.  §  2,  &  Prop.  iv.  Dem.  §  5. 

d  Preceding  Demonstration. 


180          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

bring  about  Good  ends.  By  no  means  ends  or 
effects  irrespective  of  their  moral  bearing,  but  ends 
having  distinctly  recognisable  Benevolent  action  in 
view. 

§  4.  And,  thus,  it  has  been  made  clear,  that  as 
God,  the  Lord,  is  the  Best,  so  He  is  necessarily  the 
Wisest  of  Beings. 

§  5.  As  God,  the  Lord,  then;  is  the  Best,  so  He 
is,  necessarily,  the  Wisest  of  Beings. 

COROLLARY  FROM  SECOND  DEMONSTRATION. 

From  this  demonstration  it  follows,  that,  as 
Love  and  Wisdom  act  combinedly,  so  the  one  must 
be  supposed  to  serve  as  the  measure  (as  it  were)  of 
the  other.  From  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  it 
follows  that  the  Wisdom  will  be  the  regulative 
measure, — the  guide  and  the  controller, — of  the 
Love.  Love,  in  its  promptings  and  actings,  will 
be  ruled  by  Wisdom  :  Wisdom  will  point  out  the 
fittest  means  for  Love  to  employ  in  accomplishing 
its  ends.  Wisdom  will  be  restrained  and  prevented 
from  ever  resorting  to  any  but  beneficent  devices  ; 
and  Love  will  be  prevented  from  enlisting  in  its 
service  any  benevolences  but  those  best  calculated 
to  bring  about  the  desired  effects.  Thus,  there  is 
Love  as  the  Moral  motive ;  Wisdom  as  the  Intel 
lectual  director.  The  one  the  mover ;  the  other, 
the  regulating  principle  of  the  motion. 


PROP.  L]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      181 

SCHOLIUM  AFTER  SECOND  DEMONSTRATION. 

Of  course,  the  influence  which  Love  imparts,  is 
not  the  only  influence  which  will  be  at  work. 
Wisdom  will  ever  consist  in  what  is  consonant  to 
the  dictates  of  each  and  all  of  the  other  Attributes. 
Justice,  for  instance,  will  be  represented  as  well  as 
Love,  in  the  case  of  operations  having  men,  that  is, 
actually  existing  moral  beings,  directly  for  their 
subject  and  end. 


GENERAL   SCHOLIUM  AS  TO  WISDOM. 

§  1.  It  has  been  suggested, a  that  there  is  another 
sort  of  Wisdom  than  that  which  is  purely  or  almost 
entirely  Intellectual,  a  Wisdom,  to  wit,  which  has 
a  distinct  Moral  element  inherent  in  it ;  and  it 
shall  now  be  our  business  to  open  up  this  whole 
matter.  The  Second  Demonstration  was  concerned 
with  the  proof  of  Moral  Wisdom,  or  Wisdom  as 
existing  in  the  Supreme  Being,  and  that  Demon 
stration  has,  anticipatingly,  prepared  the  way  for  us. 

§  2.  In  the  first  place,  then,  there  is  the  Wisdom 
which  has  been  above  defined  and  described : b 
Wisdom  divested  of  all  extraneous  elements ; 
abstracted  from  all  non-essential  momenta  what 
ever.  This  Wisdom  in  itself,  or  most  strictly 

a  Proleg.  §  6.  b  Proleg.  Sect.  2-5. 


182  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

taken,  is,  speaking  generally,  an  Intellectual  func 
tion  of  Mind. 

§  3.  But,  no  doubt,  there  is,  also,  a  Wisdom 
having  Moral  elements  most  distinctly  added : 
insomuch  that  the  Wisdom  now  in  view  constitutes 
a  species  widely  different  from  the  other. 

§  4.  The  Moral  Wisdom  is,  in  turn,  twofold. 
Inasmuch  as  the  Moral  itself  is  of  two  kinds,  the 
strictly  Moral,  to  wit,  and  its  opposite,  the 
Im-moral;a  so  Moral  Wisdom,  likewise,  is  of  two 
kinds. 

§  5.  First,  there  is  Wisdom  with  the  addition 
of  the  eminently  Moral  quality  of  Goodness, 
Beneficence,  Benevolence, — or  by  whatever  term 
the  superadded  Moral  element  may  be  expressed. 

§  6.  And  there  is  a  kind  of  Wisdom  which  has  an 
addition  of  an  opposite  character :  WTisdom  which 
is  evil ;  aiming  at  wicked  ends,  being  animated 
by  the  desire  to  accomplish  cruelties.  This  kind 
may  be  denominated  False  Wisdom,  as  the  former 
kind  may  be  denominated  True  Wisdom.  And  it 
may  be  of  use  to  expatiate,  for  a  little,  on  the 
topic  of  that  bad  Wisdom,  as  distinguished  from 
the  better  sort,  the  proper,  the  genuine  Wisdom. 

§  7.  The  mere  abstract  knowledge  of  relations, 
or  fitnesses,  and  the  will  and  the  power  of  using 
means  to  ends  so  as  to  effect  aims,  is  all  that  is 
absolutely  involved  in  pure  Wisdom :  Wisdom 

a  Div.  III.  Prop,  iii.,  Lemma,  §  3. 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.      183 

defecated  from  all  extraneous  or  non-essential 
adjuncts.  But  when  we  speak  of  an  end,  an  aim, 
a  purpose,  we  imply  the  idea  of  something  truly 
desirable  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  a  good  in  itself. 
And  desirable  things  are  of  two  sorts  :  things  are 
desirable  by  reason  of  the  good,  or  of  the  evil, 
which  is,  or  may  be,  in  them.  Good  ends  will  be 
aimed  at  by  Good  Beings ;  evil  ends,  by  Evil 
Beings.  Not  that  evil  ends,  as  evil,  can  ever  be 
sought  after  by  any  mind,  even  a  mind  labouring 
under  mere  insane  delirations.  But  ends,  which 
are  really  evil  in  themselves,  are  apprehended — or 
may  be  occasionally  apprehended — to  be  good 
things  by  those  who,  incurably  principled  in  evil, 
are  only  Evil  Beings.  It  is  to  be  observed,  too, 
that  the  end,  in  one  case,  may  become  but  the 
means,  in  another.  There  may  be  a  vast  interval 
between  the  primary  action  of  the  Efficient  Cause, 
and  the  last  operation  in  the  Final  Cause ;  and 
there  may  be,  between  the  extremes,  a  series  of 
ends,  each  of  which  (except  the  last)  may  be,  in 
turn,  means  to  a  further  end.  And  it  is,  in  great 
part,  owing  to  the  circumstance  now  adverted  to 
that  the  erroneous  judgment  has  been  come  to, 
that  Wisdom  is  concerned  with  ends  as  much  as 
with  means. 

§  8.  To  speak,  now,  of  the  True  Wisdom.  This 
Wisdom  always  has  regard  to  the  nature  of  the 
ends,  or  the  effects  it  would  accomplish  ;  and  it 


184          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  IV. 

will  seek  to  bring  about  only  good  or  beneficent 
ends.  Hence,  'tis  plain,  that  True  Wisdom  is 
simply  Wisdom  in  combination  with  Goodness,  or 
it  is  the  Wisdom  of  a  Good  Being.  (Wisdom + 
Goodness  =  Wisdom  of  a  Good  Mind.)  Such 
Wisdom,  in  the  most  exalted  form,  is  handled 
above,  where  the  Wisdom  of  the  pre-eminently 
Good  One  is  treated  of.a 

§  9.  On  the  other  hand,  the  False  Wisdom  has 
regard  to  ends  of  a  totally  different  character.  It- 
seeks  to  accomplish  evil  effects.  It  is  the  wisdom 
of  the  wicked  mind  :  its  motives,  therefore,  are 
malevolent.  But  to  draw  out  this  subject  to  good 
purpose,  and,  by  doing  so,  to  illustrate  yet  farther 
the  distinction  itself  between  the  Good  Wisdom, 
and  the  Evil,  let  us  go  at  once  to  the  great  fountain- 
head  and  standard  of  our  language,  our  English 
Bible.  Whatever  on  this  subject  is  found  depicted 
plainly  therein,  may  be  taken  for  granted  as  being 
in  accordance  with  the  true  genius  of  our  tongue, 
if  not  in  perfect  consistence  also  with  good  usage. 
Of  course,  in  no  other  sense  is  the  Bible  referred  to 
here  as  an  authority. 

§  10.  Not  to  be  prolix,  a  single  passage  will 
serve  to  illustrate  the  distinction  in  question.  See 
the  General  Epistle  of  James  ;  the  Third  Chapter, 
from  the  13th  to  the  17th  verses  inclusive.  The 
section  begins  by  asking,  Who  is  a  wise  man  among 

a  Second  Demonstration. 


PROP.  I.J     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     185 

you  ?  taking  ivise,  perhaps,  in  the  strictest  sense. 
Then  the  improper,  the  false,  the  evil  Wisdom  is 
treated  of.  Afterwards,  the  proper  or  genuine,  the 
true,  the  beneficent  Wisdom  is  introduced.  In 
the  one  case,  as  well  as  in  the  other,  the  Epistle- 
writer  employs  the  term  a-otyla,  >}  cro(pla.  The  same 
sort  of  broad  distinction  is  to  be  met  with  in  many 
other  places  in  the  New  Testament.  But  it  will 
suffice  that  we  keep  by  the  one  place  in  the  Epistle 
of  James,  the  practical  Moralist  among  those 
writers. 

§  11.  The  passage  in  view,  then,  informs  us, 
that  there  is  a  Wisdom,  whose  origin  is  from 
beneath,  which  is  "earthly,  sensual,  (or  animal,} 
devilish,"  (or  demon-sprung;}  and  a  "Wisdom 
which  is  from  above,"  this  Heavenly  Wisdom  being 
"full  of  mercy,  and  good  fruits,"  or  benevolences. 
In  short,  the  one  Wisdom  is  cruel ;  the  other, 
altogether  beneficent. 

§  12.  From  which  it  appears  that  the  false 
AVisdom,  when  fully  developed,  is  cruel,  or  has 
cruel  ends  in  view  in  its  aims.  It  uses  the  means 
to  produce  cruelties.  While,  on  the  contrary,  the 
other  kind  of  Wisdom  is  essentially  beneficent :  it 
is  gentle,  and  full  of  mercy. 

§  13.  Hence,  the  improper  and  false  Wisdom  is 
the  wisdom  of  the  evil  mind,  and  the  proper  and 
true  Wisdom  is  the  wisdom  of  the  good-minded 
person.  But  whereas  Wisdom,  in  and  by  itself,  is 


186          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  IV. 

(as  we  have  seena)  nowise  concerned  with  ends, 
as  in  and  by  themselves,  or  is  indifferent  to 
ends  as  such,  whether  they  be  good  or  be 
evil ;  the  more  natural,  and  the  much  more 
common  way,  is  by  an  association  of  a  cer 
tain  kind.  Wisdom  and  Goodness,  conjoined  in 
the  closest  embrace,  act  together  in  unity,  and 
from  oneness.  But  why  is  such  conjunction 
natural  1 

§  14.  The  question,  and  the  answer,  will  bring 
before  us  a  circumstance  worthy  of  observation. 
When,  in  ordinary  speech,  Wisdom  simply  is  spoken 
of,  the  proper,  the  true,  the  good  Wisdom  only  is 
meant  to  be  understood.  The  reason  for  the 
phenomenon  must  be  sought  for  in  the  depths. 
The  phenomenon,  however,  must  have  a  sound 
reason,  how  profound  soever  it  be.  The  wisdom 
of  the  good  or  gracious  character  is  more  natural 
than  the  wisdom  of  the  cruel  character :  such  is 
the  phenomenon  of  which  the  cause  is  to  be  assigned, 
and  the  cause  of  so  remarkable  a  circumstance  is 
well  entitled  to  our  attention. 

§15.  The  reason  is  this;  Cruel  (  =  devilish) 
contrivances  (i.e.,  adaptations  of  means  to  ends) 
must  be  supposed  to  proceed  from  a  Malevolent 
Mind,  and  a  Malevolent  Spirit  is  itself  unnatural : 
it  is  in  Nature,  but  not  of  Nature.  Malevolence 
betokens  imperfection  within  its  own  sphere,  and 

a  Proleg.,  &  above,  §  7. 


PROP.  L]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     187 

such  imperfection  cannot  be,  or  be  properly 
considered  to  be,  truly  natural. 

§  16.  While,  on  the  other  hand,  benevolent 
contrivances  betoken  the  action  of  a  Loving  Spirit, 
and  this  is  ever  recognised  as  becoming  and  fit. 

O  O 

It  harmonizes  with  Nature,  as  she  truly  expresses 
herself.  In  Nature,  it  is  also  of  Nature  :  in  truth, 
a  very  grand  part  of  Nature  herself. 

§  17.  No  malevolence  can  be,  or  be  supposed  to 
be,  in  the  Supreme  Cause,  the  Cause  of  causes,  for 
this  very  reason,  that  Malevolence  implies  the 
unnatural,  and  the  imperfect.  And  to  bring 
together  the  idea  of  the  First  Cause  and  that  of 
Imperfection, — of  what  kind  soever,  or  degree 
soever,  it  matters  not, — were  to  associate  together 
things  which  are  in  irreconcilable  opposition.* 
Things  which  could  be  brought  together  only  to 
expose  their  irreconcilable  variance  and  antagon 
ism.  They  would  ny  asunder  with  an  immense 
rebound.  On  the  contrary,  all  benevolent  and 
worthy  consummations  have  their  origin  in  God 
the  Lord,  the  fount  of  all  creaturely  life  and 
blessings. 

§  18.  And  thus  it  has  come  about  that  Wisdom 
is  associated  by  us  with  the  Moral.  If  we  speak  of 
men,  Wisdom,  as  a  birth  of  the  Intellect  (even  as  a 
Minerva  is  feigned  to  have  sprung  from  the  brow 
of  Jove),  and  the  Emotional  or  Moral  part  of  our 

a  Div.  III.  Prop,  i.,  §  2,— &  Prop,  ii.,  Dem.  §  4. 


188          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

nature,    are    held    to    be    in    the    most    intimate 
connection  with  each  other. 


EPILEGOMEXON. 

From  all  that  has  been  advanced,  it  will  be 
evident,  that  Wisdom,  considered  as  an  Attribute 
of  The  Supreme,  belongs,  so  far,  to  the  Relative 
Attributes,  and  that,  moreover,  it  is  not  a  pure 
and  simple  Attribute,  but  forms  one  of  the  class 
of  Compound  Attributes — of  which  class,  Holiness 
(to  which  we  are  rapidly  advancing)  is  another, 
and  a  most  notable  instance.  We  have  seen  that 
there  are  more  elements  than  one  in  that  complex 
mode  of  mind  which  goes  by  the  name  of  Wisdom. 
It  is,  indeed,  abundantly  apparent,  that  Wisdom 
is  not  one  pure  and  simple  element,  in  what 
relation  soever  it  stands  to  Mind  generally. 


PROPOSITION  II. 

God,  the  Lord,  ivho  is  the   Wisest  of  Beings,  is, 
necessarily,  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity. 

PROLEGOMENA. 

§  1.  According  to  our  highest  standards  of 
English,  the  term  Holiness,  when  applied  to  the 
Supreme  Being,  has  two  meanings.  It  means, 
either,  entire  absolute  Moral  Purity ;  or,  the 


PROP.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     189 

Excellency  involved  in,  and  flowing  from,  the 
confluence  and  conjunction  of  all  the  Attributes. 
When  each  one  of  the  Attributes  is  conjoined  with 
the  rest,  and  the  whole  of  the  Attributes  or 
Excellencies  are  considered  as  an  assemblage  of 

o 

constituents  acting  together,  a  vision  of  Holiness, 
in  the  comprehensive  sense,  is  the  result.  The 
same  remark  is  applicable  to  the  cognate  words. 
Holy,  for  instance,  may  be  employed  in  one,  or 
other,  of  the  two  senses.  The  same  sort  of  remark 
might  be  extended  to  the  corresponding  words  in 
other  languages,  such  as  the  Hebrew,  representative 
of  the  Shemitic  class,  and  the  Greek,  as  repre 
senting  the  Japhetic,  or  Aryan,  class  of  languages. 
But  it  behoves  us  to  be  more  particular  with  the 
statement  of  the  distinction  of  the  meanings.  The 

O 

distinction  is  a  most  important  one,  and  carries 
great  things  in  its  train. 

§  2.  In  the  first  place,  then,  the  term  Holiness 
is  used  as  expressive  of  Moral  Purity,  or  the 
opposite  of  Moral  Impurity.  Hence,  Holiness  is 
moral  stainlessness,  spotlessness,  unsulliedness, 
immaculateness, — in  fine,  freedom  from  polluting 
taint  of  any  kind,  in  moral  respects.  And, 

§  3.  In  the  second  place,  Holiness  is  used  to 
express  the  combination  of  the  Excellencies,  even 
the  commingling  lustre  or  glory  of  all  the  Divine 
Attributes.  It  has  regard  to  the  union,  and  the 
result  of  the  union,  of  the  Divine  Attributes,— 


190          THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

especially  the  Intellectual  and  Moral  Attributes, 
but  emphatically  the  Moral  Attributes ;  and,  of 
the  Moral  Attributes,  it  regards  emphatically  the 
presence  of  the  Moral  Purity  of  our  Proposition. 

§  4.  It  is  only  with  the  former  of  the  two  mean 
ings,  that  we  have  to  do  as  under  this  Proposition. 
The  other  sense  will  fall  to  be  handled  in  a 
Proposition  devoted  to  itself. a  For  the  future, 
then,  Purity,  or  Moral  Purity,  shall  be,  almost 
exclusively,  employed  to  express  the  idea  proper 
to  this  place  ;  reserving  Holiness,  in  the  latter  of 
the  two  significations,  for  after  consideration. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  That  God,  the  Lord,  is  necessarily  of 
ineffable  Moral  Purity,  that  is,  cannot  possibly  be 
considered  as  being,  in  any,  even  the  least,  respect, 
Impure  Morally ;  shall  be  made  as  clear  as  any 
truth  can  be.  The  proof  lies  not  very  far  off,  and 
it  will  be  found  to  be  quite  irresistible. 

§  2.  The  reason  why  God,  the  Lord,  must  be 
conceived  of  as  Morally  Pure, — or  cannot  by 
possibility  be  conceived  of  as  being  otherwise, — is, 
because  'tis  most  plain  that  Moral  impureness 
signifies,  or  involves,  some  defect  or  imperfection. 
And  no  absurdity  could  be  greater  than  the  absurd 
ity  which  would  couple  the  idea  of  any  defect  or 

a  Succeed.  Prop. 


PROP.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     191 

imperfection  with  God,  the  Lord.*  What  defect 
or  imperfection,  of  any  kind,  or  degree,  can  there 
be  in  that  Being  who  is  the  subject  of  all  the 
predicates  in  our  preceding  Propositions  ?  The 
preceding  Demonstrations  must  all  be  taken  now 
for  granted.  What  imperfection,  then,  can  there 
be  in  the  One  Necessary  Being,  of  utmost  Sim 
plicity,  who,  being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  is  Intelligent  and  All-knowing,  All- 
powerful,  and  entirely  Free, — completely  Happy, 
and  perfectly  Good  ;  who,  in  addition,  is  neces 
sarily  True,  Faithful,  inflexibly  Just,  altogether 
Righteous,  and  most  Loving, — and  withal  of 
absolute  Wisdom  ?  To  attribute  any  imperfection 
to  such  a  Being,  were  to  utter  a  mere  contra 
dictious  impossibility. 

§  3.  Moreover,  a  stain  of  impurity  must  needs 
be  something  impressed  from  without,  or  brought 
about  from  within.  In  the  case  of  the  Lord  God, 
a  stain  would  involve  a  change  from  the  pre' exist 
ent  immaculate  cleanness, — inasmuch  as  foulness 
could  never  be  considered,  by  even  the  wildest 
flight  of  imagination,  to  be  the  original  condition 
of  the  subject  of  our  Proposition,  the  Being  to 
whom  so  many  excellencies  do  so  undeniably 
appertain.  The  foulness  must  needs  be  separable 
from  the  subject  of  inhesion. 

§  4.  Now,  a  stain  involving  a  change  from  the 

a  Vide  Gen.  Schol.  under  preced.  Prop.,  §  17. 


192  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

preexistent  immaculateness :  In  the  first  place, 
nothing  can  be  more  palpable  than  that  the  Being 
demonstrated  in  the  preceding  Propositions,  cannot 
be  subject  to  being  changed,  or  acted  on,  from 
without.  There  can,  indeed,  be  no  without  in 
reference  to  the  Substance  that  fills  Infinite  Space, 
or  is  the  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and  that 
inhabits  Eternity,  or  is  the  One  Being  of  Infinity 
of  Duration.  And  if  it  be  so  palpable  that  the 
Lord  God  cannot  be  acted  on  from  without,  much 
less  (to  speak  so)  can  He  be  subject  to  be  stained 
from  without,  or  by  any  object  or  cause  without 
Himself. 

§  5.  And,  in  the  second  place,  equally  clear  it  is, 
that  no  change,  from  a  preexistent  condition  of 
purity,  can  be  conceived  as  passing  upon  the  Lord 
God  from  within  Himself.  For  as  to  the  supposi 
tion  of  a  change  wrought  from  within  in  the  case 
under  contemplation — a  change  from  immaculate- 
ness  to  a  state  of  some  foulness  or  other, — such 
a  supposition  would  involve  as  great  an  impossi 
bility  as  can  be,  the  supposition,  to  wit,  of  an 
effect  without  there  being  any  possible  cause.  To 
assign,  as  the  cause  of  a  polluting  impurity,  the 
Immaculate,  and  the  absolutely  Pure,  were  simply 
to  present  an  incongruous  absurdity.  An  utterly 
impossible  and  contradictious  cause,  is  no  cause, 
and  something  more — even  a  heap  of  nonsensical 
words. 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       193 

§  6.  The  demonstration  is,  therefore,  complete 
and  perfect,  and,  accordingly,  we  say,  without 
hesitation,  that  it  has  been  irrefragably  proved, 
that  God,  the  Lord,  who  is  the  Wisest  of  Beings, 

O     * 

is  necessarily  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity. 

§  7.  God,  the  Lord,  then,  who  is  the  Wisest 
of  Beings,  is,  necessarily,  of  ineffable  Moral 
Purity. 

SCHOLIUM. 

THE  MORAL  PURITY,  WHAT  IT  FUNDAMENTALLY  INVOLVES, 
AND  REALLY  CONSISTS  IN. 

§  1.  The  demonstration  of  the  present  proposi 
tion  might  have  been  dispensed  with,  but  for  one 
circumstance.  In  demonstrating  the  inflexible 
Justice  of  God,a  it  was  demonstrated  that  the 
character  of  God  is,  with  respect  to  Justice, 
without  flaw.  The  Divine  Justice  is  perfect,  or 
altogether  pure.  And  so  of  the  rest  of  the  Moral 
Attributes.1'  We  demonstrated  the  Attributes  as 
the  necessary  Modes  of  the  One  Necessary 
Substance  :  which  is  just  snying,  in  other 
words,  that  the  perfection  of  each  Attribute,  or 
each  Attribute  in  perfection,  was  demonstrated. 
Nothing  more  could  be  righteously  required. 
Quite  superfluous,  to  prove  no  decadence,  no 
deterioration,  no  decay,  in  necessarily  existing 

a  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III.  >'  Vide  Div.  III.  Sub-Div.  ii. 

13 


194  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

Excellencies.  A  work  of  idle  supererogation  to 
evince,  that  Perfect  Attributes  are  Perfect. 

§  2.  A  circumstance,  however,  intervenes,  to 
prevent  us  from  arguing  in  such  a  manner.  One 
essential  element  in  Moral  Purity  has  not  as  yet 
been  touched  on  anywhere.  It  is  incumbent  on 
us,  therefore,  to  supply  the  desideratum,  and  to 
shew  how  indispensable  was  a  separate  demon 
stration  under  the  present  head. 

§  3.  In  opening  up  this  most  important  matter, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  take  a  more  than  ordinarily 
extensive  sweep.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that 
the  race  of  man  began  to  be.a  As  a  constituent  of 
the  universe,  there  was  a  time  when  the  race  was 
not,  since  the  whole  Material  Universe  itself  had 
an  absolute  commencement.13  Whatever  begins  to 
be  must  have  a  cause :  the  human  race,  therefore, 
had  a  Creator. 

§  4.  A  necessary  consequence  of  man's  having 
had  a  Creator,  is  very  weighty.  Speaking 
psychologically,  man  is  but  a  congeries  of  certain 
mental  powers  and  faculties.  From  which  un 
questionable  truth  it  is  righteously  deducible, 
that  each  one  of  the  original  powers  or  faculties 
of  the  human  mind  was  the  free  bestowment  of 
the  same  First  Cause. 

§  5.  To  every  distinct  faculty  or  quality,  and 
relative  perfection,  of  mind  possessed  congeni tally 

a  Schol.  under  Part  iii.  Div.  II.  b  Sub-Prop.  Part  ii.  Div.  I. 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       195 

by  man,  there  must  be  a  corresponding  Attribute, 
and  absolute  Perfection,  in  the  mind  of  the 
Creator,  the  Father  of  spirits :  Otherwise,  there 
would  be  in  the  creature  a  perfection,  without 
there  being  aught  answering  thereunto  in  the 
Creator.  There  would  be  a  distinct  quality  of 
mind  which,  with  its  subject  of  inhesion,  began  to 
be,  without,  however,  there  having  been  any 
cause  whatsoever.  An  arrant  absurdity.  In  fine, 
'tis  an  axiomatic  truth,  That  an  effect  cannot 
possess  any  original,  distinct  perfection,  which  is 
not  in  the  cause,  either  actually,  or  at  least  in  a 
higher  degree. a 

§  6.  Now,  'tis  unquestionable,  that  there  is  in 
man  the  feeling,  or  there  are  the  feelings,  which 
lead  to  marriage;  and  perhaps  we  shall  not 
greatly  err  if  we  give,  as  the  result  of  the  last 
analysis  of  that  feeling,  a  certain  disposition  for 
communion,  or,  a  disposition  for  a  certain  com 
munion,  to  end — by  means  of  thorough  unison— 
in  complete  union,  and  absolute  oneness.  The 
question,  thus,  arises,  Must  there,  therefore,  be,  in 
first  principles,  a  perfection,  in  man's  Creator,  the 
Great  First  Cause  of  all  things,  corresponding  to 
that  disposition  for  communion  ?  Indeed,  we 
shall  not  much  err  if  we  so  estimate,  and  so  use  in 
argumentation  the  cardinal  feeling  in  view. 

§  7.   That     the     feeling    indicated,    to    wit,    the 

:i  Vide,  supra,  §  4,  Dem.  Prop.  iii.  Div.  III. 


196  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

feeling  which  brings  together  individuals  of 
opposite  sexes,  strangers  hitherto,  for  life-long 
association,  is  a  fundamental  part  of  our  mental 
constitution ;  this  is  undeniable.  That,  moreover, 
the  feeling  is  a  distinct  part  of  our  nature,  admits 
of  as  little  doubt.  That  it  is  not  a  mere  imperfec 
tion,  but,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  true  (relative) 
perfection,  is,  also,  a  point  which  cannot  be  with 
propriety  contested.  Call  the  feeling  in  question 
2^assion,  if  you  will ;  still,  'tis  certain  and  indis 
putable,  that  the  feeling  does  really  exist  :  that 
it  is  a  radical  and  distinct  part  of  man's  nature, 
and  cannot  be  classed  among  the  mere  imperfections 
and  blemishes  of  our  mental  constitution.  All 
these  are,  indeed,  points  which  the  true  psycholo 
gist  will  readily  concede.  If  one,  through  any 
perverseness,  will  not  admit  that  genuine  conjugal 
love,  as  an  indispensable  mental  power  or  sus 
ceptibility  not  to  be  confounded  with  any  other, 
presents  the  most  heavenly  sight  to  be  seen  on 
earth,  being  too  a  most  blessed  thing  in  itself;  he  is 
bound  at  least  to  give  another  and  a  better  account 
of  the  facts  in  human  life  which  are  patent  to  all. 

§  8.  The  inference  unavoidably  deducible  from 
the  great  fact,  or  class  of  facts,  adverted  to,  is,  that 
in  the  Creator,  as  Father  of  minds  and  First  Cause, 
there  must  be  that  absolute  perfection,  which,  in 
first  principles,  corresponds  to  the  feeling  in 
question — call  it  instinct  or  passion,  or  by  what 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       197 
name  soever  vou  please.     To  deny  this  inference, 

*/  1  tf 

were  to  deny  the  Axiom  which  has  been  laid  down, 
and  founded  on a :  and  deny  the  axiom  in   view, 

and  then Nothing,  pure  Nothing,  might  be  the 

cause  of  Something,  yea,  of  all  Things. 

§  9.  But  if  a  true  marriage  is  a  most  beautiful 
and  blessed  thing,  there  is,  alas  !  a  reverse  side 
to  the  picture.  That  which,  in  happy  cases,  is 
developed  into  the  beatitude  of  conjugal  love,  is, 
in  unprincipled  or  ill-regulated  minds,  manifested 
in  the  hideous  shape  of  violent,  utterly  lawless 
passion.  Become  ungovernable,  the  perverted 
feeling — susceptible  as  it  is  of  so  great  variation- 
is  capable  of  the  most  dreadful  abuses.  And  just 
in  proportion  to  the  excellency  of  true  and  pure 
conjugal  love,  is  the  vileness  of  the  unbridled 
licentiousness,  and  demoralization,  displayed  in  the 
abandonment  of  fornication,  or  in  the  form  of 
hellish  rebelliousness  against  the  ordinances  of 
Heaven.  The  one  is  outward,  and  in  the  body ; 
the  other,  inward,  and  in  the  mind  :  But  both  are 
equally,  or  they  equally  involve,  unclean  adul 
teries. 

§  10.  And  as  God  the  Lord  is  the  Originator  of 
the  blessedness  of  conjugal  love,  so  He  is  utterly 
and  unalterably  opposed,  through  the  Perfect 
Purity  of  His  Nature,  to  that  abuse  to  which  we 
have  pointed.  If  He  be  the  cause  of  the  one  ;  so, 

a  TJi  supra,  %  ">,  cum  loc.  citat. 


198  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

with  reo-arcl  to  either  of  the  others,  there  cannot  be 

O 

anything  in  the  Divine  Mind  but  what  is  immut 
ably  opposed  to  it.  To  impurity  of  the  character 
indicated,  there  cannot  be  in  God  the  Lord  aught 
at  all  corresponding.  There  is  a  correspondence 
indeed — but  the  correspondence  is  only  productive 
of,  and  manifested  by,  the  most  determined  Con 
trast,  and  perpetually  warring  Opposition. 


§  11.  Thus,  Moral  Purity  makes  secret  allusion 
always  to  a  certain  species  of  contrasted  impurity. 
But  there  is  a  farther  and  more  profound  arcanum, 
well  worthy  of  the  deepest  contemplation. 

§  12.  Of  all  the  kinds  of  impurity  which  can 
defile  the  soul  of  man,  there  is  one  kind  which,  by 
emphasis,  has  received  the  name  of  "pollution." 
The  reason  of  this  will  take  us  at  once  among  the 
recesses  of  Nature's  most  hidden  secrets.  Tis  not 
of  sexual  impurity  that  we  are  now  to  treat,  but 
another  and  a  much  worse  sort  of  impurity  stands 
before  us  as  our  dread,  yet  uneschewable,  topic. 
Our  subject,  however,  is,  unnatural  sins  or  vices  in 
their  generic  aspect,  not  any  one  sin  or  vice 
specially.  Too  dreadful  a  task  would  be  involved 
in  the  painting,  in  true  colours,  of  any  single 
species  of  unnatural  depravity.  The  most  general 
allusions  must  suffice.  That  there  are  enormities 
so  hideous  that  they  cannot  be  so  much  as  named 
among  us,  tells  its  own  tale.  Nevertheless,  such 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AXD  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       199 

portentous  wickedness    is,    unquestionably,  to    be 
found  among  men. 

§  13.  But  at  this  point  attention  must  be  given 
to  a  truth  of  great  weight  in  order  to  the  clear 
elucidation  of  the  subject.  The  Lord  God  is  never 
to  be  conceived  of  by  us  as  existing  without  any 
and  all  respect  to  sex.  On  the  contrary,  He  is  to 
be  considered  all-sexual,  in  the  sense  that  He 
contains  within  Himself  the  first  principles  of  the 
perfections  of  both  sexes.  He  is  Male,  but  He 
is  not  merely  Male,  or  to  the  thorough  exclusion 
of  any  excellent  principle  serving  as  the  ground 
work  of  the  creation  of  the  Female.  Else,  how 
could  the  Lord  God  be,  as  He  i.s,  the  Creator  of 
the  human  race,  with  its  male  and  female  ?  The 
existence  of  the  woman  must  be  accounted  for 
somehow.  If  woman  began  to  be  as  a  distinct 
unit  created  at  first-hand,  or  without  creaturely 
mediation,  the  Lord  God  was  her  Creator,  and  a 
first  principle  correspondingly  must  be  supposed  in 
that  First  Cause.  If,  again,  woman,  being  a 
mediate  formation,  had  no  such  Creator,  then  she, 
as  an  individual,  came  into  (not  being,  but) 
separate  being  with  the  first  out-going  of  sinfulness 
in  man,  and,  as  separate,  was  but  an  imperfection 
appertaining  to  the  human  creature  as  such.  But 
whichever  hypothesis  be  adopted,  it  comes  to  the 
same  thin^.  as  the  thoughtful  student  will  not  be 
slow  to  understand.  The  human  race  is  essentially 


200  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

Male  and  Female ;  and  it  began  to  be :  so,  it- 
must  have  had  a  Creator.  And  the  Creator  of  the 
human  race  must  have,  in  first  principles,  the 
perfections  of  the  same. 

§  14.  So,  being  such  a  Creator,  the  Lord  God  is 
rightly  deemed  to  be  altogether  Holy  or  Pure,  in 
direct  contrast  with  every  immoral  human  being — 
no  matter  what  the  sex — giving  its  personality 
up  to  the  debasement,  and  untold  wickedness 
of  the  abominable  pollution  thus  shudderingly 
glanced  at. 

§  15.  Indeed,  it  requires  no  stretch  of  intellect 
to  perceive,  that,  if  the  Lord  God  is  rightly 
conceived  as  being  without  taint,  or  the  shadow  of 
taint,  in  respect  of  sexual  impurity, — as  being,  in 
that  respect,  the  altogether  Pure,  or  Holy  One  ; 
much  more,  must  He  be  considered  as  the  Holy 
One  in  opposition  to  the  worst  kind  of  human,  or, 
rather,  the  worse  than  human,  impurity  and 
depravity.  Sexual  impurities  are,  at  any  rate, 
sins  in  the  direction  of  nature,  and  not  worse  than 
gross  aggravations  and  coarse  and  vile  exaggerations 
of  natural  instincts,  and  tendencies  ;  while  sins  of 
uncleanness  against  nature,  are  sins  of  the  utmost 
possible  human  (and  only  less  than  diabolical) 
wickedness,  in  the  very  form  of  wickedness.  In 
truth,  the  opposition  between  the  Purity  of  the 
Holy  One,  and  the  impurity  of  an  abandoned  man, 
becomes  greater  as  the  impurity,  passing  from  one 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       201 

stage  to  another,  is  increased  by  reaching  to  a  yet 
more  monstrous  wickedness. 

§  16.  In  making  the  transition  from  sexual 
excesses  to  unnatural  vices,  and  the  opposite  to 
these  last  in  the  character  of  The  Supreme,  we  may 
deem  that  we  have  passed  to  the  region  of  the 
inner  ground  of  opposition.  Having  traced  this 
sort  of  impurity  to  its  deepest  point  in  interior 
wickedness,  we  are  necessarily  arrived  at  the  place 
where  the  abstractest  considerations  are  the  most 
apposite. 

§  17.  The  reason  of  the  enormous  heinousness 
which  attaches  to  this  unnatural  kind  of  wicked 
ness,  lies  just  in  this,  that  here  is  an  offence  which 
is,  formally  and  expressly,  a  sin  by  a  man  against 
himself,  and  his  own  nature,  as  such.  The  germ 
of  suicide  and  murder  is  here — murder  and  suicide 
at  once. 

§  18.  In  fine,  the  Lord  God,  considered  as  the 
most  Pure  Being,  must  be  set  in  opposition  to  that 
sort  of  uncleanness  most  of  all.  The  portentous 
sin — whatever  the  precise  guise  assumed — is  a 
crime  against  Nature.  While  all  other  sins  are, 
more  or  less,  in  the  direction  of  Nature  ;  this  one 
alone  sins  against  Nature — radically  against  Nature 
herself,  and  as  such.  But  (as  has  been  decisively 
demonstrated a)  God  is  the  source  and  fount  of 
Nature :  hence,  He  is  the  most  Natural  Being. 

a  Div.  II.  Parts  ii.  &  iii.,  &  Div.  III.  Prop,  i.,  Sub-Prop.,  Schol. 


202  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

The  nature  of  the  whole  of  the  other  is  but  an 
efflux,  and,  in  some  respects,  a  resemblance,  of 
His  Nature.  Consequently,  God  the  Lord  must  be 
conceived  of  as  being  removed — infinitely,  as  it 
were — from,  and  opposed  to,  the  very  appearance 
of  that  portent  among  evil  deeds. 

§  19.  The  doer  of  such  an  enormity  is  striving 
to  overturn  the  whole  course  of  nature.  The 
endeavour  is  but  a  beginning,  but,  in  point  of 
consistency,  there  is  really  the  germ  of  an  attempt 
to  obliterate,  with  nature,  its  Divine  Source.  All 
sin,  indeed,  lias,  for  its  inmost  essence,  a  principle 
of  hatred  to  the  very  existence  of  the  Lord  God, 
and  the  order*  of  nature  instituted  by  Him.  Sin 
would  overthrow  all.  But  some  sins,  more  than 
others,  aim  at  the  destruction  of  the  foundations 
of  things.  This  sin,  perhaps,  most  of  all  does  so, 
so  far  as  possible  to  the  human  sinner.  Every 
man,  therefore,  avoiding  the  very  appearance  of 
that  awful  evil,  should  reverence  himself,  the 
creature,  and  the  image,  of  the  Uncreated  One. 

§  20.  Emphatically,  then,  is  the  character  of  the 
Lord  God  set  against  that  sort  of  Impurity.  By 
reason  of  His  ineffable  Moral  Purity,  He  is 
opposed  to  that  sort  most  of  all. 

SUB-SCHOLIUM. 

Purity,  as  directly  opposed  to  such  impurity  as 
we  have  dared  to  glance  at,  can  (as  has  been  seen) 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEIXG  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       203 

be  rightly  ascribed  to  the  Divine  Mind  ;  and  there 
can  be  no  direct  opposition,  proceeding  from, 
contrast,  unless  there  be  certain  jwints  of  resem 
blance  between  the  two  sources  of  the  opposing  forces. 
This  may  be  a  profound  truth,  but  'tis  none  the 
less  true  because  of  the  profundity.  In  fact,  but 
for  abstract,  or  most  innerly  grounded  reasons,  it 
would  be  next  to  impossible  to  tell,  and  impossible 
to  tell  well,  why  the  Divine  Cause  of  all  things  is 
the  purest  morally.  The  doctrine  might,  no  doubt, 
be  propounded  without  any  strict  proof  being  an 
accompaniment  of  the  promulgation  ;  and,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Moral  Purity  of  the  Deity  has 
been  taught,  and  most  successfully  taught,  without 
any  but  the  most  obvious  reasons  being  assigned, 
so  far  as  anv  reasons  at  all  were  assigned  :  the 

*  O 

truth  being,  that  the  doctrine  was  greatly  rested 
on  the  argument  of  the  authority  of  the  Promul- 
gator.  But  the  argument  of  authority  being  of  no 
weight  with  us,  it  is  fortunate  that  we  are  enabled 
to  dispense  with  it.  Metaphysically,  it  is  quite 
proper  to  ascribe  to  the  Great  Supreme  that  which 
was,  in  point  of  fact,  applied  to  Him  by  the  most 
excellent  of  the  world's  judges,  the  Shemitic  seers 
who  caught  sight  of  Divine  truths  by  grand 
intuitions. — the  seers,  we  repeat,  among  the 
monotheistic  and  theological  people  of  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth.  The  Hebrew  Legislator  and 
all  the  Prophets  of  the  peculiar  people,  and  the 


204  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

Apostles  of  a  later  day,  the  Missionaries  to  all 
Adamic  peoples, — all  united  in  declaring  that  the 
Lord  God  is  the  thrice  Holy  One,  and  that  His 
very  soul  hateth  the  unnatural  sins  which  were 
openly,  and  at  all  times,  practised  by  the  Heathen 
on  every  side.  The  ancient  method  was  by  a 
patent  track,  while  our  reasons  are  profound  and 
even  occult :  but  both  procedures  are  good,  having 
their  foundations  in  the  nature  of  things. 


PROPOSITION  III. 

God,  the  Lord,  who  is  the  Wisest  of  Beings,  and  of 
ineffable  Moral  Purity,  is,  necessarily,  the 
Holiest  One. 

PROLEGOMENA. 

§  1.  In  entering  upon  the  consideration  of  a 
Proposition  which  forms  a  culminating  point  in 
our  progress,  a  recapitulation  of  matter  already 
advanced  will  be,  to  some  extent,  requisite. a  There 
may  be  even  enlargement,  in  some  directions,  on 
topics  formerly  touched.81 

§  2.  The  word  Holy,  and  the  cognate  Holiness, 
as  applicable  to  the  Divine  Being,  may  be  used  in 
the  one,  or  the  other,  of  two  great  senses.  1.  The 
word  may  be  employed  to  denote  Moral  immaculate- 
ness,  or  perfect  Purity  or  Pureness.  2.  It  may  be 

a  Proleg.  preced.  Prop. 


PROP.  III.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     205 

taken  as  standing  for  the  result  of  the  Excellencies  of 
the  Divine  Nature  being  united  in  a  commingling 
whole,  and  for  the  gloriousness  thence  arising. 
And  this  latter  is  the  sense  in  which  uniformly 
Holiness  is  to  be  understood  as  under  the  present 
Proposition.  In  truth,  the  meaning  affixed  here  to 
the  term  is  the  strict  and  proper  meaning  of  the 
same. 

§  3.  Yet,  although  such  the  true  import  of  the 
word,  one  thing  ought  never  to  be  lost  sight  of, 
namely,  that  the  Holiness  subsumed  by  this 
Proposition  denotes  the  excellency  of  God,  the 
Lord,  flowing  from  the  whole  of  His  Attributes, 
with,  however,  an  onphatic  weight  attached  always 
to  Pureness  Morally.  The  Holiness  regards  the 
union,  and  the  result  of  the  union,  of  the  Divine 
Attributes — especially,  the  Intellectual  and  Moral, 
but  emphatically  the  Moral  Attributes  ;  and,  of  the 
Moral  Attributes,  the  presence  of  the  Moral  Purity 
of  the  preceding  Proposition  is  imperatively 
postulated. 

§  4.  In  that  Proposition,  the  Holiness  of  The 
Supreme,  in  the  first  of  the  senses,  was  demon 
strated  :  and  our  business  now  is  to  prove,  in  a 
manner  equally  irrefragable,  the  Holiness  of  the 
Deity,  in  the  other,  and  more  strict  and  proper 
sense. 

§  5.  But  ere  we  advance  to  the  demonstration 
itself,  it  may  be  well  to  illustrate  the  two  differing 


206  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

meanings,  by  an  appeal  to  the  best  usage.  In 
both  the  preceding  Proposition,  and  above,  the 
distinction  has  been  formally  stated,  but  as  yet 
the  reader  has  had  no  opportunity  of  observing  the 
distinction  embodied  in  actual  examples.  It  is 
one  thing  to  state  the  distincton  between  the  two 
senses  in  an  abstract  manner,  and  it  is  another  to 
bring  out  the  distinction  in  a  more  concrete  sort 
of  way,  or  by  vivid  illustrations  drawn  from  the 
worthiest  sources.  It  shall  be  our  present  business, 
therefore,  to  illustrate  the  important  distinction  in 
question  by  a  reference  to  the  best  authorities 
known  to  the  student  of  the  English  language. 

§  6.  Now,  'tis  allowed,  by  all  competent  persons, 
that,  for  general  purposes,  we  have  no  better 
standard  of  English  than  our  Bible  in  the  vernacu 
lar.  But  farther,  and  more  particularly,  we  can 
apply  to  no  other  source  than  our  English  Bible, 
with  regard  to  a  large  class  of  words.  For  terms 
answering  to  a  number  of  Moral  and  Religious 
ideas,  no  other  course  than  an  appeal  to  the 
treasuries  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  is 
practicable.  We  might,  of  a  truth,  go  elsewhere, 
but  the  authorities  themselves  would  be  found  to 
have  drawn  from  those  very  sources  of  the  various 
books  of  the  two  Testaments,  as  their  oivn  fountain- 
head.  Where,  indeed,  shall  we  find  words  ade 
quately  expressive  of  the  awful  Purity,  and  the 
glorious  Holiness,  our  theme,  except  in  the  glowing 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     207 

descriptions  of  the  rapt  Hebrew  seers,  the  true 
prophets  for  all  times  ?  Let  the  fact  be  accounted 
for  how  it  may,  the  fact  is,  and  will  remain,  that 
we  have  no  other  repertory  at  all  suitable  to  go  to 
for  words  answering  to  our  grandest  Moral  and 
Religious  ideas  than  our  correspondents  to  the 
Testament  in  Hebrew,  and  the  Testament  in  Greek. 

§  7.  It  need  scarcely  be  said — or  rather  repeated, 
for  the  statement  has  been  made  once  and  again,— 
that,  in  this  demonstration,  the  argument  of 
authority  were  quite  out  of  place.  In  citing,  there 
fore,  passages  of  Sacred  Scripture,  no  purpose  but 
one  is  entertained,  the  citations  being  made  for  the 
sole  sake  of  illustrating — in,  however,  appropriate 
language — the  reality  of  the  distinction,  by  a 
display  of  the  two  true  meanings  of  our  term. 

§  8.  As  instances  of  the  use  of  the  term  in  the 
sense  of  Moral  Purity,  the  following  passages 
may  be  adduced  : — 

"Ye  shall  not  make  yourselves  abominable  with 
any  creeping  thing  that  creepeth,  neither  shall  ye 
make  yourselves  unclean  with  them,  that  ye  should 
be  defiled  thereby.  For  I  am  the  Lord  your  God 
[Jehovah  your  Elohim]  :  ye  shall  therefore  sanctify 
yourselves  [make  yourselves  holy],  and  ye  shall  be 
holy,  for  I  am  holy  ;  neither  shall  ye  defile  your 
selves  with  any  manner  of  creeping  thing  that 
creepeth  upon  the  earth.  For  I  am  the  Lord  that 
bringeth  you  up  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt,  to  be 


208  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

your  God  :  ye  shall  therefore  be  holy,  for  I  am 
holy." — Leviticus,  xi.  43,  44,  45. — "Give  not  that 
which  is  holy  unto  the  dogs,  neither  cast  ye  your 
pearls  before  swine,  lest  they  trample  them  under 
their  feet,  and  turn  again  and  rend  you." — 
Matthew,  vii.  6. — "  He  that  is  unjust,  let  him  be 
unjust  still :  and  he  which  is  filthy,  let  him  be 
filthy  still :  and  he  that  is  righteous,  let  him  be 
righteous  still :  and  he  that  is  holy,  let  him  be 
holy  still." — Revelation,  xxii.  11. 

§  9.  To  which  might  be  appended  many 
additional  felicitous  examples.  But  the  selection 
made  will  suffice  to  illustrate  the  meaning  of  holy, 
in  the  more  restricted  sense  of  the  word.  That 
ceremonial  physical  cleanness  was  but  the  outside 
emblem  of  Purity  within — even  of  that  Moral 
Purity  which  was  really  the  ultimate  end  of  the 
great  Lawgiver  of  the  Hebrews,  and  the  other 
penmen,  his  countrymen. 

§  10.  Advance  we  next  to  passages  which  have 
reference  to  Holy,  or  Holiness,  in  the  more 
comprehensive  of  the  two  senses.  The  following 
will  afford  illustrations  of  the  term  when  standing 
for  the  Excellency  necessitated  by  the  totality  of 
the  Divine  Attributes  :— 

"  There  is  none  holy  as  the  Lord  [Jehovah]  :  for 
there  is  none  beside  Thee  :  neither  is  there  any 
rock  like  our  God  [our  Elohim]."-— 1  Samuel,  ii. 
'2. — "  They  (the  fathers  of  our  flesh)  verily  for  a 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     209 

few  days  chastened  us  after  their  own  pleasure ; 
but  he  (God)  for  our  profit,  that  we  might  be 
partakers  of  his  holiness." — Hebrews,  xii.  10.— 
"  Who  shall  not  fear  thee,  0  Lord,  and  glorify  thy 
name  ?  for  thou  only  art  holy :  for  all  nations 
shall  come  and  worship  before  thee." — Revelation, 
xv.  4. 

§11.  Numerous  apt  exemplifications  of  the  same 
meaning  might  be  adduced.  No  place,  however,  is 
more  memorable  than  the  august  passage  in  the 
sublimest  of  prophets — the  sublimest,  perhaps,  of 
all  writers — where  are  described  the  effects,  upon 
the  most  excellent  Intelligences  of  our  universe,  as 
well  as  upon  the  seer  himself,  our  representative  in 
that  glorious  scene, — the  effects,  we  repeat,  of  the 
vision  of  the  unutterable  Holiness  of  the  Lord  of 
the  hosts  of  all  the  starry  continents.  "  I  saw  also 
the  Lord  sitting  upon  a  throne,  high  and  lifted  up, 
and  his  train  filled  the  temple.  Above  it  stood  the 
Seraphim  :  each  one  had  six  wings  ;  with  twain  he 
covered  his  face,  and  with  twain  he  covered  his 
feet,  and  with  twain  he  did  fly.  And  one  cried 
unto  another,  and  said,  Holy,  holy,  holy,  is  the 
Lord  of  hosts  :  the  whole  earth  is  full  of  his  glory. 
And  the  posts  of  the  door  moved  at  the  voice  of 
him  that  cried,  and  the  house  was  filled  with 
smoke.  Then  said  I,  "Woe  is  me  !  for  I  am 
undone  ;  because  I  am  a  man  of  unclean  lips,  and 

I  dwell  in  the  midst  of  a  people  of  unclean  lips : 
14 


210  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

for  mine  eyes  have  seen  the  king,  the  Lord  of 
hosts." — Isaiah,  vi.  1-5.  One  of  the  sublimest 
places  in  the  sublime  Apocalypse  is  founded  upon 
that  description.  "  And  the  four  living  creatures 
[£<Sa  =  the  four  representatives  of  the  created 
universe]  had  each  of  them  six  wings  about  him ; 
and  they  were  full  of  eyes  within :  and  they  rest 
not  day  and  night,  saying,  Holy,  holy,  holy,  Lord 
God  Almighty,  which  was,  and  is,  and  is  to  come." 
— Revelation,  iv.  8. 

§  12.  In  giving  a  lucid,  and,  at  same  time, 
vivid  and  fervid  idea  of  the  Attribute  or  Excellency 
under  consideration,  no  other  language  could 
approach  the  capacities  and  aptitudes  of  that 
language.  No  other  language  can  equal  in  force 
and  complete  suitableness  the  language  of  our  Book 
of  books  when  we  would  give  expression  to  the 
heights  of  Moral  and  Religious  ideas.  Without 
the  aid  in  question,  we  should  have  endeavoured 
in  vain  to  convey,  by  words,  any  true  idea  of  that 
Holiness  which  springs  from  the  concatenation  of 
Attributes,  each  one  of  which  is,  singly,  an 
Excellency  in  itself. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  That  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
parts,  is  a  position  equally  self-evident  as  this,  that 
the  ivhole  is  greater  than  its  part,  which  is  one  of 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     211 

the  preliminary  Axioms  of  the  Geometricians. 
And  it  will  be  seen,  that  the  Proposition  now  in 
hand  is  on  the  same  footing  of  indisputability  with 
those  positions. 

§  2.  For,  taking  Holy  in  the  sense  of  our 
Proposition,  that  is,  taking  Holiness  to  denote 
the  excellency  of  the  Lord  God  as  implied  by,  or 
flowing  from,  the  unition  of  the  whole  of  His 

o 

Attributes ;  there  is  needed  but  the  simplest 
application  of  the  doctrine,  The  whole  is  equal  to 
the  sum  of  the  parts.  Take  the  predicates  in  all 
the  preceding  Propositions,  and  unite  them  in  one 
predicate,  applying  this  to  the  same  subject  as 
that  which  appears  in  the  last  demonstrated 
Proposition  in  our  series  ;  and  you  have,  of  course, 
a  predicate,  or  whole,  expressive  of  what  is  equal 
to  the  sum  of  all  the  individual  predicates,  or 
parts. 

§  3.  Our  application  of  that  self-evident  doctrine, 
is,  indeed,  unassailable.  'Tis  quite  evident  (whether 
it  be  self-evident  or  no)  that  the  Being  to  whom 
must  be  attributed  each  one  of  the  Attributes,  or 
Excellencies,  as  these  have  been  educed  in  the 
foregoing  demonstrations,  must  be  in  possession  of 
that  greater,  or  (we  may  say)  absolute,  Excellence 
which  is  the  necessary  result  of  the  total  attri 
bution.  He  who  is  conform  to  each  predicate, 
one  after  the  other,  is,  at  the  same  time,  conform  to 
all  the  predicates  together.  Quite  palpably,  and  all 


212  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

undeniably,  is  this  so.  No  position  in  the  Mathe 
matics  is  more  certain. 

§  4.  Doubtless,  then,  Holiness  may  be  considered 
as  if  it  were  but  one  Attribute,  and  no  more ;  yet, 
none  the  less  true  is  it  that  the  Holiness  which 
expresses  the  universal  Excellence  of  God,  the 
Lord,  is  a  result,  and  the  resultant  of  all  the 
other  Qualities  or  Properties  of  the  Divine  Nature. 
The  prominence,  in  the  view,  of  the  attribute  in 
question,  as  one  attribute,  may  affect  the  whole 
vision  :  nevertheless,  the  attributes,  whose  unition 
yields  us  this  Holiness,  are  clearly  distinguishable 
from  the  glory  which  is  the  result  of  the  congeries 
in  union. 

§  5.  The  Lord  God  is  in  possession  of  so  many 
Attributes  each  one  of  which  is  an  Excellency  in 
itself:  Therefore,  He  is  in  possession  of  that  far 
greater  Excellency  which  is  the  result  of  the 
unition  of  all  the  individual  Attributes  or 
Excellencies.  This,  the  point  to  which  we  have 
reached,  is  a  most  certain  truth,  and  it  forms  the 
foundation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  one  great  Attri 
bute,  or  Super-Excellency  of  Holiness. 

§  6.  But  there  is  a  truth  beyond  that  to  which 
we  have  attained  hitherto.  The  ground  on  which 
we  have  been  standing  is  but  the  vestibule  of  a 
much  grander  temple  of  truth,  into  which  we  may, 
so  far,  enter.  In  the  region  beyond  our  present 
stand-point,  may  be  beheld,  in  a  far-off  way, 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     213 

indeed,  and  through  a  mitigating  medium,  a 
dazzling,  and,  ill  sooth,  blinding  glory,  which  far 
excelleth  that  which  is  the  pure  resultant  of  the 
totality  of  the  attributes,  or  individual  excellencies. 
That  which  is  glorious,  may  be  conceived  to 
have  no  glory,  by  reason  of  the  glory  which 
excelleth. 

§  7.  There  is  a  law  of  mind  to  which  very  little 
attention  has  ever  been  paid  :  a  grand  law  it  is, 
however  :  a  supreme  law  in  Intellectual  and  Moral 
matters — super-eminently  dominating  in  the  Moral 
region  of  Mind.  The  law  in  question  is  this,  that, 
with  regard  to  an  assemblage  of  mental  excellencies, 
the  position,  The  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
parts,  when  applied  to  the  Supreme  Mind,  gives 
place  to  this  other  and  higher  containing  law,  that 
from  the  whole,  or  all  the  assembled,  united  parts, 
there  results  an  Excellency  or  Glory  greater  far 
than  could  result  from,  or  can  be  expressed  by, 
the  mere  sum  of  the  parts,  or  the  imition  of  all 
the  individual  Attributes.  Given  the  unition, 
each  one  of  the  Excellencies  increases,  or  intensifies, 
the  action  of  each  one  and  all  of  the  others  :  so 
that  the  resultant  bears  no  (definite)  proportion 
to  the  pure  sum  of  all  the  Qualities  or  Properties 
of  the  Substrate. 

§  8.  For  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  law, 
you  may  take  a  survey  of  the  things  of  creation  : 
for,  the  law  of,  or  rather  to,  the  creature,  is 


214  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

directly  connected  with  the  fiat  of  the  Lawgiver. 
No  Law-giver,  no  law.  In  Man's  little  world,  we 
may  behold  images,  or  reflections  in  small,  of  that 
great  truth  ;  and,  in  this  direction,  any  one  may 
verify  the  law  to  what  extent  he  pleaseth.  Nay- 
leaving  behind  the  whole  Animal  Kingdom,  and 
betaking  ourselves,  at  once,  to  the  Inorganic 
portion  of  our  kosmos, — we  may  see,  if  we  use  our 
eyes  aright,  plentiful  evidence  of  the  prevalence  of 
the  same  law, — only  the  law  raised  there  to  a 
higher — reduced  here  to  a  lower  power.  Exempli 
gratid,  in  chemical  combinations  themselves,  we 
may  see  adumbrations  of  the  higher,  or  wider  law, 
which  holds  so  remarkably  in  Moral  matters,  or  in 
the  supreme  world  of  Mind. 

§  9.  Morally  speaking,  then,  a  confluence  of 
perfections,  say  the  confluence  of  the  Perfections 
of  the  Divine  Mind,  as  these  have  severally  been 
demonstrated, — the  confluence,  we  repeat,  and 
conjunction  of  Perfections  is  equal  to — not  the 
product  of  each  single  Attribute  added  to  the 
remainder :  but  the  conjunction  itself,  and  any 
mere  resultant  of  it,  is  surpassed  by  the  far  greater 
glory  which  expresses  the  effect  of  the  unition  of 
the  Excellencies,  as  each  individual  Excellency 
intensifies  the  action  of  every  other  one,  and  of 
all  the  rest.  Each  Attribute  increaseth  the  action 
of  every  other,  to  an  inexpressible  pitch  of  intensity. 
From  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  it  must  be  so. 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     215 

§  10.  Just  as  in  a  grand  display  of  musical 
harmony.  The  harmony  which  is  so  indescribably 
entrancing,  is  not  merely  the  amount  of  the 
different  volumes  of  sounds,  from  so  many  instru 
ments,  and  so  many  throats,  added  together— 
but  is  a  something  resulting  somehow  from  that 
union,  but  not  purely  co-incident  with  it.  So,  in 
a  beautiful  landscape,  or  painting  of  it,  the  felt 
beauty  is  not  merely  a  collection  of  so  many 
primary  colours,  and  shades  of  colours  of  all  kinds, 
with  their  various  blendings,  in  their  respective 
subjects  of  inhesion, — but  it  is  a  something, 
produced  by,  indeed,  yet  different  from,  and 
superadded  to,  the  assemblage  of  colours,  and 
shadings,  in  all  their  groupings. 

§  11.  Thus,  it  is  a  great  law  of  Mind,  that 
Moral  Perfections,  co-existing  harmoniously  in  the 
same  subject,  are  much  intensified.  AVhat,  then, 
must  be  the  glory  of  the  Divine  Perfections 
meeting  and  embracing  each  other — the  multi 
plicity  of  intensifying  and  intensified  Excellencies 
absorbed  in  the  wondrous  unity  ?  That  glory 
must  be  altogether  unapproachable  by  mortal  eye, 
or  human  conception.  No  created  mind  can  ever 
see  (save  through  the  veil)  that  vision,  and  live. 

§  12.  From  all  which,  it  is  manifestly  evident, 
that  God  the  Lord,  who  is  the  Wisest  of  Beings, 
and  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity,  is,  necessarily,  the 
Holiest  of  all. 


216           THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

§  13.  God  the  Lord,  then,  who  is  the  Wisest  of 
Beings,  and  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity,  is,  neces 
sarily,  the  Holiest  One. 

SCHOLIUM  I. 

THE  HOLINESS  AND  SIN  NOT  ABSOLUTELY  CONTRADICTORY 
CORRELATIVES. 

§  1.  What  chiefly  distinguishes  Holiness  as  an 
actual  existent  force  in  the  absolute  universe,  is  its 
contrariety  to  Sin,  and  (the  effect  of  the  con 
trariety)  opposition  thereto.  The  contrariety  in 
question  may  indeed  be  said  to  be  a  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  Holiness.  Yet  such  contrariety 
cannot  be  of  the  essence  of  the  attribute,  because 
Holiness,  as  result  of  all  the  other  necessary 
attributes,  is  inseparable  from  the  Divine  Nature,* 
and  Sin  appertains  to  but  the  temporal  region. 
That  cannot  be  essential  to  Holiness,  or  any 
fundamental  Attribute  of  God  the  Lord,  which 
had  its  beginning  in  Time,  and  which  is,  itself,  but 
departure  from,  and  violation  of,  the  Nature,  the 
Attributes,  the  Laws  of  God,  the  Lord,  which  last, 
again,  are  but  the  outside  expression  of  His  Nature. 
Unless,  therefore,  Sin  be  laid  down  as  necessary  to 
the  system  of  things ;  if,  in  other  words,  Sin  be 
but  accident,  or  incidental  to  the  essential  constitu 
tion  of  things  as  existing  absolutely  in  the 

a  Demonstration  above. 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     217 

universe  :  then  Sin,  as  reality,  cannot  stand  as 
indispensable  correlate  to  Holiness.  The  necessary 
Holiness  of  God  the  Lord,  and  Sin  as  accomplished 
fact  in  the  universe,  cannot  correlate  each  other. 

§  2.  The  actuality  of  the  contrariety  and  opposi 
tion  alluded  to,  together  with  the  reason  thereof, 
are  palpable  enough.  Holiness  is  the  excellency 
or  perfection  of  God  the  Lord,  resulting  from  the 
totality  of  His  Attributes.  Sin  denies  the 
perfection.  Not  only  does  Sin  go  contrary  to  the 
fact  of  the  Attributes,  and  the  resulting  Holiness : 
Sin  denies  virtually  the  true  excellence  of  the 
Holiness,  and,  with  it,  the  being  of  all  the 
Attributes.  It  may  even  be  said,  that  Sin  seeks 
to  eat  into  (so  to  speak)  and  destroy  the  very 
throne  of  the  Lord  God,  the  Holy  One.  For  Sin 
is  not  merely  an  inactive  passive  principle,  flowing 
from  a  pure  negation,  or  privation  :  since  Sin,  as 
concentrated  source  of  evil  in  the  universe,  is 
active  and  virulent,  and  most  virulent  in  its 
activity. 

§  3.  Though  Sin  be  not  the  correlate  to  Holi 
ness,  absolutely  speaking,  yet  'tis  true  that  Sin, 
being  viewed  as  mere  pure  potency,  stands  in 
unavoidable  antithesis  to,  if  not  in  never-ceasing 
conflict  with,  the  Holiness  of  the  Lord  God.  Yet 
the  Holiness,  as  necessary  result  of  the  necessary 
Attributes,  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  unceasing 
and  inevitable  antagonist  of  the  enemy,  Sin. 


218  THE  AEGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

Given  Sin,  given  ever  present  hatred  and  anta 
gonism  to  Holiness  :  Yet,  given  Holiness,  there 
does  not  necessarily  emerge  the  everlasting  opposi 
tion  to,  and  conflict  with,  the  temporal  inimical 
force.  The  one  is  necessarily  existing  :  not  so  the 
other.  Hence  the  necessity  of  not  losing  hold  of 
a  distinction  so  essential,  arid  withal  so  important. 

SCHOLIUM  II. 

THE  HOLINESS  AND  NEVER-CEASING  SIN  INCOMPATIBLE. 

§  1.  As  Goodness  and  Love  demand  the 
cessation,  at  some  point  in  duration,  of  misery, 
their  opposite  and  foil ; a  so  Holiness,  the  glorious- 
ness  of  the  Divine  Existence,  demands,  in  like 
manner,  the  cessation,  at  some  period,  of  sin, — 
demands  the  entire  and  ceaseless  cessation  of  all 
sin,  moral  defilement,  degradation,  degenerate 
disfigurement,  of  all  kinds. 

§  2.  Love  in  the  Lord  God,  and  misery  in  man, 
as  end  in  itself,  are  irreconcilable.  The  two  things, 
the  Love  of  the  Creator,  and  the  purposed  misery 
of  the  creature,  for  the  misery's  own  sake,  are 
absolutely,  and  most  clearly,  inconsistent  with  each 
other.  They  are  inimical  forces  which  by  no 
possibility  can  ever  coalesce  anywhere  in  the 
compass  of  wide  nature. a  But  not  more  are  Love 
and  Misery  incompatible,  than  are  Holiness  and 

a  Schol.  in.,  Prop,  iv.,  Div.  III. 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     219 

never-ceasing  Sin.  Not  more,  but  less — if  less  be 
possible  :  as  by  the  preceding  Scholium  has  been 
made  abundantly  apparent. 

§  3.  0  Love,  from  beginningless  sources ;  that 
suffereth  long,  and  is  kind — that  never  faileth  ;  0 
sempiternal  Love,  exhaustless,  Thou  hast  companion 
fit  in  that  Holiness,  which,  as  a  consuming  fire, 
struggles  to  consume  the  potency  first,  and,  last, 
the  very  being  of  Sin.  Sin,  ugly  and  deadly 
excrescence  upon  the  body  of  man's  world — that, 
as  a  malignant  cancer,  eats  away,  bit  by  bit,  the 
member  it  preys  upon — that,  as  a  loathsome 
leprosy,  gradually  but  too  surely  destroys  the  body 
it  disfigures,  and  disgraces ;  has,  for  only  possible 
issue,  entire  annihilation.  Sin,  devouring,  devour 
ing,  is  a  gigantic  parasite  which,  last  of  all,  does 
away  with  itself. 

SCHOLIUM  III. 

THE  NEGATIVE  MORAL  PURITY  AND  THE  POSITIVE  HOLINESS, 
IN  FUNDAMENTAL  AGREEMENT. 

§  1.  Having  considered  Holiness  in  its  two  fold 
character — as  perfect  Moral  Pureness,a  and  as 
universal  Mental  Perfectness  b — we  are  prepared  to 
weigh  the  relation  which  the  one  bears  to  the 
other.  Both  characteristics  are  expressed  by  the 
same  term,  but  it  has  been  seen  that  they  are 
distinguishable,  and  how  much  they  differ,  from 

a  Div.  IV.  Prop.  ii.  b  Div.  IV.  Prop.  iii. 


220  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

each  other.  Yet,  have  they,  in  reality,  a  funda 
mental  agreement  ?  Whatever  outside  appearances 
may  suggest,  are  those  two  things  in  radical 
consonance  ? 

§  2.  What,  if  we  perceive  good  reasons  for 
coming  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  Moral  Purity 
of  the  penultimate  Proposition,  and  the  universal 
Holiness  of  this  last  Proposition,  do  not,  after  all, 
differ  in  so  pronounced  a  manner  as  may  have 
been  suggested  by  a  cursory  examination  of  that 
precise  topic  ?  In  a  word,  it  is  our  task  in  this 
place  to  point  out  that  inner  agreement  which 
exists  between  the  two  things,  the  themes  in  those 
two  Propositions. 

§  3.  What,  then,  is  entire  absolute  Moral  purity  ? 
It  signifies,  that,  in  no  one  respect,  is  there  any, 
even  the  least,  spot  of  impurity.  What,  now, 
does  this  involve  ?  It  involves,  that,  after  a 
review  of  all  the  Attributes,  one  by  one,  each  one 
is  reported  to  be  void  of  the  slightest  taint.  So 
that,  in  such  respect,  the  presence  of  all  the  Attri 
butes  is  assumed,  and  a  judgment  is  pronounced, 
declaring  that  all  the  Attributes  are  perfect,  or 
altogether  pure ;  not  one  of  them  having  the 
faintest  shadow  of  defilement. 

§  4.  It  seems  to  follow,  that  the  proof  of 
Holiness,  in  this  sense  of  the  term,  may  rightly  be 
called  the  negative  proof. 

§  5.   What,  next,    is    Holiness,  in    the    compre- 


PROP.  III.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     221 

hensive  sense,  or  as  standing  for  the  totality 
of  the  Divine  Excellencies  ?  It  signifies  the 
presence  of  all  the  Attributes,  in  all  their  per 
fection.  It  involves  that  Super-Excellency,  or 
Excellent  Glory,  which  is  the  resultant  of  all 
the  individual  Excellencies  acting  in  harmonious 
unison,  and  intensifying  each  other  in  all-perfect 
harmony. 

§  6.  May  not  this  be  said  to  be  the  positive 
aspect  of  the  same  thing :  and  may  not  the  proof 
be  denominated  the  positive  proof,  as  contra 
distinguished  from  the  other  ? 

§  7.  Finally,  the  one  method  declares  :  All  the 
Attributes  being  surveyed,  one  by  one,  there  is  not 
the  slightest  taint  of  impurity  or  imperfection  in 
any  one  of  them  all.  The  other  declares  :  All  the 
Attributes,  in  all  their  perfections,  are  present, 
and  from  their  commingling,  and  intensifications, 
a  great  glory  is  the  necessary  result.  Glory, 
indeed,  so  dazzling,  as  to  be  insupportable  by 
mortal  eyes. 

EPILEGOMENA. 

§  1.  It  need  scarcely  be  observed,  that  the 
Attributes  of  this  Division  are,  as  a  whole,  to  be 
reckoned  as  belonging  to  the  great  Moral  group. 
The  same  Attributes,  too,  are  members  of  the  large 
Psychical  class.  But  the  enunciation  most  apposite 
to  this  place,  is,  that  the  setting  forth  of  the 


222  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  IV. 

distinctively   Complex    or     Compound    Attributes 
terminates  here. 

§  2.  The  next  Division  shall  carry  on,  and  shall 
also  close,  the  Attributes  of  the  Psychical  class. 
Yea,  as  the  handling  of  the  Transcendent  Excel 
lencies  shall  not  be,  and,  sooth  to  say,  cannot  be, 
without  reference  to  all  the  Attributes,  of  what 
kind  soever,  the  Division  in  question  shall  be  not 
only  the  fifth,  but  must  be  the  last  too. 


Div.  V.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     223 


DIVISION  V. 

THE  TRANSCENDENT  EXCELLENCIES. 
PROPOSITION  I. 

The  Lord  God,  who  is  the  Holiest  One,  is  neces 
sarily  the  Self -Beautiful,  and  the  All-Perfect 
Being. 

§  1.  Keeping  out  of  view,  distinctively,  the 
Natural  Modes,a  there  remain  the  Intellectual ,b  and 
the  Moral  Attributes,0  and  the  Attributes  which, 
being  compounded  of  the  others,  are  Complex.'1 
Now,  to  say  that  the  combined  Intellectual  and 
Moral  Attributes  are  not  Excellencies,  would  be 
radically  tantamount  to  saying  that  those  Attri 
butes  are  not  Attributes.  And  it  shall  be  our 
business  to  evince,  that  the  allegation  that  those 
Moral  Excellencies  are  not  Beautiful,  would  be  all 
one  with  saying,  that  those  Excellencies  are  not 
Excellencies  at  all.  Therefore  (supposing  the  proof 
to  be  eminently  satisfactory)  those  Intellectual  and 
Moral  Attributes  are  truly  Excellencies,  and  the 
Excellencies  are  Beautiful — the  Beautiful  Modes  of 
being  of  the  All-Beautiful  One  who  is  the  Sub- 

*  Div.  I.  '•  Div.  II.  «  Div.  III.  d  Div.  IV. 


224  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

stratum  of  them  all.  Such  is,  in  outline,  the 
course  to  be  pursued.  The  Moral  Excellencies 
will  be  seen  to  be  Beautiful,  each  individual 
Excellency  being  Beautiful.  And,  although  the 
Intellectual  Attributes  may  not  be  always  expressly 
mentioned,  it  is  yet  to  be  understood  that  the 
Moral  Excellencies  treated  of  are  ever  accompanied 
by  the  Intellectual  Attributes  as  the  inseparable 
attendants. 

§  2.  One  of  the  Axioms  on  which  this  demon 
stration  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  founded,  is,  Every 
position  which  ive  cannot  but  believe,  is  a  necessary 
truth.*1  That  proposition  which  men,  everywhere 
and  at  all  times,  must  believe, — or  which  is  neces 
sarily  believed  by  them, — is,  of  course,  a  necessary 
truth  to  them  :  And  what  is  a  necessary  truth  to 
men,  as  men,  is,  to  them,  a  necessary  truth 
absolutely.  Every  position,  then,  which  we  cannot 
but  believe,  is  a  necessary  truth.  But,  we  cannot 
but  believe  that  the  Moral  Excellencies  with  which 
we  are  concerned,  that  is,  the  Moral  Excellencies 
or  Attributes  demonstrated,  in  the  previous 
Propositions,  are  Beautiful  things,  yea,  the  most 
Beautiful  of  all  the  objects  of  thought.  Therefore, 
that  those  Moral  Excellencies  are  Beautiful,  is  a 
necessary  truth.  These  propositions  constitute  a 
valid  act  of  reasoning,  namely,  a  syllogism  of  the 
First  Figure,  and  in  the  First  Mood, — or,  they  are, 

a  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  §  1,  d  aliis  locis. 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     225 

at  least,  easily  reducible  to  such.  Thus,  we  have 
here  an  instance  of  legitimate  ratiocination. 

§  3.  The  second,  or  minor,  proposition,  namely, 
— We  cannot  but  believe  that  those  Moral  Excel 
lencies  are  Beautiful,  yea,  most  Beautiful,  is  the 
only  one  requiring,  or  admitting  of,  proof ;  and  the 
proof  shall  be  furnished  straightway.  In  fact,  the 
truth  of  the  proposition  is  easily  evinced,  as  the 
proposition  is  very  near  to  carrying  its  own 
evidence  along  with  itself. 

§  4.  As  to  that  proposition,  then,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  it  rests,  for  its  truth,  upon  the 
pronouncement  of  a  great  law  valid  universally. 
It  is  a  law  of  mind,  valid  universally,  that  Moral 
Excellencies,  in  general,  or  as  such,  are  Beautiful : 
yea,  that  Moral  Excellencies,  of  the  highest  degree, 
or  as  they  exist  in  the  Supreme  Mind,  are  the  most 
Beautiful  of  all  Beautiful  things.  In  particular,  it 
is  a  fixed,  unalterable  law  of  our  moral  nature  to 
be  convinced  that  Moral  Excellencies  generally, 
or  simply  as  being  so,  are  Beautiful  :  and  we  are 
compelled,  by  the  constitution  of  our  minds,  to 
pronounce  the  universality  of  the  law  ;  it  is  a  law 
applicable  to  all  Minds  without  exception.  In 
truth,  the  one  position  could  not  be  believed 
without  the  other.  The  one  implies  the  other. 
It  comes,  in  short,  to  this,  that  in  the  proposition 
which  we  are  handling — the  minor  of  the  syllogism 
— we  have  a  self-evident  proposition.  If  it  be  not 


226  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

intuitively  evident,  that  Moral  Excellencies  are 
Beautiful,  the  position  is  the  very  next  thing  to 
being  so. 

§  5.  Moral  Excellencies,  then,  are  Beautiful : 
and  the  Moral  Excellencies,  the  existence  of  which 
has  been  demonstrated  in  the  foregoing  Division, 
are  the  most  Beautiful  of  all.  Moral  Excellencies 
are  Beautiful,  by  virtue  of  a  law  of  mind,  which, 
as  a  first  principle,  or  necessary  truth,  Conscious 
ness  testifies ;  and  the  true  testimony  of  Con 
sciousness,  in  an  affiair  of  this  kind,  admits  of  no 
questioning.  There  can  be  no  appeal  from  the 
court  of  Consciousness,  in  a  matter  to  which  the 
judgment  of  the  court  is  fairly  applicable.  It  is, 
thus,  a  necessary  truth,  that  the  Moral  Excellencies, 
as  modes  of  being  of  the  great  Substrate  of  all 
being,  are  the  most  Beautiful  objects  of  thought 
in  the  mighty  universe  of  universal  mind. 

§  6.  Not,  indeed,  that  those  stupendously  perfect 
Moral  Excellencies  which  have  been  specially  under 
consideration, — nor  any  moral  Excellencies,  speak 
ing  in  a  general  way, — are  the  only  Beautiful 
things.  By  no  means.  Moral  Excellencies  are, 
of  a  truth,  Beautiful,  yea,  the  most  Beautiful  of 
all  things  :  but  they  are  not  the  only  beautiful 
things.  They  are  but  the  most  Beautiful  of 
beautiful  things.  Many  things — perhaps,  many 
classes  or  kinds  of  things — are  beautiful.  Some 
more  so  than  others.  Those,  most  of  all :  and,  of 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     227 

those  the  Moral  Excellencies  of  the  Being  of  beings 
most  of  all  again.  Who  could  doubt,  even  for  one 
moment,  whether  such  Attributes  or  Excellencies 
as  consummate  Happiness,  and  perfect  Goodness,— 
Trueness,  Faithfulness,  Righteousness  and  Justness, 
all  in  the  highest  degree,  and  essential  Lovingness, 
—together  with  absolute  Wisdom,  entire  Moral 
Purity,  and  universal  Holiness,  all  existing  neces 
sarily  and  indefectibly,  and  in  indissoluble  associa 
tion  with  each  other,  and  with  perfect  Intellectual 
Attributes,  to  say  nothing  of  the  inseparable 
Natural  Modes  of  being ; — who  could  doubt 
whether  such  Super-Excellent  Qualities  of  Mind 
be  most  Beautiful,  or  no  ?  One  might  as  soon 
doubt  whether  there  be  any  Beauty  at  all  :  and, 
in  truth,  the  one  doubting  would  be  almost 

7  O 

identical  with  the  other. 

§  7.  Unquestionably,  the  law  which  has  been 
referred  to  is  an  abiding  law  of  our  minds.  If 
there  be  sucli  a  thing  as  Beauty  in  the  absolute 
universe,  Beauty  is  to  be  found  associated  with— 
might  we  say,  identified  with  ( — Moral  Excellency, 
of  the  highest  or  intensest  possible  kind,  and 
which  is  itself  in  the  most  intimate  consociation 
with  Intellectual  Supremacy.  Moral  Excellencies 
are,  in  fact,  most  Beautiful  properties  of  Mind,— 
but  to  combine  them  in  thought  with  Intellectual 
Perfections  is  to  raise  them  to  the  highest  pitch 
of  possible  Beauty.  Such  union  would  be  com- 


228  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

parable  to  the  conjunction  of  The  True  and  The 
Good — or  that  of  Righteousness  (  =  Justice)  and 
Love  ( =  Mercy).  Indeed,  the  union  spoken  of 
would  be  almost,  if  not  quite,  tantamount  to  that 
conjunction.  The  latter  is  little  else  than  a  more 
generalized  expression  for  the  former.  If  absolute 
Righteousness,  and  Lovingness,  and  Purity,  and 
universal  Holiness  be  not  Beautiful, — there  is  no 
Beauty  in  the  universe.  If  there  exist  anywhere 
Beauty,  those  Qualities  or  Perfections  are  Beautiful 
— yea,  most  Beautiful. 

§  8.  What  has  been  delivered  is  the  exposition 
of  a  grand  law  of  things, — a  necessary  truth  in 
relation  to  the  world  of  Mind.  We  cannot  but 
believe  that  Moral  Excellencies,  or  Perfections,  are 
most  Beautiful  in  themselves,  and  every  position 
'which  we  cannot  but  believe,  is  a  necessary  truth. 

§  9.  We  may,  then,  conclude — for  it  has  been 
clearly  evinced — that  The  Lord  God  is  most 
Beautiful ;  and,  being  of  Infinity  of  Duration,  or 
unoriginated,  He  is  necessarily  the  Self-Beautiful. 

§  10.  But  'tis  possible  that  every  proposition 
which  the  wit  of  man  ever  pronounced  may  be 
denied,  and  we  shall  suppose  that  our  more 
general  position,  Moral  Excellencies  are  Beautiful, 
(involving  as  it  does  the  more  particular  one,  The 
Moral  Excellencies,  par  excellence,  are  most 
Beautiful,)  is  denied — denied  by  some  person  or 
other,  by  some  one  individual,  or  class  of  men.  It 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     229 

is  denied,  then,  that  moral  excellencies  are  beautiful ; 
and,  indeed,  every  position  which  men  could  adopt, 
men  can  reject :  Ay,  men  can  most  easily  reject 
any  position,  if  the  utmost  perversity  be  no 
appreciable  hindrance  in  the  way  of  the  rejection. 
Few,  in  truth,  are  the  propositions  which  have 
never  been  called  in  question  anywhere. 

§  11.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  our  position  is 
actually  called  in  question,  by  a  doubter  or  caviller. 
Let  us,  moreover,  put  the  matter  of  the  doubt  in 
the  most  formidable  way  conceivable. 

§  1 2.  Suppose,  therefore,  that  a  sceptic,  animated 
(if  you  like)  by  materialistic  tendencies,  affirms 
that  it  is  not  true  that,  generally  speaking,  Moral 
Excellencies  are  Beautiful.  Beauty  is,  quoth  our 
dogmatising  sceptic,  not  a  possible  predicate  of  the 
subject,  Moral  Qualities.  The  term  is  highly 
inapplicable  here.  Beauty  is  a  word  which  ought 
to  be  confined  to  the  objects  of  our  senses — the 
sense  of  sight  in  particular.  In  fact,  beautiful  is 
predicable  of  only  the  things  of  time  and  sense,  if, 
indeed,  the  term  be  applicable  to  any  object  which 
is  not  an  object  of  sight.  Something  to  be  seen  by 
the  ei/e :  such  is  the  proper  indispensable  condition 
of  being  beautiful. 

§  13.  It  must  be  granted,  that  this  objection  is 
a  wide  one.  It  goes  very  far,  or  sinks  very  deep. 
According  to  it,  no  character,  as  an  assemblage  of 
moral  properties,  existing  in  even  the  highest 


230  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

degree  of  perfectness  in  any  mind,  is  or  can  be 
beautiful.  Beauty  may  be  in  this  landscape,  or  in 
that ;  but  beauty  can  by  no  means  be  in  the  mind, 
or  any  way  predicable  of  the  mind,  of  the  beholder 
of  the  landscape.  The  beauty  is  solely  an  outward 
quality ;  it  exists  in  the  landscape  beheld  :  it  is 
nowise  dependent  on  the  mind  beholding  the 
collection  of  (primary,  and  secondary  ?)  qualities. 

§  14.  Thus,  the  most  admirable  and  loveable 
character  ever  existent  on  earth,  or  delineated  by 
the  pen  of  man,  or  imagined  in  the  heart  of  man, 
is—  —not  beautiful.  The  best  moral  character 
istics  ever  united  in  any  mind  have  no  form  or 
comeliness :  there  is  no  beauty  there.  The 
objection,  in  one  regard,  is  an  old  one  :  it  is  as 
ancient  as  nearly  two  millenniums  can  make  it  to 
be. 

§  15.  Let  it  not  be  imagined,  for  a  single  instant, 
that  an  intention  of  denying  the  force  of  the 
objection  is  entertained.  On  the  contrary,  the 
intention  is  to  grant  it,  and  found  upon  it.  The 
objection,  in  all  the  truth  and  force  it  may  have, 
shall  be  admitted  for  the  purpose  of  turning  it  to 
account  by  making  it  the  source  and  the  vehicle  of 
an  additional  argument — an  argument  of  the  very 
best  description,  because  an  argument  furnished 
by  opponents  themselves.  It  shall  be  shown,  that, 
on  the  theory  of  this  objection  being  true,  the 
Lord  God  will  be  the  Self-Beautiful.  The  objection 


PROP.  I.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     231 

itself  will  evince,  that  the  Lord  God  is  the  most 
Beautiful  of  all. 

§  16.  As  often  as,  in  these  latter  portions  of  our 
demonstration,  we  speak  of  taking  any  survey  of 
the  things  of  and  in  our  kosmos,  creation,  as  fact, 
is  the  postulate.  That  which  was  proved,  in  the 
earlier  Divisions,a  is  to  be  taken  for  granted  at 
present.  The  material  universe  itself,  and  every 
succession  of  objects  in  it — in  particular,  the  race 
of  man, — each  and  all  of  these,  being  finite  in 
duration,  began  to  be.a  Having  begun  sometime 
to  be,  they  were  caused,  and  the  Cause,  or  Creator, 
was  the  One  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion  and  of 
Duration, a  the  great  Substrate.  These  positions, 
all  proved  in  formerly  occurring  places,  are  postu 
lates  now.  Creation,  then,  the  creation  of  all 
things,  is  our  postulate  here.  In  possession  of  such 
postulate,  it  is  quite  legitimate,  and  in  perfect 
accordance  with  the  best  method,b  to  appeal  to 
universal  nature  as  the  work  of  its  Creator  and 
Fashioner,  and  Preserver,  whose  Laws, — which, 
rightly  understood,  are  an  outward  expression  of 
His  Character,  which  again  results  from  His 
Nature,c — regulate  the  entire  kosmos,  and  every 
department  of  it.  The  Laws  of  Nature  are  simply 
the  exponents,  being  the  consequence,  of  His  Will. 

a  Viz.  Div.  I.  Part  ii.,  &  Div.  II.  Part  ii.,  &c. 

h  Confer,  ut  supra,  Div.  III.  Prop.  iii.  Dem.  §§  2-5  inclusive. 

c  Vide  Div.  III.  Prop,  iii.,  Schol.  Sub-Schol.  II.  §  1. 


232  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

The  Laws  of  Nature  are  but  the  Creator's  Will  in 
continuous  or  sustained  action. 

§  17.  The  postulate  in  question,  as  our  premiss, 
is  now  to  be  made  use  of,  or  applied  to  the  point 
in  hand.  The  conclusion  from  the  permiss  but 
remains  to  be  drawn.  That  conclusion,  however, 
is  by  no  means  difficult  to  be  perceived.  In  sooth, 
it  cannot  fail  to  be  palpably  discerned. 

§18.  Our  world,  the  world  on  which  we  stand, 
as  the  theatre  of  our  varied  preceptions,  contains 
many  fair  landscapes,  one  landscape  differing  from 
another  landscape  in  beauty.  But  the  world  itself, 
and  all  that  it  contains,  are  the  workmanship  of 
the  great  Being,  even  the  Lord  God,  who  was  the 
contriver,  the  maker,  the  fashioner,  of  every  beauti 
ful  object  in  every  beautiful  scene.  But,  as  the 
cause  must  (from  the  necessity  of  the  case)  possess, 
cither  actually,  or  in  a  higher  degree,  every 
excellency  which  the  effect  displays  ;  so,  the  Creator 
of  all  the  diversified  beauties  of  nature  must  Himself 
possess,  in  greater  perfection  too,  the  very  beauties 
which  His  own  creation  unfolds  to  the  admiring 
vision  of  His  representative  on  earth.  That  man, 
the  image  in  little,  perceives  the  beautiful,  were  of 
itself  sufficient  evidence  that  the  grand  Exemplar 
has  Beauty. 

§  19.  Therefore, — if  (as  the  objector  affirms) 
beauty  be  discoverable  in  only  outward  scenes,  and 
the  objects  of  sight, — these,  as  effects  of  the 


PHOP.  I.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     233 

contrivance  and  skill  of  the  mighty  Workman, 
shew  forth  the  beauty  which  is  in  the  mind  of 
Him  whose  hand  formed  all  these  things.  He  who 
produced  all  beautiful  things  is  Himself,  the  source 
of  them,  the  Beautiful  Being.  That  the  Author  of 
all  Beautiful  things  should  Himself  be  destitute  of 
Beauty,  were  a  position  incredible,  impossible,  most 
monstrously  absurd.  The  Author  of  the  beautiful 
in  nature  must  be  Beautiful  in  Himself. 

§  20.  And  adding  to  the  ground  thus  gained,  by 
legitimate  conquest,  the  former  lawful  possessions, 
we  do  attain,  once  more,  to  the  vision  of  the  Lord 
God,  the  Beautiful  One,  even  the  Self-Beautiful. 

§21.  This  is  He  who  is  the  Good  in  itself,  the 
True  in  itself,  the  Beautiful  in  itself.  This  is  the 
altogether  Good,  and  True,  and  Lovely.  In 
Himself.  First  Good,  First  True,  First  Fair. 

§  '2'2.  But  having  fallen  upon  a  certain  track,  let 
us  pursue  it,  taking  heed  whither  it  may  conduct 
us.  We  have  been  led  to  see  (and  indeed  to  say) 
that  the  Supreme  Mind  is  All-Beautiful,  because 
the  cause  must  be,  in  due  order,  more  perfect 
than  the  effect.  In  truth,  the  Mind  which  is  over 
all,  because  the  Creator  and  Sustainer  of  all,  must, 
in  respect  of  Beauty,  be  All- Perfect. 

$  23.  But,  in  the  same  way,  or  for  precisely 
the  same  reason,  that  Supreme  Mind  must  be 
Perfect  in  all  other  regards  too.  The  same  reason 


234  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

which  shews  the  Lord  God,  the  Supreme  Mind, 
to  be  sovereign  in  Beauty,  shews  the  same  Mind 
of  minds  to  be  Perfect  in  all  other  excellent 
respects.  The  Perfection  of  Beauty,  the  Lord  God 
is  the  All-Perfect. 

§  24.  But,  indeed,  a  very  short,  and  direct  a 
priori  route  to  the  position,  that  the  Lord  God  is 
All-perfect,  yea,  the  All-perfect  One,  was  always 
open  to  us.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  that  the 
Lord  God  is  the  Most  Holy  One,  as  the  possessor 
of  all  the  individual  Attributes  which  had  been 
exhibited  in  succession. a  Now,  because  so  uni 
versally  Holy,  the  Lord  God  must,  therefore, 
be  the  All-perfect  One.  Each  single  Attribute 
is  an  Excellency — which  is  another  way  of 
stating,  that  each  Attribute  or  Excellency  is  a 
Perfection :  and  the  totality  of  the  Perfections 
constitutes  All-perfectness.  Tantamount  to  All- 
perfectness  are  the  Perfections  in  union  and  com 
munion. 

§  25.  Nevertheless,  something  was  yet  lacking. 
The  enumeration  of  the  Attributes  leading  to  the 

O 

demonstration  of  Holiness  might  have  been 
incomplete.  Some  property  or  quality  of  mind, 
worthy  of  being  ascribed  to  the  Mind  of  minds, 
might  have  been  omitted :  as,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
quality,  or  perfection,  of  Beautifulness  was  omitted, 
from  the  list  of  Attributes  separately  demonstrated ; 

a  Div.  IV.  Prop.  iii. 


PROP.  L]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     235 

and,  as  a  matter  of  course,  it  appeared  as  no  item 
in  the  demonstration  relating  to  the  conjunction 
of  Excellencies  entering  into  the  universal  Holiness. 
Whereas,  the  All-perfectness  now  under  notice  as 
a  predicate,  is  intended  to  comprehend  under  it 
every  Excellency  of  Mind,  of  possible  existence, 
which  is  not  (as  well  as  which  is)  already  compre 
hended  among  the  Attributes  in  any  way  demon 
strated. 

§  26.  The  particular  demonstration  now  in  view 
will,  therefore,  be  of  this  character,  or  to  this 
effect  : — The  Lord  God  is  the  Most  Holy  One,  as 
the  subject  in  which  so  many  Excellencies  as  were 
severally  specially  demonstrated  do  exist  or  reside. 
And  being  the  Most  Holy  One,  in  that  universal 
sense,  He  must  be  also  in  possession  of  all 
other  mental  or  spiritual  Excellencies,  if  other 
there  be.  He  who,  being  over  all,  is  Perfect  as  to 
so  many  Attributes,  must  be  likewise  Perfect  as  to 
all  other  Attributes,  if  others  there  be.  Perfect 
in  those,  He  must  be  Perfect  in  the  rest,  if  they 
exist.  The  Holiest  One  must  be  Perfect  in 
all  mental  Excellencies  :  Otherwise,  an  utter 
incongruity  would  be  introduced  into  the  Divine 
Economy,  and  the  Godhead  would  enclose  incon 
sistent  constituents.  And  to  suppose  any  such 
incongruity,  or  inconsistency,  would  be  to  entertain 
the  most  extravagant  absurdity. 

§  '27.  By     reason     whereof,    it     is     true     that 


236  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR      [Div.  V. 

Sublimity,  and  many  other  Excellencies,  or  modi 
fications  of  Excellencies,  are  predicable  of  The 
Mind  of  minds.  The  Self-Beautiful,  He  must  be 
also  The  Sublime,  or,  in  other  words,  the  super 
eminently  High  and  Lofty  One. 

§  28.  Therefore,  it  is  evinced  that  the  Lord  God, 
as  the  Holiest  One,  is  the  All-Perfect  Being.  And 
it  was  before  demonstrated,  that  He  is  the  Self- 
Beautiful.8'  And  so  we  shall  formulate  our 
conclusion  accordingly. 

§  29.  So,  the  Lord  God,  who  is  the  Holiest  One, 
is,  necessarily,  the  Self -Beautiful,  and  the  All- 
Perfect  Being. 

SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  What  Beauty  is,  or  consists  in?  Whether 
it  resides  in  the  object  viewed,  of  whatever  nature 
be  the  object,  when  the  object  is  called  beautiful, 
or  in  the  mind  beholding  the  beautiful  object? 
Holding  that  Beauty  is  limited  to  created  things, 
Whether  beauty  be  an  external  quality  of  the 
material  object,  or  a  purely  internal  feeling  of  the 
percipient  ?  Or,  partly  the  one,  and  partly  the 
other — that  is,  a  mixture  of  both  ?  All  these,  and 
many  more  like  questions,  have  been  discussed, 
each  side,  in  every  case,  having  had  its  devoted 
supporters. 

§  2.   In  like  manner,  Beauty  has  been  used  in  a 

*  Supra,  §§  9,  20. 


PROP.  I.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     23r 

very  wide  sense,  and  it  has  also  been  employed  in 
a  very  narrow  sense  of  the  term. 

§  3.  But  it  would  appear,  that,  in  whatever  else 
the  various  patrons  and  advocates  of  the  several 
opinions  might  differ,  they  all  agree  in  one  thing, 
that,  to  wit,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  Beauty,  and 
that  it  is  perceivable.  Wherever  it  resides,  and 
whatever  it,  in  itself,  be, — there  is  yet  the 
beautiful,  and  beautiful  things  may  be  beheld. 

§  4.  From  the  preceding,  it  would  seem  that,  if 
possible,  it  is  yet  not  easy,  to  define  beauty,  or  to 
tell  precisely  in  what  its  essence  consists.  Is, 
then,  the  question,  What  is  Beauty  in  itself?  or, 
what  is  the  Self-beautiful  ?  an  insoluble  question  ? 
A  question  interesting  as  having  been  raised  so 
pointedly  by  one  of  the  majestic  master-minds  of 
the  world,  the  great  poet-philosopher  of  all 
antiquity.  Shall  men  never  be  able  to  do  more 
than  tell  what  things  are  beautiful  ?  or  explain 
certain  circumstances  about  the  beautiful  things  ? 
To  demand  a  strict  logical  definition  of  Beauty,  or 
The  Beautiful,  may  be,  after  all,  equal  to  the 
demand,  addressed  to  the  faculty  or  power  in  us 
which  apprehends  Beauty,  to  be  answerable,  for 
the  function  of  the  power,  to  the  dialectical  and 
linguistical  faculties.  And  to  translate  its  function 
into  their  language,  may  be  a  request  totally  and 
absolutely  inadmissible. 

§  5.   We    have     unquestionably,    a    power,    or 


238  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

powers,  of  some  kind,  by  which  we  apprehend 
Beauty :  We  may  possibly  not  have  ability  to 
describe,  in  or  by  means  of  words,  what  Beauty  in 
itself  is,  or  in  what  the  Self-beautiful  consists. 
Not  everything  is  susceptible  of  being  denned,  or 
described,  by  sound  significant,  or  by  any  language 
of  any  sort — save  that  which  appertains,  as  a 
specialty,  to  the  faculty  which  apprehends.  The 
truly  beautiful  is  understood  by  a  peculiar  power 
or  susceptibility,  or  province  of  susceptibilities,  of 
the  mind ;  but  it  cannot,  perhaps,  be  transmuted 
into  so  many  terms,  the  product  of  other,  and  quite 
dissimilar,  mental  powers.  Some  things  are  too 
simple,  or  too  peculiar,  to  be  capable  of  being 
denoted  by  more  words  than  one.  Beauty  is,  or 
may  be,  one  of  those  things. 

§  6.  Nevertheless,  it  does  appear  to  be  the 
case,  that  an  approach,  at  least,  to  the  solution  of 
the  question,  What  is  the  Self-Beautiful  ?  has 
really  been  made  in  the  foregoing  demonstration. 
Even  supposing  Moral  Excellency,  as  existing  in 
the  Mind  over  all  minds,  be  not  a  pure  synonym, 
or  an  exact  equipollent,  for  The  Beautiful  in  itself, 
—the  former  words  do  yet,  at  any  rate,  come  very 
near  to  being  equivalents  for  the  latter.  The 
Moral  Excellency  of  the  Lord  God,  is  the  Self- 
Beautiful  ;  and  the  Beautiful  in  Itself,  is  the  Moral 
Excellency  of  the  Supreme  :  this  is  true,  or,  at  all 
events,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  shew  it 


PROP.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     239 

to  be  untrue.  And  from  those  equivalent  positions, 
many  derivative  truths,  of  great  pith  and  moment, 
do  follow.  As  to  which  it  would  be  exceedingly 
advantageous  to  treat,  in  due  time  and  place. 

PROPOSITION  II. 

The  Lord  God,  ivho  is  the  Self -Beautiful,  and 
the  All-Perfect  Being,  is  necessarily  the  Ever- 
Blessed  One. 

PROLEGOMENA. 

§  1.  As  an  affair  of  language,  the  word  Blessed 
ness,  when  applied  to  the  Supreme  Spirit,  has  two 
meanings,  in  the  one  or  the  other  of  which  it  may 
be  taken.  First,  it  may  denote  consummate 
Happiness;  and,  secondly,  it  may  stand  for 
consummate  Well-thought-of -ness,  or  Wc/t-xpoken- 
of-ness.  Exempli  gratia,  in  certain  writings,  we 
read  of  "the  blessed  God,"  and  "the  blessed  and 
only  Potentate,"  where  the  word  blessed  occurs  in 
the  sense  of  the  happy  God,  or  Potentate.  In  other 
places,  we  meet  with  the  word  in  the  other  sense, 
and  "the  blessed,"  or  "ever  blessed  God,"  is 
another  way  of  expressing,  God  who  ought  to  be 
ever  well  thought  of,  and  well  spoken  of.  In 
Greek,  the  two  meanings  have  two  terms  to  express 
them.  Blessed,  in  the  sense  of  Happy,  is  denoted 
by  MaK(ipio9,  or,  as  applied  to  the  Great  Supreme, 
'O  M«KU|0/o?.  While  blessed,  in  the  other  sense, 


240  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  Y. 

that,  namely,  of  being  well  thought  of,  is  Ei/Ao^-roV, 
or,  'O  EJAo'y^To?. 

§  2.  Xow,  these  two  meanings,  though  covered 
by  one  and  the  same  English  word,  express  things 
not  only  distinguishable,  but  very  different  from 
each  other :  as  different  from  each  other  as  the 
two  words  would  have  appeared  and  been  to  a 
Hellenic  Grecian. 

§  3.  The  same  discrimination  in  things,  leading 
to  the  same  distinction  of  words,  is  to  be  seen 
elsewhere.  For  instance,  the  same  distinction  in 
terms  is  to  be  found  in  the  Hebrew  language.  A 
Hebrew,  or  Jew,  said,  in  accordance  with  the 
genius  of  his  speech,  Blessed  is  the  man,  when  he 
ascribed,  or  wished  for,  happiness,  or  fortunateness, 
to  the  man,  or  wished,  for  him,  that  the  blessedness 
would  be  preserved  and  continue  :  the  Jew  using 
the  term  Ashrey,  •oqJN.  The  Jew  would  never 
think  of  saying,  Blessed  be  God  (Elohim),  or  the 
Lord  (Jehovah),  using  the  word  Ashrey.  He  would 
assuredly  employ,  in  this  case,  a  different  word.  He 
would  say,  Blessed  be  the  Lord  God,  using  Baruch 
(TFTQ)-  Of  course,  the  latter  word  is  used  indiffer 
ently  of  the  Creator,  and  the  creature  :  because  the 
creature,  as  well  as  the  Creator,  may  lawfully  be 
the  object  of  good  wishes,  or  laudations.  The 
question  is  not  whether  both  words  may  be  applied 
to  the  creature,  but  whether  they  may  both  be 
applied  to  the  Creator ;  or,  if  both  may  be  applied 


PROP.  II.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     241 

to  the  Creator,  whether  both  be  applicable  in  the 
same  way. 

§  4.  CWld  any  thing  point  out  more  aptly  than 
does  the  circumstance  to  which  our  attention  has 
been  directed,  that  these  ancient  languages,  the 
Hebrew  and  the  Greek,  are  the  providential  (witli 
your  leave  !)  or  the  true — i.e.,  fit  and  proper- 
theological  languages  ?  That,  while  we  possess 
only  one  word  in  our  English  tongue  to  express 
such  very  different  ideas,  as  the  words  "ntTN  (0 
the  happiness !)  and  T^na  (Blessed  bo !)  do 
respectively  denote,  eacli  of  those  languages  had 
two  words  to  carry  the  two  so  differing  meanings  ; 
is  a  circumstance  well  calculated  to  make  us  pause, 
and  meditate  on  the  reasons,  no  less  than  on  the 
fitnesses,  of  things. 

§  5.  Modern  Anthropologists  have  investigated 
many  subjects.  But  the  relations  of  peoples,  and 
their  languages,  to  their  uses  on  the  world-wide 
theatre,  would  be  one  of  the  most  advantageous 
considerations  which  could  enter  into  the  matter 
of  Anthropological  Science,  or,  at  any  rate,  the 
studies  of  Anthropologists. 

§  6.  In  a  previous  part  of  this  demonstration, 
the  complete  Happiness  of  the  Infinite  Being  was 
demonstrated, a  and  we  are  come  now  to  the  place 
where  shall  be  demonstrated  the  Blessedness  of 
the  Lord  God  in  the  other  sense,  the  sense,  to 

a  Div.  III.  Prop.  i.  §  4.      Vide,  etiam,  Prop.  iii.  Schol.  n.  §  13. 
16 


242  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

wit,    of   necessary  and    consummate    well-thought- 
of -ness. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

§  1.  One  difference,  which  strikes  the  very  key 
note  of  the  distinction  betwixt  the  two  meanings 
of  the  term  Blessed  in  English,  and  the  two  words 
corresponding  thereto  in  Greek  and  Hebrew,  is, 
that  we  can  with  propriety  say,  May  the  Lord  God 
be  blessed,  or,  Blessed  for  ever  be  His  Name  ;  while 
we  could  not  say,  without  the  grossest  impropriety, 
May  He  (continue  to)  be  happy.  That  is,  we  dare 
not  employ  the  word  blessed  in  this  latter  sense. 
The  expression,  May  the  Supreme  be  happy  for 
ever,  would  convey  that  we,  His  creatures,  could 
be  in  some  way  witnesses,  or  at  least  expectants,  of 
an  increase  (by  continuance)  of  the  Happiness  of 
the  Great  Being ;  while,  indeed,  that  Happiness 
admits  not  of  the  possibility  of  any  increase,  as  it 
is  capable  of  no  diminution,  the  Happiness  being 
as  necessary  as  the  very  Being  itself.  In  fine,  it 
is,  and  will  always  be,  man's  duty  to  say,  May 
He  who  is  over  all  be  blessed  (eJAoy^ro'?.)  But  it 
would  be  a  near  approach  to  blasphemy  to  express 
a  wish,  or  to  wish,  for  a  continuance  or  an  increase 
of  that  Happiness  which  is  essential  to  the  Deity. 
An  approach  to  blasphemy  would  certainly  be  made 
by  applying  to  the  Divine  Being  the  term  blessed 
in  the  sense  of,  Be  thou  happy. 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.    243 

§  2.  Such  being  the  state  of  the  case,  the  road 
to  the  manifestation  of  the  truth  of  our  Proposi 
tion  lies  quite  patent.  Can  any  ons  doubt,  if  it 
were  but  for  a  moment,  that  the  Being  to  whom 
we  must  ascribe  all  the  previously  expressed 
Attributes,  Excellencies,  Perfections,  ought  to  be 
well  thought  of,  and  well  spoken  of?  Can  the 
Infinite  Being,  who  is  necessarily  All-Knowing, 
All-Powerful,  entirely  Free, — completely  Happy, 
perfectly  Good, — True,  Faithful,  Just  and 
Righteous,  All-Loving,  each  of  these  predicates 
being  taken  in  the  widest  sense, — the  Wisest  of 
Beings,  of  ineffable  Moral  Purity,  and  the  Holiest 
One, — who  is  also  the  Self-Beautiful,  yea,  the  All- 
Perfect  Being  ; — can  that  Being  be  otherwise  than 
well  thought  of?  Well  thought  of,  if  we  think  of 
things  as  they  are,  and  should,  and  must,  be,  and 
not  as  they  are  not,  and  cannot  be  ?  Unless, 
indeed,  we  be  false  ourselves,  it  is  impossible  the 
affair  could  be  otherwise.  Only  a  person  whose 
faculties,  and  whole  powers  of  mind,  are  in  a 
condition  of  mental  disorder — utter  moral  wreck, 
and  ruin,  and  confounded  chaos  where  all  is  equally 
dire  confusion, — only  such  could  withhold  the 
tribute  of  his  best  thoughts  as  due  to  the  Supreme, 
or  ascribe  to  Him  any  (even  implied)  evil  or  imper 
fection,  by  wish  of  heart,  or  thought  of  mind. 

§  3.  As  their  bounden  duty,  men  ought  to  give 
praise  and  glorification  to  Him  who  is  over  all, 


244  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

who  made  them,  and  sustains  them  in  beinsj.  with 

*  O7 

all  the  blessings — present  and  prospective — of  their 
being.  To  wish  any  addition  of  Happiness  to  such 
a  One,  would  be,  at  bottom,  to  look  at  things  as 
they  are  not,  and  deny  to  that  Supreme  the  posses 
sion  of  that  which  is  His  inalienably.  His,  by 
actual  possession  and  by  right,  from  the  very 
necessity  of  the  thing.  How  much  more,  therefore, 
would  any  denial,  in  a  worse  form,  be  intolerable, 
since  even  the  wish  of  an  addition  to  the  Essential 
Happiness  would  be  so  flaringly  and  flagrantly 
wrong,  and  in  opposition  to  the  eternal  fitnesses  of 
things  ? 

§  4.  So  very  evident,  indeed,  is  the  truth  and 
propriety  of  the  predicate  in  our  Proposition,  that 
it  is  extremely  difficult  to  keep  from  a  certain  air 
of  sermonizing  in  delivering  the  media  of  our 
thesis.  Topics  so  plain  are  apt  to  look  like  mere 
platitudes.  That  the  All-Perfect  Being  is  worthy 
of  all  praise,  and  honour,  and  glory — not  only 
from  us,  but  from  all  creatures  gifted  with 
Intellectual  and  Moral  properties  themselves  ;  is  as 
clear  a  truth  as  can  be  entertained  by  us.  Only 
minds  in  a  state  of  perversion,  and  hideous  collapse, 
that  can  see  things  (not  as  they  are,  but)  as  they 
are  not,  could  refuse  to  ascribe  glory  to  their 
Maker,  could  decline  to  say,  Blessed  be  He  ! 

§  5.  But  'tis  of  little  use  discussing  what  a 
perverted  mind  can  be  or  do.  For  certain  it  is 


PROP.  II.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     245 

that  every  Moral  Intelligence,  as  such,  must  say, 
and  be  always  ready  to  say,  Blessed  be  God  the 
Lord  !  Yea,  most  true  is  it,  that,  as  the  question 
concerns  the  innate  propriety  and  truth  of  things 
themselves,  we  may  pronounce  unhesitatingly  that 
'tis  a  necessary  supposition  that  the  Mind  of  minds 
must  attribute  to  Itself  Ever  Blessedness.  How 
could  it  be  otherwise  ?  As  long  as  Moral  Excel 
lencies,  closed  up  in  All-Perfectness,  be  as  they 
are,  so  long  must  a  corresponding  absolutely 
universal  Glorification — a,  Be  Ever  Blessed  ! — be 
due  to,  and  not  to  be  withheld  from,  the  Being  of 
beings,  the  All-Perfect. 

§  G.  One  element  remains,  and  the  truth  to  be 
pointed  to,  if  not  unfolded,  is  one  which  is  true  of 
created  minds,  as  well  as  it  is  true  of  the  Uncreated 
Mind,  the  ground  and  direct  fount  of  all  other 
Intelligence.  Blessedness  is  beyond  Happiness, 
even  Happiness  the  greatest  that  can  be.  The 
former  is  more  interior,  more  profound, — and  also 
more  extensive  and  comprehensive, — than  the 
latter.  Happiness,  if  itself  a  strictly  Moral  (in 
contradistinction  from  an  Intellectual)  Attribute, 
does  not  at  least  include,  or  involve,  by  any 
necessity  of  ideas,  the  remainder  of  the  Moral 
Attributes.  But  the  Blessedness  involves,  and 
distinctly  and  directly  includes  them  all.  Hence 
the  Blessedness  is,  in  truth,  a  Transcendent 
Attribute,  being  super-eminently  above  the  Happi- 


246  THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [Div.  V. 

ness,  the  existence  of  which  was  demonstrated  as 
constituting  the  step  intermediate  between  the 
Intellectual  and  Absolute,  and  the  Moral  and 
Relative  Modes  of  Being.  In  fine,  the  Blessedness 
contains  within  it  the  Happiness,  and  the  former 
exceeds  and  excels  and  supremely  transcends  the 
latter  ;  even  as  the  mightiest  of  constellations  may 
be  imagined  to  surpass  in  magnificence  the  real 
glory  of  a  single  brilliant  star  in  that  vast  and 
most  glorious  assemblage  of  stars  of  all  magnitudes. 
Only  by  virtue  of  the  isolation,  the  individual  star 
is  a  tiny  object.  A  multitude  of  stars,  no  one 
greater  than  it,  raises  the  host  unto  the  dignity 
of  a  constellation,  with  its  incalculable  proportions. 

§  7.  Therefore,  in  the  affirmation,  that  the  Lord 
God,  who  is  the  Self-Beautiful,  and  the  All-Perfect 
Being,  is  necessarily  the  Ever-Blessed  One ;  there 
is  a  most  true  and  righteous  alliance  between  the 
subject  and  the  predicate :  and  we  cannot  but 
conclude  accordingly. 

§  8.  And,  thus,  the  Lord  God,  who  is  the  Self- 
Beautiful,  and  the  All-Perfect  Being,  is,  necessarily, 
the  Ever  Blessed  One. 


GEN.SCHOL.]   THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.   247 


THE  GENERAL  SCHOLIUM. 

§  1.  From  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  matter, 
be  it  much  or  little,  which  has  been  gone  over 
elsewhere,  will  fall  to  be  introduced  in  this  place ; 
and  the  student  ought  to  be  prepared  rather  for 
the  application  of  truths  advanced  already,  than 
for  the  appearance  of  considerations  fresh  in  every 
point  of  view. 

§  2.  As  this  concluding  Scholium  shall  be  partly, 
and  indeed  mainly,  occupied  with  an  application 
of  the  positions  advanced  and  proved  in  the 
different  Propositions  of  our  discourse  ;  so,  it  will 
be  extremely  proper  to  begin  with  a  survey  of  the 
various  positions  themselves,  these  being  now  all 
held  as  so  many  established  points.  The  survey 
shall  be  made  to  be  as  short  as  possible — an 
epitome,  in  sooth,  as  succinct  as  shall  be  compatible 
with  clearness. 

§  3.  We  shall  exhibit,  then,  a  summary  of  the 
truths  established  in  the  foregoing  demonstration, 
holding  them  all  as  being  beyond  the  reach  of 
question  ;  and,  afterwards,  it  shall  be  our  business 
to  make  a  certain  application  of  the  truths  held  as 
demonstrated. 


248     THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

§4. 
SUMMARY  OF  POSITIONS  IN  THE  DEMONSTRATION. 

(1.)  There  is  necessarily  existent  One  most 
Simple  Being  of  Infinity  of  Extension  or  Expansion, 
and  Infinity  of  Duration. a 

(2.)  And  Matter,  under  any  aspect  of  it,  is  not 
that  Being.  On  the  contrary,  Matter  has  inherent 
qualities  and  capabilities,  inseparable  from  it,  which 
are  inconsistent  with  the  idea,  and  the  actual 
possibility,  of  its  being  other  than  finite  in 
extension  and  finite  in  duration. b  Thus,  it  began 
sometime  to  be. 

(3.)  The  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion,  and 
Duration,  is  a  Spirit,  that  is,  an  Infinite  Spirit : c 
which,  being  so,  is  everywhere,  and  of  absolute 
immensity.  Therefore,  It  penetrates  all  matter, 
and  every  existence  of  whatever  kind,  in  the  most 
intimate  manner/1 

(4.)  Advancing  to  the  Intellectual  Attributes,  it 
is  seen  that  the  Infinite  Spirit  is  All-Knowing  ;c 
and  It  knoweth,  therefore,  every  thing  in  every 
point  in  the  universe  of  matter,  or  of  the  pure 
space  beyond  the  same.f  It  also  knoweth  every 
thing  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  time ;  yea, 

a  Div.  I.     b  Div.  I.  Part  i.  Sub-Prop.,  &  Part  ii.  Sub-Prop. 
c  Div.  I.  Part  i.  Sub-Schol.,  &  Part  iii.  Prop.  in.  Schol. 
ll  Div.  I.  Part  i.  Gen.  Schol.  and  Sub-Schol. 
0  Div.  II.  Part  i.  f  Div.  I.  Parti.  Sub-Prop.  Dem.  §  6. 


SUMMARY.]    THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.     249 

everything  in  the  duration  itself  beyond  or  before 
the  world,  or  ere  the  material  universe  was,  falls 
within  the  range  of  the  knowledge  of  that  Infinite 
Spirit* 

(5.)  It  is  also  Ail-Powerful, — able  to  do  all 
possible  things,  or  every  thing  involving  no  internal 
inconsistency  :  no  contradiction,  impossibility,  or 
absurdity.15 

(6.)  The  Infinite  Spirit  is,  moreover,  entirely 
Free  :  It  is  the  Free  Spirit,  being  Free  in  the  truest 
sense  of  the  term.  Being  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
power,  or  influence  in  any  way,  of  aught  outward, 
extraneous,  or  foreign  to  Itself  in  any  possible 
respect,  It  is  truly  Free.  Being  alone,  in  such 
regards,  It  is  The  Free  Spirit.0 

It  behoves  the  contained  to  be,  if  co-eval  with, 
not  more  ancient  than  the  continent.  The  whole 
Material  Universe  having  had  a  beginning  :  Man, 
therefore,  had  an  absolute  commencement ;  and  of 
the  race  of  man  the  Being  in  question  is  the  most 
Free  Creator.'1 

(7.)  The  Infinite  Spirit  is  possessed  not  merely 
of  the  Intellectual  Attributes:0  It  possesses  the 
strictly  Moral  Attributes  likewise/  First  of  all,  It 
is  completely,  or  supremely,  Happy.  It  is  of 
essential  Happiness  :  Happy  in  Itself,  and  by  and 
for  Itself.* 

a  Div.  II.  Tart  i.  Dem.  g  4.       '•  Div.  II.  Part  ii.       c  Div.  II.  Part  iii. 
«l /6irf.  Schol.       «  Div.  II.       *  Div.  III.      s  Div.  III.  Prop.  i. 


250    THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

(8.)  Being  essentially  Happy,  the  Infinite  Spirit 
is  also  perfectly  Good.  It  is  Good  contemplatively, 
or  passively  :  and  Good  actively,  and  with  regard 
to  Its  creatures,  especially  the  Intellectual  and 
Moral  creatures,  formed  after  the  pattern  of  Itself, 
the  Exemplar,  or,  in  Its  own  image  and  likeness.* 

(9.)  The  Infinite  Spirit,  or  God,b  is  now  to  be 
regarded  as  in  relation  to  Hisc  moral  intelligent 
creatures.  God,  therefore,  is  the  True,d  and  the 
Faithful.0 

(10.)  He  is,  moreover,  of  inflexible  Justice  in 
His  actings  and  dealings  with  his  creatures/  And, 
ascending  to  the  fount  of  Justice  itself,  He  is  the 

o 

altogether  Righteous.5 

(11.)  God  is,  also,  the  All-Loving,  yea,  Love 
itself.11  And  being  so,  suffering  and  misery,  on 
the  part  of  His  creatures,  are  doomed  to  final 
extinction,  extinction  total  and  everlastingly.1 

(12.)  The  simple,  or  uncompounded,  Attributes 
being  exhausted,  the  complex  Attributes  enter  the 
field  of  vision.  And  under  this  head,  it  is  made 
apparent  that  God,  the  Lord,j  is  the  Wisest  of 
Beings. k 

a  Div.  1,11.  Prop.  i.  Sub-Prop.,  &  Schol. 

b  Div.  Ill  Sub-Div.  ii.  Schol.  Prsepos.  I. 

c  Ibid.  Schol.  Prsepos.  n.  h  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv. 

(1  Div.  III.  Prop.  ii.  i  Ibid.  Schol.  HI. 

c  Div.  III.  Coroll.  from  Prop.  ii.  i  Div.  IV.  Schol.  Prsepos. 

'  Div.  III.  Prop.  iii.  k  Div.  IV.  Prop.  i. 

£  Coroll,  from  same. 


APPLICATION.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.  251 

(13.)  He  is,  moreover,  of  ineffable  Moral 
Purity.* 

(14.)  And  God  the  Lord  is  also  the  Holiest 
One.b  Before  whom,  as  the  All-Holy,  sin  cannot 
persistently  exist  through  all  the  ages  of  ages.0 

(15.)  Finally,  a  transition  to  the  Transcendent 
Excellencies  being  effected,  the  Lord  God,  the  All- 
Holy,  is  the  Self-Beautiful,  and  the  All-Perfect 
Being.d 

(16.)  And  being  so,  He  is  the  Ever-Blessed 
One.e 

And  blessed  be  His  Name,  for  ever  and  ever ! 
Amen. 

§  5.  After  the  preceding  brief,  yet  perhaps  ex 
haustive  Summary,  the  reader  will  be  prepared  for 
the  observations  which  shall  be  advanced  in  the 
way  of  application  of  the  same. 

§6. 

APPLICATION  OF  THE  SUMMARY  OF  POSITIONS  IN  THE 
DEMONSTRATION. 

(a.)  There  is  a  Being  of  Infinity  of  Expansion 
and  Duration,  and  this  Being  is  Immaterial.  Now, 
this  Immaterial  Substance  and  Mind,  this  thinking 
Spirit,  penetrates  intimately  all  things.  It  per 
meates  me,  since  nought  is  exccpted. 

a  Div.  IV.  Prop.  ii.  a  Div.  V.  Prop.  i. 

b  Div.  IV.  Prop.  iii.  u  Div.  V.  Prop.  ii. 

c  Div.  IV.  Prop.  iii.  Schol.  ir. 


252    THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

(fr.)  In  truth,  this  Infinite  Spirit,  being  every 
where,  and  of  true  immensity,  passes  through,  most 
intimately  permeating,  all  matter,  and  every  thing. 
It  passes  through  me — my  body,  my  soul,  my 
spirit.  I  do  not  see  It ;  nor  touch  It :  but  It 
touches  me,  and  perceives  me  better  than  I  do 
myself.  It  knows  all  my  thoughts  :  there  is  never 
a  thought  in  my  heart  but  It  knows  it  altogether. 

(c.)  The  Infinite  Spirit  created  all  things.  The 
worlds  were  framed  by  Its  Word — for,  there  was 
no  created  medium,  nor  any  other  possible  medium, 
before  creation  was,  except  the  Word,  or  Fiat,  of 
the  Infinite  Substance  itself.  The  things  which 
are  seen,  were  not  made  of  phenomenal  visibles. 
That  Infinite  Spirit,  therefore,  is  the  cause  of  my 
being ;  and  on  It  I  do  continually  depend  for  my 
existence. 

(d.)  All-Knowing,  the  Infinite  One  knows  all 
my  thoughts,  yea,  understands  them  afar  off. 
This  Being,  who  so  understands  me,  doth  also 
love  me,  since  He  preserves  me  from  day  to  day. 
He  sustains  my  life,  and,  in  fact,  I  am  dependent 
on  Him  in  every  breath  I  draw,  and  for  all  my 
blessings.  I  could  not  be  more  dependent, 
physically,  or  naturally,  than  I  am.  He  wills,  and 
I  live,  and  live  on :  And  He  has  but  to  will, 
and  I  should  return  to  absolute  nothingness, — 
being  utterly  ignored  and  forgotten  thenceforth  as 
a  living  existence  by  every  mind  in  the  universe. 


APPLICATION.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.  253 

Yea,  the  Spirit  on  whom  all  things  depend  has 
only  not  to  will — has  only  to  cease  to  will — my 
continued  existence,  and  my  being  would  be  as  if 
it  had  never  been. 

(e.)  Being  thus  so  wholly  dependent,  what 
follows  ?  To  Him,  my  Creator,  my  Conserver,  on 
whom  I  every  moment  depend  for  life,  and  breath, 
and  all  things,  my  unceasing  thanks,  my  gratitude, 
my  warmest  love,  my  universal  homage,  are  due. 
If  I  do  not  acknowledge,  by  such  feelings,  the 
relation  subsisting  between  me,  the  creature,  and 
Him,  the  Creator,  and  Conservator,  and  Bounteous 
Author  of  all  my  good, — I  am  virtually  a  living 
liar — denying,  so  far  as  I  can  deny,  the  fact  and 
reality  of  the  relation  which  does  exist,  and  the 
existence  of  which  is  unobliteratable.  In  with 
holding  the  thanks  which  are  so  absolutely  due,  I 
am  seeking,  desperately,  to  involve  the  True  and 
the  False,  the  Good  and  the  Bad,  in  chaotic 
disorder,  tending  to  the  obliteration  of  all  distinc 
tions  in  essences,  and  even  of  all  substantive  things 
themselves. 

(/)  Wherefore,  with  regard  to  Him  in  whom  we 
live,  and  move,  and  are, — the  Being-  of  being-s,  the 

*  O  O     ' 

Mind  of  minds,  the  Cause  of  causes, — certain 
indispensable  duties  are  due,  and  the  tribute  of  our 
fullest  homage  is  owing,  and  our  obligations  are 

incapable  of  being  set  aside except  criminally, 

and  most  vainly.      Being  the  offspring  of  God,  and 


254     THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

depending  on  Him  continually,  and  without  inter 
mission,  for  all  things,  it  is  but  becoming  in  us  to 
acknowledge  the  truth  of  the  case,  by  acting 
according  to  the  true  fitnesses  of  things :  our 
acknowledgement  being  with  the  accompaniment 
of  the  suitable  and  most  harmoniously  allied 
emotions.  The  sense  of  utter  dependence  on  the 
Creator  and  Sustainer  of  all  creaturely  existence, — 
the  veneration,  and  intense  worship  due  from  the 
creature  to  the  Creator, — boundless  gratitude  from 
the  obliged  to  the  Great  Benefactor, — the  fullest 
reverence  and  love,  in  short,  on  account  of  all  the 
benefits  we  are  ever  receiving  from  Him  on  whom 

O 

we  depend  for  every  blessing,  yea,  even  the 
minutest  bestowment  of  well-being  :  these  are  the 
feelings  which  ought  to  have  the  fullest  possession 
of  our  minds. 

(g.)  To  withhold,  to  the  smallest  extent,  or  in 
the  slightest  degree,  the  expression  of  such  feelings, 
were  to  act  in  a  manner  subversive  of  the  order 
actually  existing,  and  appointed  for  the  subsistence 
and  well-being  of  the  Universe  :  a  manner  clean 
contrary  to  the  true  relations  and  adaptations  of 
things  to  each  other.  Tis  plain,  indeed,  that  to 
act  contrary  to  the  relations  in  question,  would  be 
equal  to  a  denial  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  the 
truth  of  things.  That  to  the  Lord  God,  the  King 
of  kings,  and  Lord  of  lords,  the  ascription,  by  the 
Intellectual  and  Moral  creatures,  of  all  praise,  and 


APPLICATION.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.  255 

honour,  and  glory,  is  due ;  is  as  certain  as  any 
truth  whatever.  That  the  intensest  homage  of 
the  creature  to  the  Creator,  is  a  fit,  and  decorous 
tiling ;  is  a  truth  as  certain  (and  it  ought  to  be  as 
evident)  as  that  to  the  sum  or  multiple  of  2  &  2 
belongs  an  equality  to  4  as  a  totality  :  and  one 
might  as  rationally  and  naturally  deny  the 
existence  of  the  latter  (intellectual)  relation,  as 
that  of  the  former  (moral)  relation. 


(h.)  If  one  thing  be  more  clear  than  another,  as 
the  result  of  the  foregoing  Summary,  and  indeed 
of  the  whole  demonstration  itself,  it  is  the  truth 
that  we  are  the  offspring  of  God  the  Lord,  the  All- 
Perfect  One,  and  that  He  is  our  Father. 

(/.)  The  Fatherhood,  indeed,  of  the  Absolute 
One,  and  First  Cause, — the  Fatherhood  as  in 
relation  to  us,  the  creatures,  as  simply  men, — has 
no  doubt  been  denied.  But  the  denial  is  either 
improper,  or,  being  proper,  the  premises  from 
which  the  conclusion  follows,  must  be  very 
different  from  ours. 

(j.)  For,  given  the  premises  afforded  by  this 
whole  demonstration,  it  is  unquestionable  that  One 
is  our  Father,  our  Father  bein^  the  Creator  of 

'  O 

heaven  and  earth,  and  all  things  therein. 

O 

(k.)  No  doubt,  there  are  necessary  supposita,  in 
order  to  the  conclusion  that  God  is  the  Father  of 


256     THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

men  a.s  men.  Certain  essential  conditions  must 
preexist. 

(/.)  First  of  all,  if  man  be  the  child  of  God,  it  is 
involved  that  in  God  there  be  not  only  the  first 
principles  of  masculineness ;  but  also  the  first 
principles  of  feminity  must  be  in  the  Godhead 
likewise.  How  otherwise  could  God  have  off 
spring  ?  How  could  the  human  race,  as  male  and 
female,  be  in  the  image  and  likeness  of  God,  unless 
in  God,  the  Exemplar,  there  be  principles  corre 
sponding  ?  Unless  there  be  in  the  Exemplar  the 
first  principles  of  motherhood,  as  well  as  of  father 
hood,  how  could  the  result  be  a  race  which,  as  male 
and  female,  is  in  the  likeness  and  image  of  the 
Exemplar  ?  And  here  the  special  observations 
connected  with  the  feminine  principle  in  Deity, 
and  with  the  all-sexualness  of  the  Lord  God,  are  to 
be  referred  to  as  being  in  point,  and  of  absolute 
service  in  the  establishment  of  the  doctrine. a 

(m.)  In  the  second  place,  it  is  necessary,  in  the 
view  of  God  the  Lord  being  regarded  as  our  Father, 
that  man  should  be  considered  as  made,  or  framed, 
after  the  image  and  likeness  of  the  same  Lord  God 
( — not  only  in  the  respect  already  alluded  to — but) 
as  to  the  possession  of  «,  complete  Intellectual  and 
Moral  nature ;  there  being,  in  short,  in  God  the 
Lord,  Attributes  corresponding  to  all  the  radical, 

a  Vide,  supra,  Div.  III.  Prop.  iv.  Schol.  in.  §  3 ;  &  Div.  IV.  Prop.  ii. 
Schol.  §  13. 


APPLICATION.]  THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.   257 

inalienable  faculties,  and  all  the  as  indispensable 
emotional  susceptibilities,  of  man's  nature.  It  need 
scarcely  be  said,  that,  in  the  course  of  the  forego 
ing  Propositions,  this  essential  is  seen  to  be  most 
effectually  fulfilled. 

(n.)  Man,  then,  is  the  offspring  of  God  the  Lord, 
in  respect  that  man  resembles  his  Maker  in  being 
male  and  female  in  one — one  at  first  (androgyn- 
ally,)  as  he  shall  be  one  at  last,  and  for  eternity, 
—and  as  being  in  possession  of  a  full  complement 
of  intellectual  faculties,  and  moral  susceptibilities, 
the  product  of  the  very  Substance  of  the  Divine 
Being  himself. 

(o.)  The  consideration  of  the  principle  of  the 
Fatherhood,  is  highly  requisite  in  order  to  the 
ethical  completeness  and  perfection  of  our  vision  of 
God  the  Lord.  Until  we  can  look  at,  and  do 
appeal  to,  God  the  Lord  as  our  Father — our  Father, 
although  lie  be  our  Father  in  the  heavens — we 

O 

cannot  regard  Him  with  those  affectionate  warm 
feelings  without  which  continual  filial  approach 
unto  Him  will  never  be  made,  without  which 
approach  at  all  is  all  but  utterly  impossible.  But 
God,  the  Lord,  once  regarded  as  our  Father,  and 
what  should  hinder  His  child  from  lowlily  yet 
passionately  urging  his  need  of  the  Divine 
assistance  ? 

(p.)  The  Lord  God,  as  Judge  of  all  the  universe 

of  mind,  may  be  seen  seated  on  the  throne  of  His 
17 


258       THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

glory  :  but  the  Lord  God,  the  inexorable  Judge,  to 
whom,  indeed,  as  the  Doer  of  the  Right,  innocent 
angels  might  look  up  without  fear,  is  the  same 
Bcino:  who  must  look  down  on  man,  the  fallen,  the 

O  '  * 

guilty,  only  with  abhorrence  at  his  sin.  But  the 
same  Lord  God,  seated  on  His  throne  as  our 
merciful  Father,  who  knoweth  not  only  our  needs 
but  our  frailties,  pitieth  us,  well  knowing  our 
frames,  and  remembering  that  we  are  but  dust. 
The  throne  of  judgment  has  become  a  throne  of 
grace.  In  one  word,  the  Lord  God,  as  the  judge, 
will  be  dreaded  by  guilty  man ;  while  the  same 
Lord  God,  as  our  Father  in  heaven,  will  be 
anxiously  sought  after  by  weak  man,  His  sorrowful 
and  sorrowing  child,  borne  to  trouble,  throughout 
his  few  days,  even  as  the  sparks  fly  upward. 


THEREFORE,  the  whole  course  of  these  reasonings, 
as  a  connected  and  consecutive  complete  discourse, 
can  have  but  one  proper  and  becoming  ending. 

We  do  hang  upon  God  the  Lord,  and  it  is 
incumbent  on  us,  as  a  duty  to  which  we  are 
righteously  obliged,  to  give  expression  to  our 
absolute  dependence,  acknowledging  also  the  just 
consequences  of  that  relation  between  Him  ivho 
is  over  all,  and  us  the  creatures  of  yesterday. 
WHEREFORE,  and  as  taught  by  the  %>ositions  in 
that  unimpugnable  demonstration,  as  our  immove- 
able  ground,  we  do  pray  in  the  ivords  of  this 


PRAYER.]     THE  UEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       259 

froer, 
Go 

R  FATHER  who  fillcst  all  space,  and  art 
everywhere  present,  who,  nevertheless,  dost 
manifest  Thyself,  in  a  more  glorious  manner,  in 
certain  regions,  to  those  spirits,  angels  and  saints, 
and  saints  and  angels  joined  in  one,  that  are 
likest  unto  Thyself,— who,  therefore,  dwellest  in 
the  heavens  :  Who,  inhabiting  eternity,  art  from 
everlasting  to  everlasting — Unto  Thee,  0  Our 
Father,  do  we  come,  that  Thou  mayest  assist  our 
mortal  weakness,  and  aid  us,  defective  in  every 
good  quality,  while  we  farther  pray  unto  Thee, 
saying, 

May  Thy  Name  be  Hallowed  by  us,  even  as 
Thou  art  Blessed,  and  to  be  Blessed  for  ever  more 
by  all  creatures,  especially  by  those  whom  Thou 
hast  made  like  unto  Thyself  by  their  possession 
of  Reason  and  Conscience. 

May  Thy  Kingdom  come,  even  Thy  Kingdom 
governed  and  regulated  by  the  laws  of  unchanging 
Righteousness,  and  Love,  and  universal  Holiness, 
and  may  it  prevail  on  earth  even  as  it  exists  in 
Thy  immediate  presence  in  heaven  ;  so  that  over 
all  the  earth  men  may  love  each  other,  and,  loving 
their  neighbours  as  brethren,  may  so  love  and 
serve  Thee,  in  all  lowliness  of  heart,  yet  with  most 
earnest  worship. 


260       THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI,  FOR     [GEN.  SCHOL. 

May  Thy  Will,  which  is  the  only  rule  for  the 
heavenly  inhabitants,  become  the  rule  of  our  lives, 
who  live  on  earth,  that  so  living  we  may  have, 
even  while  here,  an  earnest  and  foretaste  of  the 
exceeding  great  joy  to  be  had  in  Thy  celestial 
kingdom. 

And  seeing  that  we  do  hang  so  intimately  on 
Thee,  0  Lord  God,  our  heavenly  Father, 

Give  us,  according  to  our  need,  the  things  that 
are  requisite,  as  for  our  bodies,  so  for  our  souls  and 
spirits :  Give  us,  in  particular,  this  day  bread 
convenient  for  us — food  to  sustain  our  natural 
lives,  and  nourishment  and  quickening  for  our  real 
selves,  our  minds ;  so  that  our  affections  may 
become  more  and  more  set  upon  things  which  are 
above,  where  is  the  True  Good  and  the  First 
Beautiful. 

And,  seeing  that  in  all  things  we  offend,  and  do 
come  short  of  the  requirements  of  Thy  most  Holy 
and  Perfect  Law,  forgive  Thou  us  all  our  trespasses 
against  Thee,  and  also  against  our  brother  whom 
we  have  seen,  so  that,  forgiving  our  brother  his 
trespasses  against  us,  we  do  hope  for  Thy  forgive 
ness  of  us  who  have  so  much  more  grievously 
trespassed  against  Thee. 

And  may  we,  wrho  are  so  weak  and  so  frail,  not 
be  led  into  temptation  :  but  if,  in  the  course  of 
the  dispensations  of  Thy  wise  yet  at  present 
inscrutable  Providence,  wre  be  tempted  and  tried, 


PRATER.]     THE  BEING  AND  THE  ATTRIBUTES.       2G1 

do  Thou  deliver  us,  so  that  we  be  not  utterly 
enclosed  in  the  snares  of  that  Evil  One  who  gave 
beginning  to  all  the  evil  which  is  in  this  world  by 
sin,  and  throughout  Thy  universe.  Evil  cannot 
be  save  in  an  evil  mind  ;  and  we  beseech  Thee, 
0  Lord  our  God,  deliver  us,  Thy  sons,  from  him 
who  is  only  evil,  being  the  father  of  it.  Amen,  and 

AM  EX. 

Now,  unto  Him,  who  is  able  to  keep  us  from 
falling  into  that  condemnation,  that  so,  and  at 
the  last,  we  may  be  presented  faultless  before  His 
glorious  presence,  with  exceeding  joy  :  even  unto 
the  Only  Lord  God,  who  is  from  everlasting,  be 
glory  and  majesty,  dominion  and  power,  both  now 
and  ever.  Amen. 

Yea,  Blessed,  and  for  ever  Blessed,  be  His  Name. 

AND  the  responsive  chorus,  Loth  old  and  new, 
and  for  ever,  of  the  Church  on  earth,  ix  :— 


APPENDIX. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   SIXTH   EDITION. 

IN  offering  a  Sixth  Edition  of  "  The  Argument, 
apriori"  to  the  reflective  public,  a  few  remarks,  and 
only  a  few,  are  requisite  011  the  part  of  the  author. 
The  present  edition,  then,  differs  from  the  preced 
ing  one  in  this,  that  a  Fifth  Division,  and  indeed 
department  generally,  has  been  entirely  added ; 
while  throughout  the  pre-existent  portions  some 
slight  alterations  have  been  made.  These,  however, 
being  quite  unessential  and  unimportant,  do  not 
require  specific  notice  and  attention.  Some  inac 
curacies,  too,  in  expression  have  been  rectified  :  but 
why  should  such  improvements  be  carefully 
chronicled  ?  The  great  difference,  therefore,  will  be 
seen  to  consist  in  the  new  Division,  containing  "  The 
Transcendent  Excellencies  ;  "  not  to  omit  mention  of 
the  concluding  portion,  "The  General  Scholium,"  a 
piece  having  equal  reference  to  each  Division  of 
the  demonstration. 

No  doubt,  the  inquirers  who  have  honoured  the 

263 


264  APPENDIX. 

former  edition  with  good  heed  may  be  taken  by 
surprise,  seeing  that  they  looked  at  the  book  before 
them  as  containing  the  true  and  proper  conclusion 
of  the  affair.  And  without  dispute,  "  with  the  de 
monstration  of  the  cumulative  attribute  of  Holiness, 
a  veritable  culminating  point"  was  attained. a  But 
the  student  is  called  on  to  observe,  at  the  same  time, 
that  it  was  nowhere  said,  that  the  demonstration 
was  finished  in  every  sense,  or  according  to  the  idea 
of  it  in  its  author's  mind — the  immediate  archetypal 
repository.  There  was  nevertheless  no  cunning  dis 
played  in  hiding  a  matter,  or,  else,  the  cunning  was 
nearly  allied  to  wisdom.  The  truth  is  this :  A 
provision  was  made  against  possible  eventualities. 
Not  a  scornful  covenant  with  death  :  only,  a  covenant 
with  oneself  against  death.  In  case  the  author  had 
not  lived  to  finish  the  "  Argument,"  as  it  existed  in 
idea  in  his  mind,  and  as  he  had  actually  sketched 
the  plan  years  before,  the  demonstration  as  it  stands 
in  the  print  of  the  5th  edition  would  have  been  the 
finale :  and,  indeed,  therein  a  just  ending  had  been 
reached,  and  no  one  (unless  gifted  with  a  preter- 
naturally  acute  eye)  might  have  seen  that  yet  there 
was  room — a  desideratum  to  be,  if  possible, 
supplied. 

But  the  demonstration  is  now  ended,  ended  in 
accordance  with  the  preconceived  idea,  and  the 
actual  plan  drawn  out  years  ago,  viz.,  at  the  time 

a  Preface  to  5th  edition. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  265 

the  course  of  "  The  Argument,  a  priori,  for  the 
Moral  Attributes  of  God,"  was  laid  down.a  Now, 
therefore,  there  is  a  full  end  of  "The  Argument, 
a  priori"  A  full  end,  in  one  sense  ;  although  (it 
is  confidently  trusted)  there  will  never  be  a  full 
end  in  another  sense,  of  peculiarly  evil  signification. 
While  the  ages  roll  on,  this  Argument  will  exist, 
for  it  is  founded  upon  a  rock  which  cannot  be 
moved.  It  shall  continue  as  long  as  this  sun  :  and 
when  it  shall  cease  to  operate  on  men's  minds,  it 
shall  be  another  sun  than  ours  which  shall  shine 
—even  that  sun,  with  healing  in  its  beams,  which 
shall  endure  throughout  all  generations,  and  beyond 
them  all. 

With  regard  to  the  new  Division  of  our  Argu 
ment,  with  its  Transcendent  Excellencies,  may 
that  be  found  to  be  true  the  like  of  which  happened 
in  the  case  of  that  eminent  man  who  is  declared  by 
so  many  to  be  Germany's  greatest  author.  May 
the  Division  in  question  be  its  own  revelator  ;  even 
as  the  famous  spire  of  the  Cathedral  of  Strasbourg 
(ill-fated  city  !)  became  a  self-revealer  to  Goethe's 
sensitive  eye.  "  After  gazing  in  admiration  upon 
the  Minster  of  Strasbourg,  Goethe  perceived  at 
length,  or  thought  he  perceived,  that  the  tower 
arising  above  the  magnificent  pile  was  incomplete. 
On  mentioning  this  to  a  friend,  his  friend  replied, 

a  Tlie  plan  was  sketched  in  18G4,  the  year  before  the  publication  of 
the  work  designated  in  the  text. 


266  APPENDIX. 

'  Who  told  you  so  ? '  '  The  tower  itself,'  said  Goethe  ; 
'  I  have  observed  it  so  long  and  so  attentively,  and 
have  shewn  it  so  much  affection,  that  it  at  last 
resolved  to  make  me  this  open  confession."  And 
then  from  among  the  archives  of  the  Cathedral,  the 
original  sketch,  shewing  the  incompleteness  by  the 
completeness,  was  referred  to, — and  Goethe  had 
been  right. a  So,  the  secret  that  an  additional 
height  was  awanting,  may  be  revealed  by  the 
Transcendent  Excellencies  themselves.  There  may 
be  a  talebearer  to  reveal  secrets  at  present ;  as  well 
as  there  had  been  a  faithful  spirit  to  conceal  the 
matter.  In  fine,  'tis  trusted  that  the  thoughtful 
reader,  with  Division  V.  before  him,  will  perceive 
that,  without  these  Transcendent  Excellencies,  the 
demonstration  would  have  been  incomplete ;  or  (to 
state  the  matter  otherwise)  with  the  addition  of 
them,  the  course  of  the  reasonings  is  duly  com 
pleted,  so  that  there  is  now  existent  a  finished 
performance  wanting  nothing,  and  coming  to  its 
natural  and  proper  ending. 

But  although  the  new  portion  makes  the  demou- 

a  The  instructive  anecdote  is  set  down  as  it  was  given  in  the 
"Journal  of  Sacred  Literature"  for  January-March,  1855,  then  edited 
by  the  Rev.  Dr  H.  Burgess.  The  anecdote  occurs  in  the  course  of  an 
able  and  generous  criticism  of  "The  Necessary  Existence  of  God,"  as 
set  fortli  in  the  Torbanehill  edition.  The  Argument,  as  it  existed  at 
that  time,  suggested,  by  a  self-revelation,  its  own  incompleteness. 
Proof,  going  farther  than  Goodness,  was  desiderated  ; — and  with  much 
reason  was  the  desideratum  perceived,  and  sought  to  be  supplied. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  267 

stration  complete  and  perfect  in  every  way,  yet  'tis 
true  that  the  demonstration,  as  it  closed  in  the 
previous  edition,  had  "  a  veritable  culminating 
point "  of  its  own.  It  was  closed  up  in  a  proof  of 
the  Universal  Holiness,  and  no  ordinary  reader 
could  have  perceived  any  deficiency,  far  less 
desiderated  a  whole  additional  Division.  And  it 
may  be  a  matter  of  serious  question,  whether,  even 
yet,  the  demonstration,  as  it  ends  in  that  fifth 
edition,  be  not  more  adapted  for  Atheists,  and 
Infidels  generally,  than  the  present  edition,  with 
its  distinct  and  peculiar  addition,  can  be.  The 
Transcendent  Excellencies  are  so  exceedingly 
unadapted,  and  in  all  ways  unsuited,  to  the  state 
of  mind  in  which  a  professed  Atheist,  or  Antitheist, 
may  be  expected  to  be  found,  that  the  likelihood  is, 
that  the  handling  of  these  Excellencies  before  such 
will  only  provoke  outbursts  of  the  most  dreadfully 
appalling  blasphemies.  Such  might  be  the  effect. 
Doubtless,  an  Atheist,  or  Antitheist,  may  scoff,  and 
scorn,  and  blaspheme  at  large,  in  the  most  horrid 
manner,  with  the  previous  exhibition  of  the 
Attributes  before  him.  'Tis  true ;  and  pity  'tis, 
'tis  true.  The  monstrous  jests,  and  the  hideous 
store  of  lewd  sneers,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  obscene 
and  frightful  outcome  of  the  nethermost  pande 
monium,  may  proceed  against  a  proof  ending  with 
the  Holiness  of  the  Lord  God.  But  still  the 
blasphemies  may  be  more  and  greater  when  those 


268  APPENDIX. 

Transcendent  Excellencies  are  presented  addition 
ally.  In  fact,  these  afford  peculiarly  the  pabulum 
on  which  an  impure  imagination  astride  on  a  per 
verted  mind  might  delight  to  dwell,  in  order  to 
profane,  with  the  besotted  ribaldry,  the  supremely 
holy  things  of  the  Church — the  more  privileged 
peculium  of  believers,  and  the  assembly  of  the 
saints  universally.  We  err  and  sin  by  casting  our 
pearls  before  the  swine,  since  thereby  a  more 
abominable  filthiness  is  occasioned  than  comes  from 
the  trampling  by  the  brutes  upon  their  more 
accustomed  garbage. 

It  may  be  (we  advisedly  say)  a  serious  question  : 
and,  accordingly,  the  Fifth  Edition  shall,  henceforth, 
be  reckoned  the  edition  peculiarly  adapted  for  the 
Atheists — in  perfect  accord,  indeed,  this  determina 
tion  with  the  special  purpose  indicated  in  the  Preface 
thereto  ;  while  the  new  edition  shall  be  deemed  the 
appropriate  heritage  of  the  Theists,  and  believers 
generally.  The  one  shall  be  called,  the  Atheists' 
edition  ;  while  the  other  shall  have,  for  its  distinctive 
title,  the  Theists'  own  edition.  The  former  will 
suffice  to  silence,  if  not  to  convince,  the  unbeliever 
and  the  disbeliever, — and  such  shall  be  its  function. 
The  latter,  again,  will  serve  to  confirm,  and  edify, 
the  mind  of  the  honest  inquirer,  and  introduce  him, 
it  may  be,  into  the  splendours  of  a  region  unvisited, 
or  at  least  uninvestigated,  before,  to  his  increase  of 

O  ' 

joy,  and  measureless  delight. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  269 

If  this  our  demonstration  be — as  it  is  commonly 
admitted  by  its  students  to  be — an  impregnable 
logical  construction  :  if  it  be,  in  truth,  a  demonstra 
tion  equal  to  a  mathematical  certainty  (as  it  is 
confidently  declared  a  to  be  :)  mark  what  follows, 
with  regard  to  various  classes  of  persons. 

In  the  first  place,  all  Atheists,  and  Infidels,  must 
keep  silence  in  presence  of  the  proof.  If  the 
unbelievers  and  disbelievers  would  proceed  to  work 
logically,  they  must  be  speechless  to  be  in  order. 
If  they  cannot  refute  this  demonstration  of  the 
existence  of  a  Holy  Lord  God,  they  must  at  least 
hold  their  tongues.  To  be  allowed,  by  a  logical 
licence,  to  speak,  they  must  open  their  mouths 
only  to  refute  the  reasonings  of  the  Argument. 
Failing  their  ability  to  do  so,  they  must  preserve 
unbroken  silence  before  the  men  of  the  Church. 

There  is  another  class  of  the  Infidel  public,  who 
before  men  call  themselves  men  of  Science,  but  who, 
in  reality,  are  secretly  unbelievers.  With  regard, 
therefore,  to  the  secretly  infidel  among  the  men 
of  Science  (unbelievers  are  they,  though  seldom 

a  A  voice  from  a  far-oil'  island  in  the  Atlantic,  has  recently  made 
such  a  declaration.  The  individual  who  utters  the  voice  is  a  genuinely 
zealous  student  of  true  philosophy,  although  he  writes  from  the 
distant  and  isolated  Newfoundland  ;  and,  far  away  though  he  is  from 
the  great  centres  of  thought,  he  has  yet,  in  one  of  the  periodicals 
of  Modern  Athens,  challenged  contradiction  of  the  statement,  that 
the  Argument,  a  priori,  "has  demonstrated,  to  a  mathematical 
certainty,  the  necessary  existence  and  attributes  of  God." 


270  APPENDIX. 

disbelievers)  there  is  a  word,  in  season,  to  be 
said. 

Our  gentlemen,  then,  of  Science,  of  each  one  and 
all  of  the  Physical  Sciences,  must  allow  the  applica 
tion  to  themselves  of  their  own  great  dictum,  That 
each  distinct  science,  and,  much  more,  every  great 
department  in  science,  has  its  own  rules,  valid  for 
itself,  and  effective  for  its  own  internal  regulation ; 
and  these  rules  are  not  to  be  meddled  with,  far  less 
impugned,  in  a  high-handed  way,  or  by  any  short 
cut,  or  indirect  method,  by  any  theologian,  or  by 
any  person  whatever,  be  his  science  or  philosophy 
what  it  may.  Mineralogy  might  be  given  as  an 
example  of  a  single  science  ;  and  Geology  might  be 
adduced  as  representing  a  whole  class  of  sciences, 
such  as  Botany,  Comparative  Anatomy,  Chemistry, 
and  even  Mineralogy  itself.  The  former  is  a  science, 
while  the  latter  stands  for  a  departmental  collection 
of  sciences.  Now,  as  touching  the  rule  in  view,  the 
validity  thereof  shall  by  no  means  be  called  in 
question  in  this  place.  Far  from  it :  for  the  rule, 
held  as  settled,  shall  be  founded  on  for  a  good 
reason  of  our  own. 

If,  then,  it  has  been  demonstrated — and  the  affir 
mation  we  go  by  is,  that  it  has  been  demonstrated — 
that  the  Material  Universe  is  finitely  extended,  and 
is  of  finite  duration,a  or  began  sometime  to  be  ;  our 

a  See  "Argument,  a  priori:"  Div.  I.  part  ii.  Sub-Prop.,  in  connec 
tion  with  Sub-Prop,  in  Part  i. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  271 

men  of  science  cannot  l>e  permitted  to  pooh  !  pooh  ! 
the  demonstration.  Thev  must  meet  it  on  its  own 

J 

ground,  and  there  controvert  it,  and  overturn  it,  or 
— they  must  grant  it.  They  dare  not  controvert 
it,  simply  because  they  are  men  of  science ;  nor 
dare  they  by  any  side  wind  seem  to  blow  it  away : 
because  their  own  rule  forbids  them  to  do  so. 
Their  own  grand  doctrine  is,  that  every  distinct 
science,  or  philosophy,  such  as  Theism,  or  group  of 
separate  sciences,  such  as  Theology,  has  its  own 
rules  and  method,  for  which  it  is  answerable  to 
the  representatives  of  no  other  sciences,  nor  set  of 
sciences  whatsoever. 

This  being  so, — and  it  has  been  settled  and  fixed 
for  ever  by  the  Physical  Philosophers  themselves 
that  it  is  so, — our  scientific  gentlemen  must  look 
the  matter  fairly  in  the  face.  It  is  a  position 
regarding  that  Material  Universe  which  affords  the 
basis  for  all  their  experiments  and  observations, 
inductions  and  generalisations,  which  is  on  the 
tapis ;  and  the  logical  and  metaphysical  proof, 
touching  the  non-eternity  of  Matter,  being  before 
them  in  a  legitimate  mode,  it  cannot  be  kicked 
contemptuously  aside  or  away.  As  Chemists,  as 
Anatomists,  as  Zoologists,  as  Geologists,  as  Astro 
nomers,  as — what  not  ?  the  Natural  Philosophers 
cannot  object  their  sciences  as  being,  per  se,  a 
sufficient  opposing  force  to  that  demonstration  by 
the  metaphysical  Theist :  and  no  man  of  Science  can 


272  APPENDIX. 

lawfully  travel  out  of  his  province,  and  away  from 
the  straight  path  before  him,  to  start  an  objection 
incidentally,  or  by  the  way,  while  he  is  making  an 
excursion  in  an  irregular  cross  road.  The  objection 
must  be  directed  to  and  against  the  demonstration 
itself.  If  it  be  drawn  only  from  the  particular 
pursuit  of  the  Savant,  it  cannot  be  but  futile,  and 
vain, — and,  as  being  not  in  point,  it  must  be 
dropped  altogether.  In  a  word,  a  man  of  science, 
any  one  physical  science,  cannot,  as  being  simply 
a  man  of  science,  oppose  a  demonstration  of  Theism, 
since  Theism  is  itself  a  Science,  yea  (when  the 
truth  is  told)  the  Science  of  Sciences.  For  Theism 
being  true,  all  the  sciences  must  hold  of  it :  It, 
in  turn,  holding  of  none.  Of  the  sciences,  in  fine, 
Theism  is  the  true  head  and  chief,  as  well  as  the 
crown  and  glory. 

The  affirmation,  therefore,  is,  that  it  has  been 
demonstrated,  demonstrated  in  the  very  strictest 
sense,  that  Matter,  finite  in  extension,  is  also  finite  in 
duration  ;  and  so  it  began  to  be.  Or,  you  may  say, 
it  had  an  absolute  beginning.  Geologists  may  dig 
and  grope,  and  better  grope,  for  centuries,  yea,  for 
millenniums,  in  the  bowels  of  the  earth  :  they  may, 
in  the  course  of  countless  ages,  break  down,  and 
reduce  to  powder,  and  smallest  dust,  every  handful 
of  the  crust  of  the  earth  :  but  there  will  still  be 
one  thing  which  the  Geologists  (taken  as  represent 
ing  the  men  of  science  in  general)  cannot  do. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.          273 

Keeping  within  their  own  province,  they  cannot 
interfere  with  the  rigorous  metaphysical  and  theist- 
ical  proof,  that  Nature  herself  had  an  actual 
commencement.  The  matter  of  the  world  had  an 
absolute  beginning.  It  was  created,  having  before 
had  no  existence  whatever,  except  in  the  thoughts 
of  God. 

Should,  however,  any  members  of  the  Scientific 
world,  in  love  with  philosophy  beyond  the  bounds 
of  their  proper  sphere,  be  disposed  to  go  out  of 
their  own  province  for  a  time,  to  meet,  fairly  and 
face  to  face,  the  Theists  on  their  own  domain,— 
then,  the  demonstration  itself  of  the  true  non- 
eternity  of  matter  will  be  the  subject  of  discussion. 
And  so  be  it.  And  God  defend  the  right. 

Even  the  most  cursory  reader  of  the  "  Argument, 
a  priori,"  will  perceive  that,  between  the  first  part 
and  the  last  part,  there  is  a  vast  difference  in  style, 
in  a  certain  weighty  respect.  The  difference  may 
be  characterised,  in  few  words,  by  saying,  that,  while 
the  early  portions  contain  few  Moral  and  Religious 
terms  (as  they  may  be  called),  the  later  portions 
contain  many  such  words,  and  indeed  they  may  be 
said  to  abound  with  them. 

It  is  quite  true,  that  such  a  difference  exists  ;  and 
some  of  the  causes  of  the  difference  have  been 
particularized  in  the  Preface  to  the  Fifth  Edition. 

But    the    reference    therein    is   of   a   more   limited 
18 


274  APPENDIX. 

nature    than    that  which   we   have   under  present 
notice. 

The  early  portion  of  the  demonstration,  ending 
with  the  3rd  Part  of  Division  II.,  is  wholly  taken 
up  with  the  consideration  of  the  Infinite  Being,  and 
the  purely  Intellectual  Attributes ;  with,  in  short, 
the  Being  and  the  Attributes  absolute.  While, 
with  the  Moral  Attributes  of  Division  III.,  begin 
the  relative  Attributes ;  and  GOD  is  considered  in 
relation  to  Man.  Here,  therefore,  Man  is  intro 
duced  upon  the  stage,  and  a  perfectly  different 
course  of  treatment  is  the  necessary  result. 

But,  in  addition,  Moral  Attributes  involve  dis 
tinctively  Moral  handling.  Hence,  the  introduction 
of  Moral  words,  or  words  answering  to  Moral  ideas, 
was  unavoidable.  The  necessity  for  the  use  of  such 
words  reached  its  climax  when  Holiness  entered  the 
field  of  vision  :  All  sorts  of  Moral  and  Eeligious 
terms  became  then  an  absolute  necessity  of  the  situa 
tion.  And  when  the  Division  with  the  Transcendent 
Excellencies  was  added,  every  sentence  must  be 
loaded  with  suitable  terms ;  and  although  no  defi 
ciency  in  strict  logic  was  permissible,  there  must 
needs  be  a  perfect  redundancy  of  words  correspond 
ing  to  the  Moral  and  Religious  notions  and  emotions, 
present  through  their  symbols. 

Any  other  course,  even  had  it  been  a  logical 
possibility,  would  have  been  guilty  of  an  immorality 
chargeable  against  its  very  conception.  It  is  an 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.          275 

offence  against  morality,  no  less  than  against  good 
taste,  to  treat  a  highly  moral  subject  without  a 
sufficiency  of  words  denoting  the  presence  of  highly 
moral  emotions  :  whilst  it  would  be  equally  im 
moral,  though  the  immorality  would  be  of  a  dif 
ferent  complexion,  to  treat  a  merely  logical  theme 
by  the  interspersion  of  a  crowd  of  Moral  or  Religious 
epithets.  To  have  introduced  Moral  and  Religious 
terms,  and  phrases,  into  the  1st  Division,  would 
have  been  ridiculously  out  of  character ;  and  to 
have  made  the  4th  and  the  last  Divisions  as 
destitute  of  these  as  the  first  Division  was,  would 
have  been,  less  ludicrous  indeed,  but  much  more 
offensive  otherwise.  The  destitution  of  the  highly 
moral  and  religious  words  would  have  been  an  out 
rage  upon  both  Morality  and  Religion. 

A  late  critic  characterises  the  distinction  in 
view  in  a  way  not  so  far  amiss  when  he  writes  : — 
"The  whole  of  the  earlier  part  of  the  treatise  is 
"the  hardest,  closest,  most  irrefragable  argument 
"we  have  seen  for  many  a  day,  and,  so  far  as  we 
"have  discovered,  without  a  single  weak  point. 
"  The  later  Divisions  are  looser  in  texture,"  &c.a 
Such  is  the  deliverance  of  one  of  the  latest  of  my 
reviewers. 

One  of  my  earliest  critics,  however,  went  much 
farther,  and,  by  one  bound,  he  high  over-leaped  all 

a  "  The  Literary  Churchman"  for  Feb.  4, 1871.    It  is  the  5th  edition 
of  "  The  Argument,"  which  is  under  notice. 


276  APPENDIX. 

bound.  Division  III.,  with  its  Moral  Attributes,  has 
as  yet  no  existence.  Only  Divisions,  I.  and  II., 
discussing  the  Being  and  the  Natural  Modes,  and 

O  O  7 

the  Intellectual  Attributes,  had  been  produced. 
What  does  the  reader  suppose  that,  in  these  circum 
stances,  a  resolute  theologist-reviewer  did  ?  While 
noticing  that  in  the  thin  octavo  before  him  (it  was 
the  first  edition)  there  was  no  attempt  to  demonstrate 
the  Moral  Attributes,  he  adduces  the  circumstance, 
that  the  proof,  as  it  stood,  had  no  terms  indicative 
of  Moral  and  Religious  emotions  and  ideas,  as  a  proof 
of  a  most  serious  transgression.  Transgression  of 
what  ?  Not  of  the  laws  of  logic.  Not  of  those  of 
good  taste.  A  transgression,  however,  of  both  the 
theory  and  the  practice  of  sermonizing,  as  sermons 
commonly  go  among  us.  For  your  sermon-maker 
is  by  no  means  nice,  in  general,  with  his  adaptations 
of  words  to  subjects.  His  words  may  be  quite 
germane  :  or  they  may  not.  But  we  are  not  to 
condemn  the  reviewer  unheard  for  his  own  behoof. 
He  is  criticising  the  original  edition,  and  thus  he 
makes  his  charge  : — "  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Mr 
"  Gillespie  has  so  entirely  divested  his  argument 
"  of  that  moral  colouring — if  we  may  be  allowed 
"the  expression — the  presence  of  whose  deep  and 
"  solemn  tinge,  pervading  every  part  of  Dr  [Samuel] 
"  Clarke's  otherwise  abstract  demonstration,  has 
"  always  appeared  to  us  one  of  the  most  interesting 
"and  singular  circumstances  connected  with  that 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.           277 

"  masterly  performance.  In  reading  Dr  Clarke's 
"  demonstration,  one  always  feels  the  inherent 
"  grandeur  and  solemnity  of  the  subject ;  in  reading 
"Mr  Gillespie's — never."  ["Never"  is  the  word 
in  the  original  diatribe,  as  it  appeared  in  the  bi 
monthly  "  Presbyterian  Review : "  but  in  the 
volume  of  1852,  when  the  Torbanehill  edition  of 
the  "  Necessary  Existence  of  God  "  had  been  several 
years  published,  the  word  "never"  is  changed  into 
— "  but  partially  and  seldom."]  "  The  treatise  now 
"  before  us  might  almost  have  been  written  by  one 
"  originally  and  totally  destitute  of  the  moral  senti- 
"  ments.  The  existence  and  attributes  of  the  King 
"  Eternal,  Immortal,  and  Invisible,  whose  name  is 
"  Holy,  are  reasoned  of  here  with  the  same  passion- 
"  less  apathy  as  if  they  were  the  properties  of  an 
"arbitrary  and  cold  abstraction,  or  as  if  the  subject 
"  of  discussion  were  a  mere  algebraical  symbol. 
"  This  we  regard  as  a  very  serious  defect ;  so 
"serious,  indeed,  that  we  can  hardly  imagine  it 
"capable  of  full  and  satisfactory  justification,"  &c. 
&c.a  There  is,  in  the  article  quoted  from,  more 
of  the  same  sort  of  stuff,  which  he  who  pleases  may 
turn  to,  if  he  be  in  search  of  excessively  candid, 
and  more  than  ordinarily  honest,  moral  colouring. 

a  The  full  title  to  the  volume  in  question  is  : — "  Papers  on  Literary 
and  Philosophical  Subjects  ;  including  a  Selection  from  Contributions 
to  various  Periodicals."  It  was  a  means  to  an  end.  Soon  after  the 
publication,  the  author  was  seated  in  a  Professor's  Chair. 


278  APPENDIX. 

In  fine,  the  aim,  throughout  "  The  Argument, 
a  priori"  has  been,  to  produce  a  proof  without  there 
being  in  it  a  single  bad  argument,  or  paralogism ; 
a  proof,  moreover,  where  technical  words,  whether 
nouns  or  adjectives,  should  never  be  significantly 
employed  until  a  right  to  the  full  and  unfettered 
use  of  them  had  been  successfully  established. 

Hitherto,  our  view  has  been  directed  to  the  content 
of  this  new,  or  sixth  edition,  considered  as  in  and  by 
itself:  but,  before  concluding  these  introductory 
observations,  it  will  be  but  proper  to  look  at  that 
content,  as  it  stands  with  reference  to  the  contents 
of  another  volume  (the  predecessor,  in  fact,  of  the 
fifth  edition  of  "  The  Argument  ")  to  wit,  "  The 
Necessary  Existence  of  God."  a  In  a  word,  attention 
must  now  be  bestowed  upon  the  relation  which  the 
volume  entitled,  "  The  Necessary  Existence  of  God," 
bears  to  that  having  for  its  title,  "  The  Argument, 
a  priori,  for  the  Being  and  the  Attributes  of  the 
LORD  GOD,  the  Absolute  One,  and  First  Cause." 

This  is  the  more  necessary  to  be  done  in  that  a 
misunderstanding  about  the  matter  is  afloat.  A 
kind,  no  less  than  judicious,  critic,  for  instance, 
ventures  to  hope  that  "some  of  the  treatises"  of 
the  larger  volume,  the  Necessary  Existence,  "  will 
not  be  allowed  to  pass  out  of  print ; "  and  the 

a  It  is  right  to  notice  that  the  edition  of  the  work  named  in  the 
text,  is  the  (stereotyped)  Eussel  edition  of  1863,  1865. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  279 

reason  assigned  for  the  hope  is,  because  "  the 
treatises  possess  such  intrinsic  worth."11  Now,  had 
the  real  truth  been  fully  known,  or  attended  to,  no 
such  fear  need  have  been  once  entertained.  There 
is  no  danger  of  any  of  the  treatises  alluded  to 
passing  into  oblivion,  by  being  allowed  to  go  out 
of  print,  because  the  smaller  volume,  the  Argument 
itself,  has  attained  to  perfect  completion. 

If  we  take  the  "  Argument,  a  priori,"  as  the 
central  figure  of  the  group,  we  may  discern  that,  of 
its  attendants,  some  are  before  it,  while  the  others 
go  behind  and  after  it.  Or  (to  change  the  metaphor, 
or  rather  drop  metaphor  altogether)  let  us  take  that 
Argument  as  the  organon  itself.  Then,  we  classify 
the  other  pieces  by  the  same  author,  on  the  same 
general  subject,  as  the  ante-predicamenta,  and  the 
post-predicamenta. 

Among  the  ante-predicamental  monographs,  we 
may  enumerate  such  pieces  as  these  : — 

"Inquiry  into  the  Defects  of  mere  <l  pu«f<'ri<>ri 
Arguments  for  a  God." 

"  Reviews  of  the  Demonstrations,  by  Mr  Locke,  Dr 
Samuel  Clarke,  the  Rev.  Moses  Lowinan,  Bishop 
Hamilton,  and  others,  of  the  Existence  and  Attri 
butes  of  A  Deity." 

"  Necessary  Existence  implies  Infinite  Extension." 

After  the  central  piece,  the  organon  itself  (which, 

u  The  not  unsagacious  critic  has  made  the  "Christian  Ambassador'' 
the  vehicle  for  his  ideas.     See  Number  for  February,  1871. 


280  APPENDIX. 

in  the  "  Necessary  Existence,"  is  given  in  no  larger 
dimensions  than  it  had  in  the  eyes  of  the  antitheists 
of  its  early  days)  come  the  post-predicamentals. 
Among  which  stands  conspicuously,  and — so  far  as 
the  volume  in  question  goes — exclusively,  indeed,  the 

"Examination  of  ANTITHEOS'S  Refutation  of  the 
Argument,  a  priori,  for  the  Being  and  Attributes 
of  God ; "  with  its  various  interspersed  monographs, 
and  subsequent  Appendix,  containing  monographic 
essays  of  its  own. 

Among  the  interspersed  separable  treatises,  are 

"  The  non-infinite  divisibility  of  Extension  and  of 
Matter,"  and 

"  Of  the  sentiments  of  Philosophers  concerning  Space," 
Of  the  various  pieces  in  the  Appendices,  some  of 
them  are,  in  fact,  as  many  distinguishable  essays 
on  as  many  different  topics. 

Now,  in  this  enumeration,  as  a  whole,  we  have  a 
set  of  radically  distinct  treatises  (greater  and  smaller) 
which  have,  or  may  have,  intrinsic  claims  on  atten 
tion  ;  and  the  claims  of  some  of  the  treatises  do 
nowise  depend,  wholly,  or  even  mainly,  on  the 
"Argument"  itself.  Some  of  those  treatise  are,  in 
logical  arrangement,  which  is  the  true  equipollent  of 
the  order  of  nature,  introductory  precursors  to  the 
"  Argument,  a  priori  ;  "  and  others  fall,  as  evidently 
or  naturally,  into  their  proper  place  when  they  are 
made  to  come  after  that  organon.  In  a  General 
Preface  to  the  "  Necessary  Existence,"  a  rationale 
of  the  proper  order,  or  the  "  relation  to  each  other  " 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.  281 

of  "  the  various  pieces  "  of  that  volume,  is  given ; 
and  it  is  shewn,  that  "  they  severally  handle  the 
different  departments  of  the  subject."  Without 
dwelling  farther  on  the  topic  in  this  place,  we  may 
simply  refer  the  reader  to  the  rationale  in  question. 
It  extends  to  several  pages. 

But  among  the  class  of  post-predicameutals,  we 
might,  with  great  justice,  put  a  production  not 
included  in  the  volume  which  has  been  under  notice. 
The  "Examination"  of  Antitheos  was  indeed  "a 
diffusion  and  defence  of  certain  portions  "  a  of  the 
"  Argument :  "  and  equally  so  was  the  production  to 
be  adverted  to.  The  production  thus  in  question  is, 
generally  speaking,  the  volume  of  the  Debate  between 
ICONOCLAST  a  ml  the  present  Author*  which — so  far 
as  it  contains  letters  and  pieces  emanating  from  the 
author  of  the  Argument — may  very  fitly  be  classed 
with  the  Examination  of  the  work  of  the  Antitheist. 
Antitheos,  with  all  his  force,  attacked  the  3rd  Pro 
position  of  the  Argument:  Iconoclast  attacked, 
with  all  his  might,  the  1st  Proposition  of  the  same 
demonstration ;  although  his  predecessor,  in  the 
autitheistic  walk,  had  declared  (what  every  man, 
gifted  with  the  usual  complement  of  human  intellec- 

a  See  the  General  Preface,  referred  to  previously. 

h  The  title  of  the  volume  referred  to  in  the  text  is,—"  Atheism  or 
Theism  ?  Debate  between  Iconoclast,  the  accredited  Champion  of 
British  Atheists,  and  others,  and  William  Honyman  Gillespie,  of 
Torbauehill,"  &c.  &C.-1870. 


282  APPENDIX. 

tual  faculties,  must  unhesitatingly  declare)  that  first 
to  be  altogether  unassailable.  Both  Atheists,  how 
ever,  purposed  to  assault  the  "  Argument  "  itself : 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  author  thereof  defended 
his  demonstration  (successfully,  there  can  be  no 
doubt)  against  both  assailants,  thelatest  assault  being 
repelled  with  as  much  good  will  as  the  earliest  one 
had  been.  In  short,  'tis  evident  that  both  defences 
fall  to  be  ranged  among  the  pieces  which,  in  due 
order,  come  after  the  organon  itself.  You  cannot 
defend  a  thing,  until  after  it  exists,  and  appears 
before  you. 

The  plain  truth  is,  that  the  two  volumes,  "The 
Necessary  Existence,"  and  "  The  Argument,  a 
priori,"  have  a  principle  of  vitality,  each  for  itself, 
and  distinctly  as  regards  the  other.  The  two  are 
distinctively  different.  The  one  volume  is  mainly 
taken  up  with  the  natural  precursors,  and  with  the 
natural  followers,  of  the  organon.  The  other  again 
consists  exclusively  of  the  organon  itself,  pure  and 
simple.  No  need  for  the  one  to  be  the  occasion  of 
the  other's  going  out  of  existence,  and  being  seen 
no  more  in  print.  Rather,  the  life  of  the  one 
should  be  a  guarantee  for  the  continued  existence 
of  the  other.  The  prosperity  of  the  organon,  the 
grand  central  figure,  should  make  the  company  of 
its  congenial  attendants  desirable. 

In  a  perfect  arrangement  of  the  different  works, 
the  order  would  be  this  : — 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SIXTH  EDITION.          283 

1st,  The  precursors  of  the  Organon,  or  ante-predica- 
meiitals. 

2nd,  The  Organon  itself;  and 

3rd,  The  post-predicamentals,  or  pure  followers  of 
the  Organon  (like  the  Examination  and  the 
Debate)  as  the  close  of  the  series. 

And  no  one  of  the  departments  would  tend  to  render 
the  other  departments,  or  either  of  them,  superfluous. 
The  reverse  indeed  :  The  one  would  naturally  pave 
the  way  for  the  other,  or  create,  by  a  well-understood 
law,  a  desire  for  the  perusal  of  the  rest. 

THE  A  UTHOR  OF 
THE  ARGUMENT,  A  PRIORI. 

EDINBURGH, 
June,  1871. 


***  'Tis  evident,  now,  that  the  Fifth  Edition  and  this  Sixth 
Edition  are  to  be  regarded  as  co-existent  works,  rather  than  as 
publications  successively  put  forth  as  candidates  for  public  attention 
and  favour.  The  two  editions  are,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
-simultaneous  productions  :  the  one  being  for  use  against  Atheists, 
and  disbelievers  of  all  sorts  ;  and  the  other  for  the  use  of  all 
Theistic  inquirers,  desirous  to  have  their  own  beliefs  strengthened 
and  confirmed.  The  Theists  will  be  edified  by  seeing,  from  their 
peculiar  sources,  how  truly  unimpeachable,  in  every  respect,  is 
their  faith  in  the  most  vital  of  all  truths.  The  highest  and  noblest 
portions  of  the  superstructure  will  be  seen  to  be  held  to  their 
attachments  by  the  most  indissoluble  ligatures  and  fastenings; 
while  the  common  foundations  of  the  entire  erection  are  them 
selves  iminoveably  stable,  and  eternally  secure. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIFTH   EDITION. 

THE  present  is  the  first  complete  edition  of  "  The 
Argument,  a  priori" — or,  the  Argument  as  consist 
ing  of  Divisions  III.  and  IV.,  as  well  as  of  Divisions 
I.  and  II.  This  is,  in  other  words,  the  Argument 
as  embodying  the  whole  of  the  Moral  Attributes, 
from  Goodness  onwards  to  Holiness,  the  apex  of 
the  construction,  as  well  as  containing  that  preced 
ing  portion  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  immut 
able  foundation  and  solid  basement-story  of  the 
whole  edifice,  however  high  it  may  be  carried. 
For  true  it  is,  that  hitherto  the  demonstrations 
for  the  Moral  Attributes  (corresponding  generally 
with  Divisions  III.  and  IV.)  have  been  procurable 
only  in  separate  volumes,  though  the  volumes  were 
but  small.  But  to  exhibit  a  brief  historical  survey 
of  things  from  the  commencement :  First  of  all, 
there  appeared,  as  the  original  demonstration,  what 
(barring  alterations)  is  now  comprised  within  the 
limits  of  Divisions  I.  and  II.  No  Greater  were  the 

o 

dimensions  of  that  first  edition  of  the  Argument. 
After  a  period  of  some  length,  during  which  the 
work  was,  in  various  ways,  much  before  the  public, 

and  much   too  upon  its   trial  in  all  respects,  the 

284 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.          285 

Propositions  (relating  to  the  Happiness  and  the 
Goodness)  represented  by  the  1st  Sub-Division  of 
Division  III.,  were  added,  and  came  out  in  the 
Torbanehill  edition  (1843.)  After,  again,  a  much 
longer  interval,  in  which  events  of  moment  to  the 
fate  of  the  demonstration  were  proceeding,  the 
Relative  Moral  Attributes,  as  corresponding  with 
the  2nd  Sub-Division  of  Division  III.,  were 
published,  in  a  little  volume,  by  themselves  (1865.) 
Lastly,  the  Complex  or  Compound  Moral  Attributes, 
comprehended  in  Division  IV.,  were,  in  a  minute 
volume,  given  to  the  public  in  the  beginning  of  this 
year  (1870.)  Such  has  been  the  course  of  events, 
and  the  progress  of  the  demonstration  to  consolida 
tion  and  completion. 

From  its  very  first  appearance,  the  "  Argument  " 
was  doomed  to  meet  with  opposition  of  every  kind 
and  variety,  and  from  believer  and  unbeliever  alike. 
The  opposition,  however,  from  the  side  of  believers 
has  become  faint  indeed.  If  conceited  and  obstrep 
erous  at  first,  it  is  quite  hushed  and  subdued  now. 
It  used  to  take  the  form  of  objection  to  the  rele 
vancy  of  the  argumentation  generally.  At  the 
present  time,  the  opposition  on  the  part  of  Theists 
is  almost  entirely  limited  to  persons  who,  up  to 
this  good  hour,  advance  and  advocate  the  superior 
and  exclusive  claims  of  the  rival  a  posteriori 
method  :  these  persons  being  a  remnant  of  the 


286  APPENDIX. 

anatomical  and  physiological  school  of  Paley,  and 
the  Experimentalists,  drawn  from  the  various  class 
rooms  of  the  Inductive  Philosophers.  Of  proper 
opposition,  there  is,  in  fact,  but  little  now-a-days  ; 
and  where  the  voice  of  objectors  goes  forth,  the 
echoes  are  but  feeble,  and  the  sound  is  remote  and 
unheeded.  But  however  the  diminished  opposition 
proceeding  from  Theistical  quarters  stands  at  this 
present,  our  view,  on  this  occasion,  shall  be  confined 
within  the  limits  occupied  by  the  Infidel  objectors 
and  opponents. 

In  another  quarter,31  it  has  been  my  business  to 
record  a  survey,  by  epitome,  of  the  operations 
conducted  by  the  opponents  of  the  atheistical  class 
against  the  reasonings  employed  in  the  demon 
stration  treated  of.  With  a  view  to  the  object 
immediately  before  us,  it  will  suffice  to  mention, 
that  the  "Argument"  had  been  no  long  time  in 
existence  when  it  was  assailed  by  an  enemy  to  all 
Theistical  ratiocination,  of  whom  it  may  be  truth 
fully  said,  that,  on  the  side  of  the  Atheists,  his 
equal  in  metaphysical  and  logical  powers,  and 
general  grasp  of  his  subject,  has  not  since  arisen. 
Yet  even  the  celebrated  "  Antitheos "  (for  it  is  of 
him  I  speak)  was  obliged  to  lower  his  ensign,  by 
virtually  acknowledging  overwhelming  defeat  at 
his  own  weapons.  After  him,  a  shoal  of  small  fry 
sailed,  in  pursuit,  in  the  wake  of  the  offensive 

a  Debate,  referred  to  below. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.  287 

conqueror  :  but  (as  was  to  be  expected)  the  puny 
efforts  availed  but  little,  save  only  to  keep  up,  and 
support  at  a  certain  elevation,  the  interest  by  that 
time  created  in  the  discussion. 

For  a  dozen,  or  for  perhaps  a  score,  of  years 
after  Antitheos's  day,  the  Atheists  of  the  East,  no 
less  than  of  the  West,  and  of  the  South  as  well  as 
the  North,  tried  to  find  a  weak  spot  in  the  coat-of- 
inail  endued  by  the  author  of  the  "Argument": 
but  an  unprotected  joint  in  the  armour  became 
obvious  to  the  eye  of  no  atheist,  how  keenly  soever 
he  might  peer.  All  the  scrutiny  was  in  vain.  The 
reader  will  understand  that  it  is  of  the  "  Argu 
ment,"  as  it  originally  stood  (or  Divisions  I.  and 
II.,)  that  these  assertions  are  made.  But  the 
original  portion  is  the  essential. 

With  regard  to  the  succeeding  portion,  being 
that  corresponding  with  the  2nd  Sub-Division  of 
Division  III.  (comprised  in  the  publication  of 
18C5;)  it  has  been  pronounced,  by  a  not  incom 
petent  student,  to  constitute  "  a  course  of  severe 
reasoning,  as  strict,  indeed,  as  that  of  Euclid." 
("Laws  of  Thought,"  1868.) 

In  fine,  it  may  safely  be  prophesied,  that,  as  the 
Atheists  have  not  hitherto  been  able  to  agree  as  to 
any  one  vulnerable  point  in  the  whole  demonstra 
tion  ;  so,  they  will  never  be  able  to  lay  their 
fingers  on  a  single  place  where  is  any  radical 
fallacy.  The  atheist  being  yet  to  be  born,  will 


288  APPENDIX. 

therefore  never  be  born,  who  will  succeed  in 
discovering  the  defenceless  and  indefensible  spot. 

Should  it  be  objected,  that  the  atheists,  until 
comparatively  lately,  have  had  to  do  only  with  the 
early  part  of  the  entire  ratiocination ;  the  reply 
to  be  made  lies  ready  at  hand :  the  portion  in 
question  is  indubitably  the  back-bone  of  the 
structure,  the  rest  being  merely  educed  elonga 
tions  of  the  skeleton,  or  pure  additions  to  the 
great  axis  of  the  vertebral  column.  Or  if  we 

o 

sought  to  be  more  accurate  in  the  conduct  of  the 

o 

comparison, — the  first  might  be  represented  by 
the  fixed  skeleton  generally ;  the  other  portion 
being  likened  unto  the  flesh  and  blood,  and  all 
the  outward  adornments  of  the  structure,  as  a 
living  organism,  in  all  the  glow  of  high  health  and 
beauty. 

Finally,  in  relation  to  this  topic  :  If,  at  this  time 
of  day,  atheistical  opponents  are  less  able  (if  diminu 
tion  in  ability  be  possible)  to  refute  the  reasonings 
of  the  "Argument"  than  they  were  at  the  first; 
how  impossible,  how  more  than  hopeless,  now, 
would  be  the  adventure  to  overturn  the  founda 
tions,  or  any  of  the  essentials,  of  this  demonstrative 
construction  !  The  unabashed  present  Coryphaeus 
of  British  Atheists  has  made  it  to  be  publicly 
known  and  most  palpable,  that  he  is  even  more 
unable  than  was  his  predecessor,  the  Champion  of 
the  Scottish  Atheists,  to  accomplish  the  feat  of 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.           289 

overturning  the  reasonings  of  that  demons! ration 
which  bars,  and  completely  obstructs,  the  Athe 
istical  highway.* 

If  the  "Argument"  has,  in  the  Atheists,  met 
with  foes  from  the  beginning, — the  tables  are  turned 
when  the  "Argument"  is  brought  to  bear  directly 
against  the  very  head-quarters  whence  the  chief 
enemies  must  proceed.  All  this  is  but  natural,  and 
what  might  well  have  been  anticipated.  A  just 
reckoning  is  sure  to  dog  the  steps  of  the  enemies 
of  truth  sooner  or  later.  In  a  word,  this  Fifth 
Edition  is  specially  intended  for  Atheists,  that  is, 
for  use  against  Atheists.  But  this  requires  a  more 
particular  explanation. 

There  are  contained  herein  passages  which  mio-ht 
not  have  been  introduced  at  all,  but  for  the  edition 
having  a  direct  and  express  relation  to  the  case  of 
Atheists.  For  example,  we  may  take  the  contents 
of  the  Postulata,  and  a  not  unrelated  Scholium, 
under  the  Sub-Proposition  attached  to  Proposition 
iv.,  Part  i.,  Division  I.  ;  or  we  might  instance  in 
the  Scholium  attached  to  Proposition  L,  Part  iii., 
of  the  same  Division, — places  introduced  to  meet 
the  methods  adopted  by  certain  ardent,  yet  hard- 
pushed  members  of  the  existing  atheistical  host. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  places  where 
additional  matter  might  have  been  supplied,  but 
for  its  utter  unfitness  for  use  against  aught  so  crass 

a  See  second  note  below. 
19 


290  APPENDIX. 

and  coarse  as  the  current  Atheism  :  of  which  the 
non-use  of  the  doctrine  of  Spirituality,  introduced 
in  the  Sub-Scholium  under  the  same  Fourth  Pro 
position,  may  be  given  as  a  striking  illustration. 
That  doctrine,  confined  as  it  may  be  said  to  be 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  1st  Division,  might 
have  been  used  on  a  much  more  extensive  scale 
than  has  been  actually  adopted. 

But  farther.  Whereas  Dr  Samuel  Clarke  wrote 
his  justly  celebrated  Demonstration  "more  par 
ticularly  in  answer  to  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  and  their 
followers  "-  —with  a  view,  in  other  words,  to  special 
schools  of  Atheists,  or  the  special  phases  of  Atheism 
at  that  era  most  prevalent ;  the  present  production 
has  reference,  almost  equal  reference,  to  the  case  of 
Atheists  of  another  description.  In  truth,  while 
this  production  does  most  emphatically  keep  sight 
of  the  present  phases  under  which  Atheism  chooses 
to  present  itself,  it  is  yet  adapted  and  addressed  to 
the  case  of  every  species  of  possible  Atheism.  This 
demonstration  is,  no  doubt,  peculiarly  applicable  to 
the  method  of  arguing  followed  by  the  existing  race 
of  Atheists.  There  is,  of  course,  a  common,  or,  at 
any  rate,  a  generally  adopted  road,  in  which  the 
bulk  of  the  Atheists  of  our  day  are  to  be  found — 
and  this  demonstration  follows  them  into  their  fre 
quented  high-way.  Every  instructed  man  knows, 
that  our  present  Atheists  are  pure — or,  rather, 
extremely  gross — Materialists,  as  they  deny  the 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.  291 

existence  of  any  extension  whatever  separate  from 
Matter  :  they,  however,  add  to  their  pure  Material 
ism  a  sort  of  Hylozoism,  or  doctrine  of  life  apper 
taining  to  matter  as  matter.  They  hold  (somewhat 
after  the  fashion  of  those  ancients  who  belonged  to 
the  school  of  Strato  of  Lampsacus),  the  doctrine  of 
the  essential  life  of  all  Matter :  Matter  is  the 
gcnetrix  and  matrix  of  all  particular  or  individual 
things,  whether  substances  or  events. 

But  our  demonstration  is  also,  and  equally, 
applicable  to  the  method  of  Atheists  belonging  to, 
and  claimable  by  other  schools.  It  is  thoroughly 
applicable,  for  example,  to  the  Atheism  which 
(with  the  doctrine  of  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  as 
expounded  by  Lucretius),  admits  of  vacuum,  or 
pure  space,  as  a  distinct  ab-original  principle  in 
addition  to  matter,  that  is,  its  fundamental  atoms, 
or  primordial  corpuscles. 

Notice  must  be  taken  of  a  certain  great  difference 
which  obtains  between  the  early  and  the  recent 
portions  of  the  demonstration.  In  the  original, 
and,  in  fact,  in  the  early  editions,  the  Scholia  in 
Divisions  I.  and  II.  were  brief:  while  the  Scholia 
of  the  latter  Divisions  (we  can  hardly  say,  of  the 
later  editions)  are  frequently  long,  some  being 
very  much  so.  The  Scholia,  indeed,  in  Divisions 
III.  and  IV.  are  long,  in  relation  to  the  attached 
Demonstrations,  as  well  as  compared  with  the 


292  APPENDIX. 

earlier  Scholia.  One  reason  is  easily  given  :  The 
earlier  Scholia  concern  the  Being  whose  Existence 
is  in  course  of  being  proved ;  while  the  later 
Scholia  have  much  to  do  with  Man  and  his  con 
cerns.  In  the  former  case,  the  simplicity  of  the 
Great  Being  treated  of  seems  to  transfer  itself  into 
the  argumentation  about  Him  :  In  the  latter  case, 
which  is  man's,  the  reflection  of  the  entanglements 
and  the  disorderliness  of  his  affairs  seems  to  be 
diffused  and  transfused  through  all  the  reasonings. 
The  truth  about  the  Being  of  beings,  as  He  is  in 
Himself,  is  simple,  and  capable  of  being  clearly 
stated  in  few  words.  But  with  Man's  entrance  on 
the  stage,  a  complicated  and  confused  state  of 
affairs  is  superinduced,  and,  by  comparison,  a 
deluge  of  words  (which  you  may  perhaps  accept 
as  a  modest  redundancy  of  language)  becomes 
necessary,  and  requires  to  be  excused.  Sometimes 
words  pour  down  upon  the  reader  avalanche-like : 
nor  can  the  torrent  be  avoided.  The  difference, 
in  fine,  is  inevitable,  since  it  arises  from  the  nature 
of  the  case. 

We  may  adopt  another  method  of  bringing  out 
the  same  result,  wherein  the  points  of  contact  with 
the  preceding  exhibition  will  be  sufficiently 
obvious.  In  Divisions  I.  and  II. ,  the  great 
substratal  Substance  is  viewed — or  His  Modes  are 
viewed — as  Absolute,  as  well  as  Simple.  But  in 
the  subsequent  portion  of  the  piece,  the  Attributes, 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.           293 

become  Moral,  are  at  length  directly  Relative,  and 
they  come  to  be,  at  last,  Complex  or  Compound. 
Now,  'tis  plain,  that  the  elucidation  of  the  subject 
of  Relative  and  Complex  Attributes,  can  by  no 
means  be  trajected  in  so  unelaborate  a  way  as  that 
sufficient  for  the  handling  of  the  Simple  and 
Absolute  Modes.  The  very  circumstance  of  the 
relativity  necessitates  and  enforces  a  more  involved, 
intricate,  and  perplexed  method  of  treatment. 

Another  matter,  connected  with  the  same  topic, 
is  worthy  of  even  more  consideration.  In  this 
Argument,  the  demonstrations  themselves  are  the 
weighty  things :  all  else  is,  comparatively  speak 
ing,  quite  subordinate  and  unimportant.  If  the 
Demonstrations  fail — if,  in  truth,  any  one  of  the 
main  Demonstrations  be  not  infallible,  all  goes  for 
nothing.  If  they  are  all  infallible,  all  is  right. 
An  ordinary  Scholium  is  but  an  application — some 
inference  or  other  drawn  from  the  proof  itself:  and 
an  error  in  the  application  of  a  demonstration 
would  by  no  means  invalidate  the  piece,  in  the 
way  in  which  a  radical  flaw  in  the  demonstrative 
part  itself  would  do. 

Pertinent  instances  might  be  easily  produced  to 
illustrate  the  position  regarding  the  relative 
importance  of  a  demonstration  and  a  scholium, 
when  compared  with  each  other,  whereby  it  would 
be  very  visible  that  the  whole  might  remain  intact 
and  perfect  although  the  application  in  the 


294  APPENDIX. 

Scholium  were  allowed  to  be  renounced  as  invalid, 
—while,  at  the  same  time,  to  make  an  acknow 
ledgment  of  the  illegitimacy  of  the  proof  in  the 
Demonstration  would  have  the  effect  of  bringing 
down  the  entire  edifice.  The  demonstration,  as  a 
whole,  would  fail  at  that  point.  Though  all  going 
before  had  been  logically  proved,  and  consequently 
were  quite  valid,  yet  at  that  precise  point  the 
demonstration,  alas  !  would  give  way,  and  break 
down.  On  the  other  hand,  again,  if  the  proof  at 
the  place  indicated  be  unassailable,  or  at  any  rate 
indestructible,  no  mighty  harm  would  ensue 
although  a  succeeding  scholium  should  contain  an 
inaccuracy.  But  the  reader  can  without  difficulty 
look  up  examples  for  himself ;  and  it  may  be  taken 
for  granted,  that  no  one  can  fail  to  see  the  superior 
weight  attributable  to  the  Demonstrations  over 

O 

their  attached  Scholia.  A  demonstration  must  be 
irrefragable  :  a  scholium,  however,  may  be  faulty  in 
deducing  a  certain  inference,  without  at  all  damag 
ing  the  connected  proof  containing  the  imagined 
inference  sought  to  be  drawn  and  applied. 

'Tis  quite  true,  that  all  such  special  questions 
as  are  treated  of  in  the  long  Scholia  might  have  been 
left  out  of  our  consideration  altogether.  A  demon 
stration,  a  full  and  perfect  demonstration,  of  a 
God,  would  remain,  in  the  absence  of  all  such  dis 
cussions.  To  be  particular  :  'Twere  quite  possible 
to  complete  the  construction  of  an  a  priori 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.  295 

argument  containing  a  reference  to  the  Moral 
Attributes,  even  the  whole  of  the  Moral  Attributes, 
without  entering  upon  any  discussion  of  the 
Rewards  and  the  Punishments  of  the  Future 
(the  subject  of  our  Scholium  in.  Prop,  iii.,  as  well 
as  Scholium  in.,  Proposition  iv.,  both  in  Division 
III.)  But  to  give  the  complete  go-by  to  that 
topic,  or  any  such  topic,  were  to  omit  the 
topic  of  perhaps  the  greatest  human  interest  of 
nil  in  this  whole  inquiry.  To  say  nothing  of 
never-ending  blessedness, — what  subject  can  vie, 
in  true  importance,  and  absorbing  interest  to 
man,  with  the  subject  of  the  possible  eternity 
of  mortal  anguish  in  insupportable  torments  ? 
And,  in  point  of  fact,  what  theological  inquiry 
is  at  present  so  all-engrossing  ?  This  topic 
has  attached  to  it,  in  sooth,  the  very  greatest 
human  interest  of  all  in  this  whole  enquiry. 
Not,  indeed,  the  inquiry  concerning  the  Being  and 
the  Attributes,  but  that  more  limited  one  which 
concerns  the  Moral  region  of  the  Attributes.  No\v? 
an  a  priori  argument  which  omitted  topics  of  the 
deepest  interest  would  be  of  too  dry  a  character 
to  invite  the  attention  of  the  most  of  mankind. 
There  might  be  all  the  essential  fixities  of  the 
structure  :  each  individual  permanent  of  a  perfect 
skeleton  might  be  present :  But,  after  all,  the  bones 
would  be  dry  bones.  "  Rather  the  skeleton  of  an 
argument,"  to  use  the  words  of  a  certain  Professor 


296  APPENDIX. 

of  Moral  Philosophy,  "  than  anything  entitled  to 
be    considered    as    a   full    and    finished    perform- 

"a 

ance.  a 

The  following  passages  are  taken  from  the 
"  Advertisement "  prefixed  to  the  publication  of 
1865,  and  from  the  "Preface  to  Division  IV.;" 
with  but  few,  and  unimportant  variations.  There 
will  be  perceived,  ho\vever,  several  places  which 
touch  on  ground  traversed  already.  But  the 
repetition  will  not  be  found  to  be  to  any  consider 
able  extent. 

An  attempt  to  demonstrate,  in  the  strictest  way, 
the  Moral  Attributes  of  God — unlike  attempts  to 
demonstrate  generally  the  Being  and  the  Attributes 
—had  never  been  made  before,  or,  if  made,  had 
certainly  failed,  since,  of  a  surety,  no  a  priori 
proof  of  those  attributes  is  familiar  to  the  world. 
The  attempt  was,  therefore,  a  most  difficult  one. 

It  is  true,  that  Dr  Samuel  Clarke,  in  the  12th 
and  last  of  the  Propositions  of  his  celebrated 
"Demonstration,"  endeavours  to  reach  the  Moral 
Attributes  :  but  the  great  Rector  of  St.  James's 
deals  with  the  "  Infinite  Goodness,  Justice,  and 
Truth,  and  all  other  Moral  Perfections,"  in  that 

a  The  words  quoted  in  the  text,  are  from  the  Review  of  the 
original  "Argument,  a  priori,"  by  the  late  Professor  Patrick  C. 
Macdougall,  of  the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of 
Edinburgh.  The  Review  was  published  in  the  Professor's 
permanent  volume  of  his  "  Papers  on  Literary  and  Philosophical 
Subjects,"  1852. 


PREFACE  TO  THE   FIFTH  EDITION.          297 

one  Proposition,  and,  in  a  great  measure,  in 
cumulo.  The  author  of  the  Demonstration  does 
not  treat  these  Moral  Attributes  as  I  have  done, 
namely,  by  making  each  of  them,  one  by  one,  in  a 
proper  order,  the  subject  of  a  distinct  cl  priori 
proof,  in  a  Proposition  devoted  to  itself.  What 
that  famous  author  did  was,  therefore,  quite 
different  from  that  which  I  have  now  attempted. 
My  attempt  was  of  a  vastly  more  difficult  nature. 

Besides,  Dr.  Clarke  never  once  essays  to  intro 
duce  such  an  attribute  as  Lore.  An  attribute 
Scripturally  revealed,  and  thought  to  be  so 
peculiarly  the  deliverance  of  Revelation  that  no 
endeavour  had  been  made  to  attach  it  to  Natural 
Religion  by  any  of  its  modes  of  proof. 

In  fact,  with  reference  to,  not  only  Love,  but 
Moral  Purity,  a  main  ingredient  and  element  in 
Universal  Holiness, — not  one  of  these  Attributes 
was  ever  brought  into  the  field  of  view  by  that 
great  author  in  his  famous  Demonstration. 


The  preceding  observations  are — for  the  most 
part — from  the  Advertisement  already  spoken  of. 
The  alterations  are  few, — but  it  must  be  confessed 
that  there  is  an  addition. 

The  following,  again,  is  from  the  Preface  to 
Division  IV.  The  reader  will  perceive,  no  doubt, 
that  there  is  some  iteration  to  be  encountered. 
But  it  is  hoped  that  the  offences  of  this  kind  will 


298  APPENDIX. 

be  of  a  nature  easily  pardonable,  and  really  deserv 
ing  to  be  condoned. 


As  is  patent,  this  piece  is  but  a  continuation  of  a 
previous  work ;  in  truth,  of  previous  works.  Tis 
also  not  unentitled  to  be  regarded  in  the  light  of 
last  ivords,  since,  with  the  demonstration  of  the 
cumulative  attribute  of  Holiness,  a  veritable 
culminating  point  is  attained. 

The  production  of  which  a  portion  is  now  pre 
sented  to  the  reader,  is  not  the  first  attempt  at 
a  priori  argumentation  on  the  peculiar  subject, 
which  the  world  has  seen.  By  no  means  :  there 
have  been  many  endeavours  of  the  kind.  But  one 
thing  may  be  boasted  of  by  the  present  author,  and 
'tis  this,  that,  while  Dr  Samuel  Clarke  (who 
possibly  was  not  singular)  aimed  at  demonstrating 
the  Moral  Attributes,  in,  however,  a  certain  brief 
and  agglomerating  manner ;  among  those  he 
specified,  even  in  his  cursory  way,  were  no  such 
Attributes  as  "Love,"  and  "Moral  Purity,"  and 
"  Holiness."  This  production,  therefore,  is  peculiar, 
inasmuch  as  it  has  distinct  demonstrations  for 
Moral  Attributes  which  no  previous  author  ever 
thought,  or  even  dreamed,  of  proving  in  a 
demonstrative  manner :  while,  with  regard  to  other 
Attributes,  there  are  here  full  and  separate  proofs, 
where  before  there  were  only  brief  allusions,  in  the 
course  of  a  general  proof,  by  no  means  lengthy  as 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.          299 

;i  whole.     In  short,  in  this  our  work  are  to  be  met 
with  tilings  unattempted  yet  in  prose. 

This  may  not  be  the  very  best  place  to  magnify 
the  importance  of  a  work  of  this  kind,  on  supposi 
tion  (as  generally  conceded,  or  contended  for,  by 
the  professional  theologians)  that  the  attempt  at 
irrefragable  proof  has  been  successful.  Still,  it 
may,  not  inappositely,  be  noticed,  that  our  age  is 
unquestionably  infidel,  and  even  atheistical,  in 
tendency.  The  highest  philosophy,  and  the 
exactest  science,  alike,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on 
the  other,  the  lowest  literature,  and  the  loosest 
pseudo  science, — are  equally  set  against  any  true 
recognition  of  a  Righteous  Moral  Governor  of  the 
world,  the  Supreme  Source  of  all  human  lights, 
and  the  Final  Cause  to  which  all  mundane  things 
must  infallibly  tend,  whether  men  like  or  no. 
Again,  the  whole  of  Religion,  speculative  and 
practical,  rests  on  the  one  foundation  of  Theism ; 
and  the  sole  root-doctrine  of  Theism  is,  There  is  a 
God.  If  this  doctrine  be  satisfactorily  established, 
and  be  firmly  settled  in  men's  minds,  the  solid  basis 
of  Religion  is  laid,  and  the  superstructure  may  be 
advanced  to  completion.  But  if  the  doctrine  be 
insecurely  made  out,  or  be  generally  deemed  to  be 
so,  the  interests  of  Religion  at  large  cannot  be  on  a 
safe  and  proper  footing,  and  the  ranks  of  Infidelity 
may  be  expected  to  increase  still  more  rapidly,  in 
accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  times.  The  days  on 


300  APPENDIX. 

which  we  are  fallen  are  unquestionably  evil,  and 
evil  they  will  continue  to  be,  and  they  will  be 
increasingly  evil,  unless  men  can  point  to  some 
proof  which  believers  shall  hail  as  a  true  demon 
stration  of  the  truth  of  their  faith ;  while  the 
unbelievers  seek  in  vain  to  demolish  the  edifice 
which,  rising  step  by  step,  all  rests  upon  a  founda 
tion  which  cannot  be  shaken — far  less,  removed,  or 
to  the  slightest  extent  displaced. 

These  remarks  apply,  or  their  spirit  applies,  with 
double  force  to  a  strictly  logical  proof  of  the  Moral 
Attributes.  A  Supreme  Being  such  as  is  imagined 
by  some  Deists,  is  one  thing  :  A  Supreme  Judge 
who,  executing  righteous  judgment,  will  assuredly 
reward  the  good,  and  punish  the  evil,  exactly 
according  to  merits  and  demerits  ;  this  is  quite  a 
different  existence,  and  one  which  the  immoral  man 
cannot  but  be  most  averse  to  in  his  inmost  heart. 

Neither  is  this  the  very  best  place  to  magnify 
our  demonstration  as  a  relative  thing :  If  our 
method  be  good  in  itself,  'tis  perfectly  obvious  that 
it  is  vastly  superior  to  the  rival  method.  To 
magnify  the  virtues  of  a  strict  deductive  proof,  by 
vindicating  its  vast  superiority  over  the  claims  of 
the  other  plan,  even  allowing  this  latter  to  be  all 
that  its  patrons  can  legitimately  claim  it  to  be ;  is 
not  the  proper  business  on  this  occasion.  Nor  are 
we  in  search  of  a  contrivance  by  which,  if  we  do 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.          301 

not  perceive  a  lawful  road,  we  can  at  least  make  a 
cimning  though  arduous  cutting  through  the 

unsuitable  and,  indeed,  intractable  middle  region. 

o 

No :  the  superiority  of  the  one  method  to  the 
other,  is  no  such  occult  matter,  nor  so  difficult  to 
understand,  that  we  need  to  force  the  topic 
unseasonably  on  attention.  Suffice  it  to  say  at 
this  present,  that  there  is  evidently  a  fast-growing 
disposition  on  the  part  of  theologians  to  desert  the 
mere  a  posteriori  way,  and  come  over  to  the 
dialectical  domain  where  the  a  priori  method  is 
regnant.  None  know  so  well  how  unfit  the 
a  posteriori  argument  is  for  the  exigencies  of  these 
days  in  which  we  live,  as  do  those  who  have  tried 
to  use  the  method  in  encounters  with  skilled 
atheists.  The  atheists,  indeed,  contemn  the  method 
now  in  view,  to  the  very  point  of  holding  it  in 
contempt,  as  a  weapon  calculated  to  affect  their 
position  :  and,  of  a  truth,  the  argument  derived 
from  the  beautiful  and  majestic  works  of  Nature 
draws  none  of  its  glory  from  its  adaptation  to  the 
case  of  atheists.  On  the  other  hand,  according  to 
the  admissions  of  the  atheists  themselves,  they 
have  not,  up  to  the  present  moment,  been  able  to 
bring  forward  a  single  good  argument  in  opposition 
to  "The  Argument,  a  priori:"  that  is,  there  is  no 
common  consent,  nor  any  approach  to  a  common 
consent,  among  our  atheists  as  to  any  one  good 
objection  valid  against  the  demonstration  in  ques- 


302  APPENDIX. 

tion.  So  far  from  any  valid  objection,  of  universal 
acceptation,  having  been  worked  out,  there  is  the 
strongest  evidence  that  no  one  objection  is  recog 
nised — save  by  its  own  creator,  and  elaborator, 
and  advocate.  Having  endeavoured,  for  more 
than  a  score  of  years,  to  adduce  undoubtedly 
valid  objections  against  that  demonstration,  the 
atheists  have,  in  their  latest  efforts,  gone  to 
lop-o-erheads  with  each  other  about  which  of 

oO 

them  has  failed  most  egregiously.  Who  has 
done  most  harm  to  the  common  atheistic  cause 
by  the  ill-directed  blows  against  the  impreg 
nable  rock-built  citadel  ? — this  is  the  bitter  com 
plain  t.a 

One  thing  may  be  apt  to  strike  the  student  of 
the  present  performance ;  and,  in  sooth,  it  has 
forcibly  struck  its  author.  The  conclusions  arrived 
at  by  virtue  of  the  most  rigid  and  rigorous  reason 
ings,  are  in  wonderfully  exact  accordance  with  the 
intuitional  discoveries  of  the  Prophets  of  the  East, 
made  thousands  of  years  ago.  The  seers  of  the 
segregate  Hebrew  people  uttered  truths  appertaining 
to  the  higher  planes  of  the  Moral,  where  the  Moral 
and  the  Religious  are  blended  together  in  one,  such 
as  no  Gentile  philosopher,  not  even  a  Plato,  nor  an 
Aristotle,  nor  a  Zeno,  ever  found  out,  or  even  so 
much  as  approached.  Whether  those  surpassing 

a  See  the  "Debate"  between  Iconoclast  and  W.  H.  G.,  (1869),  and, 
specially,  the  Address  prefixed  to  Division  II.  thereof. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION.          303 

ethical  and  theistical  discoveries  were  made  by 
reason  of  a  supernatural  elevation  of  the  spirit  into 
a  sphere  transcending  the  ordinary  human  sphere, 
or  by  reason  of  more  purely  human  intuitions,  in 
open  vision  :  this  is  not  a  point  for  us,  and  for  this 
place.  Those  intuitions  were  of  the  grandest 
nature,  however  they  were  come  by.  But  our  point 
is  this,  that,  derive  the  discoveries  of  the  Israelitish 
and  Jewish  Seers  from  what  source  you  choose  to 
fix  on,  the  discovered  truths  are  mighty  facts,  and 
are  in  astonishingly  close  conformity  with  the 
conclusions  reached  by  our  perfectly  independent 
a  jiriori  reasonings.  The  truths  promulgated  by 
the  "  prophets  old  "  of  that  Shemitic  people,  and 
the  truths  attained  by  so  much  labour  of  brain,  and 
cast  abroad  in  the  present  hour,  ARE  ONE.  Japliel 
can  do  no  better  yet  than  dwell  in  the  abodes  of 
Sham :  and  well  will  it  be,  if  there  be  full  content 
ment  with  an  ordinance  which  there  is  no  passing 
beyond. 

Finally,  in  an  advertisement  prefixed  to  the 
Fourth,  or  Russet,  Edition  of  "  The  Necessary 
Existence  of  God,"  (1863),  it  was  said  :— "  I  wish 
"  I  could  mention,  here,  (or  any  where,)  that  I  am 
"  quite  ready  to  publish  the  full  results  of  my  much 
"pondering  on  the  proper  ultimate  form  for  the 
"  strict  a  priori  determination  of  the  great  Moral 
''Attributes  of  JUSTICE,  or  RIGHTEOUSNESS,  and  of 


304  APPENDIX. 

"  HOLINESS.  "a  The  strong  desire,  imparted  to  the 
public  in  that  expressed  wish,  synchronising  with  a 
wail  of  the  heart,  (for  there  was^  undoubtedly  such,) 
has,  at  length,  been  accomplished.  The  great 
Moral  Attribute  of  Justice  was  demonstrated,  and 
the  demonstration  was  published,  several  years 
ago ;  and  now  the  great,  and,  if  possible,  greater 
Attribute  of  Holiness  is  demonstrated  too.  After 
the  aspirations,  and  heart-yearnings,  of  so  many 
weary  waiting  years,  the  years  have  fulfilled  their 
course :  the  star  of  hope  has  risen  above  the 
horizon,  and,  after  a  happy  ascension,  it  is  to  be 
beheld  now  in  the  zenith.  There  is  no  question  of 
any  arguing  with  any  atheist  here,  and  most 
unfeiguedly  do  I  say, 

Too  Qeci)  <Jo£ct. 

W.  H.  G. 
EDINBURGH, 

September,  1870. 

a  The  wish  of  the  text  had  been  transferred  from  the  Torbanehill 
edition,  where,  however,  the  aspiration  might  have  had  no  very 
articulate  expression.  Sub-Auditur,  it  was  heard  as  an  indispensable 
ground-tone.  By  no  means  the  first  time  wishes  and  expressions  to 
the  same  effect  had  found  vent. 


LORIMER   AND  CHALMERS,    PRINTERS,    EDINBURGH.